Training must be the backbone of any fire department (and firefighter for that matter). Whether we like it or not, there is a direct relationship between how good we are at putting out fires and what we do on the fire training ground. I realize experience plays into how well we perform, but you can tell those departments that put great emphasis on training from those that do not.
Firefighters are trained in many life-saving methods. We as administrators and training officers speculate on the situations our crews might encounter and then provide training in how to react under those circumstances. Fire departments have a legal and moral obligation to provide their members with training that mirrors conditions their members might face, and fire officers and crew members have a legal and moral obligation to act within the scope of their training.
However, not every eventuality can be addressed. There may be times when officers and crew members are confronted with a situation for which no advance training or preparation could have been anticipated. Should an untrained firefighter don a Level A haz-mat entry suit to mitigate a nitric acid spill or a SCUBA dry suit to effect an underwater search? In such situations, the answer is obvious. However, firefighters on occasion are put in situations where a fine line exists between saving lives and working within their scope of training. Many departments operate under the provision of a risk policy. Does that policy apply only to fires? Can (and should) it be applied elsewhere?
If a crew riding down the street observes a fight between a man and a woman in progress, and the woman is obviously in danger of immediate physical harm, should the crew—untrained in self-defense and the nuances of domestic violence mitigation—intervene to protect the woman?
There is no wrong answer to this month’s question. Under the circumstances cited, I could justify a crew’s crawling down a hall after informing the dispatcher (the officer in this scenario is the incident commander) of their actions so that incoming crews know where they are. I could also justify a crew’s waiting outside (and securing all probable tools and equipment—trauma boxes, stretchers, and the like—while they wait) until the police secure the scene. I am going to take the coward’s way out and keep to myself what I would like to think I would do in these circumstances and pray that I would make the correct decision for the children, my crew, and myself if I were in that situation.
—John “Skip” Coleman, deputy chief of fire prevention, Toledo (OH) Department of Fire and Rescue, is the author of Incident Management for the Street-Smart Fire Officer (Fire Engineering, 1997) and Managing Major Fires (Fire Engineering, 2000). He is an editorial advisory board member of Fire Engineering and a member of the FDIC Educational Advisory Board.
Question: Your department responds to shots fired in a school. As you stage outside, students who have self-evacuated run over to your location and tell you that several children, shot and bleeding, are inside the doorway about 20 feet down the hallway. Police are inside the building but have not yet secured the building and are still looking for the shooter(s). Would you allow your crew members to enter the building and bring out the injured children?
Thomas Dunne, deputy chief, Fire Department of New York
Response: Given the danger involved, I feel it would be irresponsible for the incident commander (IC) to have his personnel enter the building. This is a dynamic situation with the potential to get even worse if emergency workers are incapacitated or killed.
The fire department IC should establish contact with the ranking police officer, ensure that there is an adequate EMS presence, and stage his personnel in a secure location until it is determined that they can operate safely.
Obtaining information and a clear picture of the situation would be difficult, but it is vital. There is no guarantee that the information received from the self-evacuated students is correct. Clearly, the students will be in a state of panic, and this may alter the accuracy of their observations. There is also the possibility that one of the self-evacuated students may be one of the shooters. (Remember the scene at Columbine High School? Police led children away from the building but made them keep their hands over their heads.)
The fire department commanding officer will have to maintain communication with the police to know if any parts of the building are secured for rescue operations. The police commander may have his own problems gathering information, since he may be dealing with specialized police units as well as personnel from different police agencies. Fire personnel should not commit inside the building until the police indicate it is safe.
An IC’s first consideration at any incident should be the safety of his people. At a fire or emergency, he must quickly size up the dangers and adjust his strategy accordingly. A risk analysis may lead him to act aggressively or may dictate extreme caution.
About 20 years ago, an entire block of row houses in Philadelphia was lost because a police shoot-out with residents in one of the buildings limited firefighting strategy. More than 50 homes were destroyed, but there were no fire department deaths. Firefighters should not be expected to perform their duty under the threat of gunfire.
The IC is not just a “position” in an organization chart. He is also a human, subject to doubts and emotions. When he relives an incident like this, he will undoubtedly feel empathy for the children (and parents) whose treatment was delayed because of his orders. However, he will also have to bear in mind that his decisions may have avoided a department funeral for one of his firefighters.
Bob Zoldos, captain, Fairfax County (VA) Fire and Rescue Department
Response: Although the temptation to run in and lend assistance is incredible, this action may very well be counterproductive. Therefore, the simple answer is no.
