Need for Resource Manual Cited After Acid Spill
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Alaskan geography complicated the handling of this hazardous material incident. The closest acid pump was 500 miles away.
I was in Fairbanks, Alaska, with Gene Carlson (a Fire Engineering contributing editor) to conduct a three-day class entitled “Handling Hazardous Materials Incidents.” At the conclusion of the first class, I told the students that whenever Gene and I teach, the host department seems to immediately have a hazardous material incident. The students laughed because it had been about six months since the last incident in the area.
The prediction, however, turned out to be quite prophetic. The next day, Fairbanks had a major hazardous materials incident.
At about 12:30 a.m., a police officer on routine patrol noticed a cloud in the vicinity of the industrial area. Upon investigating, he discovered the cloud coming from a truck parked near the railroad yards. The officer radioed for assistance and a pumper from Fairbanks Fire Station 4 was dispatched.
The engine’s officer and a fire fighter donned SCBA and full protective gear. In addition, they applied a special sealing lubricant to all exposed skin and to areas where the protective clothing might not prevent penetration of the acid fumes. With this very basic protection, they entered the cloud area.
The two fire fighters found that the truck was leaking a liquid product from a bottom unloading valve. There was a small pool of the product under the truck and a vapor cloud was rising. They noticed that the truck appeared to be a corrosive materials carrier because of its external bands. In addition, the truck had a corrosive placard with the four-digit number 1789.
After determining that they would not be able to stop the leak, the fire fighters backed out and reported these findings to the shift officer at the command post, set up 500 feet upwind of the incident. A quick check of the DOT Hazardous Materials Guidebook indicated that the four-digit number was for hydrochloric or muriatic acid.
Gene and I reported to the incident commander on the scene. There we were told about the leak, the product identification, and the fact that it did not look like the leak could be plugged.
—photo by the author.
Our first suggestion was that full encapsulated entry suits be obtained to ensure protection of the fire fighters. Chief Bill Shechter on the scene requested some from his department, the University of Alaska Fire Department.
Next, we recommended that a weather report be obtained to determine wind direction and any potential precipitation. A light, easterly wind was reported and the morning was clear with the temperature about 48°. (I also should point out that it does not get dark in Fairbanks at this time of year, so the incident remained completely visible during the night.)
The next major requirement was to contain the leak if possible. The soil surrounding the truck was very sandy. All that was needed was some heavy equipment to build a dike. By this time, the borough (county) mayor and the city manager were on the scene. They arranged for the Fairbanks Public Works Department to bring a front-end loader to the scene.
When the loader arrived, there was concern about the operator working in the vicinity without protective clothing or SCBA. The driver stated that he did not want to enter the hazardous area. Instead, a Fairbanks fire fighter with heavy equipment operation experience was located. He wore full protective gear and SCBA was placed near the truck to aid the loader driver in case of problems.
The control dike was completed in about 30 minutes. The loader was driven from the area and parked. By now, another Fairbanks pumper had arrived on the scene and was used to decontaminate the loader, driver and back-up fire fighter.
Wind shift
With things going so smoothly, something had to happen. It did. Without prediction, the winds suddenly changed direction and headed straight for the command post. It was abandon ship for everyone. Personnel grabbed maps, reference books and clothing and headed away from the fumes.
With the command post reestablished about 3/4 mile upwind, the attack continued. It was decided that soda ash should be added to the spilled area to neutralize the product. Using the mobile telephones in Shechter’s and the Fairbanks shift commander’s vehicles, individuals were put to work calling all commercial establishments, trying to locate the necessary quantity of soda ash. (It must be remembered that Fairbanks is quite isolated from the rest of the state. It is not easy to bring resources into the area.)
—photo by Gene Carlson.
A list of possible vendors, the quantity of soda ash, and its cost were drawn up. Approval for the purchase of the necessary amount was given by the mayor.
About 4 a.m. the fumes increased. The cloud got noticeably bigger and began to drift toward the main part of the city. Until this point, no evacuation was necessary because the industrial area was completely unoccupied. Now, however, the story was different.
Evacuation
The leak was getting bigger and the cloud was staying close to the ground. After conferring with Gene and me, Civil Defense Director Bob Cavanaugh decided to evacuate civilians up to a mile downwind of the incident.
The evacuation decision was made at 4:30 a.m., and preparations to move an estimated 200 people began. The University of Alaska was nearby and made an ideal evacuation site. Shechter arranged for the cafeteria and some of the dormitories to be opened. The police conducted the evacuation.
Buses from the Fairbanks Transportation System were obtained and told to report to the city library parking lot, where the evacuees were directed to go. Individuals who were disabled or without transportation were told to call a taxi and the city would pay the cost. The taxicab company was notified and four taxis were sent to the area.
By having the people meet at the library, massive traffic jams at the college were avoided. In addition, a better count of the number of evacuees could be maintained.
In order to ensure that all citizens in the area were notified, the radio stations were contacted and asked to broadcast the message about the affected area and the fact that the occupants were to report to the library. In addition, the civil defense director had the sirens sounded in the evacuation areas. Civilians awakened by the sirens called the police department and were told about the evacuation.
Within an hour, the shelter at the college had been opened and the affected area cleared of civilians.
Slowing the leak
After conferring at the command post, it was decided to transfer the product from the leaking tanker to another tanker. While in most other states this would not be a problem, this action was the most difficult to accomplish. An empty corrosive materials truck that had last hauled hydrochloric acid was needed, as well as an acid pump.
A second corrosive materials truck was located in a storage yard two blocks from the command post. The owner of the yard was contacted and he agreed to allow his truck to be used. However, he indicated that he did not have a tractor available to pull it. A tractor was found and a driver came from home. The tractor and truck were brought to the scene.
The major obstacle, locating an acid pump, now remained. There did not seem to be an acid pump in the entire Fairbanks area. While personnel were trying to locate a pump, the Fairbanks Public Works Department wanted to try a regular 3-inch centrifugal pump. Permission was granted, with the knowledge that the acid would probably ruin the equipment. The pump lasted 15 minutes before stopping.
I suggested that the Anchorage Fire Department, about 500 miles south, be contacted to see if they knew where an acid pump could be obtained. A call was placed, and Captain Van Quinn of the Anchorage department attempted to locate a pump.
While all of this was going on, two fire fighters donned fully encapsulated suits to resurvey the leak, having determined that they could reduce it by cutting up an inner tube from a truck and covering the valves with stainless steel clamps. When they entered the area, they found a valve from a second compartment also had started to leak. So, it would now be necessary to cap both valves. After about 45 minutes, the fire fighters were successful in capping the valves. This significantly reduced the vapor cloud, and citizens returned home at 11 a.m.
Product containment
In the meantime, Captain Quinn had located an 800-pound corrosive materials pump in the Anchorage area. The pump was put on a 10:45 a.m. commercial flight from Anchorage and arrived in Fairbanks at noon.
With the pump, the product was transferred without incident, and the spilled area neutralized with soda ash. The truck owner arranged for disposal.
The incident was over by 2 p.m.
Mutual-aid companies supplied compressed air bottles to fill SCBA tanks and assist with the decontamination process.
What of our class? Well, it had been scheduled to start at 9 a.m., but was postponed to 1 p.m. Gene taught that session while 1 remained to help with the final cleanup.
Critique
Overall, the handling of the incident went very well. The need for good communications at the command post, particularly the need for a telephone was pointed out. Accurate weather information would have prevented the need to move the command post.
Also needed is a resource manual that should be developed by individual fire departments. Many varied items are needed at a hazardous materials incident, and it’s very time-consuming to try and locate them while the incident is in progress. Develop such a manual in advance.
