Boston Night Club Holocaust Claims Over 500 Lives
Cause of Fire Not Yet Established; Blocked Exits Responsible for Heavy Loss of Life
FIVE hundred persons are dead and 200 others seriously injured as a result of the “flash” fire and panic that swept the Cocoanut Grove night club in Boston, Mass., on Saturday evening. November 28.
The “Grove” was one of the largest and most lavish of New England “hot spots,” and was located in the heart of the club, theatre and film district in the Park Square Section of the South End.
It was famous for its paint-garden dance floor with moving stage and roll-back roof that permitted dancers to see the stars on pleasant evenings. This main dance floor had a seating capacity of about 500.
Adjacent to this large room, where food and drink were served at tables set among paper palms around three sides of the floor, was a new cocktail, lounge and bar; a smaller bar at the right of the main entrance; and a newly opened Melody Lounge in the basement comprised the general layout. The rooms were connected by narrow corridors and a glance at the accompanying illustration shows the entrance through a revolving door on the Piedmont Street side of the building.
There was one other door in the far end of the Broadway side of the cocktail lounge and a few exits, which were not used because they were hidden by drapes. Witnesses have testified that other doors were locked and barred—at the time of the fire. With nearly 1,000 merrymakers, divided into four groups, and all of them dependent upon the revolving door as the principle exit, it is not difficult to understand why so few escaped.
That many were burned beyond recognition, and hundreds of others died from the inhalation of smoke, flame and fumes is also understandable when one reads or hears the testimony of fire officials, police, doctors, army and navy men, and those who were lucky enough to get out alive.
Probably no fire in the nation’s history has caused as much comment and speculation, as much grief, and horror. Surely no holocaust has had so many angles, or has brought forth so many contradictory statements.
While parts of the building were frequently called “new,” and on applications for food and liquor licenses were labeled as such, it was really an old, made over set of buildings, frequently referred to as a re-built garage. The opinion was expressed that possible fumes, left in tanks, had exploded, providing the “ball of fire” mentioned by several witnesses. This idea was dropped when it was learned that the main building was once a film exchange.
The one story, Piedmont Street, section was of stucco; the Shawmut Street side was of brick, with fancy modernistic designs that disguised the old plate glass windows; and the corner building on Broadway and Shawmut Streets was a very old three story brick house that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered modern. Dressing rooms for the show girls and rest rooms for the help were on the top floors. Statler Motel guests could see the whole layout from the eastern side of that building.
The Cocoanut Grove had been in operation about 15 years, and in prohibition days was a popular gay-spot made famous by Charles (King) Solomon, who left the “Grove” one night in the mid 30’s to visit the nearby Cotton Club. There he was murdered, and following his death the “Grove” was taken over by Barnet Welansky, a well-known Boston attorney. Mr. Welansky was ill at the time of the fire and is still confined to the hospital. His physicians say it will be weeks before he will be able to testify.
Photograph Courtesy of Boston Globe
An insignificant blaze in an automobile saved many lives on that fateful Saturday night. Here is what happened.
At 10:15 P. M. a passerby pulled Box 1514 at the corner of Stuart and Carver Streets for a blazing auto, bringing engine companies 35, 10, 7 and 22. Also responding to that box were ladders 13 and 17, Rescue Company 1, Tower 2, and Deputy Chief Louis C. Stickle of Division 1 and District Chief Daniel Crowley of District 5.
When the chiefs arrived, the fire in the auto was out, and most of the companies were either making up or starting back; at that moment somebody yelled that the “Grove” was on fire just around the corner.
Deputy Chief Stickle ran the short distance, and found thick clouds of black acrid smoke rolling in great billows from the building. Not knowing that Box 1521 had already been sounded at 10:20, he skipped the first and second alarms and ordered a 3rd at 10:23. One minute later, when sheets of flame seemed to envelop the whole building, he ordered a 4th alarm, at 10:24. The 5th alarm, to tiring additional manpower, was sent in by Chief McDonough at 11:05.
