TRAINING BURN ON THE 19th HOLE
TRAINING
All photos by Farmington Hills Fire Department.
The Farmington Hills (MI) Fire Department has been fortunate to have many live training opportunities. In the past four years, we have conducted more than 250 evolutions in more than 50 structures, most of them single-family dwellings. Such training helps to better prepare members for the most common type of structure fire they’ll encounter.
Some of our training burns were conducted in multiple structures to involve more personnel and to practice command and control procedures. When a developer offered us the use of the former Farmington Hills Country Club, scheduled for demolition, for a burn exercise, we readily accepted. The only stipulation was that we schedule the burn on a specific date.
We decided to use the structure to conduct two major training evolutions: an offensive attack followed by a large burn to practice defensive tactics. Our decision was based on a number of factors. Our department, like many others, seldom is exposed to large fires requiring multiple-company operations. Mutual aid rarely is needed or activated. Practice is necessary so that in the event of a large fire or other disaster, mutual-aid companies have some understanding of each other’s operations. By having a few large “live” fires, we would be able to practically apply our Incident Command System and test its feasibility in a “live” situation without endangering any valued property. We would fully expand the command functions to include divisions, sectoring, and staging. Officers and firefighters on all levels would benefit. This exercise would lend realism to the disaster drill process.
Besides the overall command and control functions, individual members would be able to practice firefighting skills. While tabletop and simulated field exercises are valuable. they cannot compare with a live fire in intensity and realism.
PLANNING THE BURN
We began the planning process by taking a look at NFPA 1403, Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions in Structures. Since we knew of no other exercise of this magnitude, we felt our best approach was to follow the national standard. After reviewing the standard, we decided who would participate: all department members and several mutual-aid companies. We invited all adjacent departments, including those from two separate mutual-aid pacts, in order to help us identify problems in coordinating large-scale incident command when operating with independent organizations. Five departments participated.
We closely inspected the building and the site layout. The country club was a three-story structure built in three phases. The center, or first phase, was a converted barn built around the turn of the century. Made of heavy timber, it included dining rooms on two levels and an open storage room in the attic. The total area of this phase was approximately 7,000 square feet.
The south addition was built within the past 18 years and was of ordinary construction with masonry walls and concrete floors. The second and third levels had locker rooms and the lower level contained a pro shop and storage rooms. This phase covered approximately 9,000 square feet.
The north addition was two stories. The lower level had the kitchen and associated equipment and storage, and the main level housed a lobby and entrance. This phase covered approximately 4,000 square feet.
The plan was to divide the structure between the south addition and the original building, where a masonry fire separation wall and stairwell were. The developer was very cooperative in leaving important fire doors intact, as well as windows, floors, and staircases. Fires would be set on all three levels on one side of the separation, then the other. On completion of these two evolutions, we would start one large fire, which would be the basis for the defensive exterior master stream attack, incorporating the ICS.
We completed a prefire incident survey sheet, as is department practice on all commercial structures (we use it to develop a strategy on attacking fires). We also obtained support from other municipal agencies such as the police department for traffic control and the department of public works for road maintenance—specifically, snow and ice removal. Finally, we chose a specific date and time —a winter Sunday morning at 4:00 a.m — that would have minimal impact on traffic and reduce the potential for too many spectators.
We conducted a total of six planning meetings. Deployment of personnel while maintaining safety was our next concern. With a fire of this magnitude, we were very concerned about personnel safety. We had to establish a method of controlling personnel and placing key, experienced members in proper position to monitor conditions at all times. This gave us an opportunity to operate similarly, but not exactly, as we would in a typical fire. We had the opportunity to closely supervise all personnel and have sufficient numbers to ensure safety. We assigned personnel to keep track of who entered and exited the building and tested our own version of a tracking system, which involves Velcro name tags.
We decided to “script out” the session for better control. Preassignments were needed in order to maximize the use of the property and minimize the potential for the fire to burn out of control. The site had limited access as well as a limited number of fire hydrants. If the first vehicle placed itself improperly, it conceivably could block all three hydrants and, in effect, kill the drill. Because of that we told vehicles where to “spot” on the scene.
The final preburn steps involved site preparation and the determination of how and what to burn. The condition of this structure was sound, although scavengers had removed almost everything of value. Ceiling tiles had been removed and some voids were created with the removal of the heating and air ducts. Members cleared the site of sharp objects such as nails and broken glass to reduce hazards to attack crews. A ventilation hole (approximately 4 feet X 8 feet) was precut in the roof for emergencies. Its plywood covering could be easily removed if necessary.
