INCIDENT COMMAND TEAMS FOR LARGE-SCALE INCIDENTS

BY STEVE KREIS

Whether your fire department uses Fire Ground Command (FGC), the Incident Management System (IMS), the National Interagency Incident Man-agement System (NIIMS), the FIRESCOPE Incident Command System (ICS), or any other type of command system, we all agree incident command is absolutely critical for safe and effective service delivery.

The point of this article is to determine which is the most efficient, safe, and sane way to transition from the daily house fire to incidents that require a full-blown ICS without having to use two different systems. The Feds are trying to get us all on the same page with command systems. Recently, they released the all-risk plan, called the “National Incident Management System (NIMS)” in draft form. Some have called this plan the “one-eyed” NIIMS. I don’t know how successful they will be at developing a national system, but it looks as if they are making significant progress. A lot of time and taxpayer money are being expended to determine what this national system will look like. Clearly, we should all use a common command system in a national emergency.

It seems a little crazy to me that we can get some of the best minds in the U.S. fire service together to develop a common national system, but for the past 28 years (as far as I am aware) it has been difficult to focus this much time, attention, and money toward developing a national system that can be used to manage the day-to-day operations during which we have been losing fellow firefighters at a consistent rate.

Planning for a jet plane to fly into a high-rise building is important. Hopefully, we will never face another catastrophic incident of that magnitude. But, if world history plays out, the next series and probably longest lasting terrorist events will be local, small-scale incidents. As a matter of fact, all terrorism is local in the fire service.

Each of the command systems identified above has its strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the FGC and the IMS lie in the fact that they are most effective when used on a day-to-day basis, in local communities and at local events. Clearly, NIIMS and the FIRESCOPE model systems are designed for large-scale or long-term events and are truly a sight to behold when operating at their height. But, most of us don’t have incidents of this magnitude on a regular basis. Most of us live and operate in “Anytown, USA.” We typically operate and tragically sometimes die in structure fires that last for less than three hours. In most cases, we either put them out or they run out of fuel. Most firefighters who die in structure fires lose their lives within 100 feet of the door and within the first 45 minutes of the firefight.

(1) An incident command team operating in a command vehicle. [Photo courtesy of Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department.]

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WHAT IS AN INCIDENT COMMAND TEAM?

Let’s start with what an incident command team (ICT) is not. It is not incident management by committee. It is not an opportunity for command officers to “freelance” within the IMS/ICS system, and it’s not a way for command officers to pass off portions of the incident commander’s (IC) responsibility to others without being accountable for the decision-making processes. And, please don’t confuse an ICT with the command teams the Feds are considering establishing to support the NIMS.

An ICT is a group of three command officers—an IC, a support officer (SO), and a senior advisor (SA)—located in a strategic position (sitting in a vehicle) working toward a common goal. Each command officer has specific roles and responsibilities (described below). These three positions are filled as command officers arrive on the incident scene. Again, an ICT is not incident management by committee; each of the three team members has specific roles to fill in the team process.

In most organizations, informal command teams already exist. In fact, if three command officers are strategically placed while operating at an incident, more than likely many of the roles of the IC, SO, and SA are being informally acted out. In other circumstances, most of us have seen some of the downsides acted out. Until the roles and responsibilities are defined, written down, acted out, and truly formalized within an organization, they will not be as effective as they should be.

• The ICT is an effective way to manage daily incidents, which have grown more complex. What are the IC’s roles and responsibilities in the incidents to which we respond every day? Are there any simple incidents anymore? Compared with the incidents to which we responded in the 1970s (when the concept of incident command was conceived), incidents are much more complex. Today, hazardous materials are everywhere, and other considerations include asbestos, the impact of the incident on the community, large- and small-scale evacuations, loss-control considerations, customer service, media concerns, environmental issues, rapid intervention teams, hotter fires, more toxic smoke—the list goes on and on.

