BURIED ALIVE, Part 2: RESCUE AND LESSONS LEARNED

BURIED ALIVE, Part 2: RESCUE AND LESSONS LEARNED

LARRY COLLINS

Editor`s note: Part 1, “Size-Up and Initial Operations,” was published in the November 1999 issue. The author, a captain of LACFD USAR Company 1, was assigned as the entry team manager after USAR-1 was dispatched on a mutual-aid request from the Los Angeles Fire Department to the engulfment within tons of soil of Arturo Garcia, a contract worker at a public works project. Part 1 ended with the completion of preparations to insert the first primary rescuer into the collapse zone containing the victim.

Moments after our briefing with Pacoima Incident Commander Chief Daryl Arbuthnott and other Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) commanders, who concurred with the action plans and alternate actions, Captains Steve Vizcaino (LAFD USAR Task Force 88) and Steve Resnick (assigned as entry attendant) and I (assigned as entry team manager) quickly checked on the progress of the time-critical tasks we had assigned. We determined that things were sufficiently in order to insert the first primary rescuer into the collapse zone: Truck 39`s aerial ladder was in place and rigged with a single-line 3:1 mechanical advantage rope system, edge protection of the collapse area was in place, the walls of the collapse zone were being shored with plywood timbers and hydraulic “quick shores” to meet Cal/OSHA trench standards, the hand-held dirt vacuum and air knife from LAFD Heavy Rescue 56 were operational at the edge of the collapse zone, and identical equipment from Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) USAR-1 was in place as backup in case of equipment failure.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT ROLES

It was now about 15 to 20 minutes into the operation, and LAFD Assistant Chief Wilfred Bisson (who had taken over as the Pacoima incident commander) and Arbuthnott (now Pacoima Operations) had just concluded the Initial Action Plan (IAP) briefing. The LAFD command structure had grown to include operations, rescue group, medical group, logistics, an incident safety officer, a technical rescue safety officer, and the standard confined space entry positions.¹ The incident command system chart would soon be expanded to include civilian technical specialists: a soils engineer and several crane and super dirt vacuum operators.²

As entry team attendant, I was posted atop a horizontal steel I-beam next to the hanging trench plate, directly above Garcia, who remained buried 12 feet below. Although only the top of his hard hat and one hand clinging to a manila rope that had been tossed to him as he sank into the ground were visible, he was still alive and somehow talking through the wall of dirt with LAFD Captain Bill Stires and Firefighter Steve Berkery, who were positioned on a horizontal I-beam on the opposite side of the main trench plate.

Resnick was positioned across the pit, where he could observe the collapse zone from another angle. Our respective locations provided the requisite views of operations deep in the collapse zone, as well as enabled us to maintain voice communication with Garcia and line-of-sight communications with the rope teams who would be receiving hand signals from Resnick and me. Vizcaino circulated about the incident scene, supervising various critical support activities. Also roving about the scene was USAR Truck 88 Captain Rick Cotteral (assigned as the USAR safety officer), whose job it was to ensure that we were observing the necessary safety considerations, including personnel accountability, entry time, and duration for each primary rescuer sent into the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) zone.³

The next eight hours were devoted to coordinating strategy with the Pacoima incident command; choreographing the insertion and extraction of primary rescuers and their equipment⁴–all of which was suspended in midair by rope systems–with teams from Truck 39 (and later Truck 88, whose aerial ladder would also be needed) and dozens of other firefighters in support positions; constantly assessing the stability of the excavation walls; evaluating the effectiveness of the current strategy; making adjustments as necessary; and supporting a succession of primary rescuers as they struggled through the night to unbury Garcia. It was clear from the outset that this was going to take hours. The question was, Could Garcia survive that long?

LACFD USAR-1 Firefighter/Specialist Brian LeFave was in his harness and ready to be placed into the main collapse zone as the primary rescuer. His extensive experience operating the dirt vacuum and air knife and expertise in rope rescue and belowgrade shoring were critical to this stage of the operation. LAFD Firefighter David Nordquist was ready as the backup rescuer.

We had sufficient personnel to get LeFave in and out of the hole safely. LAFD personnel had laddered the main excavation pit; Haz Mat Squad 39 was monitoring the atmosphere; and firefighters from Heavy Rescue 56 were cutting two breach holes in the main trench plates, as outlined in Part 1. LAFD command had specified that all personnel working near the edge of the collapse be attached to belay lines to prevent accidental falls (and to assist in locating personnel who might become trapped should there be a major collapse of the side walls). This task, too, was being addressed.

INITIAL ENTRY

Resnick connected LeFave to the rope system and clipped two separate tag lines to his harness; the lines would allow two LAFD tag line teams (located on each end of the collapse zone) to control his lateral movement. I double-checked LeFave`s equipment, per standard protocol, and then used hand signals to direct Truck 39`s crew to start the raising operation to suspend LeFave over the collapse zone.

As entry team attendant, I served, per common protocol, as the control point for the raising/lowering operations. Resnick backed me up. Standard hand signals, augmented when necessary by radio communications on a separate LAFD tactical channel,⁵ were used for the rope rescue operations.

We had intended to lower LeFave suspended upright to begin to unbury Garcia. The priorities were to clear Garcia`s face and attach a pair of wrist rescue straps to his wrists (which, in turn, would be connected to our rope system) to prevent Garcia from slipping farther into the ground. LeFave suggested an alternate plan of being lowered upside down between the suspended (fourth) trench plate and the fixed (main) trench plate. He would be attached to the rope system by the connection on his full body harness designed for that purpose. It would be a tight squeeze; the plates were only about 18 inches apart. This strategy might allow him to operate with more protection from secondary collapse and also give him more direct access to Garcia.