To deny entry to rescuers may seem cowardly, but it is a prudent course of action. The police department is trying to secure the structure and is hunting down the shooters. Fire department members entering the building may hinder police actions. Our actions could endanger the children or the police, or we may become victims ourselves, adding to the problem.
Discipline is a must during incidents like this because the common urge will be to take intervening action. The information given by the self-evacuating students should be relayed to the police; it may be of tactical value.
Consideration should then be given to creating a collection point for the evacuees, starting the civilian accountability process for the incident. Next, we should ensure that we have the proper resources en route or on-scene. This time can also be used to organize the responding units, notify area hospitals, and properly stage EMS units for ease of egress to the hospital.
As appealing as rushing in and rescuing some kids are, we should remember how frustrated we get when the police attempt to “help” by ventilating the building before we are on-scene—their mistake could endanger the very people they are attempting to save. We should avoid the temptation to act in a similar manner at a scene that is a police matter first.
Josh Thompson, battalion chief, Avon (IN) Fire Department
Response: No. Our equipment is designed to protect us from fire and toxic gases, not bullets. First, we must evaluate the staging location. I would not stage any personnel near the scene without police protection (who probably have committed their resources elsewhere). Police protection is imperative for everyone’s safety, especially if the shooters have decided to evacuate to your location. A staging location, protected by a barrier, should be set up relatively remote from the location but within distance of any walking wounded. In addition, call for an enormous amount of resources; this has the potential to be a mass-casualty incident that will require abundant resources.
Second, at this point in the incident, the decisions must come through the police department’s incident command system. The police must trust us to make the right decisions and use them as we see fit at our incidents; we should do the same. We must relay any vital information to their command for further action.
The risk at this incident is high; the reward is unknown. Just as is the case in fire situations, we must be able to determine the risk for savable lives. The difference is that we can reasonably predict fire behavior but not human behavior.
Our responsibility at this time is to assist (and stay out of the way of) the police. Once the building has been secured and the scene is safe, then we can go to work. The “secured” issue is another concern. Containing the shooter(s) and searching for other “traps” that might have been set should be considered. It might not be a bad idea to train the police in some basic techniques for removing victims and have them bring the victims to us and further limit our risk. This would be a tragic situation for all involved, and we must take steps not to avoid adding to the problems.
Larry Anderson, deputy chief, Dallas (TX) Fire-Rescue
Response: Rescue is our number one priority in all emergencies. We must consider the probable outcome of our actions and weigh them against the risks taken. In this situation, I would do my best to get an armed escort from the police commander on-scene. We have done a lot of training with our tactical (SWAT) police units relative to response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events. The time spent working on WMD scenarios has created a really good working relationship between police and fire in our community. I would definitely consider a rescue attempt, but I would first quickly explore the possibility of an armed escort.
Michael Allora, lieutenant, Clifton (NJ) Fire Department
Response: The choice in this scenario is quite clear. This scene is not safe. We do not belong inside this building. We should not even be close to the building. The first responding fire companies should wait, stage the apparatus in a safe area, and stand by for further instructions from the IC— much the same way we operate at a report of a bomb inside a building.
If we decide to go for the rescue, what would be our plan? What would be our backup plan if the shooter met us in the hallway? Our turnout gear is certainly not going to protect us from the hazards at this incident. We have seen police officers running into fire buildings with oxygen bottles under their arms to make a rescue. What was the plan there? They don’t belong inside the building at our fire incidents, and we don’t belong inside the building at their incidents.
This is a police department emergency. Should this incident take place in our city, we, as firefighters, would respond in a support capacity for EMS. The fire department provides the EMS service in our city. Our department is nearly 100 percent EMT certified, and all of our apparatus are dispatched as first responders equipped with automatic external defibrillators. More than likely, the fire department will be tasked with setting up a triage area for the victims. Should we be needed inside the building once the scene has been secured, the IC would let us know when and where.
The information about the wounded children inside the building should be relayed to the IC. Gather as much information as you can from the children who tell you about the victims. Perhaps they know where the shooter is or was last seen. Maybe they know the identity of the person shooting and if more than one person is involved. Most importantly, ask these children if they need medical attention.
Life safety is still our number one priority. Keep yourself and your crew out of the building and out of the hot zone. Get the self-evacuating children out of the hot zone, and care for the injured as best you can. Do not become part of the problem.