The first alarm from Box 1521 at the corner of Winchester and Church streets at 10:20 P.M. brought engine companies 3 and 26, the Deputy Chief of Division 2, the District Chief of District 7.
Many of the firemen and much of the apparatus that responded to Box 1514 for the auto blaze were already at the burning nightclub when the first alarm companies rolled in to box 1521. No one will ever know how many were saved by the coincidental arrival of those first companies.
It is impossible to describe the scenes of horror in those first terrible moments when scores of human torches raced from that inferno, screaming as they died. Others followed, and soon the street was littered with blazing and burned bodies. Then, as the revolving door became jammed, and the searing flames snuffed out the lives of hundreds more inside, the firemen managed to get streams of water in, and more bodies out of the vestibule where the revolving door was located.
Windows made of glass blocks were smashed and streams of water used to cool down the interior so that rescue work might go on. Testimony at the inquest conducted by Fire Commissioner William Arthur Reilly will shed more light on conditions at the beginning of the fire.
The third alarm, sent in at 10:23, brought engine companies 2, 12, 32, 33, 34 and 39.
On the 4th alarm, sounded one minute later, engines 8, 9, 16, 21 and 23 responded, with ladder 12 and District Chief 9.
The 5th alarm, called because of need for rescue work rather than fire fighting, brought engines 18, 20, 37, 50 and 53, also Rescue Companies 1, 2 and 3 (some of these were already at the scene) and fuel wagons and lighting trucks.
Without the large Saturday night crowd, and if the entrance had not been solidly blocked with bodies, the fire could have been brought under control in a short time. Ordinarily it would have been considered a 2 or 3 alarm fire at most. All early efforts were of course bent on rescue work and first aid.
Photograph Courtesy of Boston Globe
The “all out’ was sounded at 3:42 A.M. on Sunday, but long after that the firemen and police. Civilian Defense and other agencies probed the blackened shell for bodies that lay buried under debris.
Photograph Courtesy of Boston Globe
The entire section of the city was roped off for hours and was under military guard. Streets were kept open for the hundreds of cars, trucks, express wagons and ambulances that raced from the scene of disaster to hospitals and morgues. A half million people visited the fire area and pushed six deep against the fire lines to gape with grief at the smoke and flame seared ruins. One hundred traffic officers were kept on duty for twenty-four hours to handle the crowds. At noontime, on Monday and Tuesday, 20,000 people shuffled slowly along Shawmut Street and Broadway or peeked down Piedmont Street where the revolving door had trapped so many. The streets were still littered with hats, shoes, torn and burned clothing, and piled up furniture.
Scenes in the hospitals and morgues are indescribable.
By mid-afternoon Sunday, the immediate area in front of the ruins was cleared as high ranking Army and Navy officials, F.B.I. agents and State detectives made an inspection. A huge pile of officer’s hats, and service mens’ clothes told of the great loss to the armed services.
Every hospital in the city was taxed to capacity. Outlying districts sent hundreds of stretchers and doctors, nurses, civilian aides, workers of every description.
When the victims were brought to the hospitals they were divided first into the living and the dead. The latter were taken to mortuaries, the others were given morphine as an antidote for shock, placed in warm beds, and plasma was given to reduce shock.
Through the efforts of Boston’s Committee on Public Safety, a Master Disaster File was used to check and recheck the names—a Herculean task the Massachusetts Women’s Defense Corps.
Fire Inquest Opens
Sunday afternoon the first of the Official Inquests got under way, at Bristol Street Fire Headquarters, opened by Mayor Maurice J. Tobin of Boston. Fire Commissioner William Arthur Reilly acted as head of the Board of Inquiry while Captain Walter Smith, U.S.N., Captain Roland C. Grady, U.S.N., Dept, of Justice agents and State Fire Marshal Stephen C. Garrity sat as observers.
The origin of the fire was discussed by district and deputy chiefs, and it was generally agreed that the task of fighting the fire was deferred until all possible survivors within reach of the entrances had been removed.
“Bear in mind, said Com. Reilly, “that the cause of death must be determined by the courts through the medical examiner.”
