“Life affords no higher pleasure than that of surmounting difficulties, passing from one step of success to another, forming new wishes, and seeing them gratified. He that labors in any great or laudable undertaking has his fatigues first supported by hope and afterwards rewarded by joy.”-Samuel Johnson
It is indeed difficult at this time to think of words such as “success,” “gratification,” or “joy” in the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11. If we look at our history, we would see that woven in our very fabric is the thread of overcoming adversity and becoming stronger and better for it. We have been handed just such an opportunity. Those people whose lives were taken from this earth will cry out that we learn and become better through their sacrifice. This we must do and do well.
In the aftermath of the attack on our country, the only way to put the pieces together is to look for the opportunity created by such destruction.
Two glaring facts have stood out as a result of this incident: (1) We have expected too much of our firefighters in asking them to fight fires in buildings that are too tall, and (2) we have woefully underestimated the high-rise evacuation issue.
 (2) This high-rise occupancy is a straightforward 10-story hotel with guest rooms and service areas. Code requirements do not distinguish between a 10-, 20-, or 110-story high-rise. |
Nothing in this article is intended to presume facts about the events at the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11. The observations included here are based on known facts and initial reports of those who experienced this tragedy. It is also beyond the scope of this article to explore in detail issues related to training and preparation requirements for high-rise safety. One thing that must be kept in mind is that the collapse of the two towers [or any high-rise], as occurred on September 11, was beyond what our collective minds could comprehend as a possibility, although Chief Donald Anthony of the Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department had predicted such a possibility after the First Interstate Bank fire more than 10 years ago. We will never again look at a raging fire in such a building in the same way again.
WHAT IS A HIGH-RISE?
Over the past 100 years, we have wrestled with the high-rise issue. We finally settled on the definition of a high-rise contained in National Fire Protection Association Standard 101, Life Safety Code® “a building greater than 75 feet in height.” This definition beat out “100 feet” and “highest aerial apparatus available.” I have a friend who has his own definition: “any building that is too high to jump from and survive.” I have no quarrel with the definition that has been applied. However, I have identified a serious flaw of not carrying the Life Safety Code® definition to the next step.
This feature is quite costly and is not required in the model codes, even for high-rises. This solution is more than is needed for an occupancy of this type and size, yet this method would be impractical for a high-rise building. This is an example of a solution looking for the right problem. If the intended use is for cross-ventilation, it would be more practical to use an exhaust system with air-handling units.
Just how far above 75 feet? has made little difference in our thinking. Yet, I believe we will all agree there is a big difference between 100 feet higher and 1,300 feet higher. How did we not recognize this glaring gap in our approach to high-rise safety? I believe it is because, until September 11, a high-rise collapse was not possible-at least, in our thinking. The result of our not addressing this issue to the fullest is that we have built buildings that cannot be evacuated easily and quickly. We have also demanded that our firefighters fix the problem when it occurs, even if it is 1,000 feet in the air and the only way up is by stairs.
EXCESSIVE EVACUATION TIME
Many studies have been done and formulas have been developed to help us determine a reasonable projection of the time for evacuating a high-rise structure. (I will not explain or defend here any particular method of calculation.) It has been estimated that it would take in excess of two to under four hours-not considering special needs-to evacuate occupants from a 110-story structure. One evacuee of One World Trade Center indicated that it had taken him 50 minutes to egress from the 71st floor. Yet, in the 1993 bombing incident at the WTC, we know that it took up to six hours to evacuate the entire building. We also do not calculate the reduction of egress capacity for the portion of the stairways and exits firefighters are using to enter the building, thus reducing exit capacity.
There is no indication of the time lapse between the start of the incident and the decision to evacuate. It is also difficult to take into consideration the nature of a particular incident. Indeed, it would be difficult for building and life safety codes to address such a massive assault of two structures such as occurred in the WTC on September 11. It is highly likely that the protected means of egress for floors above the impact points were compromised and unavailable to those occupants on the highest floors. There is no possible way to predict or prepare for the alternative evacuation routes needed in such situations.