We agreed to try the inverted position approach. USAR-1 personnel had used it successfully while extracting victims from tight subterranean spaces at least twice in recent years. Also, if LeFave were to slip between the plates, he might be better protected from the effects of a slough-in and would have better access to Garcia.

After reconnecting the rope to the “inversion” attachment point on the pelvic section of LeFave`s full body harness, Truck 39`s crew hauled him into the air. LeFave inverted himself, wrapping a leg around the rope for control, and was slowly lowered between the plates. It quickly became apparent that the 18-inch opening between the plates would not allow sufficient working space for a helmeted rescuer and that LeFave might become trapped if the plates should shift during a secondary collapse, the “suspended” plate move, or the ground be rocked by an earthquake.⁶ I signaled for Truck 39 to haul LeFave out. We resumed the original plan to put him in the collapse zone “right-side up.”

After LeFave was raised back to the surface and righted himself (he was still “on rope”), he was then lowered into the collapse zone and suspended in a position that would allow him to use the dirt vacuum. The dirt vacuum was lowered in, and LeFave began working to uncover Garcia while carefully avoiding contact with the unstable walls of the excavation.

WORKING IN THE COLLAPSE ZONE

The working conditions were restrictive because LeFave (and the primary rescuers who followed him) had to maintain a constant vigil to avoid kicking against the shoring or the side walls, which might lead to secondary collapse. As a result, each of the primary rescuers would be deprived of the leverage provided by standing on solid ground or bracing against a wall. In effect, the primary rescuers had to rely on the tag line teams to secure their suspended bodies in place while they directed the dirt vacuum against the soil and gingerly worked it around Garcia`s head and body.

The full body harnesses–though necessary–restricted the primary and backup rescuers. Depending on the point of connection selected by each rescuer (attachment from the shoulder clips or connection to the front of the pelvic harness by carabiner), their suspension placed pressure on specific parts of their bodies, increasing the potential for fatigue as the firefighters struggled to maneuver the dirt vacuum and the air knife and perform other tasks within the confines of the collapse zone.

LACFD RESCUE GROUP ESTABLISHED

As LeFave struggled to uncover Garcia, LACFD Battalion 60 Chief James Powers, Technical Operations Section, arrived. As the incident progressed, LAFD commanders established an LACFD Rescue Group. Powers (a highly experienced former LACFD USAR truck company captain, swiftwater rescue team member, and member of the LACFD FEMA USAR Task Force) was designated as technical group supervisor. He would essentially mirror the LAFD rescue group leader, Acting LAFD Battalion Chief John Lawrence (assisted by Vizcaino). Supporting Powers were Captains Mike Layhee, John Boyle, and Rory Rehbeck and Firefighter Specialist Ysidro Miranda, all of whom are normally assigned under Powers in the LACFD Technical Operations Section. During the ensuing seven hours, I was able to communicate “face-to-face” with Powers about certain command and strategic issues. He, in turn, was able to coordinate smoothly with LAFD`s overall incident command. At the same time, Resnick, Vizcaino, Cotterall, and I remained in face-to-face and radio communication as we supervised tactical operations in and around the collapse zone.

APPROACHING LIMITS

After approximately 35 minutes of work, during which he managed to uncover Garcia “down” to his forehead (despite several moderate slough-ins of dirt from the side walls), LeFave indicated that he was tiring and would need to be relieved soon. Resnick made preparations to “bump up” Backup Rescuer Nordquist to the primary rescuer position. LAFD Firefighter James Crites was designated as the new backup rescuer for rapid intervention duty.

On signal, LAFD personnel lifted the dirt vacuum from the hole, Truck 39`s crew raised LeFave back to the surface, and the tag line team maneuvered LeFave over to the primary rescuer staging area near the northwest aspect of the collapse zone. LeFave was unclipped from the rope system. The ropes were attached to Nordquist`s harness. LeFave briefed Nordquist on the progress in uncovering Garcia. Nordquist`s gear was double-checked once more before he was lowered in between the shoring; the dirt vacuum followed.

At this point, an additional, completely separate, rope system was established, using Truck 88, so that the second system could be used to raise and lower the primary rescuers with better control and the original system from Truck 39 could be used to attach to Garcia once we were able to “capture” him with wrist rescue straps (and later with a rescue strap). There were concerns about the forces being applied to Truck 39`s aerial ladder, which was positioned nearly parallel with the ground to maintain sufficient clearance below the overhead power lines that ran directly over the pit but which apparently could not be dropped or deenergized.<sup>7</sup> Using Truck 39`s aerial as the anchor and as the “high point” for the change of direction of additional rope systems would be inviting disaster by possibly exceeding its working strength.

A separate primary rescuer rope system was established using Truck 88 as the anchor. While Nordquist worked in the hole, Resnick and Cotterall coordinated the positioning of Truck 88`s heavy-duty aerial, which required some imaginative maneuvering in the tight confines of the construction site. The tips of both aerial ladders were “crossed” to allow vertical entry and egress at the point of entry. A 4:1 ladder rig system and backup lines were suspended below Truck 88`s ladder and designated for the next primary rescuer.

At this point, the industrial-size dirt vacuums that had been requested had not yet arrived. Based on the volume of dirt that needed to be removed from the collapse zone to free Garcia, this rescue would take at least twice as long without these vacuums.