THE ADVANTAGES OF AN INCIDENT COMMAND TEAM

To make matters worse, we haven’t even touched on the nature of our business since September 11, including terrorism, weapons of mass (and local) destruction, secondary devices, and the like. In the early 1970s, our role in most incidents was fairly simple: respond to the fire; cover the tactical priorities of rescue, fire control, and property conservation; and then drive off (actually climb on the tailboard, hopefully in the same physical condition in which we arrived), giving each other high fives and leaving the Smith family standing on the curb in a cloud of diesel smoke with everything the Smiths owned destroyed by the fire. Clearly, expectations from the community and the fire service have changed.

As expectations have changed over the past 30 years, so have the roles and responsibilities of the ICs. It’s not fair to the ICs or the communities they serve to expect that a single person sitting in the front seat of a chief’s car can manage all of these responsibilities.

The IMS most of us use today is a hybrid of California FIRESCOPE (ICS) and the Phoenix Fire Ground Command (FGC) System. The National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium developed the IMS. The system is designed to increase the effectiveness of command and firefighter safety. Each of these systems previously used a single IC to manage small to major incidents. Although the ICs are supported by a variety of sections, sectors, divisions, or groups, it is not practical to expect that a single IC can manage today’s complex incidents in the fast-paced world of structural firefighting.

Using an ICT is a very effective way to front-end load the command system for managing most of the day-to-day incidents with which we are confronted. Most of the incidents structural fire departments face daily are residential fires (recently, the most dangerous for firefighters) or first- and second-alarm commercial structure fires. Clearly, on most residential fires, a single IC can manage the resources assigned to the incident safely and effectively. But when the local hardware store catches fire, incidents many times become more complex so that a single IC cannot manage it safely even after establishing sectors within the incident management structure. The IC and the SO must focus on the tactics, strategy, safety, and accountability aspects of the incident.

The community expects much more from us than managing a safe and effective firefight. Citizens expect us to manage the hazardous materials found in the hardware store, to consider the effect the fire will have on the community and neighboring businesses, to get the owners back in business as soon as possible, and—among other things—to keep the public officials for whom we work up to date.

Again, the most important task for the IC and SO is to focus on the tactics, strategy, and safety of the firefight. But someone must address the other community expectations. The SA working with the SO can do this.

• The ICT concept can be built into any command system. Examining the timeline for these local events shows us that there is a 10- to 40-minute critical timeframe within which command must be completely focused on firefighting activities. Occasionally in these local events, we need to begin building an incident organization for “the big one.” An ICT demonstrates its value during this 10- to 40-minute timeframe. And, even on those once-in-a-lifetime “big ones,” there is a similar timeframe within which firefighters are at greatest risk.

With a few minor changes in the way we operate, the concept of an ICT can be built into almost any of the command systems we use. Again, this 10- to 40-minute period within which local incidents are most susceptible to a host of predicaments is where the strength of the ICT is evident.

• Using ICTs reduces the reasons for transferring command. Why do we transfer command? I would argue the only reason to transfer command is to “improve it.” If the transfer is not going to improve the incident management process, why transfer it? In many systems, command is automatically transferred (in many cases based on ego) to the highest-ranking officer on the scene. In other systems, command is transferred to specific individuals because of tradition and their performance at previous events. Using an ICT provides a strong command presence from the onset of an incident. If you can’t improve command effectiveness by transferring it, don’t transfer it.
• New command officers learn faster and better. Dr. Gary Klein, a cognitive psychologist, has studied and written extensively on how fire ICs make decisions on the fireground. He determined that ICs act based on decisions and outcomes they had experienced earlier in their careers, what he calls “the recognition primed decision (RPD) model.”¹ Basically, it’s similar to having in our minds a carousel we load throughout our careers with slides from experiences gained in previous situations. Every time we respond to an incident, we review the slides in our carousel and find one that is similar in circumstances to those of the incident we are facing and employ the same firefighting methods used in that imaginary slide.

If you subscribe to Klein’s theory, how many slides do young ICs have in their carousel? Most would say not nearly as many as seasoned ICs. Following Klein’s theory, the only way for a young command officer to acquire more slides for the carousel is through the school of hard knocks. Although this is a method of learning in the fire service, it is clearly not very effective. It can be very risky. Because of the nature of our business, it isn’t a good way to learn the skills that make an effective IC.

