Fire Prevention and Building Restoration Activities

Fire Prevention and Building Restoration Activities

After any major fire incident, an assessment of the building and its fire protection systems’ performance usually is made. The assessment involves a review of building and fire codes, looking closely at specific code provisions to see how they affected the outcome of the incident. The World Trade Center (WTC) bombing incident provides a case study for such activities.

The Port Authority (PA) of New York/New Jersey, a bistate agency, is not required to comply with the building and fire prevention codes of New York City. However, a review of fire department records reveals that the department has had a long-standing relationship w ith the PA concerning life and fire safety conditions at the WTC. This relationship dates back to the design and construction phases of the WTC and includes a joint protocol, signed in 1986, for inspection activities.

Despite the fact that the PA is not required to follow local codes, the WTC, on February’ 26, 1993, was in substantial compliance with New York City’s Local Laws (LL) 5, which went into effect in 1973, and 16, which became effective in 1984, which address life and fire safety in high-rise office buildings.

FIRE PROTECTION/CODE COMPLIANCE

Immediately following the bombing incident, I was assigned to analyze WTC Buildings 1 (Tower 1), 2 (Tower 2), 4, and 3. In April, I prepared a point-by-point analysis of these buildings’ compliance with LL 5 and 16. Following are synopses of the major findings contained in the report.

Noncompliance Areas

The major areas in which the WTC was at variance with city requirements (and the subsequent corrections) are the following:

Lack of fire command stations (FCS) in each building. Prior to February 26, 1993, a centralized FCS for buildings 1, 2, 4, 5; the concourse; and subgrade levels was located at the B-l level in the Operations Control Center.

Fire control stations presently are being installed in the lobbies of Buildings 1, 2, 4, and 5. An FCS, which will cover the concourse and subgrade levels, will be installed in the concourse level.

Lack of manual pull stations at each exit in Towers 1 and 2. At the time of the bombing, a combination voice/manual station was located in a corridor only near Stairway B.

Six new approved “Class E” fire alarm and communication systems to service Towers 1 and 2, Buildings 4 and 3, and the basement and concourse levels are being installed. They will provide for a manual pull station at each exit. All systems will have decentralized and separate control centers located in the lobby of each high-rise building, and these stations will be staffed 24 hours a day. Although all six systems will have separate detection capabilities, each system will be able to provide voice communications and strobe-light activation for all of the complex’s systems.

Access stairs unenclosed for more than tiro stories (nonegress convenience stairs). Code permits access stairs to be unenclosed for not more than two stories. Several locations exceed the two-story limit.

These locations are now protected by closely spaced sprinklers in combination with draft stops, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Installation of Sprinkler Systems.

Areas where WTC requirements exceeded New York City code requirements

WTC requirements exceeded those stipulated in the NYC code |LL 3/73, Fire Safety in Office Buildings (274267, Fire Prevention Code)) in the following areas:

• Emergency power for exit lights and signs. Existing buildings (prior to EL 16/84) are permitted to use battery storage equipment or emergency power sources. However, circuits separate from the general lighting and power circuits taken off ahead of the main switch also may be used.

The WTC had emergency generators as the power source and, since February 26, 1993, has additionally installed battery-powered capacity.

• Additional emergency power capacity. Emergency power to fire and booster pumps, at least three elevators at one time, alarm systems, communications systems, and emergency lighting were in place prior to the bombing.

However, under the code, existing buildings are not required to provide emergency power, except as in No. 1 above. WTC is an “existing” building (prior to LL 16/84) and need not comply.

