Panic Piles Up the Dead in New York Loft Fire
24 garment workers victims of fire and explosion in Manhattan’s high hazard district…nets save several
AN EXPLODING OVEN in the premises of the SGS Textile Printing Company on the third floor of the five-story loft building at 632 Broadway, Manhattan, on Wednesday, March 19, started a fire in which 24 persons lost their lives. Fifteen others were injured.
In many ways the tragedy was reminiscent of the Triangle Shirt Waist holocaust of March 25, 1911, which claimed 145 dead. Both involved garment workers; both occurred at about the same time of day; both were due to gross carelessness, and in both, panic played its villainous role in the swift, stark drama.
The old building which saw this latest disaster was five stories in height, measured 35 feet front on Broadway and extended nearly 200 feet through to Mercer Street on the rear. Like so many venerable structures of the area, it was “built to burn.”
The first floor, basement and subbasement were occupied by the Manhattan Plumbing Supply Company; the second floor by the Markoff Hatt Company; the third floor by the SGS Textile Printing Company; the fourth floor by the Monarch Underwear Company and the top floor by the Davan Textile Company.
The walls of the building were brick, 24 inches thick in the lower portions and 16 inches thick in the upper. Joisted floors on wood girders were supported on iron columns. The roof was of built-up tar and gravel construction.
Adjoining on both sides were eightstory structures of a slightly later architectural period. Windows of these buildings overlooking the fire building were protected by iron and tin-clad shutters.
Within the ill-fated building a stairway at either end led from the first floor to the roof. Both were enclosed in shafts constructed of metal lath and plaster. Elevators were located at front and rear, the one in front enclosed in a brick shaft, the other by wood and glass.
An important contributing factor to the rapid spread of the flames were large thick glass skylights measuring approximately 10 by 20 feet. These were located about the center of the long narrow floors, originally to provide light from above. Later they were covered over with metal sheathing and lath and plaster to provide more floor space. Once the fire had gained sufficient heat, the glass fell apart and the flames spread unchecked upward from the third floor through the roof. The fact that this heavy glass practically disintegrated attests the high heat generated by the fire (ordinary glass melts at about 1500 degrees F.).
At the time of the fire there were reported to be 66 persons in the building, 39 of these being employees of the underwear firm. All of the dead were from among this personnel. Occupants of the third and lower floors had little difficulty in reaching the street; four men on the top floor used the staircase to the roof from which they were removed by ladders.
Started in curing oven
It is established that the fire started in a curing oven used to dry material that had been newly printed with designs. The oven measured 10 feet high, 8 feet wide and 10 feet deep, and was heated by gas. It was disclosed at post-fire hearings held before Fire Commissioner Edward F. Cavanagh, Jr., that there had been a previous fire in this fixture only a short time previously. This fire was said to have been extinguished by employees using portable extinguishers and pails of water. However, no report was ever made to the fire department.
From the evidence it would appear that employees (there were said to be three officials of the textile printing concern on the floor) attempted to extinguish the second fire when it flashed, but this time they were not so fortunate. Following the burst of fire in the oven, an explosion ensued, which was felt through the entire building and caused severe burns to the hands of one of the men. As the fire spread, feeding on the combustible material and along the dust-covered ceiling, the men fled. The shock coming on top of the smoke which filtered into the upper floors, added to the fears of employees and helped precipitate the panic.
The oven blast is believed to have blown open an exit door leading from the stairwell on the third floor, providing additional draft for the fire. Flames roared through the long, narrow, undivided third floor “like in a wind tunnel,” as one witness expressed it.
Delayed alarm costly
There is confusing evidence about the time lag between discovery of the fire, the explosion and the sounding of the alarm. The building lacked automatic fire alarm notification and extinguishment systems. The only alarm system was comprised of gongs, actuated by pull boxes located on each floor of the building. Some witnesses reported hearing gongs, others claim there was no such warning.
The fire department’s Manhattan Central Communications Office received the first notification at 3:51 p.m. from Box 342. Almost at the same time a neighboring box (362) was received and within a minute more, six telephone alarms flashed on the phone board.
Engine Company 13 and Ladder Company 20 from their quarters at 155 Mercer Street less than a block distance, arrived within moments; the chief of the Fifth Battalion (Theil) came in one minute later, closely followed by the chief of Division 1 (Mackey).
The speed with which the fire spread before arrival of fire companies is indicated by the fact that notwithstanding this prompt response, people were at windows and on ledges preparing to jump from the fourth floor; and the third floor appeared fully involved in flames, with very heavy smoke conditions above.
The terse, laconic “preliminary” report by the Fifth Battalion received at headquarters said, “Fire at 623 Broadway; five-story brick; 25 x 90 vacant (this was revised later); fire third floor…using all hands…doubtful if will hold… exposures (1) street; (2) eight-story brick 50×100; (3) rear, street; (4) eight-story brick 50 x 100.”
It is said firemen of Engine 13 could hear the screams of the frightened women on the fourth floor as they left their station. The first-arriving firemen saw several women all screaming in panic on the fourth-floor window ledge. They implored them to wait until they could set up a life net. Disregarding the pleadings, three women jumped to the sidewalk. Miraculously, none of these was killed but all were critically injured.