ICTs allow young ICs to run a major fire with a seasoned command officer, filling the role of SO, sitting next to him providing coaching and guidance from the beginning of the incident to the end.

Recently, we had a second-alarm fire late at night. The IC just happened to be working his first shift in the field as a newly promoted battalion chief. On the first unit’s arrival at the 10,000-square-foot restaurant, the incident was declared a defensive operation because of the volume of fire, the time of day, the danger to firefighters, and the fire’s extension. Sharing a common wall and attic space next to the restaurant was a 10,000-square-foot gym—clearly, a challenging but very manageable incident for a seasoned IC, but for a newly promoted battalion chief it could have been overwhelming.

Using an ICT on this incident allowed the new BC to actually run the incident from beginning to end with the assistance of a seasoned SO and SA. Using Klein’s model, that new battalion chief received a lot of slides for his “tray” that evening.

More importantly, the outcome was predictable. A strong, aggressive firefight took place to protect the gym; however, because of the high ceilings, several obstacles, and the volume and size of the fire in the neighboring occupancy, firefighters were unable to keep the fire from extending to the gym. Everyone went home in the morning sitting up in their seats.

In this case, the new battalion chief created his first parking lot (a $2 million fire loss) and gained a million dollars worth of slides for his carousel (experience). Again, the SO was a seasoned veteran, and the outcome was predictable. If interior troops were not able to confine the fire to the attic space over the restaurant and prevent its extension, we would lose most of the gym. Although it was a significant loss for the community, it was a success as far as the knowledge and experience gained by the new battalion chief was concerned. Again, after all the critical factors were evaluated, this was a standard outcome.

• Three are always better than one when the roles of the three are clearly defined and followed. Again, I can’t stress enough that an ICT is not incident management by committee. The three officers are looking at and operating the fire at the strategic level from different perspectives; they are working as a team to effectively manage a complex incident. Political Science 101 teaches us that a system with checks and balances is much more effective than a single authority—another strength of using ICTs. One of the primary roles of the SO and the SA is to review and evaluate the Incident Action Plan (IAP). If either officer does not agree with the IC’s plan, the plan must be adjusted.

Command teams provide a significant advantage for those who use them, but many organizations will have a difficult time staffing all of the positions needed to manage a major incident. The two-in/two-out rule forced communities to strengthen their automatic-aid or mutual-aid agreements, which allow us to share resources among communities. The same holds true for smaller communities and command officers when developing ICTs. If it’s good for our firefighters, it’s probably good for command officers. Remember, the goal is to be effective and provide high-quality service to Mrs. Smith and our firefighters, not to be territorial within our jurisdictions.

Sometimes it is better to use an officer from the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) as the IC component of the ICT, but in most cases, the first command officer to arrive on the scene should fill the IC position. Preferably, this person should be from the AHJ, but it’s not a necessity. The SO position is best filled by a more senior/experienced fire officer; it is less important that this individual be a member of the department having jurisdiction. Typically, the ICT operates most efficiently if at least one of these two positions is held by a member of the AHJ. But, it is absolutely critical that the SA position be an officer from the AHJ. ICTs can be filled and operated effectively by using members of your organization or an automatic- or mutual-aid agency.

ICT MEMBERS’ ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Incident Commander

The first member of the ICT is typically the first command officer to arrive (typically a battalion chief) and is identified as the IC. The role of the IC has been around for years. Probably the easiest way to describe the IC’s responsibilities is to use Phoenix (AZ) Chief Alan Brunacini’s eight functions of command.² We will look at each one briefly.

• Assumption, confirmation, and positioning of command. The command process cannot start until somebody assumes, confirms, and takes an effective command position. Everybody responding to or participating in an incident needs to know that command has been established and who that IC is. Positioning for the IC has been a much-discussed topic for several years. Clearly, the advent of the two-in/two-out rule has reduced the number of members making the initial entry into a structural fire today. If the initial IC is arriving on the first engine company, most of the time the officer should assume command in a fast attack mode and operate with the crew on the interior of the structure.