Compromised by the explosion

The explosion damaged or destroyed several fire safety features within the WTC complex, including the following:

• hire alarm and communications systems. Feeders connecting the Operations Control Center at the B-l level with the fire protection systems in Buildings 1, 2, t, and 5 ran through the subgrade levels destroyed by the explosion. As a result, the fire alarm signal and communications systems were rendered inoperable.
• Standpipe and sprinkler systems. The looped water main supplying the standpipe system for Buildings 1,2, 4, and 5, the concourse; and subgrade levels was damaged. However, water from gravity tanks, fire department pumpers, and city connections permitted the standpipe system to be used during extinguishment.
• l he sprinkler piping in the explosion area was damaged, affecting protection in the subgrade area. The above-grade piping subsequently was isolated, restoring systems to serviceability.
• Fire pumps in the subgrade tenets. These pumps were damaged. During a survey of building systems, the gravity tanks in the towers were found to be empty’. A fire department pumper w as used to refill tanks, thereby providing a source of water for systems in the towers.
• However, fire pumps supplying buildings l and 5 were not restored for 10 days.
• Emergency generators. They op-
• erated for a short period and then shut down due to lack of cooling water, caused by the damage to the piping.

RESTORATION PROCESS

The compromising of the fire protection systems in Buildings l, 2, 4, and 5 made it necessary to strictly control all movement of personnel into these areas, rile fire department, in consultation with FA personnel, established minimum requirements tor controlling movement into these buildings.

A deputy chief was assigned as an on-scene coordinator between fire department and PA personnel. Many issues were resolved without the need to refer them to higher levels. When necessary, the coordinator served as a liaison between high-level fire department commanders and the PA.

Fire department command post

A fire department command post was established on the WTC concourse level. It was staffed 24 hours a day for approximately four weeks. Battalion chiefs experienced in highrise operations and having an intimate knowledge of the WTC supervised day-to-day fire department operations. In many cases, they were able to resolve day-to-day issues without referral to higher levels. The command post provided continuity; a log book recording day-to-day operations was maintained there. The following records were maintained: the arrival and departure of units; the status of the fire protection systems; and the movement of tenants, cleaning personnel, etc. into the towers.

Command post personnel, in consultation with PA personnel and lawenforcement agencies, established the protocol for controlling fire department personnel. A fire department presence was necessary near the explosion area to control the many minor fires caused by torch operations. However, movement into the blast area had to be controlled and monitored so that the crime scene would not be compromised.

Command post personnel monitored housekeeping conditions during restoration operations and consulted with the PA concerning fire protection/prevention matters in general, particularly hazardous operations.

Commodities Exchange Center

Buildings 4 and 5 of the WTC requested permission to open for business on the Monday morning following the explosion. Since the fire protection systems (standpipe/ sprinkler pumps, fire alarm, and communications systems) in the building were down, it was necessary to survey them and establish criteria for providing an acceptable level of protection. Roving fire guards (certified by the fire department) were stationed throughout the buildings, and a reserve pumper to supply the standpipe and sprinkler systems had to be dedicated to each building. Both buildings opened on Monday morning.

Cleaning personnel

Hundreds of cleaning personnel were present on various floors (prior to restoration of the fire protection systems). Their movements had to be strictly controlled. Records of their locations were maintained in the building lobby and at the fire department command post. Personnel moved from floor to floor in one group, accompanied by a fire guard. Stairways were monitored by roving fire guards, who each were equipped with a PA radio and bullhorn and an emergency pack, which included emergency flashlights. Fire guards similarly equipped would be alerted to an emergency and they, in turn, would use the bullhorn to summon personnel.

HIGH-RISE PROGRAM

The lire commissioner and his staff, with the assistance of Frank McGarry of the New York State Department of State Bureau of Fire Prevention, submitted a proposal for federal funding to address the issue of “Fire preparedness in high-rise fires and emergencies.” Among topics included in the proposal are establishing effective lines of communication within the incident command structure at the fire scene, educating employees working/living in high-rise structures, instructing municipalities nationwide on the appropriate fire operations to employ at a high-rise fire, and examining and evaluating the impact of such programs on fire safety.

RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS/ENHANCEMENTS

At a meeting with NYC Fire Commissioner Carlos Rivera, FDNY fire chiefs, and other fire department personnel in the days immediately after the WTC explosion, Stanley Brezenoff, executive director of the PA, committed the PA to “implement all findings for the improvement of safety systems and procedures made by the fire department.” The introduction of safety systems was reviewed with the fire department. The areas in which the WTC was at variance with city codes also were addressed to the satisfaction of the fire department, as previously mentioned.