Bob Oliphant, lieutenant, Kalamazoo (MI) Department of Public Safety
Response: Our personnel provide both police and fire services. Incident command is used for all major incidents whether police or fire related. There is total unity of command when both police and fire services are required. In this scenario, tactical measures to manage the threat from the shooter(s) would be integrated with rescue efforts. There would be no delay between one department’s completing its work and the other department starting its work.
If I were the first officer on the scene, I would establish incident command and try to implement rescue efforts after communicating with the officers already inside the school. Pending action would depend on what type of information the inside officers provide. If incident command were already implemented, I would report the information to the IC and wait for direction. An independent rescue effort would not be an option. Rescuers could easily be targets or end up in the line of fire.
I think the general strategy would be to isolate the shooter(s) from the general area of rescue or secure the rescue area before sending people in to evacuate the victims. I don’t believe the shooter(s) need to be eliminated or the entire school secured to effect rescue. Rescue would be strictly limited to “get in, get out.” Treatment would take place at another location removed from the danger.
I think the bigger issue related to this question is how well traditional fire and police organizations are prepared to work together. Entering the school without coordinating with the police officers already on-scene could be disastrous. A successful resolution to this incident would require an effective command structure, communication, and teamwork among the involved departments.
Leigh T. Hollins, battalion chief, Cedar Hammock (FL) Fire Rescue
Response: No, I would not allow my firefighters to enter the building. There is just too much risk. Both the shooters and the police trying to secure the building could get your people killed.
Actually, although our district is suburban, we are faced with very similar calls regularly. Whether the victims are children in a hostile situation (such as in this scenario), adults in a hostage situation, or an elderly person attempting to take his life with a weapon, our actions would be the same—Level II (remote from the scene) staging until the scene is cleared by law enforcement.
The Manatee County Recommended Operating Guideline (below) spells out the actions that should be taken.
Response To Crime Scenes And Violent Acts
SCOPE: This ROG establishes guidelines for responding to incidents involving a crime or violence and to provide a safe working environment by limiting firefighter exposure to those incidents with or without law enforcement assistance.
A. Definition
Violent Incident Scene: any scene that does not have police involvement yet, and the incident caused an injury by the actions of another (e.g., shootings, stabbings, and assaults).
B. Objective
To position the apparatus in such a way so as not to excite those involved, but to provide for rapid access to the area.
C. Procedure
1. Care should be taken not to move possible evidence at the scene of a crime.
2. Limit the number of personnel into the crime scene area.
3. Any unit dispatched to a violent incident scene that will arrive prior to law enforcement will establish a Level II staging area one or two blocks from the incident.
4. Line of sight from the incident to the staging area should be a major consideration. The responding unit/s should stage in a location out of sight from those involved, but near the immediate area of the incident in order not to contribute to an escalation of violence by the unit’s appearance in the area.
5. The responding unit should report its arrival when it is in the area, that the staging area has been established and its location, and await the “All clear” from law enforcement.
James Murtagh, deputy chief (retired), Fire Department of New York
Response: I would immediately, with the children in hand, proceed to the police IC and (1) advise him of what I was just told and then (2) offer him our fire department resources to help and support his plan and the children’s recovery. The police IC would decide what we would do and how we could assist the police, the injured children, and their families.
As the lead person for the fire department, to initiate an immediate rescue and removal of the children would be tantamount to freelancing.
We must use ICS/UC (unified command). Its use is even more important in times of stress, like this one. To send our firefighters into serious harm without additional information about what is going on, how serious the problem really is, and the level of danger to be confronted is irresponsible leadership. I would not initiate or condone an immediate, uncoordinated attempt at rescue or removal.
Ron Hiraki, assistant chief, Gig Harbor (WA) Fire & Medic One
Response: No. This is a difficult situation for everyone. To go in and bring out the injured children may seem appropriate. However, in addition to putting our fire and EMS personnel at risk, we are also putting many other people in danger. Law enforcement officers will have to modify their action plan to work around fire and EMS personnel or reduce their initial entry group to protect us. If the shooters are not quickly subdued, they might continue to shoot more innocent people.
Our department serves the City of Gig Harbor and the surrounding unincorporated areas of the county. We have an excellent working relationship with the Gig Harbor Police and the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department. Our goal is to recognize the need to work together and establish a unified command. To that end, quickly prioritizing strategic goals would place mitigating the situation and making the scene safe ahead of going in to bring out the injured children. Call this “Incident Command Triage.” Fire and EMS personnel are trained and experienced in the triage of injured people in critical situations. Fire and EMS personnel in “Patient Triage” often make the tough decisions about who can be saved and at what risk. The same principle must be applied to this situation.
