Rapid Strategy Changes Save Furniture Factory
FIRE REPORT
The lack of substantial firewalls, improper storage practices, and poor water supplies combined to cause a “routine” offensive firefighting operation to rapidly escalate into a defensive $2-million loss.
The fire, which started in a furniture manufacturing facility’s paint shop, spread to consume an adjacent 36,000-square-foot warehouse. Eight fire companies combined their efforts and logistics for six hours before the blaze was brought under control.
Harris Pine Mills, a large furniture facility at the south end of Hamburg, PA, includes a factory (a 350 X 150-foot, one-story structure of lightweight metal and wood construction); a 100 X 100foot covered loading ramp that connects the factory to a 240 X 150-foot warehouse of similar construction; and a paint shop between the assembly department and the warehouse that is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. There was an area above the paint shop that was used to store cardboard boxes of furniture, and this area probably contained a fair amount of the fumes emanating from the paint spray operation below.
Fire protection for the district of Hamburg is provided by Union Fire Company’s 50 volunteer firefighters manning four pumpers and one 65-foot Quint ladder truck. All the fire company’s apparatus responded to the fire alarm at the furniture facility.
Arriving at 11:20 a.m., Chief Ray L. Hartman found a relatively small fire in and around the paint shop. The sprinkler system was operating, all five heads had fused, and the fire seemed to be under control. Chief Hartman wanted to assure continued control with handlines prior to ordering the sprinkler system shut down. He ordered two 1 1/2-inch preconnects to be hooked up to a nearby hydrant and stretched into the structure. An additional 1 1/2-inch backup line was stretched as a precaution.
The fire gave every indication of darkening down and it appeared that the fire would be easily extinguished.
The chief had ordered the aerial ladder to be raised to the roof, and the roof team began venting above the paint shop.
Problems began when a large electrical panel behind the paint shop wall exploded violently, sending up a huge fireball. This ignited some flammable vapor trapped above the paint shop and communicated rapidly to the storage area.
The concussion was of sufficient force to raise the lightweight roof about four inches. The fireball rolled across the ceiling, out the roof vents, and through the incomplete ventilation hole. The venting team left the roof area immediately. A large volume of fire continued rolling across the ceiling area and into the warehouse. The order was passed to all personnel to back out.
Firefighters operating the handlines in the paint shop had no knowledge of what was happening nor did they hear or feel the concussion. As they began to comply with orders and retreat, the magnitude of the fire problem was evident. The three handlines proved very valuable in protecting the firefighters’ retreat in the face of an overwhelming firefrontf
The warehouse, filled with wooden furniture and cardboard boxes, provided a heavy fuel load for the rapidly expanding fire. The sprinkler system at this point was useless, either overwhelmed by the fire or damaged and separated from its source by the explosion.
Apparatus placed on the east side of the warehouse had to be repositioned away from the fire. The chief, in his strategy change from offensive to defensive, knew that the old six-inch main that was his primary water source, would never be able to supply the water flow necessary to control the expanding fire. A call for mutual aid was initiated to eight surrounding communities for tankers, pumpers, and manpower.
The strategy was to gain an offensive stop on the fire that was extending through the loading ramp toward the factory and to employ defensive exterior tactics on the warehouse. Water was what was needed now.
Water supplies
The water supply was extremely poor in this area, and a tanker shuttle was set up on the south end of the fireground. Chief Hartman set up his command post and assigned chiefs from mutual aid companies to staff this strategic function. Chief Roland Rank of Leesport took charge of the tanker shuttle and Chief Richard Klee of Shoemakersville surveyed the fire’s progress from a state police helicopter. Water from the city hydrants could no longer meet the heavy demand to supply the shuttling tankers. A drafting site was established two miles away from the Schuylkill River. A minor water supply was found by drafting from a creek a 1/2 mile from the incident and relayed through multiple threeinch lines. A five-inch supply line was layed by the Kutztown Fire Company from a canal a 1/4 mile from the fire. The damaged sprinkler system control was now accessible and shut down. This gave the hydrant system an unexpected increase in water pressure.
Flying brands became a problem and accounted for the ignition of brush fires as far as two miles away. An additional fire company, Port Clinton, was pressed into service and given charge of controlling flying brands and extinguishing the brush fires.
Chief Hartman’s main concern was to set up sufficient heavy caliber exterior streams to support the newly positioned interior handlines and keep the fire contained to the warehouse and out of the assembly plant. These aggressive tactics, coupled with a partial firewall, were successful.
The warehouse structure, weakened by the blaze, collapsed, and the fire was declared under control at 5:30 p.m. Chief Hartman declared the fire extinguished and took up at 7:30 p.m.—eight hours after the initial alarm.
Critique
In his critique, the chief noted several major lessons, some new and some heavily reinforced:
- The early calling of additional firefighting forces necessary to handle a fire problem is essential.
- Never play “catch up.” Have additional help standing by before you need it. Never be “out” of manpower at a growing incident if it can be avoided.
- Maintain surveys and improvements of water systems. The water main, laid years ago, was never meant to handle the fireload of an expanding community. The system should be reevaluated regularly in relation to the fire district’s growth.
- There is no way to measure the value of pre-plan. The layout and strategic concepts of this firefight were discussed a year before this major incident.
- The setting up of a command post and delegation of support services (such as water supplies and flanking reports from the helicopter) allowed the chief to make rapid, necessary strategy changes.
- Large diameter hose proved its worth. The laying of five-inch hose to the fire scene provided an accessible source of water in the immediate fireground. This overcame traditional hydraulic problems and allowed for the placing of more handlines in operation with less manpower.
Although the warehouse and its contents were lost, the quick strategy changes employed in this incident resulted in a $3-million save for the furniture facility. The assembly department was operational within two weeks after the fire.
