First Response: Engine 6 Operations Below Grade
The tour at Engine 6 began in a typical fashion on February’ 26, 1993No outside activities were scheduled, and the four on-duty firefighters regularly assigned to Engine 6 were performing maintenance tasks related to equipment, apparatus, and quarters. They had been with the department for from six to 12 years.
Also in quarters was an off-duty Engine 6 firefighter who had completed the night tour and was talking on the pay phone to a friend who worked on one of the upper floors of the World Trade Center complex. At about 1217 hours, the off-duty firefighter was told by his friend that the electrical power had failed at the WTC and that the building shook. The friend knew that Engine 6 would be responding. The firefighter hung up the receiver and shouted, “Get out. Something just happened at the World Trade Center!”
When I slid down the pole to the apparatus floor, he told me what he knew and asked permission to respond with the unit. 1 granted permission and directed all members, including the off-duty firefighter, to gear up while 1 notified the Manhattan dispatcher that Engine 6 was heading to the WTC.
At the same instant, the teleprinter alarm began to transmit the following: Fill out alarm – 2nd source. E006 E007 LOW LOOl BC01. Box 0069 -West St. – 640′ south of Vesey St. Incident #181. 02/26/93121852. The printout specified a location other than that normally given for the WTC. Engine 6 is the second-due engine at alarms for the WTC. The fire alarms transmitted for the WTC instruct the companies to respond to specific locations, according to the location of the reported incident. I directed the engine chauffeur to respond to the location given on the teleprinter printout. This was just the beginning of what was to be anything but a normal incident.
En route, the department radio reported a possible electrical transformer explosion. Engine 6 arrived at the WTC within two minutes—traffic was unusually light. A tremendous volume of black and brown smoke was pushing violently from the street vents and the garage entrance in front of the Vista Hotel.
As we passed under the north pedestrian bridge, which connects the WTC with the financial center across West Street, members of the New York/New Jersey Fort Authority Police were exiting the B ramp from the B-2 level of the parking garage. They stopped us and said there had been an explosion on the B-2 level of the parking garage, people were trapped, and numerous fires were burning. They also said their knowledge of and experiences with the WTC complex indicated that “this was not an electrical transformer fire.”
I directed the chauffeur to take a nearby hydrant while I began an initial size-up. My primary concerns were the conditions, whether we were at the proper location for attacking the fires, the collapse potential in the area, and conducting a quick surface search for victims while we advanced on the fires.
1 directed members, including the chauffeur, down the B ramp for a primary search of the immediate area while I conducted my survey. They were about to enter the garage when an agent from the United States Secret Service told them there was an ammunition storage area on the B-2 level. The question now was, How involved were the munitions in this incident? The agent entered the B-2 level with Engine 6 and showed me the location of the storage area. Although we determined that the ammunition was not part of the fire, we still had to consider its presence when planning operations.
The B-2 level was devastated. Dozens of cars were crushed, thrown about, and fully involved in fire. Walls and ceilings had collapsed. The piping containing electrical wiring was down.
As the firefighters conducted their searches, I moved into the area of devastation. There was a heavy smoke condition and a red glow’ in the distance. As I continued my survey, I discovered that the sprinkler system had been destroyed. The extent and nature of the damage made it evident that someone had exploded a bomb on the B-2 level.
Under normal conditions, we wrould use 2‘/2-inch hoselines from a standpipe system when operating in high-rise buildings. Two companies would work together to give the units six lengths of 2‘/2-inch hose on each line. Not today!
The number of cars burning, the large red glow in the distance, and all the rubble and debris present made it necessary to hand-stretch from the apparatus in the street. This line would supply a confirmed, continuous source of water. The volume of water in the stream would quickly knock down the car fires as the firefighters fought their way to the main target —the large, red glow’ in the distance. The reach of the stream would permit them the luxury of operating in the safest position they could find while still extinguishing the large body of fire awaiting them. Most importantly, the 2’/2-inch hoseline was their link to the outside: It would guide them out or, in the worst-case scenario, lead responders to them if they became victims.
Quickly returning to the B ramp, I ordered that a 2’/2-inch hoseline be hand-stretched. The firefighters, meanwhile, had rescued two civilians from the collapsed rubble. Both were severely burned, had suffered lacerations, and were in shock. Shouting orders while on the run, I raced to the apparatus and transmitted the signal “10-45” (victims severely injured and/or burned) on the department radio. The time was 1223 hours.
While the chauffeur was running to the apparatus to begin hooking up to the hydrant, he saw EMS ambulances responding down West Street and quickly went into the roadway, stopped the ambulances, and requested assistance for the two burned victims. With EMS and the police treating the civilians, Engine 6 now was able to turn its full attention to the long hand-stretch.
Reentering the garage dragging the uncharged hand line, the firefighters began the struggle of stretching over the collapsed debris, under the downed pipes, and around collapsing walls. During this time, explosions were occurring all around them. It took a few moments to realize that the explosions were caused by burning car tires and were not secondary bomb explosions —at least they hoped it was car tires.
During the stretching of the hoseline, a third victim suddenly appeared out of the flames and smoke, startling the firefighters for an instant. One of the firefighters moved quickly among the burning cars and under the downed pipes to grab the victim, who was heading toward the main fire. After turning the third victim over to EMS, the firefighters returned to continue with the hand-stretch of the hoseline.
ENGINE 7 ASSISTS
Engine 7 arrived at the scene. The lieutenant observed Engine 6’s stretching of the hoseline and directed his firefighters to assist. An employee of the New York Telephone Company and a member of the Syosset (NY) Volunteer Fire Department helped with the hand-stretch and then remained for many hours to help Engine 6’s chauffeur. The additional help on the handline enabled Engine 6 to begin the attack on the fire.