District Chief John F. McDonough was the first witness, and, under oath, said, “I met Supt. Fallon of the Police Dept, on Piedmont Street, and we looked into the entrance of the Club together. I saw a heap lying in the vestibule and thought it was a dummy. I crawled in and touched the body. It was nude, with the clothes burned off entirely. Then I hacked out. The heat was terrific. We moved around to the Broadway side and opened an exit door. One of my men crawled in with a gas mask and came back to report that there were a lot of bodies inside. The heat was so intense, the men with gas masks went in on their stomachs and couldn’t stay. They would snatch at an arm or leg and back away, dragging the body free. I got a hose line to cool it off so we could work. One of the men with a mask reported there were a lot of bodies on the stairs, and I got hose lines in there to cool it. Then I met Chief Pope and we went to the Shawmut side of the building and directed the work of recovering valuables and wraps to help establish identification later.”
Photograph Courtesy of Boston Globe
Reilly: “Would you say there was a panic there?”
McDonough: “Evidently.”
R.: “Was it a heavy or light fire?”
McD.: I’d say it was a flash fire.
R.: “Any other causes that you observed?”
McD.: “I checked on an egress door on the Piedmont side which was equipped with a panic lock, and found that the panic lock was not working, that the bolt was shot, and the door locked so the panic bolt couldn’t work. I had the photographer take a picture of it.”
Reilly: “Were there any bodies piled up at the door with the panic lock?” McD.: “They were about ten feet in, all piled up. Chairs and tables were piled and tipped over.”
Where Fire Started
Reilly: “Did you form any opinion as to what part of the building the fire started in?
McD.: “I was informed a man had lit up a palm in the main dining room.
District Chief John J. Kenney of the Fire Prevention Division, responsible for the inspection of buildings, testified that he arrived on the fourth alarm.
Reilly: “Where did you see the first victim?“
Kenney: “I saw the first one when I fell over a chair and came in contact with two bodies.
R.: “What position were they in?”
K: “They were under a table. There were twelve or fourteen bodies covered by debris near the stage on the left hand side.”
R.: “Did you observe any signs of panic?”
K.: “Absolutely, Sir.”
R.: “Did you form any opinion where the fire started?”
K.: “Yes, I did. Because I found a body in a telephone booth badly burned near the annex to the bar, I felt it was there, The floor seemed about to cave in at that point. I had a ladder propped up to bolster it. In the passageway between the main room and the annex I noticed that the thimble of the chimney was burned through.”
R.: “Would the burning of the chimney thimble indicate anything?”
K.: “Possibly because there was a grease flue that went up at that point.”
R.: “Have you any other information?”
K.: “After the fire was extinguished, I found that the check room was scarcely scarred by fire. Bundles of laundry still wrapped in the original paper were unburned.”
District Chief Louis C. Stickle, previously mentioned, testified that when he arrived from the auto fire, he saw a man hanging over the window on the Broadway side of the club, and then the flames came up to him; that there were bodies on the Shawmut Street sidewalk and that the crowds milling around pushed him one way and another. He considered that panic had taken place and that it was a quick-spreading fire. This was corroborated by Deputy Chief Daniel Crowley.
When questioned by Commissioner Reilly as to where the fire had started, Chief Crowley said, “I’d say on the Broadway side of the building on the street floor.”
District Chief Wm. J. Mahoney was asked, “Have you any idea where the fire started?”
“It was my impression that it was in the corridor at the Broadway end.”
Chief Mahoney testified that, “We got forty bodies out of the cocktail lounge on the Piedmont Street side and at the foot of the stairs—they were burned frightfully.”
Com. Reilly asked, “How do you think the fire got downstairs?”
“The flash, I would say, with all that stuff heated to the ignition point and then a swoop of flame touching it off.”
H. C. Gray of Waltham stated that he was seated with a party in the main dining room near the actors’ entrance to the stage at 10 o’clock when he noticed that the side of the wall “felt hot.” Mrs. Francis Driscoll in the same party said, “I smell smoke.” This was one-half hour before the flash. (A Boston paper had put forward the theory, allegedly based on its independent examination of the ruined building, that fire was burning in the walls of the Grove for some time before the “flash” in the palm tree occurred.)
