LODI: COMMUNICATIONS WITH LIMITED PHONE SERVICE
JOSEPH M. HARTMAN
The Lodi Police Department operates on the assigned frequency of 154.740 MHz. The base unit is a Motorola 100-watt unit with a telephone tie line to an antenna mounted on a 150-foot water tower in the highest part of town. This unit is supplemented by a second 100-watt Motorola unit with an antenna on a 35-foot tower located directly behind the municipal complex.
The Lodi Fire Department operates on the assigned frequency of 33.86 MHz with a 100-watt Motorola unit as the base. The antenna arrangement is the same as for the police department–one antenna on the water tower and a second backup base unit in the municipal building with the antenna on the 35-foot tower.
The Lodi Ambulance Corps, located on the other side of town, has all of its radio equipment at headquarters. This radio is connected to the dispatch center by telephone tie lines and can be operated by Ambulance Corps personnel or from the communications center at the municipal complex.
In addition, the Lodi Department of Public Works also has a 100-watt Motorola base station and operates on the assigned frequency of 37.10 MHz.
All dispatching and communications are handled by the Lodi Communications Division of the Police Department, commonly referred to as the 911 Center. This PSAP center takes all 911 calls for the borough of Lodi as well as for five surrounding communities. Three civilian dispatchers and one police department supervisor staff the communications center at all times. These personnel dispatch all emergency calls for Lodi. Calls for the other communities are forwarded to the appropriate police department and handled by personnel in that community.
Communications throughout the borough are also supplemented by Nextell cellular telephones with direct connect capabilities issued to all department heads, the police chief, the fire chief, three assistant fire chiefs, the emergency management coordinator, and me.
PREPARATION
During the days leading up to September 16, all involved personnel were monitoring the weather forecasts closely as Hurricane Floyd marched up the East Coast on its way to New Jersey. On the evening of Wednesday, September 15, 1999, Emergency Management Coordinator Sam J. Garofalo and I began preparations to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). We contacted the Bergen County Emergency Operations Center to coordinate our efforts with Bergen County Emergency Management and the New Jersey State Police EOC.
During the morning hours of Thursday, September 16, the first rains of Hurricane Floyd began to fall heavily, and the roads and streets began to flood even before the Saddle River started to rise. During these early hours, all department heads were called to the EOC, and plans were devised to warn the residents of low-lying areas to be ready to evacuate to higher areas. The police and fire departments implemented this plan.
During this part of the operation, traffic on both radio frequencies became very heavy. We broadcast a request that all transmissions be limited to priority traffic only.
Police and fire frequencies are shared with neighboring towns, which can be problematic during a widespread emergency. To get relief from the overcrowding, Sergeant Edward Reuiter of the Lodi Police Department contacted our radio service company and rented 30 Motorola portable handheld radios tuned to a private frequency. These units were issued to key personnel and relieved the pressure on the primary channels.
As Thursday wore on, the rains became heavier, and the water level continued to rise. The decision to start voluntary evacuations was made at noon. The fire department was assigned to effect the evacuations. Shelters were opened at three school buildings. The Red Cross and Salvation Army were called to help at the shelters.
Residents living in the low areas were reluctant to leave their apartments and homes and resisted the voluntary evacuation efforts. At 2 p.m., evacuation became mandatory. Even then, many people refused to leave their homes, resulting in increased radio traffic, as units called for instructions. Residents who at first had refused to evacuate called later in the day–when they realized the flood was much worse than expected– asking to be taken to safety. This necessitated many additional return trips for emergency personnel and increased radio traffic.
During this time, the Communications Center was receiving a large volume of 911 calls from people in all the communities it serves, necessitating that Lodi fire and ambulance personnel be stationed at the center to handle the Lodi dispatching so that the regular dispatchers could take incoming calls and route them to the appropriate police departments.
During this time of heavy rain and increased telephone and radio communications, the regional AT&T switching center in Rochelle Park was beginning to take on water in the basement housing its equipment. The water level got high enough to disrupt the center and, consequently, normal land line and cell phone service for the entire northern New Jersey area. The public could not reach the Communications Center to call for help. The only telephone service still available was that within certain exchanges–for example, if the first three digits of the telephone number were 778, a call could be made to some 778 numbers, and so on. In the absence of telephone service, police and fire units were assigned to patrol specific areas so civilians in need of assistance could flag down a unit. In that case, police or fire personnel would contact the dispatch center by radio, and the appropriate action would be taken.
As the rain continued, the Saddle River, which splits Lodi in half, rose over its banks and cut the town in half. When it became obvious that we needed help in evacuating the remaining citizens still in their homes, Garofalo contacted the Bergen County EOC through the State Police Emergency Network (SPEN)–since the telephones were out of service–and requested help from the National Guard.
The overflowing river also put three feet of water in the Lodi Fire Department headquarters, which were temporarily set up in the department`s Rescue 611 Truck, which was positioned on higher ground down the street. The rescue unit was also used as a field communications center.
While waiting for the National Guard units to arrive, the evacuations continued. We used every available piece of equipment able to travel through the flood waters: Department of Public Works dump trucks, pickup trucks, and vans. DPW personnel were assigned as guides to the drivers of two large Saddle River Tours buses. When the National Guard units arrived, they were also assigned guides from the DPW or fire department. Each bus and National Guard truck was given one of the 30 rented radios and could be dispatched to several locations without having to return to the EOC for orders.
During what seemed to be a really chaotic time, more than 600 civilians were evacuated to shelters, the fire department effected more than 20 rescues of people who drove their cars around barriers or tried to walk through the flood waters, not realizing how strong the current was. One man was swept away and was found the next day after the water receded.
Several police officers rescued stranded motorists. Two police officers operating a rowboat with a small outboard motor were bringing two women to safety when the motor on the boat cut out and the current forced the boat into a signpost. When the boat hit the post, the women panicked and caused the boat to capsize. One officer held his radio high over his head while holding on to the signpost and called for help. An immediate rescue effort was launched for the officers and women, who were in danger of being swept away by the current. Two civilians and emergency personnel placed a ladder to the roof at the rear of the nearest building, lifted the ladder onto the roof, and lowered it to the officers on the front side of the building.
During the emergency, the only communications to anyone outside of Lodi was through the SPEN radio system. Lodi`s radio network was put to the test and proved to be the salvation of many civilians as well as emergency personnel.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Our priority is to upgrade all of the community`s communications systems. The acquisition of the 30 portable radios took a great deal of strain off our regular communications system. We were also able to use the Nextel Direct connect feature to speak with each other, even though we could not make any calls to the area affected by the AT&T flood.
Representatives of various agencies and local, state, and federal officials have been addressing the AT&T facility flooding and the resulting communications consequences for the county and beyond.
The incident command system was used during this emergency and is an extremely valuable tool, but it requires practice to keep all of the involved personnel up-to-date and informed. Emergency management drills are very important and should be conducted on a regular basis.
All departments that depend on communications in any emergency should have a communications section or division with more than one person responsible for maintaining and upgrading all radio and telephone systems on a regular basis. It is very easy to take our communications for granted, and that can lead to trouble in a large-scale operation, including a hurricane or other natural disaster.
JOSEPH M. HARTMAN, a member of the Lodi (NJ) Fire Department since 1982, served as lieutenant, captain, assistant chief, and chief (1997-1998). He is now fire marshal and chief fire inspector, Subcode Official, Fire Protection; and Fire Protection Inspector HHS, Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator. He is the municipality`s agent for dealing with FEMA to coordinate flood recovery efforts for all municipal properties.