SLOW PROGRESS

After approximately 30 minutes, Nordquist was rotated out for mandatory rehab. Despite several more slough-ins, he had managed to uncover Garcia to the bridge of his nose. This was excruciatingly slow progress. I kept looking down to see Garcia buried above his nose, wondering how long he could survive under these conditions. However, those of us who were in a position to view Garcia`s predicament understood that the restrictive conditions in the hole–and the continued collapse of dirt from the side walls–were going to make this an inch-by-inch operation. There would be no quick solution to this rescue short of pulling the main trench plates up with a crane, which could prove disastrous to Garcia.

Nordquist was raised from the hole on Truck 39`s rope system while Backup Rescuer Crites was being connected to Truck 88`s newly installed rope system so he could be rotated into the hole. Truck 39`s line was now kept ready for connecting Garcia by way of the wrist straps once they were applied. USAR Truck 88 Engineer Joseph St. George became the backup rescuer for Crites.

The tag lines (and direct force by hand) had to be used against the rescue line to maneuver each of the primary rescuers around and between the struts so they would not jar the struts and timbers loose as they descended into the hole. Once each primary rescuer was in position, the LAFD tag line teams maintained them in the chosen location.

Crites was now positioned in the hole and went to work uncovering Garcia. Throughout this entire rescue, Stires and Berkery continued to monitor and communicate with Garcia. They repeatedly reminded him to quit tugging on the manila rope that was still in his hands because the rope ran over the edge of the collapse and therefore was “shearing off” sections of dirt from the wall`s edge.

This was a difficult time for Garcia, who was clinging to the manila line in a losing struggle to remain at the surface. At any given time, he was in danger of sinking farther into the soil or being reburied by one of the repeated “secondary collapses.” Stires and Berkery did an excellent job of calming Garcia and keeping him focused. They also kept us informed of Garcia`s status. Garcia continued to move his hands and signal with his fingers–practically his only form of communication with the outside.

SAFETY CONCERNS AND ADJUSTMENTS

Personnel from LAFD Haz Mat Squad 39 continued to monitor the atmosphere within the pit for toxins and oxygen levels. Although the excavation was open to the air and there seemed to be little chance of a toxic atmosphere on first appraisal, continuous monitoring was necessary because toxins could migrate up from the disturbed soil (especially from any subterranean void spaces that might have collapsed at the outset of this incident) and diesel and other exhaust products could migrate from the apparatus and power equipment into the excavation area. No dangerous readings were recorded throughout the entire incident. However, based on the incident safety officer`s recommendations, the excavation and collapse zone were continuously ventilated by mechanical means.

Meanwhile, the shoring team, under the direction of Layhee and Vizcaino, continued to shore up the irregular side walls, a task that proved extremely problematic. When a sheet of plywood was lowered in against the north wall in an attempt to pressurize it with lateral struts braced to the south against the main trench plate, for example, the increasing strut pressure apparently caused an adjacent portion of the north wall to collapse, spilling yet another layer of dirt in over Garcia`s head. The shoring team worked under frustrating conditions: Shoring and pressurizing one area of the collapse zone sometimes caused walls in other parts of the pit to fail and “slough in.” From the beginning, there was limited room in which to place lateral struts while maintaining sufficient clearance to move the primary rescuers in and out of the pit. Moreover, the shoring options were becoming even more limited because the pit`s dimensions forced rescuers to dig a “V”-shaped hole with the dirt vacuum as they burrowed deeper into the ground to unbury Garcia.

The narrowing V-shape of the hole around Garcia (which eventually extended some 25 feet belowgrade) simply made it impossible to install the standard complement of shoring that would be called for in a pit of this depth. Widening the hole or otherwise increasing the space in which shoring could be placed was, of course, an option. But that would have defeated the purpose of the digging operation, which was simply to unbury Garcia down to his feet as soon as possible while moving the least amount of dirt. It was a Catch-22 situation for the shoring team.

Later, Garcia`s predicament would prove to be similarly frustrating to the medical team and other decision makers whose desire to provide definite medical intervention for crush syndrome and other maladies common to such entrapment incidents would be thwarted by the confined spaces of the V-shaped hole.

VICTIM PROTECTION CONCERNS

The option of placing a pipe or some other barrier protection over Garcia was discussed. At the request of Resnick and Powers, workers on the scene had already fabricated several pipes and even one large steel pan with a section cut out for facial access. However, there simply was not enough room in the pit beneath the “hanging” trench plate for such a measure. Besides, we were still struggling to remove dirt from directly around Garcia`s face and head. This had to be accomplished before placing barriers over or around his head or torso. And it remained impossible to safely move the hanging plate to make more room without risking a catastrophic collapse that might end any chance of a live rescue.

At Resnick`s suggestion, we went with an alternate plan to place a supplied air breathing apparatus (SABA) umbilical air mask on Garcia. An air supply officer was assigned to ensure a constant air supply throughout the rescue. The plan was to place a SABA mask on Garcia the instant his face and head were sufficiently cleared. This would enable Garcia to breathe even if he were to be reburied by secondary collapses. But, it took nearly two hours from the time of arrival to clear Garcia`s head so he could don the mask.