Our high-rise history has dictated that the building will protect us while we evacuate and mount firefighting activity. It is more important that we address the practicality of evacuation for points below the impact areas, which we assume were intact and available for egress. The sheer height of such a building would, without consideration of the emergency situation, affect the occupants’ ability to egress in time to be removed to a safe area outside the building. This raises the question: Can we justify such tall structures from which there is no reasonable expectation that we can evacuate occupants within the time available to maintain structural integrity?
In the case of the WTC towers, some articles reported the fire rating to be two hours. Under “normal” conditions, this may even be increased to three hours or longer. Certainly, this level of protection did not take into consideration such a massive fire load introduced from outside the building, nor should it have. Without any doubt, it is almost impossible to believe that towers of such strength could have succumbed so quickly. I tend to agree with one commentator who stated that we should not be so amazed that the buildings failed so soon but that they stood for so long.
The question of how high we should build will haunt us after this tragedy and no doubt will be factored into the planning of new high-rise buildings.
OCCUPANT RESPONSE AND EVACUATION
In my opinion, there are three essential components to evacuation issues: occupant preparedness, permission to evacuate, and capability. In some parts of the country, people have become quite accustomed to working and living in high-rise buildings. However, the conveniences of elevators have caused them to ignore the stairways. Keeping the fact that the stairways exist in the back of their minds does not make them familiar with the process of using the stairs to evacuate the building.
Stair enclosures often are not air-conditioned, are poorly illuminated, are filled with dust and dirt, are all too often used for storage, and are poorly maintained. The stairway is not an area occupants would normally think about. Nor would they think about using the stairway to practice evacuation from time to time.
Most of us subscribe to the theory that catastrophic events happen to someone else, not us, which adds to the indifference concerning the “system” of egressing from a high-rise. Over the life span of a building, the stairs may be needed only a few times for evacuation purposes.
An often overlooked factor pertaining to evacuation is that while the occupants are using the stairs to evacuate, a stream of diligent warriors will be rushing into the building using the same protected passage occupants are using to escape, making it more difficult to exit. This is an aspect of high-rise design with which we must cope.
PERMISSION TO EVACUATE
Permission to evacuate is of great concern. Almost from the beginning of the WTC incident, building occupants related their initial response was based on an initial feeling that they were in some danger-that “something” had just happened. They didn’t rely on notification from alarms or some other mechanical means. One occupant stated that he felt the impact and then decided to go to another floor, where his wife worked. They met and decided to return to their offices. He later reported that he had made it out but did not know where his wife was.
Another occupant said he was aware that something was wrong and went around checking windows before finally going to his superior to ask if they should evacuate because something may be wrong. It was further reported that, after the first attack, one supervisor asked his employees in the unaffected tower to return to their workstations, obviously unaware of the danger that would befall them in less than 20 minutes.
One Fire Department of New York chief reported finding 50 employees huddled near the 70th floor just before the second collapse and ordered them to get out just a few minutes before the second collapse. Clearly, we have not done enough to educate high-rise occupants so that they can make the right decision, or we have taught them too well to rely on the building fire alarm sound and/or automatic directions from the fire alarm voice communication system.
In this situation, the occupants did not appear to be able to or want to make a decision to evacuate the building. People often look for leadership in emergencies.
Have we considered the importance of panic? Yes, panic! It would be difficult for anyone to believe that such tall and strong structures could ever collapse; it seems reasonable to believe that we would be safe as long as we are away from the fire area. The standard operating procedure has been to evacuate the fire floor, the floors above, and two floors below. The question remains, Why have we not given permission to high-rise occupants (or occupants of any other buildings for that matter) to seek safety in the face of possible danger?
Neil Townsend, divisional officer, London Fire Brigade, puts it this way: “I think that when people die in fires, it’s not because of panic-it’s more likely to be the lack of panic.”