Very simply, once the first command officer arrives, command needs to be positioned in a command mode (strategic position). That means in most cases in a vehicle, sitting down, headset on, using a mobile radio to communicate with those on the fireground. There are a host of reasons for the IC’s needing to be in a vehicle and not walking around. To put it simply, if you were a company officer or a firefighter in an offensive firefight inside a structure and you got into trouble and you had only one chance to transmit a Mayday, where would you want your IC to be? Would you want the IC walking around outside in the elements or sitting in a vehicle intently listening to the radio and concentrating on tactics and strategy?

• Situation evaluation. Basically, this is the size-up we have all been practicing for the past 30 years: fire location, volume of fire and smoke, time of day, resources, fire walls, type of construction, and so on. More importantly, what are the red flags associated with the incident? Heavy black smoke under pressure, impending flashover conditions, differing elevations, and lightweight trusses are just a few examples of red flags. Red flags are the factors that could seriously injure or kill a firefighter if command is unaware of their existence. These are all considerations ICs must evaluate on a timely basis to be effective on the fireground.
• Communications. How many times have we read in the assessments of incidents in which firefighters have been injured or killed that poor communication led to their demise? Look closely at the next report. Effective communication is critical to a successful fireground operation, and the IC must control the communication process.
• Deployment management. All of the functions of command are extremely important, but if the IC does not assign units to achieve objectives, nothing will be accomplished. ICs across the United States are good at this function of command, very simply because we are action oriented. It feels good to assign units tasks to achieve goals. It’s what we do.
• Strategy and Incident Action Planning. It is absolutely impossible for an IC to assign units without having a plan in mind. That being said, why is Incident Action Planning listed as the fifth function of command and deployment listed as the fourth? I asked Chief Brunacini why he listed them this way when he developed his functions of command. He said that deployment begins at the point of dispatch; therefore, Strategy and Incident Action Planning cannot take place until units begin to arrive on the scene. But, he does agree that an IC must have a plan before assigning units. If firefighters are operating without or outside the plan on the fireground, they are freelancing. What should we call an IC operating without a plan? Some would say chaos; others call it “incident commander freelancing.”
• Organization. Clearly, a primary component of the IC’s responsibilities is to develop the organization required to provide for safe and effective operations on the fireground. An effective IC must consider the objectives needed to achieve the span of control, the ability to manage companies, and the geographical layout of the incident when developing the organization. Sectors and branches or divisions and groups, or whatever you call these subdivisions of resources, are necessary to reduce the IC’s span of control, achieve the necessary tactical objectives, and provide for firefighters’ safety and accountability.
• Review, evaluation, and revision. It is critical for the IC to review and revise the plan, communication, deployment, and organization factors throughout the incident. As changes take place on the fireground, the IC must make the appropriate changes and continue to make progress on the fire and look out for the safety of the resources assigned to the incident.
• Continue, transfer, and terminate command. As the incident progresses and additional command officers and firefighting resources arrive on the scene, the IC must consider the options. As stated earlier, in Phoenix since we started using ICTs we have not transferred command from the initial battalion chief to arrive. Clear-ly, continuation and termination of command must be considered as the incident escalates or begins to wind down.

The eight functions of command have been with us since the inception of ICs. As noted previously, to expect one person to manage all of the actions listed above and do the other tasks we have discussed is unfair not only to the IC but also to the communities we serve.

The Support Officer

Typically, this is the second command officer to arrive at an incident unless command officers are needed to fill more critical positions inside the hazard zone. In Phoenix, the shift commander (deputy chief) typically fills this role. Normally, this person is a seasoned command officer who has had many years of fire activity experience (and slides in his slide tray). We have had success using the shift commander at this position, but in communities where command resources are not as abundant, the second command officer to arrive can fill this position with just a little training and practice. Just as there are eight functions for the IC to consider, there are eight functions/responsibilities an effective SO must perform.