As the inquest proceeded, during the week, much interest was aroused by the testimony, under oath, of Lieut. Frank J. Linney, who declared that on Nov. 19—ten days before the fire—he had personally tested six of the imitation palm trees with a lighted match, and all were “fireproof.”
Lieut. Linney’s report on his inspection of the Cocoanut Grove was introduced as evidence. It was typed and dated Nov. 30, two days after the fire, but Com. Reilly explained that the actual report written in longhand was made out Nov. 20th, and that the Nov. 30 date was a typographical error. Lieut. Linney’s report was as follows:
Text of Linney Report
FROM: The Fire Prevention Division. TO: The Fire Commissioner.
SUBJECT: Inspection, Cocoanut Grove, 17 Piedmont Street.
OWNER & MGR.: Barnet Wilansky, Night Club.
Building: 1 story, occupies approximately 7,500 square feet.
I submit the following report of inspection made this day, November 20, 1942, and in my opinion condition of the premises is good.
A new addition has been added on the Broadway side used as a cocktail lounge room, seating 100 people. No inflammable decoration.
Photograph Courtesy of Boston Globe
(Continued on page 753)
Main dining room seating 400 people. Old tenement houses next to new lounge room.
Second floor used as dressing room.
Third floor used as help locker room.
This building connects into hallway between lounge and main dining room.
Kitchen in basement, free from grease, hood over stove, under side, clean. Cocktail bar.
Sufficient number of exits.
Sufficient number of extinguishers.
Heat, using fuel oil, two 275-gallon tanks and coal.
Condition Good.
Respectfully submitted,
(signed) Frank J. Linney,
Lieutenant.
When asked about inflammable decorations, Lieut. Linney explained that in the newly remodeled Melody Lounge there were no decorations the day he made his inspection, but there were palm trees on the main dance floor.
Decorations Tested
R.: “What was the condition of those palm trees—did you make a test?”
L: “Yes, I took some of that brown material, struck a match and held it to the stuff. It did not burn.”
R: “How many palm trees did you test?”
L: “Oh, I’d say five or six.”
R: “You felt that the palms were not inflammable?”
L: “They were treated with fire proofing.”
R: “Do you still feel, in the light of what has happened, that conditions there were good?”
L: “Positively.”
R: “And there was nothing there that would help spread fire as rapidly as it did spread?”
L: “No, Sir, because I would have noticed it and ordered an abatement of the condition.”
(A weather expert subsequently testified that on the day Lieut. Linney made his test of the Palm trees, the humidity was very high, and stated that if the test had been made on a dry day when the humidity was low, it is possible that the palms would have burned and the inspector would have known that they were not properly protected.)
In connection with these “nonflam” palm trees, which would not burn when they were tested by the inspector, was the surprise testimony of John J. Walsh, Director of Boston’s Committee on Public Safety, who was in the Grove at the time of the fire. He testified that he saw a puff of smoke and flame near the Piedmont Street entrance and a moment later the fire flashed through the dining room along the ceiling engulfing the palm trees and flashing toward the stage.
Bartender Bradley, working in the Melody Lounge where Inspector Linney had seen no decorations, testified that someone put out a light in a corner of the Lounge, and he directed one of the bar boys to replace it. A moment later, a nearby palm tree blazed up, followed by a flash. Then the whole ceiling burst into flame. He and several others escaped through the kitchen. He added. “Nobody thought of that damn door back of the Lounge Bar. It was fastened, but all you had to do was take the bolt off.”
Bar Boy Drops Match
The next witness was sixteen-yearold Stanley Tomaszewski, who had previously stated that he had seen the fire in other parts of the Grove than the Melody Lounge.
Com. Reilly: “You are here as a volunteer. We appreciate all the good things you have done for us. We want you to tell what you saw and did that night.”
The youth told how he got a job as a bus boy on Friday and Saturday nights, and then as a bar boy serving drinks. This phase of the evidence is being investigated by State Labor Commissioner James T. Morriarty because it is illegal for minors to work after 10 o’clock at night in a place which serves liquor.