Engine 7 returned to the street and started a second 2’/2-inch hoseline down the B ramp. I informed the firefighters that the car fires had to be knocked down as quickly and as safely as possible so that they could address the main target —the big red glow in the distance. Engine 7, in the meantime, would stretch a handline and operate to the right of Engine 6, where many more car fires were encountered.
Engine 6 began its attack. With the firefighters spread out on the hoseline, the nozzleman opened the nozzle, bouncing the water off the interior roofs of the cars, breaking up the stream, and then shooting the water under the cars’ hoods and at each wheel well. The fires were quickly extinguished. The nozzle then was shut down, making the line easier and safer to move in the debris while moving on to the next car. With the controlman and the doorman pulling hose while watching everyone and the surrounding area for hazards, Engine 6 repeated this operation again and again until the crew arrived at the main body of fire.
Suddenly, another danger presented itself. The force of the explosion had crushed dozens of cars, rupturing their gas tanks, oil crank cases, and transmission and brake hoses; the floors became covered with gasoline and oil. We became aware of this problem when the nozzleman and the backup man, operating under a heavy smoke condition, began to slide down into a huge crater created by a collapsed portion of the garage floor that was at a 45-degree angle. Flames lapped at their legs, and everyone moved quickly. The doorman and controlman grabbed the backup man, while I grabbed the nozzleman. We almost became victims, however, as the oily floor made it necessary for us to struggle to maintain our footing. The backup man was rescued first. Working together, the crew got the nozzleman back on level ground. Moving back a short distance, Engine 6 regrouped, pulled the hoseline back, and repositioned themselves at another point on the edge of the bomb crater.
ARRIVAL AT THE PRIMARY FIRE
We had reached our main target. The reach of the 2’/2-inch hoseline now was brought into play. The bomb crater was huge, and a tremendous fire was burning. Our 45-minute SCBA air pack alarms began to ring. Our chauffeur appeared with spare cylinders. Concerned about our safety, he made repeated entries into the bomb area. Engine 7’s officer and chauffeur were working as a team to monitor pumper operations.
I was unable to contact the command post on the street level from our below-grade location. As senior officer at the location, I checked on the safety and progress of Engine 7 and the members of Ladder 1, who were conducting primary searches of the burned cars. Moving around the area—climbing over, under, and around all the hazards and debris— was extremely dangerous, but the safety of the members was of paramount importance.
MAIN GOALS: PROTECT AND EXTINGUISH
Early in suppression operations, Firefighter Kevin Shea fell into the bomb crater. When this occurred, Engine 6 was the only unit with the necessary water pressure and volume operating into the bomb crater. Our primary focus, therefore, became the protection of Firefighter Shea and his rescuers in addition to the extinguishment objective. For the good part of an hour, Engine 6 firefighters worked to accomplish these goals, rotating positions on the handline numerous times in an effort to conserve as much strength as possible without jeopardizing safety and operations. As more units arrived on the scene and advanced toward the bomb crater, the crater fire began to darken down, Shea was removed from the hole (see page 59), and the main body of fire was extinguished.
Relief units arrived on the B-2 level after 1400 hours, and the first-alarm operating units were able to leave the area. As Engines 6 and 7 emerged up the B ramp after almost two hours on the B-2 level, their members confronted a scene that was unbelievable. The quantity of equipment and number of personnel on the scene were mindboggling.
During operations, the members were so intently focused on extinguishing the many fires and protecting each other that they did not realize the beating they had taken: smoke inhalation, traumas from falling concrete, hitting downed pipes, and falling over collapsed debris. Engine companies 6 and 7 were taken to St. Vincent’s Hospital in Greenwich Village, where the hospital’s disaster plans were in full operation.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- For engine companies, the deci-
- sion to apply water and knock down the fires, thereby reducing smoke development, played an important role in the outcome of the incident— just as important as locating victims in and removing them from the immediate blast area.
- Company commanders play an important role in relaying initial conditions of their “slice” of a major incident—in this case, for example, relaying information on the extent of the explosion to help the incident commander establish the magnitude of the incident.
- Although the 2’/2-inch handline is more difficult to maneuver, speed was not compromised due to the need to move slowly around the crater —leaking vehicle fuels, water, and so on made the floor and surfaces very slippery, threatening to plunge members into the crater. The 2’/2-inch hoseline placed greater physical demands on firefighters, but it provided the vol-
- ume and reach needed for fire extinguishment and member protection.
- Gather as much information from a variety of sources as possible in making size-up determinations and tactical decisions. Many factors entered into the decision to operate down the B ramp and hand-stretch our line, including information from the off-duty firefighter, the teleprinter. the department radio, Port Authority Police, and the Secret Service agent, plus a number of on-scene tangibles and intangibles, including
— the visual inspection of the blast site;
— the nonoperating sprinkler system;
—achieving a positive, confirmed water supply;
— the training and experience of members;
—our ability to adapt and be flexible;
— our members’ awareness that they were operating in a very dangerous environment and that they had to be alert for worsening conditions;
—confidence in the firefighters and their abilities and firefighters’ confidence in the officers;
— the importance of getting the first hoseline into operation; and
— teamwork and communications between the first-arriving units that made it possible to get water on the fires more quickly.
- Appropriate levels of safety and accountability must be achieved for every incident. PASS devices and good flashlights were mandatory during this operation. In a major operation, communications may lie difficult, particularly from below grade, and it may take time to fill positions within the ICS in the initial stages of the incident. It is incumbent on senior company officers to assume a “global” responsibility for member safety during such situations.