• Refine, evaluate, or change the IAP. Probably the first thing an effective support officer must do when arriving at the scene is to go to the command post and ask the IC what the IAP is. If the IC gives the SO one of those “thousand yard” stares, the SO must immediately assume there is a problem. As we talked about earlier, an IC cannot effectively assign tasks and objectives without having a sound plan at least in his head and probably scribbled down on a tactical worksheet. Provided that the IC has a plan and can communicate it effectively to the SO, the SO has the responsibility to agree with it, modify it, or change it. A SO cannot continue with an ill-fated plan.
• Provide guidance relating to tactical priorities, fireground factors, and firefighter safety. One of the primary advantages of using an ICT is that it allows a second person to overlook the actions of the IC. A primary role of the SO is to take a fresh look at the critical factors on the fireground. Many times firefighters are hurt or killed on the fireground for being in “offensive positions” on what should be a defensive fire. ICs don’t intentionally put their firefighters in these positions, but many times the fire progresses and the IC keeps trying to beat the fire by fighting harder. A fresh set of senses in this situation may keep the IAP in the right context. Shift commanders look at the incident from a different perspective and can see tactical priorities that need to be addressed or critical fireground factors that have not been considered.

When we look at many of the post-incident critiques of a firefighter death or injury, they often cite the same factors that led to the incident’s poor outcome—poor communications, the lack of an IMS, or a failure to recognize critical fireground factors. Clearly, the IC did not intentionally fail to consider these factors; however, often the IC becomes busy with the firefight and fails to account for changing factors. This leads to the “offensive positions during defensive conditions” phenomenon. The second set of senses and expertise provided by the SO allows the ICT to have a better view of what actually is going on on the fireground and allows the team to correct task, tactical, or strategic concerns that need to be addressed.

• Evaluate the need for additional resources. How many times have we witnessed a late call for additional resources? A late call for the second or third alarm can affect the incident’s outcome and members’ safety. Not having a ready reserve of resources can be devastating. Clearly a role for the IC as well, this evaluation and reminder to call for additional resources by the SO allows the IC to focus on the tactics and strategy of the incident (which is what he should be doing).
• Assign logistics and safety responsibilities. In most cases, if the firefight is still active and conditions are not getting better on the arrival of the SO, the incident will be a major incident that requires a logistics officer. If aides or field incident technicians (FITs) are assigned with the command officers, many times they can get the responsibilities for the Logistics Section underway before formally setting up the section. The same is true with the Safety Section. Many organizations have added this fifth section to the IMS/ICS organization. It’s hard to argue that the Safety Section should not be established early in the incident. This is just another example of the SO’s relieving the IC of critical tasks that must be assigned to somebody at the incident.
• Control the tactical worksheet. When an incident really gets going and the IC is making assignments as fast as units arrive, it becomes difficult (for many of us) to maintain the tactical worksheet accurately. Pretty soon you need to find Engine (E) 99, and without an accurate accounting of where each unit is assigned, it becomes almost impossible to do it within a reasonable time. But more important than resource allocation is the need for the IC to be able to account for all units on an immediate basis. The time when the company officer is announcing a Mayday is a really poor time to find out you don’t know where E-99 is. The IC may and probably should work on his own tactical worksheet, but the SO sitting right next to the IC is in a better position to maintain the “master” tactical worksheet.
• Evaluate the fireground tactical and task level organization. Only a few of the many things that must be considered are the following: Are there enough sectors (again, divisions, or groups for the ICS folks) assigned? Do we need to get command officers into some of the critical sectors? Is the span of control too great for the IC or within the sectors? The SO must evaluate the organization plan the IC has established and make sure that it is constructed as effectively as possible.
• Second set of eyes and ears. Two sets of senses are always better than one set. Pay attention. If your “gut” tells you something is wrong, trust it. Something is wrong. React immediately.
• Protect the IC from everyone. Everybody from the police officer concerned about traffic congestion to the late-arriving oper-ations chief who wants an update on what is going on wants to talk to the IC. Whether in a chief’s car or a command van, the IC must be protected from interruptions. The IC needs to be focused on the tactics and strategy of the incident. The SO needs to be the filter for the IC. It is absolutely critical for the SO and everybody else in the department to understand that the role of the SO is to keep people away from the IC. Many times, just the way individuals are seated keeps folks from getting in the way. If in a chief’s car, an IC should wear a headset to hear radio traffic better and have the window up and the door locked. The SO should sit in the other front seat with the window open, allowing people to have access to him. In a command vehicle, creative use of headsets and seat locations can prevent access to the IC.