I know that this statement flies in the face of what we have told ourselves.
Professor David Canter, of Liverpool University, may have put it in a more acceptable way: “You must think about people’s reactions to a fire in terms of the three basic stages of making sense of what’s going on, preparing to act, and then acting.” There seems to be some breakdown in these areas.
The capability to effectively exit a high-rise depends on many factors; physical capability is only one of the important considerations. Capability hinges greatly on the two issues: Have the occupants made an attempt to become familiar with the protected means of egress from the building? If so, do they understand what to do if they feel a need to use that means of egress? Are they capable of making the right decisions and acting on those decisions when faced with such threats?
Capability also relies on the ability to understand what is going on around you. Initially, many of the occupants in this situation had very little information to process to make the decisions they needed to make. This situation changed as they received calls from the outside with new information.
TYPES OF EVACUATION
The most common theories on egress have held that high-rise situations call for two basic types of evacuation: self-evacuation of the total building and controlled selective evacuation.
Self-evacuation, which takes on a life of its own, is essentially a haphazard process. It is based entirely on the decisions and actions carried out by large segments of building occupants. Controlled selective evacuation requires that the building’s management have input in the decision-making process and execution of the actions needed to evacuate and that those responsible for evacuating occupants are adequately trained to make the right decisions and provide the leadership to achieve a successful outcome. A controlled selective evacuation should also be coordinated with the local fire department.
ELEMENTS IN PERCEIVING AN EMERGENCY
Essentially six elements are involved in the perception of a fire incident or other emergency: recognition, validation, definition, evaluation, commitment, and reassessment.
- Recognition occurs when the individual perceives that there is a threat. This perception is achieved through multiple inputs, including visual and audible alarms, the smell of smoke, and a loud noise.
- The above signs lead to validation of the input and raise questions such as the following: What is the source of the sign I recognized? Is the input validated according to my perception?
- The process of definition is more complicated. This is the point at which the individual begins to relate to the validated recognition and moves into action. This is also the point at which anxiety can surface, dependent on the ability to process the information. There is a very narrow timeframe between this stage and the point at which the individual makes an evaluation.
- During the evaluation phase, cognitive and psychological activities motivate the individual to respond to the threat. This is the point at which the initial decision pertaining to course of action is made. If the right decisions have been made, taking planned action can quell anxiety.
- During the commitment stage, the individual decides the course of action based on the initial input. Individuals will complete, partially complete, or abandon their strategy. If they could not make the right decisions, they will return to the initial stages of their reaction and begin the process all over again until they are successful or fail completely.
- Anxiety and defeat can become overpowering in the reassessment stage. If the initial attempts fail, the individuals will become more frustrated, and anxiety will build. To achieve the desired results, the individual must process the relevant information correctly and take the right action. Individuals meeting with success will continue with their plans.
Some considerations here include the following: Have we done all that we can to educate the general public and occupants of high-rise buildings? Do occupants know what to expect in an emergency? Have we given them permission to act in their best interest and the interests of their fellow occupants by moving to a safe area? Have we provided the training that will help them to make the right choices and act accordingly? Have we failed to recognize that the height of the buildings we construct should be limited to a height below that which the great engineering minds can design to stand?
These questions will become more important as we consider the tragic events in New York City and evaluate the potential for occupants in similar situations to respond properly. While we pray that we never again will have to face another such horrific incident that will afford us only one chance to respond correctly, it would be a dishonor to those who perished if we do not take the lessons learned and develop answers that will help others in the future.
EVACUATION TRAINING AND FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS
The Life Safety Code® and Department of Labor [Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)] regulations dictate minimum requirements for occupant training and drills for the workplace. The major difference between the two is that the Life Safety Code® is concerned with building occupants, whereas OSHA requirements are directed toward the desired actions employers should take to protect their employees’ safety. The main concerns outlined in the OSHA requirements are directed toward the nature of the hazard, recognition of hazards, controls or protective measures, engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protection controls.