Two caught in net
At least two other jumpers were caught safely in the net. Another woman who lost her grip as she was attempting to get on a ladder, fell and landed on the rim of the net. Her fall was partially broken by Edward Wine, a volunteer truck driver, who was severely injured himself. The net was put out of action.
Firemen took lines into the building and endeavored to fight their way up the stairways to reach victims. Some occupants of the smoke-filled structure were located and removed by these men; others were taken down ladders quickly thrown against the building, front and rear. According to fire officials, had those who jumped only waited a moment they could have been saved.
Great confusion and panic raged among occupants of the fourth floor. The smoke grew so heavy that it was impossible for victims to see the exits. Twentytwo died on the floor from suffocation and flames; two succumbed later in Bellevue Hospital.
Ten bodies were found on the fourth floor beneath work benches of the underwear company, by fire fighters who were able to enter the floor about an hour later. Five bodies were huddled together at a rear window on the Mercer Street side; and four bodies were piled on top of each other at the head of an unburned staircase on the same floor. The other dead were scattered about the premises. By 9:00 p.m., 23 bodies had been recovered. Ambulances which responded in numbers sped the injured to various hospitals.
By a freak of fate, two persons, a man and a woman, survived the fire. The woman hid most of herself in a large metal storage box where water from hose lines kept the container sufficiently cool to save her. She suffered severe burns about the extremities. The man buried himself beneath fallen debris and crawled out when the fire was quenched. He lived.
Even before the wreckage had cooled, an investigation was instituted by the fire department to determine the cause of the disaster and whether or not any of the city codes had been violated. At the insistence of fire officials headed by Commissioner Cavanagh, Mayor Robert Wagner has introduced into the city council a slate of eight new fire prevention laws designed to require added safety precautions and to bring factories under the same fire regulations as apply to other types of commercial structures. These call for:
- Sprinklers in all factory buildings four stories high or more in which more than 50 persons are employed above the street floor
- Fireproof partitions on all floors used for manufacturing where the floor is 150 feet long or wade, or more; the partition would have to be able to resist fire for at least an hour, and would have fireproof doors
- Red exit signs lighted by bulbs of at least 75 watts, and an auxiliary power supply for these signs in case of failure of the regular power
- Removal of glass sections of floors, to BE replaced with the same material as is in the rest of the floors
- Roof skylights over stairwells. In the event of fire, firemen would break these skylights and permit heat and gases to escape, keeping the stairways usable for evacuation
- Technical changes in the labor law by tightening entrance and exit requirements in all city factory buildings
- Inspection at least every three months by an approved fire protection agency of any pumps used in building to provide water for sprinkler systems
- Stoves, ranges, ovens or other heating devices in new installations to be placed only on the top floor.
(The published recommendations made no reference to drilling or training personnel, use of warning signs in different languages or of automatic fire detection and notification systems; some of these essentials are understood to be presently covered by existing regulations—Editor)
Chronology of Response
Wednesday, March 19
3:51 p.m.—Box 342, Broadway and Houston Street: Engines 13, 30, 33, 55; Ladders 20, 9; Rescue 1; Chief of Division 1, Battalions 2 and 5.
3:56 p.m.—Second alarm (via radio) Box 342: Engines 7, 17, 24, 31; Ladder 3. Relocating: Engines 213 to 33, 26 to 30, 256 to 31, 203 to 7, 221 to 17; Ladders 18 to 9, 7 to 3.
At the same time Chief Division 1 requested at least three public ambulances and notification of police and disaster unit, Bellevue Hospital.
4:08 p.m.—Third alarm (via radio): Engines 5, 12, 18, 27; Ladder 8; Chief Battalion 4; also Ambulance 1 and Field Communications 1. Relocating: Engines 21 to 5, 34 to 18; Ladder 15 to 8.
4:22 p.m.—Fourth alarm (via radio): Engines 9, 14, 15, 28, 32; Ladder 5. Relocating: Engines 205 to 15, 209 to 9; Ladder 12 to 5.
4:35 p.m.—Fifth alarm (via radio): Engines 1, 3, 16, 207, 216; Ladder 1. Relocating: Engines 44 to 16, 40 to 3, 54 to 1,219 to 207, 237 to 216.
6:15 p.m.—Special call Fuel Wagon 12.
6:39 p.m.—Special call Searchlight Unit 24 (Queens).
The staff which handled communications at the Manhattan Central Station included: First crew—Supervising Dispatcher Finneran; Dispatchers Gallagher and Krasnopolski; Firemen (acting dispatchers) Matthews and Greenidge; Telephone Operator McLaughlin. Second crew—Supervising Dispatcher Cruses; Dispatchers Ansorge, Garcia and Pearlman; Firemen (acting dispatchers) Miller, Raney, Umlauf and Cruse; Telephone Operator Roethlein.
Acknowledgement: Thanks are extended Fire Commissioner Edward F. Cavanagh, Jr., and fire department officers and men including the photo unit (Hellriegel, Heffernan, Johnstone and Lind), for their aid in the preparation of this report. The assistance also of the New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization was especially helpful.