SABA CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESCUERS

The need to provide SABA masks and five-minute escape bottles for the primary and backup rescuers, as in a typical confined space rescue operation, was discussed. After considering the “clear” atmospheric readings that Haz Mat 39 was reporting and the problems associated with using umbilical air and hardwire communications (i.e., lines becoming tangled on–and perhaps disturbing–shoring, for example), we decided not to place the primary and backup rescuers on SABA air at first but continued to evaluate the potential need for SABA for rescuers throughout the operation. During the later phases of the rescue, as the rescuers burrowed past the 20-foot-deep mark, we were beginning to lean toward the SABA, not so much for protection against a toxic atmosphere but as a safety measure in case a primary rescuer became buried in a secondary collapse. We never got to the point where we thought the SABA was absolutely necessary. In retrospect, however, requiring SABA on the rescuers might have been a prudent measure, considering the ever-increasing potential for a major secondary collapse or the migration of toxic gases as the victim and rescuers moved deeper into the ground.

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Medical Group, initially headed by the firefighter/paramedics from (paramedic) Engine 77, made several helpful suggestions early in the incident regarding possible medical interventions for Garcia. Among them were initiating treatment for crush syndrome and compartment syndrome–common maladies associated with entrapment injuries of this nature–and oxygen therapy as soon as possible. This was the standard course of treatment instituted at previous entrapment incidents, including major rescues following the Northridge Earthquake. However, Garcia`s predicament continuously foiled any rational expectation of being able to undertake the above mentioned definitive treatments.

Throughout this incident, we evaluated the opportunity to provide more definitive medical treatment and concluded there simply was not enough room in the pit to support establishing IVs without unduly delaying the extraction process (even though several of the primary rescuers were paramedics). Even if IV treatment were established, we concluded, the tubing and solution bags would become additional impediments to timely extrication. Furthermore, it was nearly a certainty that the IV catheters would have been dislodged during the course of uncovering Garcia`s body. This was especially evident in the later stages of the rescue when Garcia actively participated in his own rescue.

A SERIOUS SETBACK

After about 30 minutes, Crites signaled that he was ready for relief. Garcia was still buried to his cheeks, and he continued to slip farther into the soil, which was reburying him as we watched. Fortunately, Crites had uncovered Garcia`s wrists, and it was now possible to apply the wrist straps. Stires and Berkery assisted in this operation from their posts. The straps, which were attached to the end of Truck 39`s rope with a carabiner, were lowered by Stires and Berkery, who instructed Garcia to apply them to his wrists while his head was still buried in dirt. It worked!

The expectation was that the wrist rescue straps, connected as they were to a rope system, might prevent Garcia from sinking farther into the material and possibly prevent his being lost in case of another major subsidence of the soil from below.

With Garcia “captured” by the wrist straps, it seemed safe to try another tactic to expedite his extraction–hand-digging the soil pile at the bottom of the center trench plate from within the open excavation. As the digging commenced, however, Garcia–and the soil that had engulfed him–began to sink farther belowgrade in equal measure to the soil that was being removed from beneath the trench plate. One possible explanation for this problem was that the dynamic rope Truck 39 used seemed to stretch enough to allow Garcia to slip beneath the surface (dynamic rope is currently being phased out by the LAFD in favor of static kernmantle rope). The hand-digging operation was immediately discontinued, but within seconds Garcia had been reburied in a layer of dirt about two feet deeper than the top of his head.

Crites, seeing that Garcia was completely buried, insisted on staying in the hole to attempt to uncover his head and face. This was allowed because Garcia`s chances of surviving this reburial were very slim unless he could be uncovered within a few minutes. Even though he was already fatigued, Crites worked feverishly with the dirt vacuum. However, his progress was slowed by the amount of dirt that covered Garcia, whose hands were not even visible now. Resnick assigned a Task Force 39 member to keep a count at the beginning of this burial sequence so that we had a running clock on Garcia`s new predicament.

Another 10 minutes passed. Crites was nearing the point of exhaustion but refused to quit. Although Resnick and I were monitoring Crites` condition, it was difficult to gauge his level of reserves. He was still working effectively. In retrospect, however, he was probably operating on adrenaline as he fought to uncover the victim. Then, at the worst possible moment, the exhaust sock of the dirt vacuum became clogged with soil and had to be removed from the hole so support personnel could clear it. Finally, Crites became physically exhausted and signaled that he wanted to come out. He was so dehydrated that LAFD paramedics transported him to the hospital for evaluation.

St. George was rotated in as the primary rescuer. We were now about 15 minutes into this burial sequence, and there was absolutely no sign of Garcia. Worse, there was no movement whatsoever beneath the soil. This was (according to my estimate) about the fourth or fifth time that I had observed Garcia completely buried by a secondary collapse. Garcia`s survival seemed to be in extreme doubt at this point; the situation seemed to be heading toward a body recovery operation.

St. George took up where Crites left off. Meanwhile, Resnick marked the elapsed time since Garcia had been buried. As the 20-minute mark approached, St. George worked feverishly with the dirt vacuum to unbury Garcia, but it wasn`t pulling enough material to make the difference needed. There still was no sign of Garcia. One of the “last-ditch” measures had to be immediately implemented if Garcia was to have any chance of surviving.

Vizcaino thought we should rig the center trench plate with a chain to a crane that was on-scene for just such a task and pull it if we didn`t unbury the victim within moments. After looking into the collapse zone and seeing no sign of Garcia under all that soil, I agreed. Vizcaino set about making final preparations to pull the plate. We would have about one minute from decision time to “pull time.” I neglected to pass on this critical piece of information to Resnick (a glaring error).