Com. Reilly: “How many exits are there in the Melody Lounge?”
Tomaszewski: “Two. Up the stairs and out through the kitchen.”
R : “Tell us what happened.”
Greatly shaken, the boy told how he was sent to replace a light bulb that had been unscrewed by a soldier sitting with a girl in dark corner. “I got up on a chair and put in the light bulb. Then I saw there was a fire in the Palm Tree. I tried to pull down the curtains on the ceiling.”
R: “Were the leaves of the palm tree afire?”
T: “Yes. they were burning.”
R: “Was the room filled?”
T: “It was packed.”
R: “Did the drapes on the ceiling catch fire?”
T: “Yes, they were burning. The whole room was ablaze at the top. It came so fast, it was worse than any gasoline fire I ever saw.”
R: “Had the light bulb been removed?”
T: “No, Sir. just loosened.”
R: “Was there more than one bulb at the palm tree?”
T:“I saw only one near the ceiling.” R:“Did you light a match there?”
T:“Yes.”
R:“Why?”
T: “So I would be able to locate the bulb.”
R:“What did you do with the match?” T:“I shook it out, got down, and stepped on it on the floor.”
R: “How tall was the palm tree?”
T:“It was from the floor to the ceiling.”
The dark, slim, good-looking youth was assured by authorities that he would not be prosecuted for the accidental start of the fire. He testified that when he screwed the bulb into the socket, the light came on and there was no short circuit.
John J. Rizzo, a waiter, caught in the milling crowd at the Terrace, was thrown down the stairs. “When I saw the blaze in the main dining room, it was like a forest fire running through the trees.”
One man, Daniel M. Weis, cashier at the Grove, testified that he remained in the burning building during the entire fire and emerged with only slight burns and a severe sore throat.
He said he was behind the bar in the Melody Lounge when the flash of fire raced from the palm tree to the ceiling coverings. “It all burned off in about two and a half minutes,” he said. “I threw water on the blaze and it was out—in the Lounge in a few minutes.”
He then went into the kitchen, stayed there for 5 minutes and after that the fire was over as far as he was concerned. It had raced upstairs to sweep unchecked through the curtains, drapes, and palm grove.
Photographs made in the kitchen, next to the Melody Lounge, showed surprisingly few signs of fire.
Weis testified that when the cigaret smoke got thick he turned on the ventilating system, which was working at the time of the fire.
When questioned about the smell and taste of the smoke, mentioned by many as being different from smoke at ordinary fires, he said, “I got sort of a sweet taste. It made my nose and throat dry.”
(Doctors at the hospitals said they believed something more than carbon monoxide had entered the lungs of many of the victims.)
Another waiter told of his inability to open a door from the kitchen, through which many could have escaped, because the key was in the possession of Barnet Welansky, the proprietor, who was in the Massachusetts General Hospital during the fire.
Building Commissioner for Boston, lames H. Mooney, testified that he tried to enter the building, got part way in. but had to come out because of the smoke. “I remembered a sliding roof, and found the apparatus that worked it, but there was no power, and I had to get down.
Com. Reilly: “Can you tell us about the structure itself?”
Mooney: “The main building appeared to be built of concrete—of incombustible material.”
Mooney said there were four doors on Shawmut Street, one on Broadway, three on Piedmont Street. He also said there were three exits to the Melody Lounge.
Reilly: “Do you think there were sufficient number of exits?”
Mooney: “Yes, I do, for the building.”
He then testified that there were four casement windows of large dimension and windows filled with glass blocks, but they were not considered as windows. Asked on what basis he made his statement that there were enough exits, Mooney stated that the Grove had 279 3/4 inches of total egress in its openings. This, he said, would make the place available for 1,938 people on the basis of the theatre laws.
Reilly: “How do you account for such a loss of life?”
Mooney: “I do not believe people ever reached the means of egress.”