Peter Sells, district chief, Toronto (ON) Fire Services
Response: Our operating guidelines would not allow firefighters to enter under the circumstances of this scenario. Police would have complete jurisdiction and control over the incident until they have declared the building safe for other emergency responders to enter. For firefighters to enter, however valiantly, before police have secured the scene could seriously endanger, in addition to the firefighters, police personnel, injured/trapped victims, hostages, and possibly even the perpetrators.
A good IC is not only aware of the appropriate operating guidelines but also can apply them rationally and dispassionately with adrenaline flowing at the scene.
Steve Kreis, assistant chief, Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department
Response: Our standard operating procedure (SOP) is that we would not go into the scene if police have not secured the site. In a normal situation, we stage about a block from the incident and wait for the police to secure the area before entering. We don’t have any protection against bullets, and we don’t have any SWAT medics. Guns, bulletproof vests, knives, nightsticks, etc. are all police equipment. We are there to support the police efforts. After they have secured the scene, we can go to work to render aid.
Recently, we had an encounter with a shooter at a house on the west side of the city. We followed our SOP, and the units staged about a block away. For a variety of reasons, the police were late in arriving. But in this scenario, the shooter started walking around the neighborhood. He left the house where the original shooting had taken place and walked home to reload and get another gun. On leaving his house, he walked around the corner and noticed the fire apparatus staged in what was supposed to be a safe location. He then began to fire at us. The officers of the trucks quickly gave the order to retreat (back up). Police arrived during our retreat and killed the shooter. Luckily, none of our members were physically injured. These types of incidents stress the importance of unified command and will dictate a review of our SOP.
Clearly, a shooting at a school is not a typical Saturday night knife and gun club event. In this situation, we would either establish unified command or have a liaison in the police command post to gather enough information to determine whether a rescue were possible. Before we entered the school to rescue the kids, we would have the police at least secure the immediate area where the victims are reported to be and our access/egress paths prior to entering the building. We would also expect police officers to escort us in and out of the building. The rescue team would develop a plan to extricate the injured students as quickly as possible to limit our exposure.
This type of event demonstrates the importance of police and fire using a common ICS and being able to work together and support each other. Without the necessary support of the police department, any rescue attempt by a fire department could be a suicide mission.
Overall, a shooting at a school with the shooter not secured is a police event, but it seems that nothing we do anymore is black and white.
Katherine T. Ridenhour, captain, Aurora (CO) Fire Department
Response: Obviously, this is a Columbine High School-type incident, which hits very close to home here in Colorado. However, I am thankful after watching much of Columbine unfold on live TV that no responders were hurt. Columbine had the potential for many more victims had circumstances been different.
This situation certainly stirs up deep emotions in all of us as well as enormous incident safety concerns. There is no simple answer in this scenario, but the bottom line is, don’t go in until the scene is secured. Easier said than done, no doubt.
Let’s take a quick look at the risk/benefit analysis at this situation. Obvious high risks. Let’s look at the known factors. One or more armed and shooting gunmen are inside the building and in an unknown location. There are reports of several kids shot, probably needing immediate medical attention. Some kids already may be dead. You need direct communication with the police. Where are the police, and what is their plan? You need additional resources. This will probably be a long and complicated event.
What is the direct benefit of going inside? You may be able to find one or more patients; you may find only victims, or you may find the gunmen. You may also be able to get the kids out (or be wounded or die with them). There exists significant potential to be shot by the gunmen or even friendly fire from the police, who may not know who you are and what your intentions are. There is a bottom line in our job, and that is safety—safety of the responders. At this point in the scenario, there is too great a risk to go in immediately without better risk/benefit odds.
So, what can we do to control this situation? First, get your crew, the students, and yourself to a safe location. Second, find the police supervisor, and establish a unified command. Effective communication with the police is critical. Next, request adequate resources to stage at a safe and distant area. Ensure that the police have cordoned off the area. Strong perimeter control will help with management of freelancing—many responders will “self-dispatch” to the scene, and accountability will have to be addressed. Set up your EMS area—triage, treatment, and transport—and order plenty of ambulances. You will probably need more than one EMS area to handle the number of patients and the logistics of this large building. Obtain a preplan or floor plan of the school. Activate your mass-casualty plan (emergency operations center, operations command center, city government duties, etc). Inform the local hospitals. Prepare your public information officer, and set up a staging location for the media. Assume this will be a long-term event. Set up the Logistics, Planning, and possibly Finance sections of the IMS.