The SO role is extremely critical to the ICT. The role should be filled (whenever possible) by seasoned/experienced fireground commanders. The SO must be involved in tactical and strategic decisions and must provide the support activities that allow the IC to remain focused on tactics and strategy.

The Senior Advisor

The SA, the third position of the ICT to be filled, is usually staffed by a ranking fire officer. Depending on the organization’s size, this position can be filled by the chief, assistant chief, or deputy chief. Because of the SA’s roles and responsibilities, a command officer from the AHJ is best suited for this position. As with the IC and the SO positions, the SA is also responsible for eight functions.

• Review and evaluate the IAP. As with the SO, the SA must go to the command post and ask about the plan. If the SA doesn’t agree with it, the plan must be revised, modified, or changed. If the incident escalates into a major incident, the SA will eventually assume the role of IC; the original IC and the SO will transition to the Operations Section. Any changes to the plan need to be processed through the SO, who will see that the change gets to the IC.
• Provide “big picture” review and expertise. With the IC and SO concentrating on fireground tactics, strategy, safety, and accountability, it is the SA’s role to figuratively take a step back from the incident and look at it from a more global perspective. In our earlier example of the local hardware store fire, the SA would be concerned about and attempt to deal with the impact on the community of any hazardous materials in the store, the long-term effects of the fire on the community, the impact the smoke is having on the neighborhood, and what will happen to the other occupancies if the power to those establishments is shut off. The list goes on and on. Basically, all of the stuff that the IC and SO are not working on becomes the SA’s responsibilities.
• Review the tactical organizational structure. As the incident escalates, the SA needs to review the tactical organization the IC and SO are developing and make any needed changes. Have they developed the safety sectors? Do they have accountability of all their firefighters? Do they have the fireground geographically divided appropriately? Do they need to begin to establish branches, or is it time to start getting ready to switch gears to a much larger command organization for a large-scale incident? The tactical organizational framework is the responsibility of the IC and the SO, but the SA should review that structure.
• Develop a strategic organization. In a pure example of the IMS, the strategic level of command exists with the IC, the IC’s staff, and the sections. Basically, using an ICT allows for a smooth transition from medium-sized to large incidents. The SA is responsible for making this decision and coordinating the transition. When the transition takes place, the SA assumes overall command of the incident (off the radio) and the SO and (original) IC assume the Operations Section of the IMS or ICS. The SA is also responsible for filling the other sections in IMS. The SA should fill the roles of Logistics, Planning, Safety, and Finance/Administration on an as-needed basis. Many organizations have recognized the importance of a Safety Section and have added it to the ICS. (A personal note: I have never seen a line-of-duty death report listing the lack of a Finance/Administration Section as the cause of the death or injury.)
• Liaison with other agencies and elected officials. As much as we hate to admit it, this can be a critical function for somebody on the ICT to fill during a “local” event. Ask any chief. This is a critical role during significant events in most communities if for no other reason than continued employment. Depending on the type of incident, elected officials need to know what the impact on the community will be. Evacuations during incidents can have a significant impact on individuals in the community. Other agencies must understand what the IAP is and what their role in the incident is.
• Do not get involved with fireground tactics. This is where the system must prevent incident command by committee. Once the SA is comfortable with the IAP, he must step away from the IC’s and SO’s tactical decision making. They must be trusted to make good decisions. Although this is easy to say and even easier to write here, it can be extremely difficult to do for less experienced officers filling the role of SA. I have watched many command teams operate, most of them effectively and occasionally others with some struggle. More times than not, the problem with the team’

  IMS/ICS VS. THE COMMAND TEAM APPROACH

  Let’s compare the roles and responsibilities of an ICT with those in the typical NIIMS or FIRESCOPE model. To do this, we will look at a natural transition between the types of incidents we face on a daily level and some major incidents that hopefully we won’t ever have to face.