Mooney further said, “There were sufficient exits to comply with the law. They were not marked, but they do not have to be under state law, and my department can only follow the law. The law requires only two exits in restaurants. Sprinklers might have reduced the toll of lives, but restaurants do not have to have sprinklers.”
Exits
A summary of testimony discloses that there were a total of six exits: (1) The main doorway on Piedmont Street with a revolving door which quickly became jammed as flames poured up from the Melody Lounge in the basement; (2) A door with a “panic lock” that led onto Piedmont Street bolted by a second lock; (3) A door leading from the new cocktail lounge onto Broadway Street, which became blocker! by victims; (4) An exit door leading from the main dining hall on Shawmut Street, covered by draperies; (5) A service entrance leading to the kitchen next to the Melody Lounge; (6) An entrance leading to second floor lockers and third floor dressing rooms for employees and performers. Both exits to Shawmut Street were heavily bolted on order from the management and had to be broken down by the firemen. One of them provided the only means of escape from the Melody Lounge other than the flameenveloped staircase.
Panic Door Locked
The panic door out through the check room was locked. There was a door to the dressing room of the chorus in the rear which was kept closed for the privacy of the girls. That door was broken open by firemen to permit exit to Shawmut Street.
The Grove itself is a one-story structure, covering more than half a block. A large part of the walls are solid, without windows. The Piedmont Street side was a solid cement wall.
The stairway from the Melody Lounge in the basement comes up close to the check room, where the locked “panic” door was located. The kitchen, off the Lounge in the basement, has a narrow door which was not reached at first because the inner door was closed. The two first floor windows had four iron bars across them. These bars were not removed. Upper windows had no bars, and victims jumped from them.
Rubin O. Bodenhorn, describing himself as designer of most of the night clubs in Boston, testified that he first designed the Grove in 1927, and redesigned the Melody Lounge in 1938. He testified that the decorations of the Cocoanut Grove were as follows:
Ceilings—blue satin. Supposed to be flame proofed. Walls—rattan and artificial leather. He had never tested the materials to find out if they were flame proof, and did not know if anyone connected with the Grove had.
(Continued on page 763)
(Continued from page 754)
He told of elaborate flame proofing in connection with the original intallation of palm trees, cocoanuts and wall coverings, but added that all this needed annual renewal, and the ceilings, an annual fire-proofing treatment. When asked if this had been done, he said he did not know. He felt sure that the fire was not caused by the bus boy’s match, and that it did not spread by the decorations. He suspected some wiring break as the cause. Describing the palm trees in the Melody Lounge, he said their lights were concealed in real cocoanuts treated with fireproofing and open at the top and bottom. They had 7 1/2-watt bulbs. He did not know the solution Welansky bought to soak the palms and coacoanuts to make them fireproof, but he had seen them soaked. (James Welansky, manager of the Grove, stated he did not know anything about fireproofing the place.)
Bodenhorn said further that there was bamboo construction in the lower lounge behind the Venetian blinds, all sprayed with flame-proofing. He thought all the leaves in the dining room were new since the originals, but he didn’t know whether they were flame proof.
Chemist’s Report
At the request of Fire Commissioner Reilly, Andrew Landini, a chemist for Skinner & Sherman, Inc., Industrial Chemists, made a written report of tests to determine whether various decorations in the Cocoanut Grove were flame resistant. Mr. Landini explained that samples were brought back from the Grove to the laboratory while still wet and were allowed to dry over night before being subjected to the match flame ignition test. He could not state positively from the tests that none of the materials had been treated to render them flame resistant.
Mr. Landini’s report stated, in part:
- Blue fabric from the molding in the Melody Lounge over the palm tree where the fire was supposed to have started when touched with a match burst into flame instantly and was entirely consumed.
- Fibrous material wrapped around the trunks of the same imitation palm tree burst into violent flame as a dry Christmas tree or excelsior would do.
- Brown colored leaves from the same palm in the Melody Lounge burned slowly, but freely.Netting still fastened to the ceiling at the stairway did not catch fire as quickly as the blue fabric of the fibre. It flamed for a short time, then died down and continued to glow.