A potential problem was the common attic that spanned the structure. If fire entered the attic, it would rapidly race the length of the building and possibly hinder our ability to conduct multiple evolutions. Our only recourse was to try to set the fire so it wouldn’t spread to the attic right away.
Our objective was to create an extended incident (approximately one hour in duration) without igniting the entire structure or endangering personnel. We did not want the fire to burn itself out before we set up the large operation. We chose wooden pallets as the fuel source, collecting them from neighboring industrial warehouses and placing a substantial number on each level of the occupancy. Experienced personnel would set the fires.
CONDUCTING THE BURN
With all the preparation and planning completed, the final step was conducting the burn. The 130 participants met at 3:30 a.m. on the chosen Sunday. We held a briefing to explain the goals of the burn as well as to address any participants’ concerns. We outlined the objectives with an emphasis on safety. We assigned personnel to vehicles and vehicles to specific locations on site. We provided predetermined size-up information and written handouts of pertinent facts to all personnel. This created some confusion, as participants had their own idea of what would happen and had preselected what they would do on arrival, which sometimes conflicted with the incident commander’s direction. This was not totally unexpected and contributed to some minor confusion and realistic problems, similar to operations at actual fires.
We discussed radio frequency usage and assigned channels. Finally, we assigned personnel to a remote area where they could await dispatch to simulate a half-mile nonemergency response.
Administrative personnel and the “torches” arrived at the site at approximately 4:15 a m. The temperature was 5°F. We conducted a final safety inspection—a quick walk-through — and checked all rooms and areas of the structure again to make sure that no changes had been made since our previous site visits. The first fires were subsequently lit, and units were dispatched to the site. The operation began as the fire quickly built, soon engulfing half the structure. The time from ignition to calling in the fire to response was approximately 15 minutes.
Many people had heard about the training burn, so a large crowd had gathered. We considered this part of the exercise, since a real incident also would create crowd control problems.
Live fires create unanticipated scenarios that can’t be simulated in a classroom.
The fire eventually spread to the attic, and we had to modify the game plan. This is one of the benefits of “live” fires: It creates actual scenarios that can’t be simulated in the classroom. We were able to control the fire, but not in the manner we anticipated. The fire development and subsequent control made a lasting impression on the participants.
VALUABLE LESSONS
Following are some of the more important lessons learned and reinforced from the training burn.
- In departments where large fires or other incidents are not common, the command and control of large numbers of personnel and apparatus can be difficult. Even though an ICS is used for smaller emergencies and
- practiced in a tabletop setting, there are some problems in the real world.
- This type of exercise helped us to drill the ICS and also emphasized its importance. The drill reinforced an ICS that the entire department understands and practices. This system must be generic and flexible enough to incorporate all mutual-aid companies.
- The success of any operation is dependent on the decisions of the first-arriving units. Poor judgment at the beginning can adversely affect the outcome. Thus first-arriving units must receive ICS and officer training.
- We learned lessons about establishing and controlling a staging area, as well as controlling personnel in staging. This was the first time most of our personnel activated level-two staging.
- It was difficult to monitor personnel not assigned to apparatus. Only a few pieces of apparatus were operated (three engines and two aerials per fire), so additional personnel were taken from staged vehicles and reassigned. These crews can be given tasks but need to report back to command when they complete assignments. As a general rule, operational personnel should remain re-
- mote from the command post.
- The importance of a command post cannot be overemphasized. It must be located remote from apparatus, as noise interferes with communication. The command post also must be identified in some way so that all people are aware of its location. Staff-
- ing is needed to handle radio traffic; track vehicles, personnel, and mutual aid; and perform liaison work and record keeping.
- Communications remain a very important part of an operation and contribute a great deal to its successes and failures. Good equipment and procedures are a must. Multiple frequencies, portable radios with lapel microphones, and headsets for apparatus operators all help.
There certainly is a need to practice large-scale incidents. Such drills provide invaluable experience to all department members and show them the “big picture.” In general, members understand the need for continual training and drills.
We surveyed our firefighters before a formal critique to get some feedback. There were many positive responses and some very good suggestions on how to improve our operations. Members reported a wide variety of experiences. The Farmington Hills Fire Department found this to be a beneficial exercise—one well worth committing the effort and resources to.