  We all respond to residential fires. In most cases, they are our “bread and butter” types of incidents. In this scenario, typically a single incident commander supported by an aide can effectively manage the incident. Organizationally, both systems are in sync with each other. They each operate with the first-arriving person (typically an engine or ladder company officer) being the IC (IC-1). Then, as the first command officer arrives, command is transferred to that person (IC-2). But, as the incident escalates to the 10,000-square-foot warehouse, the command organization becomes more critical. This is the point at which the ICT begins to demonstrate its value over other types of command organizations.

  Using the ICT process, IC-2 is now supported by an experienced, higher-ranking command officer. In a few minutes, another higher-ranking command officer will arrive and fill the role of SA. These support positions come at a most critical time in the event, usually between 10 and 40 minutes into an incident, when we are most challenged. This is the point where the incident strategy becomes most critical—the point at which the initial firefighters are beginning to run low on air and fire conditions will significantly worsen or begin to improve. And, most importantly, this is the time when a front-end loaded command system is most effective for looking out for the safety of the firefighters. This is where we face a critical decision-making point in the IAP. This is the point at which we are deciding whether to leave firefighters inside the structure to operate in an offensive firefight or to bring them outside and transition to a defensive strategy.

  This is the point in a firefight where the ICT is at its strength. This is the time in a structural fire timeline when command must be at its strongest. This is also the point in time in other systems when IC-2 begins to operate as the Operations Section, and now you have IC-2 operating alone, unsupported, and the ranking chief officer assuming the role of IC-3 and beginning to set up the full-blown ICS.

  Some would argue that at this 10- to 40-minute mark in a structural fire event, we should begin organizing for a large-scale operation to prevent our command organization from being overwhelmed if the incident escalates. I would contend that this is a critical function of command, but not at the expense of the time-critical stuff we are doing in the firefight.

  Considering some of the major events that have happened in the past decade, we always (and rightfully so) say that the system we are going to use on the “big one” should be the same system we use on a daily basis. If it’s not the same system, we will probably not use it when the “big one” happens. Again, with a little practice in using an ICT concept, it is easy to transition from a small or medium-sized incident to a large one while maintaining the focus on the firefight at its most critical time.

  There is no substitute for NIIMS or FIRESCOPE/ICS when you are burning 500,000 acres of timber or operating at an incident that will last for 30 or 40 days. And, there is no argument that the ICT process we are talking about here would be completely overwhelmed at an incident of this magnitude. But, on the local day-to-day operations we face in the structural firefighting world, the ICT clearly strengthens any of the command systems we use. As noted, the value of the command team process is that it easily transitions to full-blown ICS while providing a strong command presence at the extremely critical “decision time” for our daily operations and the “big one.”

  Most U.S. fire departments probably mirror many of the concepts discussed here. But, if the roles and responsibilities of the players who attend these local events are not clearly defined and acted out, the system will not be as effective as it should be.

  The Feds are concentrating their efforts on the next “big one” and how we will all play together. This is a noble cause, but who’s looking out for us locals on a daily basis? High-quality training allows us to deliver good service on the task, tactical, and strategic levels and is critical for our survival on the fireground. There also aren’t any substitutions for strong tactics and strategy, but I would contend that front-end loading the command function will provide us with the best chance for keeping our folks safe. ICTs give us the best of both worlds—front-end loaded command at the most critical times and the ability to transition to the NIMS for those very rare major incidents.

  References

  1. Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. The MIT Press, 1999, 24.

  2. Brunacini, Alan V. Fire Command, the Essentials of Local IMS, second edition. National Fire Protection Association, 2002.

  STEVE KREIS is assistant chief of the Emergency Services Division of the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, where he has served for 28 years.