We considered how this last-ditch effort would change the equation, looking for unseen effects that had not yet been considered. We would have to remove the primary rescuer before pulling the plate, but that would take only about 45 seconds. The major concerns were that the actual act of pulling the plate might crush Garcia or that he might end up in a worse predicament by being buried beneath tons of moving earth. Still, it might be his only chance for survival.

Just as we were about to order that the plate be pulled, St. George uncovered one of Garcia`s hands. The plate-pulling operation was put on hold.

Garcia`s hand looked gray, and there was no motion. St. George uncovered the other hand; it had the same pale look. Neither hand moved. The feeling was that our victim had become unsalvageable. There was a palpable and emotional letdown at the scene.

A moment later, as St. George kept bumping Garcia`s hands with the tip of the dirt vacuum, Garcia`s fingers moved. Then both hands began moving. Against all odds, Garcia was still alive. Suddenly, there seemed to be a renewed optimism that this patient might survive his ordeal despite the setbacks. But it was still going to be a long process; we seemed to be back nearly to Square 1.

St. George continued to work rapidly to uncover Garcia`s face. As he neared the point at which exhaustion reduced his effectiveness, he was rotated out for USAR 88 Apparatus Operator Todd Sands. LACFD USAR-1 Miranda was now backup rescuer.

Sands unburied Garcia`s face enough so that the SABA mask could finally be applied. Once it was secured on his head, Garcia had a constant supply of breathing air until he was extracted. Some progress was being made in uncovering him, but it was still slow, tedious, and dangerous work. Garcia would be partially buried by several more slough-ins, but nothing compared with the one he had just managed to survive.

MEDICAL CONCERNS RENEWED

As the incident progressed into the fourth hour, the LAFD`s medical director recommended that we reassess the potential to initiate IV and other therapies for Garcia. The concern was to prevent him from succumbing to the effects of crush syndrome. However, a survey of the scene made it evident that we were still not going to be able to perform the medical intervention and rescue the victim without undue delay. We couldn`t even ensure adequate attention to the ABCs (airway, breathing, and circulation), let alone risk delaying Garcia`s removal from the hole to address the issues of C-spine precautions or IVs to prevent crush or compartment syndrome. Having been a certified paramedic for 19 years, this created a conflict for me, but not enough to override my belief that the best thing for Garcia (as well as the primary rescuers risking their lives in that unstable collapse zone) was to remove him from that hostile environment as soon as possible.

As the incident dragged on, there were repeated requests to consider assigning a paramedic to establish an IV to supply the patient with oxygen and perform various advanced life support tasks. I kept checking with Stires and his firefighter, who consistently reported that Garcia was conscious, lucid, and oriented in his muffled conversations with them. And I observed Garcia`s vigorous attempts to help his rescuers free him; it was obvious that he was sufficiently stable to participate in his own rescue, essentially “clearing his own spine” in some respects. That is not to say that crush/compartment syndrome, C-spine injuries, and other maladies were not concerns. But in the overall scheme of things, it was most important to remove Garcia from the hole before he and his rescuers became buried by a major secondary collapse or suffered some other mishap in the bottom of the hole, where immediate help might not be possible.

LAFD Rescue Ambulance 98 had now joined Engine 77 on the Medical Team, ready to immediately evaluate, treat, and transport Garcia and any other victims to Holy Cross Trauma Center after extraction.

PROGRESS

The first commercial dirt vacuum arrived on the scene sometime around 2030 hours. As the big vacuum truck was being positioned and its vacuum hose was being snaked toward the edge of the collapse zone, the primary rescuer continued to work with the smaller dirt vacuum. When he swapped that tool for the commercial vacuum, there was an immediate improvement in the amount of material that could be removed. Garcia was finally uncovered to the top of his shoulders.

When Miranda was lowered into the hole, he was asked to check the shoring situation and to make recommendations to Layhee and the shoring team. Several adjustments and additions were made to the shoring complex within the hole. Miranda then proceeded to work with the commercial dirt vacuum, making good progress.

As Garcia`s hands and arms became freed from the dirt, he began gesturing where the digging should proceed. The commercial vacuum clogged several times. Apparently, we were getting into the deeper clay levels, and the moisture combined with the clay to cause clumping. Miranda was given an air knife so he could break up the moist soil so that the vacuum could suck it up. The process of alternately breaking up the soil with the air knife and pulling it out with the dirt vacuum continued throughout the remainder of the incident.

Primary rescuers were rotated in and out in 20-minute increments. As confined space safety officer, Cotterall reminded Resnick and me to rotate rescuers at approximately 20-minute intervals. Because of all the interaction already taking place, Cotterall went through Powers on the issue of rescuer rotations in the hole. His job was crucial to the success of this rescue, and I appreciated his forthrightness in keeping our rescuers safe.

RAIN THREATENS TO COMPLICATE RESCUE

Somewhere around 2130 hours, a light rain began to fall. Resnick and I discussed a plan for draping the entire rescue scene to prevent water from making the situation even more unstable and the soil more difficult to work. We also discussed using sandbags to divert rainwater away from the excavation. Bisson instructed several LAFD units to address both these issues. Fortunately, the rain stayed light and lasted for only 15 or 20 minutes.

The rotations of primary and backup rescuers continued until Garcia`s torso was uncovered. I lowered my personal rescue strap to the primary rescuer, who placed it around Garcia`s chest. The rope from Truck 39 was attached to the strap by way of a figure-eight on a bight, and the wrist straps were reconnected to the same rope by prusiks.