Both the Life Safety Code® and OSHA requirements are driven by the concept of the owner/management as the source of responsibility for compliance. Enforcement of these requirements often is sporadic and varies greatly from region to region. High-rise management typically is not aware of what it is required to do and often will resist when “forced” to do something through enforcement procedures alone. Management is much more receptive when it is educated about the requirements and how to comply. Because of this lack of understanding, it is not uncommon for high-rise occupants to be left on their own to respond when an emergency occurs.
Another area in which we have seen little change is firefighting operations. We have demanded that fire department personnel carry tremendous loads of equipment up an excessive number of flights of stairs and then expect them to be capable of initiating firefighting activity-higher and higher into the sky without appreciating the physical demands of just arriving at the fire floor, let alone being able to initiate the strenuous physical activity of rescue, fire attack, extinguishment, and overhaul.
Previous attempts to develop methods of exterior access on upper floors of high-rise buildings have not been practical or successful. Platforms suspended from helicopters have had limited ability to carry personnel and equipment. Landing firefighters on building roofs has also been largely impractical, as this places lives above the fire floor in the direction in which the fire is traveling. There has been some limited success with this approach; however, for large-scale operations, this usually is not an option.
Where does that leave us? Do we stick with what we have, or do we look for other solutions?
OCCUPANT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
One of the challenges we encounter when attempting to decide the training and drill requirements applicable to high-rise occupancies involves making a determination as to the type of occupancy with which we are dealing. On the surface, a high-rise such as the WTC would appear to be nothing more than a high-rise business occupancy, defined in the Life Safety Code® as “an occupancy used for account and record keeping or the transaction of business other than mercantile.” One of the examples given is “General Offices.” This seems to fit our needs fairly well. However, on reviewing the requirements in the “Operating Features Section for Business Occupancies,” we discover that the only distinction for these requirements is that there be an employee population of either 500 total or more than 100 persons above or below the street level. There, again, is no distinction between one level or 100 levels above street level and anything in between.
We then must determine our occupant load for the building in question. If we use the square footage in Table 7.3.1.2 of the Life Safety Code®, we would divide our building area by 100. Thus for one level of the WTC, we would determine the occupancy to be 300 per floor, with some consideration for areas such as elevators, storage, service, and so on. This would result in a total occupant load of approximately 33,000 per tower building. This may be too few based on some reports of the actual building population. In this situation, we may be expecting far fewer occupants than there really are.
A review of the “Operating Features” section for New and Existing Business Occupancies reveals that occupants must be trained in accordance with Section 4.7 Fire Drills. The training requirements include knowledge of the following:
- the purpose of emergency egress and relocation drills,
- the building’s fire safety features,
- the egress facilities available, and
- evacuation procedures.
In addition, occupants must be given the opportunity for instruction, and practice drills should be provided.
There is also a requirement for employee training in the use of the fire extinguisher, although this is not supported in many areas where the fire department preference is for evacuation only.
Clearly, specific training objectives must be achieved. It should be noted that there are no additional requirements based on the business’ being located in a high-rise.
Requirements under the Department of Labor are found in OSHA 29 CFR 1910.38, Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans. OSHA offers guidelines to assist employers with identifying training needs. Section 1910.1200 outlines some basics of worker fire- and life-safety practices. OSHA offers in section 1910.157 the following choices concerning employees and portable fire extinguisher training:
- Option 1: Total evacuation of all employees once an alarm has sounded. The employer in selecting this option must establish an emergency action plan and fire prevention plan.
- Option 2: Designated employees who have been trained to use portable fire extinguishers may use them to fight fires. Employees not selected and trained to do so must evacuate the area immediately once an alarm has sounded. The employer must create the prevention and emergency plan and comply with requirements for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the fire extinguishers in addition to providing the training and education.
- Option 3: Applies the above requirements to all employees of the business.
It should be noted that the training must include the elements of hands-on practice under simulated emergency conditions. As a minimum, the fire extinguisher training must include the discharging of fire extinguishers.