The fire incident commander needs to focus on directing and controlling this incident. The initial decisions must be based on keeping our personnel and the many other responders from becoming victims. Since this is a crime scene, the police will become the lead agency. Now is not the time to be teaching them the IMS system or begin a cooperative relationship with them (if one had not been established before). Now is not the time to wonder if your jurisdiction has an emergency operations plan. Be proactive. Take time now to reread and revise your plan, or start now to create one for your community.
Adam Watson, public information officer, Robertsdale (PA) Wood & Broad Top Volunteer Fire Company
Response: A similar scenario has crossed my mind dozens of times, but involving hostages being held by a crazed gunman instead of injured students. Our department is small; fewer than 50 volunteers respond to incidents. We have no written policies to deal with such incidents. I suspect that many other “rural” volunteer fire companies might be in the same boat.
As terrorism hits closer to home and is beginning to permeate into rural America, even small departments have to start developing policies to deal with such matters. Domestic matters involving disputes over children in rural America seem to be more common. One might prompt an armed standoff at an elementary school with a distraught parent. Just food for thought!
A.M. Brooks, lieutenant, Columbus (OH) Division of Fire
Response: First, what is the fire/EMS crew doing so close to the scene on a report of shots fired? Ideally, the crew would have staged a block or two from the scene, waiting for law enforcement to secure the scene. Once the scene is secured, then and only then should the crews be allowed to enter the scene.
If the crews were allowed to enter the scene prior to law enforcement’s securing it, the crews would not be doing their job. If crew members become casualties, not only would they not be able to render much-needed aid, but they themselves would need to be treated. This would pull much needed, already slim, resources away from the initial victims, further compounding the situation.
It is in the rescuer’s nature to want to aid people in trouble; but in this case, the professional thing is to resist the urge to rush in. Victims may have to wait a little longer, but the chance of increasing the number of victims is decreased.
Brian Cameron, firefighter, Lansing (NY) Fire Department
Response: This is an immediate life safety concern and may require conscious disregard of SOPs. “Several children” could be any number from two to 10, although this is less likely. Since the victims are near a door, there is no question of their location or where escape routes for rescuers might be. The best option would be to get one or two police officers to immediately clear that wing of the school and stand guard long enough so EMS personnel can remove the victims for treatment. This decision will almost certainly be questioned, especially if a rescuer is injured despite police presence. However, it goes back to “Risk a little to save a little, risk a lot to save a lot.” I don’t know any firefighters or EMS personnel who wouldn’t risk a lot to save the life of a child.
Brian C. Thurston, assistant chief, Division of Training and Education,Jackson (MI) Fire Department
Response: NO!
Bruce A. Watson, chief, Travis County Emergency Services District No. 6, Hudson Bend Fire Department, Austin, Texas
Response: If I were the officer on an engine company, I would advise the IC of the information I had just received and charge my personnel to take the students to safety. If I were the IC in the unified command post, I would convey the information to the law enforcement representative and find out if the shooter(s) were located and the area is clear and whether he had the resources to secure the area long enough so the injured students can be retrieved and brought to a safe zone for medical attention. If the answer to these questions is no, I would stage my crew members and do whatever we can to help the self-evacuees and wait until the area is secured. Obviously, this is not our nature; however, as an IC or engine or battalion company officer, we must think personnel safety first.
Vincent Colavitti Jr., lieutenant, Clifton (NJ) Fire Department
Response: Responses to these types of calls, unfortunately, are more common than they seem. In past years when the fire service was not as involved as first responder and with EMS, it wasn’t as much of a concern. But today the fire service is an integral part of these calls.
Pertaining to the children who had self-evacuated and approached our staging area to advise us of the wounded children in the school, I would get as much information as possible from them concerning the extent of the injuries, whether the victims were conscious or unconscious, the number of the injured, and their exact location in the building. I would then notify the IC and tell him the children need to be moved to a secure area by the police and ask for the resources I would need after the building has been secured.
I would not allow my members to enter that building until it has been secured. They could be wounded or killed by the perpetrators or accidentally by the police trying to secure the building. Anxiety runs high at an incident like this.