When LeFave made his second entry as the primary rescuer, he was asked to double-check this system. The intent was to haul Garcia out vertically by the strap primarily; the wrist straps were to act as backups. This would allow us to extract Garcia as soon as he was uncovered sufficiently to enable us to “pop” him out.

We also had a harness and a “confined space C-spine harness” ready to go to further secure Garcia if it were feasible and safe. We wanted to provide as much C-spine protection as possible.

I constantly adjusted the dynamic rescue rope from Truck 39. Garcia was sinking farther into the ground, increasing the tension on the rope. I repeatedly requested Truck 39`s crew to play out more slack to avoid injuring Garcia.

CONCERNS MOUNT AS RESCUE NEARS END

As the rescuers burrowed deeper into the ground, approaching the 25-foot mark, I was becoming more concerned about the increasing potential for a major collapse in the hole. Garcia was now uncovered to his knees. At this point, Resnick and I discussed the need to consider pulling Garcia to forcibly extract him. Under very tightly controlled conditions, and after carefully explaining the process to Garcia, Truck 39`s crew was directed to start pulling the line an inch at a time to see if we might lift Garcia free of the soil. A few attempts proved too painful for Garcia. The operation was stopped, and the uncovering process was continued. More soil had to be removed from around Garcia`s legs.

FINAL PHASE OF RESCUE

Finally, as we uncovered most of the front of Garcia`s body and his backside to about his iliac crest, it became apparent that his left leg was wedged against a stone in the solid dirt. The final 45 minutes were devoted primarily to trying to work the leg free of the rock. When it became obvious that this was the final hurdle, concerns resurfaced about the instability of the hole that had been tunneled so deeply. We were racing against a major secondary collapse that might bury Garcia and the primary rescuer.

I believed it would be safer to pull more forcibly on Garcia`s rescue line even if it meant fracturing his leg to extract him. Resnick agreed with my concerns and left the final decision to me. I signaled to Truck 39`s crew to prepare for a hauling operation and explained the strategy to the primary rescuer in the hole, who explained the situation to Garcia and who was to carefully monitor Garcia for pain. Pain to Garcia`s leg alone would have to be tolerated to some degree, but pain to his torso or pelvic girdle would be the signal to stop pulling.

After explaining by radio to Truck 39`s crew that I wanted to pull the rope an inch at a time, to attempt to free Garcia, we began. Using the standard hand signals, I had Truck 39 raise Garcia`s line slowly until the primary rescuer called “Stop” because of Garcia`s pain reaction. Garcia, eager to get out, was also pulling himself by grasping the rope above his head and flexing his arms–but to no avail. He had felt some slight movement but was still trapped by the rock against his leg. We attempted several more pulls, with similar results.

SUCCESS

Finally, Garcia asked the rescuer to cut his belt, which had become hung up on a beam. That, as it turned out, proved to be the final hurdle. After several more pulls, Garcia was “popped” right out of his pants and boots, which remained lodged in the soil. Now suspended by the strap (with the wrist straps as backups), Garcia was free of his entrapment. The signal was given to Truck 39 to raise him from the hole. Cotterall ordered the medical team into position to receive the patient. We maneuvered Garcia in the air and lowered him directly onto a gurney. It was approximately 2350 hours. The scene was secured with most of the shoring left in place. Garcia was transported to Holy Cross for treatment for cuts and abrasions. He was released from the hospital the next day. All equipment was repackaged and rehabbed. Several brief impromptu critiques were conducted at approximately 0120 hours. The last LAFD and LACFD units departed the scene.

Three weeks after the Pacoima incident, the LAFD`s Training Division conducted a formal multiagency After-Action Critique, during which several new lessons learned were documented and shared. Just one week after the critique, many of the same LAFD firefighters who worked at the Pacoima incident applied those very lessons during the successful four-hour rescue of a man buried to his waist in the collapse of a trench in the Hollywood Hills. By all accounts, the time required to perform the Hollywood Hills rescue was cut dramatically by using the newly learned tactics.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

•Safety. Always the primary priority, trying to ensure safety can create a dilemma for rescuers. Some observers might be concerned or surprised that it took 20-plus minutes to get the first rescuer into the collapse zone to begin uncovering Garcia. However, we had no tools readily available to safely remove dirt from around Garcia`s face while working from outside the excavation, it was risky to commit a rescuer into such an unstable collapse zone, and the potential for secondary engulfment or burial of the victim and rescuers was high.

Furthermore, we had to comply with worker safety regulations concerning protection for rescuers and victim from IDLH hazards and other dangers such as secondary collapses caused by inadequate shoring of the collapse zone and falls. We had to ensure rapid intervention capabilities to meet OSHA`s two-in/two-out rule for confined space operations. Moreover, a review of OSHA statistics and various case studies on the deaths of would-be rescuers should be convincing evidence of the need to approach trench/excavation/ engulfment/ deep shaft rescue operations methodically and with due regard for speed and rescuer safety.

That said, it was personally very frustrating to us who could see Garcia struggling to stay alive beneath the soil while we hurried to ensure the completion of critical tasks before we lowered the first firefighter into the hole. It was equally frustrating to the officers at the command post and to firefighters and Garcia`s coworkers positioned on the periphery of the incident, who couldn`t see exactly why it was taking so long. (Later, we learned that Garcia`s family, having been alerted by his coworkers, was watching the excruciatingly long rescue on live television.)

•Cooperation. With the possible exception of Garcia`s own stamina and his ability to assist in a limited way in his own rescue, cooperation among response personnel was the most important factor in the success of this rescue operation. This entire incident was characterized by excellent interagency cooperation.