- Straw or imitation straw matting from the Piedmont Street side of the Melody Lounge did not ignite readily, but caught fire after a few seconds.
- The outer surface or coating of the red imitation leather taken from the lower part of the wall in the lobby ignited readily and was consumed quickly before the base fabric showed any evidence of fire. A chemical test showed this coating to be pyroxylin or nitrocellulose. When this coating burned, irritating fumes were given off, believed to be oxides of nitrogen.
Poison Gas Fumes
Medical examiners of Suffolk County stated on December 2nd that “something deadly” in the smoke of the Grove fire had gassed the victims and that pathological evidence will be introduced at the state probe.
Dr. Timothy Leary, one of the examiners, declared, “there is no question that there was something poisonous in that smoke besides carbon monoxide and flame,” and added that material has been gathered at the mortuaries and hospitals for presentation before the investigators. (Several patrons of the club during their testimony stated that the smoke was “acid,” “not like ordinary smoke” and that it caused watering of the eyes and choking to an unusual degree.)
Night Clubs Closed
Close on the heels of testimony that showed laxity in many directions, the Boston Licensing Board issued a sweeping order that closed fifty-two night clubs and caused the suspension of 1,161 entertainment licenses. The authorities charged with guaranteeing the safety of people in public places dug through the law books to find ordinances and statutes which have been ignored for years by public officials.
After a rigid investigation, many of the places of entertainment have since been reopened.
Illegal Wiring
As the hearing at Fire Headquarters continued, Raymond Baer, Navy Yard worker, testified that he had put in the wiring of the Melody Lounge, and claimed ignorance of the fact that he needed a permit, stating that he and another electrician had planned to apply for a license two days after the fatal fire. Questioned by Bernard B. Whelan, Supt. of the Wire Division of the Fire Dept., regarding his knowledge of electrical devices, Baer confessed that his ignorance would prevent him from getting an electrician’s license. He testified further that he had been making electrical installations for three years without getting permits.
Building Inspector Testifies
Theodore Eldracher, Boston Building Inspector, testified that the new cocktail lounge was allowed to open before alterations had been completed. One of the alterations was to have been a metal covered and self-closing fire door between the main dining room and the passageway leading to the new lounge. Testimony showed that the door had not been finished at the time of the fire, and that 100 bodies were found in the lounge to which flames spread from the main dining room.
It was brought out by an insurance inspector that because of the lack of investigators few inspections had been held. Goldsmith H. Conant said, “We try to get into buildings once or twice a year but we are short handed. I went to the Grove on October 8, 17 and 24th but the new lounge was not completed and was unfit for an inspection.”
Further questioning by Commissioner Reilly brought out that this particular agent last inspected the Grove in 1936, that he had “intended to inspect the oil burner but never got to it,” that the Grove had no night watchman, no automatic alarm system, and no sprinklers.
James Welansky, acting manager of the Grove on behalf of his brother, Barnet, the owner, testified that the building is partly owned and partly leased. He was not posted on what the insurance provisions are. Neither did he know what had been done about fire proofing the place. He said the club would hold about 900 persons and 100 employees. However, Louis Epple, Secretary of the Boston Licensing Board, testified that the Grove’s application for food and liquor licenses for 1943 listed only 460 chairs and stools for patrons in a restaurant which on the night of the disaster was unofficially estimated to have held approximately 1,000.
As the inquest conducted by Fire Commissioner Reilly got into the second week, more than 150 witnesses had told their stories and many others were waiting to give their testimony. At State Police headquarters on Commonwealth Avenue more than fifty witnesses had been interrogated.
The holocaust has aroused a storm of indignation never equalled. The public demands a thorough and impartial investigation of the entire matter and swift punishment for those who are found by the courts to be legally responsible for the hundreds of deaths and injuries.
Current opinion is that Attorney General Robert T. Bushnell and District At torney Wm. J. Foley will seek several indictments on the mass of evidence they are collecting.
(EDITOR’S NOTE: A review of the findings of the various investigating groups will be given in the January issue of FIRE ENGINEERING, if their work has been completed before that time.)