The fire department reviewed the enhancements proposed by the WTC to provide additional redundancy to correct the problems—such as the lack of communication and information and the lack of light, especially in the stairways—that surfaced at the time of the explosion, causing occupant concern.

In accordance with the training they had received, WTC occupants expected to hear instructions via various communication methods during the emergency and to see lights indicating the means of egress. Neither was available. They were forced to make decisions while functioning in an information vacuum.

The following enhancements for improving fire/life safety have been made in the WTC complex:

• Installation of a city-approved Class E fire alarm/communications system, including the installation of fire command stations for each building (1, 2, 4, and 5), the concourse, subgrade levels, and secondary command stations in the sky lobbies.
• Expansion of the public address system into tenant areas, including replacement of the “whoop” signal. The system previously served only corridors and stairways.
• Magnetic reentry locks that automatically release when power is lost.
• An FM wireless communications system that will provide emergency communications between fire command stations, lobbies/sky lobbies, and stairwell reentry floors. The system might be extended to each stair-
• way, elevator cars, and other critical areas such as fire pump and elevator machine rooms.
• At the time of the bombing, all elevators were equipped with phase 1 and 2 capability. Elevator modernization to include installation of a threeposition key switch that includes a “hold” position in all elevators is taking place.
• Emergency power for smoke purge fans.
• An additional power source from New Jersey’s Public Service Electric & Gas utility via PATH (rail system) facilities through to the Consolidated Edison (power supplier for the WTC) distribution system. Excess power provided by the emergency power source possibly could be made available to tenants as standby power.
• Installation of an antenna system (Channel 7-FDNY handheld radios ) to improve fire department communications Recent field tests of the system in the entire complex proved highly successful.
• Installation of phosphorescent signs in elevator cars (indicating the car number and intercom button) as well as in exit stairwells to identify reentry points and exits from the stairwells.
• Accelerated rate of sprinklerization of nonsprinklered floors. Non-
• sprinklered floors in Tower 1 must have asbestos removed before sprinklers are installed. There is no asbestos in Tower 2. (At the time of the explosion, 1 WTC had sprinklers in 98 percent of the building—including all below-grade areas —and 2 WTC had sprinklers in close to 90 percent of the building—including all below grade areas.)

Note: Floors not fully protected by sprinklers have certain areas (storage rooms, janitors’ closets, for example) in the core protected by sprinklers.

• As discussed earlier, access stairs (nonegress interior convenience stairs) not in compliance with 27-375 (i)(2) of the NYC Building Code were provided with enhanced protection as specified in NFPA 13 (installation of 18-inch deep draft stops and closely spaced sprinkler heads around stair openings). Immediate emphasis was placed on stairs that penetrated three or more floors.
• Battery-pack light fixtures in elevators and stairways as a backup to emergency light fixtures supplied by emergency generators.
• “Vertical patrol” personnel to check for safety of stairwells and corridors (including fire safety checks).

CODE IMPLICATIONS

The WTC incident reinforces the fact that many government buildings are not required to comply with local codes. This could lead to a lack of standardization in building construction and fire protection systems. No inference is made that such buildings do not use recognized national standards. (WTC sprinklers were installed according to NFPA 13, referenced in the NYC Building Code.) Local codes, however, provide a “systems” approach to life and fire safety. Agencies free to choose piecemeal from national standards and codes might not produce a “systems” approach. To address this situation, the city will be submitting legislation requiring that local codes be followed.

The city has established a code committee, which includes representatives of the applicable city agencies and the private sector, to identify the changes needed, especially since existing codes do not consider terrorist acts. The committee will research ways to guard against an explosion’s incapacitating a building, such as having an emergency power source established at a remote location.

The fire safety areas of the applicable codes will be reviewed to explore the availability of technological advances that would make buildings safer and the need for additional safety’ systems.