•Experience. The Pacoima incident was essentially a combination of emergency trench/excavation rescue, confined space rescue, and high-angle rescue. Fortunately, rescuers participating in this rescue had had years of experience dealing with the specific problems that presented themselves during this eight-hour rescue: Experienced personnel from LAFD USAR Task Force 88 and LAC USAR-1 assisted the LAFD command staff in developing a well-defined IAP, supported by an effective rescue plan, within the first moments of the incident. The strategy and tactics recommended were based in part on their experience in similar rescues. They quickly recognized key factors of the incident as it progressed. Consequently, they knew from experience that certain practices not currently taught in standard rescue training courses were likely to be effective and safe in extracting Garcia from his specific predicament and protecting rescuers` safety. We were able to constantly (and accurately) evaluate the changing conditions and to adjust strategy and tactics appropriately through the duration of the incident.

•Training. Rescuers were trained in emergency trench rescue, rescue systems I, confined space rescue, and other related areas. Several are state instructors. The skills taught in these courses provided the baseline by which personnel evaluated Garcia`s predicament and developed appropriate strategy and tactics to address it. The importance of this training, which allowed us to mitigate several life-threatening conditions, cannot be overemphasized. Some of the strategies and tactics used at this incident were not taught in the standard California State Emergency Trench Rescue courses but were “unorthodox” strategies resulting from experimentation by USAR personnel during training and actual emergency operations over the past 12 years. We had immediately available up to 20 USAR-trained personnel assigned to LAFD USAR Task Forces 88 and 27 who were skilled in shoring, rigging, rope rescue systems, the Air Cart and umbilical air system, and safety. We also had a readily identifiable pool of rescuers–augmented by LAC personnel–trained and equipped to be lowered into the collapse zone. The LAFD had another full USAR Task Force (Task Force 66) in reserve if this operation had extended later into the morning.

•Equipment. This incident required the use of standard rope rescue, trench rescue, and confined space rescue equipment, augmented by equipment that could be characterized as unusual or specialized. In most cases, this equipment was carried on units already assigned to the incident. In other cases, the equipment was not readily available, but we knew where to find it.

Some notable items that proved their worth included heavy-duty aerial ladders. It would have been desirable to have a third aerial ladder or a crane boom over the hole, to suspend additional lines for backup rescuers and equipment, but there did not seem to be sufficient room at the scene for this additional apparatus, except for a long-reach (200-foot) crane boom that could be placed over the top of the other apparatus positioned around the scene.

Dirt vacuums were by far the most important single items contributing to the success and relative timeliness of this rescue. USAR-1, LAFD USAR 88, and Heavy Rescue 56 all are equipped with smaller, hand-held dirt vacuums. However, for difficult engulfment extractions, commercial-grade dirt vacuums are often called for. Without the industrial vacuums, it would have taken double or triple the time to extract Garcia.

USAR-1 and Heavy Rescue 56 had onboard air compressors with which to operate them. At incidents such as these, it is advantageous to have at least two air compressors on the scene, to operate simultaneously one dirt vacuum and one air knife to break up and remove the soil more effectively. Unfortunately, Heavy Rescue 56`s air compressor failed at the scene, which left us with one air compressor on USAR-1. Consequently, only one dirt vacuum could be operated until another air compressor could be located. Once it became evident that Heavy Rescue 56`s air compressor was out of service, we requested the response of Demolition 2, the air compressor trailer from LACFD Camp 2, to ensure that a second air compressor was en route while LAFD OCD attempted to locate another compressor from L.A. City Public Works or the Sanitation Department.

•Command. This rescue challenged those in command, who were faced with an unusual rescue in a collapse of unknown etiology with a plethora of additional dangers. Few of the personnel at this scene had seen a similar “victim predicament” during their careers. Despite these challenges, the incident command was well organized. The establishment of a separate LAC Rescue Group allowed for closer coordination of LAC resources in support of the LAFD. And the willingness of all parties to consider the evaluations and recommendations of personnel from other agencies was a key to the “seamless” character of this rescue operation.

•One recommendation for future formal emergency trench rescue, confined space rescue, and other rescue courses is to include a finger-based signaling system, like that used in the Pacoima incident, for victims who are otherwise unable to communicate with rescuers. Some may consider this overkill, but it worked in this case.

•Rapid intervention. During the course of this rescue, backup rescuers were designated at all times. One was always standing by with full equipment donned to replace the rescuer currently in the hole or be inserted to assist if the current rescuer became incapacitated. However, this incident presented problems with respect to a rapid intervention operation: Because of the configuration of the collapse/engulfment zone, the shoring required to stabilize it to prevent secondary collapse, and the need to suspend all rescuers in the hole to prevent rescuers from contacting the side walls of the collapse (to protect against secondary collapse and/or rescuer engulfment), there was room for only one rescuer at a time in the hole. This meant two-member teams could not be inserted as the primary rescue teams or as backup/rapid intervention teams.

This situation is typical of problems encountered at deep shaft rescues and other confined space situations, and even though USAR-1 personnel are accustomed to this situation, it remained a serious concern throughout this incident.

Should a secondary collapse have entrapped the primary rescuer, it may have been exceedingly difficult for a single backup/rapid intervention rescuer working in the hole under unstable conditions that might require more shoring and equipment to unbury and extract him–not to mention that the victim would suffer from the delay caused by the necessity for us to make the trapped rescuer the primary focus of our rescuer efforts.