My responsibility is to protect my company members and make sure they go home safely to their families at the end of their tour. Most fire personnel are not trained properly in tactical operations to retrieve the injured in hostile situations. Besides, we would be on the verge of freelancing if we were to enter the building, not to mention violating department SOPs. The fire department is there to become not part of the problem but part of the solution.
The best-case scenario, until the entire school is properly secured, is to have the IC notify the police through unified command and have the police search the building, secure that hallway, and bring the wounded children out of the building to us for treatment.
Christopher Brennan, firefighter, Darien Woodridge (IL) Fire Protection District
Response: Of course, department SOPs dictate that we wait for the crime scene to be secured. This is an active shooter incident and, as such, several things need to be considered. First, scene security will take time to accomplish. Patrol officers are not going to go in and clear this building; they will only establish the outer perimeter to contain the shooters. The establishment of an inner perimeter and clearing the building will be undertaken by a department, county, or state police tactical response team. That will take time as the team mobilizes, plans, and deploys—time that is likely to cost injured people their lives. So we fall back on the fire service adage of “Risk a lot to save a lot.”
I would instruct my crew to establish a triage area for the students who self-evacuated and ensure that they would remain in that position. Then, provided I could find a patrol officer to assist/provide cover, I, as the company officer, would attempt to make the hallway and assess the situation. A “combat triage” method would have to be used to determine if any patients were viable.
I would then begin the process of trying to remove the savable students while the patrol officer provides some form of cover. Provided the officer could maintain a perimeter inside, such as at a corner or intersecting hallways, the risk from the shooters would be reduced to manageable. Additionally, the operation would be less hazardous if we could obtain some type of body armor.
The risk here is extreme. The benefit is uncertain until you assess the conditions of the victims inside. I would not risk my crew in this undertaking. I would place myself in the line of fire provided the police could give some form of assistance. Also, dumping the turnout gear with reflective strips and the white shirt might be a good idea.
Rick Lasky, chief, Lewisville (TX) Fire Department
Response: Taking into consideration that this would be an extremely stressful and difficult incident to manage when you consider the emotions of all involved, more than ever it is a time for leadership and discipline. However, considering the fact that the building is not secured and the shooter(s) are still unaccounted for, our decision would be not to allow any fire department personnel in the building. It may sound cold and uncaring but, unlike a fire where we have protection through PPE and water, we don’t have much in the way of protection when it comes to bullets.
Granted, fire can kill us and we lose brothers and sisters on the fireground each year, but we take a calculated risk when we enter a building on fire. We are trained for it, and PPE—including SCBA and our attack line, backup line, and ventilation—will aid us in our efforts. We will work and have worked closely with our tactical team. When we are assisting them, we support them and prepare to receive and treat the injured. When we receive information that the building or the involved area in the building has been secured, we would enter the secured area to treat and remove the injured. As we would expect the police to follow our lead at a fire scene, we need to follow their lead when dealing with a shooting incident.
Chris Murtha, firefighter, Wilmington (DE) Fire Department
Response: Absolutely not. The risks in this scenario clearly outweigh the gains. Too much is unknown about the situation. How many shooters are there? Where are they? A crew entering the school with good intentions can quickly become part of an even larger problem should they become injured or trapped by the shooters within the school. This will only compound the problem for the responding police officers and escalate the incident. The fire/EMS crew cannot do the victims any good if they also are injured. Additional crews would have to be called to the scene to treat our personnel. The best course of action here is to await the police’s arrival so they can secure the scene. They can then remove the victims to our location or escort us into the building when they are sure that it is safe to do so.
Bart Hadley, chief, Lawton (OK) Fire Department
Response: Yes, I would. It is our SOP to wait until the police have secured the area, but just as in a fire rescue situation, we are willing to accept a higher threshold of risk when saving lives is possible/probable. An example of this attitude is expressed in NFPA 1710, which allows an exception to the required safe levels of staffing when and if a life is at risk. I would, however, ensure that a police officer enter with the rescue crew to help cover the crew members during the rescue attempt and that the crew had discussed with the police exactly how they would exit (or take cover) if the shooter appeared during the rescue.
Danny Kistner, battalion chief, Garland (TX) Fire Department
Response: During the late 1980s, I found myself in a similar situation; however, a strip shopping center was involved, not a school. On arrival, my ambulance and engine company staged in the parking lot, in full view of the incident and panicking bystanders. All were pointing to a business establishment that was aiding a gunshot victim. Three shooters were reported to be in an adjacent occupancy. We were clearly in the line of fire as we succumbed to the desires of the crowd and proceeded to initiate an evacuation and rescue. Fortunately, law enforcement personnel joined us shortly thereafter.