In many areas of the country, the fire service disapproves of Options 2 and 3. The preference is for employees to evacuate the building, leaving any and all firefighting activity to trained firefighters. On the surface, this approach appears to be the most rational solution. It contains the element of having the building partially or completely evacuated by the time the fire department arrives. However, there are some situations that must be considered. First, in many situations, it would be far better to have an occupant of the building take action with an extinguisher during the incipient stage of a fire. This may extinguish the fire, thus reducing damage and threat to life. At least, the fire would be held in check until trained firefighters could take over.
The selection of Option 2 creates a situation where only selected employees are trained to use extinguishers and authorized to fight a fire. Although this option provides for both the evacuation of the majority of employees and some level of incipient fire attack, there is always the potential that an untrained occupant may be the first to confront or be trapped by a fire and may lack the skills to take appropriate action. Certainly, many factors must be taken into consideration before determining which option to select. The choice should be made after examining the hazards of the workplace involved, the response and capability of the local fire department, and the capability of the employees/occupants. Note that the employer must select one of the options. Failing to do so often will result in a citation and fines from OSHA for failing to meet its minimum requirements. OSHA has taken these actions many times and has even imprisoned employers who failed to train their employees and develop fire safety and evacuation procedures.
Although some in the fire service may oppose these requirements, the employer has no option under federal law. Both the Life Safety Code® and OSHA requirements are driven by the owner/management as the source of responsibility for compliance. Some areas have additional requirements, such as New York City Law 5 for high-rise buildings. However, in many areas there is a lack of understanding of these requirements. High-rise occupants are left on their own to respond when an emergency occurs.
BUILDING OCCUPANCY CONSIDERATIONS
For this discussion, I have avoided the obvious question of occupancy classification. The majority of high-rise buildings may encompass multiple occupancy concerns including those of assembly, mercantile, and residential/lodging issues.
In the weeks following the events of September 11, I encountered two very different attitudes related to high-rise safety. Owners and managers of high-rise buildings in places like New York and other major cities have had increased concerns about high-rise safety and evacuation training. In many other parts of the country, however, little has changed. By contrast, terrorism, a far less likely potential in most metropolitan areas, is receiving far more attention than necessary. High-rise occupants are more likely to encounter fires and other “nonterrorist” events that would present safety concerns.
Mail handling is being given excessive attention in many situations. Many more deaths will be caused by fire, and even the flu this year, than will be caused by contacting anthrax through the mail system. Yet, there is greater concern in the anthrax area, and the business sector is capitalizing on this.
Add the notion that “it couldn’t happen here” to the general lack of understanding the requirements for evacuation training, and it becomes clear that these issues will not be properly addressed on their own. The fact remains that the majority of occupants in high-rise buildings may not have received any training in fire safety and evacuation or may have chosen not to participate when training was given, despite the fact that such training has been a requirement for more than 30 years. From the perspective of the occupants, there is great concern for personal safety. They want to be trained on what to do in an emergency. There is also greater apprehension about working in high-rise buildings.
The main reason for the lack of training is that the “Operating Features” section(s) of the Life Safety Code® is not being enforced in many areas. High-rise building owners and management are not being required to comply by providing this training. The legal issues and fines for not doing so bring some accountability for not meeting these requirements, but the fact remains that these actions are taken after lives have been lost.
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the majority of fire departments across our nation, there are insufficient personnel and resources to provide training assistance to meet these requirements. The only viable solution is private sector resources that can assist in the training. In addition to the basic requirements in the occupancy-specific chapters of the Life Safety Code®, there is the need to use performance-based options. One such tool well suited for addressing life safety concerns is the “Life Safety Evaluation.” A detailed review of this process would require an entire article, but the existence of this evaluation method should be recognized here. The Life Safety Evaluation is intended mainly for assembly occupancies; however, it can be applied to any situation. The code also permits the evaluation to be performed by persons “acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction,” minimizing the potential additional demand on public fire and life safety services.