We were ever mindful that a secondary collapse might trap a rescuer and make the situation far worse. The shoring scheme was critical and had to be observed constantly for signs of slippage or failure. Assigning a shoring officer with full responsibility to evaluate the current shoring and place extra shoring where it was needed (and where we could find a place to do it!) ensured that these crucial tasks would be ongoing and enabled me to attend to other duties.

Also critical was the condition of the soil and the excavation walls. I constantly observed both for stress cracks and other signs of impending slough-ins or collapse. To my consternation, both events occurred repeatedly during this operation.

•The “last-ditch” plans devised for this incident could have had disastrous consequences for the victim and rescuers. We came within minutes of implementing one of these options at a point in the incident when a secondary collapse buried Garcia past his head (without respiratory protection) for 28 minutes. Future improvements might include developing better alternatives for engulfment incidents.

During the early stages of the incident, Los Angeles Fire Department personnel began placing rudimentary protection in the form of plywood sheeting and timbers around the edge of the excavation. USAR Task Force 88 Captain Steve Resnick, the entry team attendant (left), radios instructions for shoring the collapse. Los Angeles County Fire Department USAR 1 Engineer Brian LeFave (right) and other firefighters evaluate possible entry routes for the primary rescuers. Plainly visible is the “hanging” trench plate suspended by chain below a construction crane.

The backhoe operator awaits instructions as members of the rescue group discuss options for shoring the excavation and inserting rescuers to begin unburying the victim.

To avert a secondary collapse, the backhoe (left) and the crane, from which the “hanging” trench plate is suspended, remained stationary throughout the rescue.

USAR-1 Engineer Ysidro Miranda is lifted off the rescuer staging area to be placed into the collapse zone. Visible at left is the large-diameter hose extended from a commercial dirt vacuum into the hole. Miranda and the other primary rescuers used the vacuum to help unbury the victim.

After eight hours, Arturo Garcia is finally removed from the hole. The soil pressure was so great that even though he was buried only to his ankles, his pants and boots remained in place as he was pulled from the hole by a mechanical advantage rope system.

Endnotes

1. Standard confined space rescue positions were deemed appropriate because although this incident involved elements of high-angle and trench/excavation collapse rescue, some of the primary hazards were related to the confined spaces (with potential for secondary engulfment of rescuers) in which the firefighters were working. With the addition of the shoring officer, the standard confined space rescue positions provided the requisite supervision and organization required for this incident.

2. After seeing live news coverage of this ongoing rescue, the owners of two private firms–Miller Pipeline of Santa Fe Springs and United Pumping of the City of Industry–had contacted the LAFD on their own and immediately dispatched their best equipment and operators to assist in Garcia`s extrication.

3. Immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) refers to an atmospheric concentration of any toxic, corrosive, or asphyxiant substance that poses an immediate threat to life or would cause irreversible or delayed adverse health effects or would interfere with an individual`s ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere [29 CFR, Section 1910.120(a)(3)] in Hazardous Materials Dictionary, Second Edition, Ronny J. Coleman (Lancaster, Pa.: Technomic Publishing Company, Inc., 1994).

4. This task required that the rescuers, the various dirt vacuums, the air knife and hoses, and other equipment be guided in and out through a growing maze of shoring and other obstacles erected within the collapse zone. Meanwhile, the victim continued to sink into the earth, and the rescuers burrowed deeper into the unstable ground to unbury Garcia.

5. Radio instructions were needed to issue the exact directions of the rope teams, such as lifting the patient or rescuer “inch by inch” to prevent injuries.

6. Although it may seem extremely remote, the potential for a seismic event during delicate IDLH operations is, in fact, a constant threat and should not be ignored by fire/rescue supervisors in earthquake-prone regions. If the vibration of heavy equipment is sufficiently dangerous to merit its elimination as a matter of national standard protocol during trench and excavation collapse rescue operations, consider the potential effect of a significant earthquake or aftershock on rescuers operating within the confines of an unstable trench or excavation.

7. The power lines that ran directly over the collapse zone were supplying a power grid that reportedly served three-quarters of a million people in the San Fernando Valley. Shutting them down might endanger people reliant on it for life support power.

Bibliography

•County of Los Angeles Fire Department Confined Space Rescue Training Lesson Plan.

•Applicable Regulations and Guidelines

–California Code of Regulations, Title 8–General Industry Safety Orders, Article 108–Confined Spaces, Sections 5156-5157.

–FedOSHA 29 CFR 1910–Permit Required Confined Spaces.

–NIOSH Publication No. 80.106–Working in Confined Spaces.

–ANSI Z117–Safety Requirements for Working in Tanks and Other Confined Spaces.

LARRY COLLINS is a 19-year member of the County of Los Angeles Fire Department (LACFD); a paramedic; and one of three captains assigned to USAR-1, the LACFD`s central urban search and rescue company, responsible for supervising, instructing, and performing technical rescue operations across Los Angeles County. Collins served as a member of FEMA`s USAR Incident Support Team at the Oklahoma City Bombing and as assistant leader of the LACFD FEMA USAR Task Force (CATF-2) at the Northridge Meadows Apartment collapse. A former chairperson of the LACFD Water Rescue Committee and member of the Los Angeles County Multi-Agency Swiftwater Working Group, he is a current member of the LACFD Anti-Terrorism Work Group, the USAR Committee, and various other advisory groups and committees. He lectures, instructs, and writes regularly on these topics.