We reviewed the incident in the following hours and came to some critical realizations:
We did not know exactly where the shooters were. We had reports, but no one knew for sure. Had the shooters opened fire on us, we would have become part of the problem and further complicated the incident. Additionally, priority would probably have been given to our evacuation instead of evacuating the waiting injured, further diminishing the Golden Hour for the original victims.
We should not have staged in full view of the incident. Once we did so, we felt committed to act. We should have staged a block or more from the incident, out of the shooters’ and bystanders’ line of sight. If we can see them, they can see us. Further, if we are in the shooter’s line of sight, we are probably in gun range as well. I do not believe a shooter will distinguish fire from police when threatened.
We have been preparing for a possible school shooting since the Columbine tragedy. Of course, firefighters’ natural tendency is to go in and remove as many victims as possible with almost complete disregard for their own safety. Most of us are parents with children in a public school system, and separating emotion from professionalism is extremely difficult. Emotions always take the extreme path during life-threatening situations involving kids.
For the purpose of this discussion, I will assume that the first-due staged immediately outside the school building. I would order the immediate withdrawal of all fire companies until the shooter is neutralized. The key in the given scenario is that the police have not secured the area and the shooter(s)’ location is not known.
Students are 20 feet into the building, but the shooter may be 25 feet inside. Police have not secured the building; as far as we know, the shooter is still active. We could be inside attempting to remove students who may well be dead already, becoming victims ourselves. Depending on local resources, we may have eliminated a substantial responding force.
Additionally, a combination of events at Columbine, along with additional training provided to us by the Garland Police Department’s Bomb Unit, compel us to be prepared for the possibility of booby traps and explosives.
We have five large high schools within Garland city limits, seven total within the school district. Planning for this scenario began at the highest levels jointly with the fire and police command staffs and the Garland Independent School District.
Captains who have a school in their first-due district were charged with detailing a preplan that included provisions for large-scale staging of resources, helicopter landing zones, and an off-site command post. These plans, along with a detailed prefire plan for each school, are carried on all apparatus.
As in most departments, the Garland Fire Department maintains a stand-down policy on all calls involving violence. This means that first-due units stay out of the line of sight of the incident in most cases and do not approach until cleared by the police department. If this policy is followed and preplans are carried out, it would be extremely difficult for our personnel to get caught up in rescue prior to the shooter’s being neutralized.
It is reasonable to suggest that as a wing is cleared and a perimeter is secured, firefighters can be called in to help remove victims according to an established and controlled plan. Those able to move unassisted can be directed to areas of safety.
Lance C. Peeples, instructor, St. Louis County (MO) Fire Academy
Response: All actions undertaken at the scene of an emergency require careful consideration of risk vs. benefit. Fire officers and firefighters should be prepared to undertake great risk to effect great benefit. Likewise, they should minimize risk when the benefit is small. In the case of a shooting at a school where the police have not yet secured the scene and there are reports of children wounded, the problem becomes one of determining the amount of risk present (we already know that the potential benefit is great).
Because we are unable to adequately assess the degree of risk involved, it behooves us to err on the side of caution and assume that an armed gunman is still present. If this is the case, sending firefighters into the unsecured scene will likely compound the difficulties of those arriving after us, who must now face the arduous task of carrying out our dead carcasses in addition to tending to the wounded. Alas, the distinction between heroism and foolishness is often fuzzy, but in the present instance I believe that adhering to SOPs that require potentially violent scenes be secured by the police prior to firefighters’ entering is indeed the mark of courage.
Leo A. Perrin, firefighter, Columbus (OH) Division of Fire
Response: No. I know that it is extremely difficult to stay in staging, but if you run, you may become injured—or worse. You may be able to help a few and not get hurt. If you fall victim to the violence, maybe because the children running up to you are part of it, you won’t be able to help anyone, especially if you are the first on the scene and the next unit is still responding and will help you first (we take care of our own). There is a reason police are trained for this and we are not. We don’t carry guns YET!