The only way that the required evaluation and training will be completed is through enforcement of these requirements. In some jurisdictions, enforcement has not been pursued because of a lack of resources. It is interesting that these requirements are set aside or simply ignored because of a lack of resources to implement them when this is not the case for other “building”-related requirements.
Management-related issues are of equal or greater concern. Building owners and managers must be held accountable for meeting the safety training requirements for assembly, business, residential, correctional, mercantile, industrial, and health-care occupancies.
FIREFIGHTING DEMANDS
Finally, there is the issue of fire personnel waging battle against high-rise fires. No examination of these issues would be complete without addressing the fact that all our prevention and training will not ensure that fires and other emergencies will not occur. As noted, our tradition has been to load individual firefighters with hoses, air packs, hand tools, and other equipment; send them up 20, 30, 50, or 100 flights of stairs; and then have them initiate fire attack and assist with evacuation. It is almost unimaginable that we would expect firefighters to traverse such a great height, let alone with lots of equipment.
If we are to continue to occupy and have fires in “mega high-rises,” then we must rethink our expectations pertaining to firefighting personnel and how they access these buildings. Clearly, it is impractical to expect firefighters to carry such heavy loads of equipment. But beyond this, at what height is it impractical to expect firefighters to take themselves higher and higher by stairs alone?
We must examine better methods for getting firefighters to the upper floors more quickly and safely. We should expect building owners to provide for the storage of firefighting tools and equipment on upper floors of high-rise buildings-equipment storage and maintenance under the control of the fire department with the cost defrayed by the high-rise building owner. In some places in California, upper floors of high-rise buildings have been equipped with air bottle filling stations. This is a start, but more must be done. The only practical approach is to ensure that firefighters can access upper floors and be properly equipped in the process without undue demands. Elevators have been off limits during building fires. Is there a solution in bringing back the “dumbwaiter” and having an equipment-only lift in high-rise buildings? Or would it be more practical to construct hardened elevator shafts and equipment that could be used reliably in emergency situations?
Perhaps this article has raised more issues than it has solved, but the hope is that you at least have been challenged to rethink high-rise safety. We must reexamine our definition of high-rise. We must look at additional requirements for “mega high-rise” buildings. Collectively, through our code-making process, we can develop changes that will improve high-rise safety. Until then, we must ensure that existing requirements are properly enforced. I am reminded here of one definition of insanity: “doing the same things over and over again, but expecting different results.” Let’s do things differently, and better. Through better enforcement, education, preparation, and re-sponse, we can expect to achieve the goal of greater safety for high-rise building occupants and those sent to fight fires in them.
References
- The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. 1995. National Fire Protection Association and Society of Fire Protection Engineers. Philip J. DiNenno, Craig L. Beyler, Richard L.P. Custer, et al, eds.
- Blaze: The Forensics of Fire. Nicholas Faith. (Channel 4 Books: London, 1999).
- High Rise Fire & Life Safety. John T. O’Hagen. (Fire Engineering, 1977).
- Building Construction for the Fire Service, Francis L. Brannigan, SFPE (Fellow), National Fire Protection Association, 1971.
- Introduction to Employee Fire & Life Safety. Gyr R. Colonna, PE, ed. National Fire Protection Association, 2001.
DAVID R. BLOSSOM, ALCM, CFPS, CFI 1 is vice-chairman of the Fire and Life Safety Code Board of Adjustments and Appeals for Orange County, Florida, and a member of the City of Orlando Building and Fire Code Appeals Board. He has held positions involved with fire protection and life safety with several major insurance carriers. He attained the designation of associate in loss control management from the Insurance Institute of America, certified fire protection specialist, and certified fire inspector. He attended the Fire Technology Program at Valencia Community College in Orlando and studied through the School of Fire Protection at Oklahoma State University-Stillwater. He is a member of the Central Florida chapter of the American Society of Safety Engineers.