Michael D. Singleton, lieutenant, Fayette County (GA) Department of Fire & Emergency Services
Response: SOPs are written to keep us as safe as possible. That does not mean that they are followed without fail. They are guidelines, and we must use our good judgment to make a call. If I were to allow a crew to go inside, it would be behind me. Extreme caution would be used, just as at a fire; and just as at a fire, the rule “Risk a lot to save a lot, risk a little to save a little” applies. I believe wounded children fall into the first category. As in any other circumstance when lives are on the line, you must use your best judgment, make a decision, be prepared to justify your actions, and accept responsibility when the smoke clears.
Craig H. Shelley, fire protection advisor, Saudi Aramco Ras Tanura Division
Response: I would not let the crew enter without the police first securing the building. With regard to rescuing the injured children, the police should handle this function. They are equipped with personal protective equipment better suited for this operation. If our SOPs prohibited entry, I especially would not have my personnel try the rescue. What is the point of having SOPs if we violate them? SOPs are there for a reason.
SOPs for these types of responses should be developed with the police department, and each agency must know its role and follow the guidelines. We should not become additional victims. Discipline is the key word at these operations. We fight the fires; the police handle the guns.
Steve Edwards, deputy chief, Marshalltown (IA) Fire Department
Response: No. Firefighter safety has to be our highest priority. We have to get rid of the mentality that we have to do something. The something we have to do is get our people home alive to their families at the conclusion of their shift. Our people need to know our decisions are based on risk analysis and that their safety is our first priority.
Tom Sitz, lieutenant, Painesville Township (OH) Fire Department
Response: Yes. I would make every attempt to secure a police officer or two to go with us while we perform a rapid extrication of one or all of the wounded students in that 20-foot zone from the door. The way I read the scenario is as follows: We are already in the school parking lot or an area around the school. We would perform our risk vs. benefit analysis. If there is no indication that the gunmen were in that area of the hallway, I would attempt to snatch and grab every student I could. Victims would not be assessed or treated until they were in a secured area. Basically, we would treat them as if they were down in the hot zone of a haz-mat incident, in need of rapid removal for survival.
Brandon Turman, firefighter/EMT, Salt Lake City (UT) Fire Department
Response: IFSTA Essentials IV answers this very clearly: “All firefighters must remember that they did not cause the emergency incident; they are not responsible for the victim’s being in that situation, and they are not obligated to sacrifice themselves in a heroic attempt to save the victim—especially not in an attempt to recover a body. In fact, it is irresponsible and unprofessional for firefighters to take unnecessary risks that might injure them and prevent them from performing the job for which they were trained. The function of the fire/rescue service is not to add victims to the situation” (pp. 28-29).
Firefighters are heroic; however, before they are heroic, they make educated, professional, and smart decisions. Again, IFSTA Essentials IV states: “The firefighter should be too smart and too professional to take unnecessary risks.”
Thomas McCabe, lieutenant, Stratford (CT) Fire Department
Response: I would allow those of my crew who wanted to accompany me to rescue the children—even if it were against department SOPs. The key elements here are that I am leading the crew and that I am not ordering anyone to go. They understand the risks and are still willing to go.
I would not go on a suicide mission—under a blaze of gunfire—but I would go only if I felt we had a pretty good chance of succeeding and if we could pull back if we had to.
Bobby Halton, deputy chief, Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department
Response: No. There are a lot of good reasons. In Albuquerque, we have developed a very complicated algorithm for division of responsibility: Cops shoot, arrest, and stop bad guys. Firefighters fight fire, provide aid, and answer the call when no one else can. This works well. We don’t race into the Stop and Rob and apply large volumes of water in attempts to drown would-be robbers. The police here don’t break into house fires and try to shoot it out with the fire.
The police call this type of event “an active shooter situation,” for which they practice. A big part of that plan is to have medics staged safely to receive patients for treatment and transport. The role of the first-arriving supervisor is to identify the staging location and make contact with the supervising police officer. The commands are unified, and we follow the police’s lead until it turns into a rescue. Then, they follow our lead.
A sick kid with a deer rifle is most certainly a local domestic terrorist; this threat is generally more probable in most communities than that of a foreign terrorist. The issue here is, dead or hostage medics are no good to anyone. We should allow the cops to clear and secure the buildings and then provide the aid we can to the injured and wounded. The kid with a deer rifle killing other kids will certainly kill a firefighter.
It is important to understand how the cops clear and secure various threats in these events. They are very deliberate in search and security. Firefighters entering into unsecured or potential traps just makes this process longer and more dangerous. I can think of no good reason to go into an unsecured location and put my people and myself in danger.
