BY SCOTT HOLLIDAY
George Bernard Shaw said, “If history repeats itself and the unexpected always happens, how incapable must Man be of learning from experience.” When dealing with fires in high-rise buildings, this statement couldn’t be truer. The inability to learn from past high-rise disasters has cost hundreds of innocent lives and millions of dollars in property damage. The fire service must take the lead and compel local governments to bring building and life safety codes up to standards that will protect the public and their property through the use of modern automatic fire detection and protection systems. Local governments must learn from past tragedies and not succumb to the pressure of special-interest groups to grandfather existing buildings that do not meet modern codes.
One hundred and forty-eight women and young girls lost their lives in the Triangle Shirt Waist Company fire in New York City in 1911. In 1988, one civilian life was lost and 49 people, including 14 firefighters, were injured in a 62-story commercial office tower in Los Angeles, California. In 1989, in Atlanta, Georgia, five people were killed and 29 were injured, including six firefighters, during a fire on the sixth floor of a 10-story office tower. Three Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department firefighters lost their lives battling the 38-story One Meridian Plaza fire in 1991. These fires illustrate the reluctance to change and learn from previous mistakes. The fires could have been prevented; measures could have been taken to increase fire and life safety. More than 80 years separate these incidents, yet similar circumstances and ignoring past lessons contributed to these disasters. Politicians and the fire service cannot ignore the past. The knowledge is there and must be applied appropriately and without prejudice.
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
In the 1911 disaster in New York City, modern building codes, fire safety and prevention practices, and modern firefighting equipment and techniques were not available. Still, building construction and human error are what led to the majority of the deaths in this disaster. Exit doors, which opened inward, were locked. These mistakes prevented the swift egress of employees once the fire alarm sounded. The one fire escape present on that 10-story building led to an enclosed courtyard, where victims were trapped. Stock was piled floor to ceiling, sometimes even blocking the exit doors. The exact cause of the fire is unknown, but it is believed that it was fed by the scraps of linen and cotton that overloaded the manufacturing floor.1 Following this fire, building and fire codes and local laws were amended to reflect the construction and use of buildings at that time. Still, we did not fully learn our lesson from that fire. Human error, poor design, and cost-cutting measures would still continue to cause tragedies in high-rise buildings.
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
The 62-story First Interstate Bank building was struck by fire on May 4, 1988. Fire destroyed or damaged five floors, claimed one life, and injured 49, including 14 firefighters. Property loss was estimated to be at more than $200 million. The building was constructed in 1973, one year prior to the passing of a local law that required high-rise office buildings to be equipped with automatic sprinklers. At the time of this fire, the building was being retrofitted with an automatic sprinkler system. Ninety percent of the installation was complete on the night of the fire. Although the five floors damaged or destroyed by fire were connected to the automatic sprinkler system, a decision had been made not to activate the system until the entire project was completed. The building was also equipped with a standpipe system in the stairway; it was supplied by fire pumps in the basement.
The fire originated on the 12th floor. The exact cause of the inferno has not been determined; it is thought to have been electrical in nature. The fire spread to the open office area and several private offices. It extended up to the 16th floor through the void space between the floor slabs and the building’s outer wall, created by the building’s outer curtain walls.
On the night of this fire, the building’s fire pumps had been shut down and the standpipe system drained to allow contractors to connect the new sprinkler system to the existing standpipe system. The sprinkler system contractor’s employees noticed smoke at the ceiling level on the fifth floor. A manual fire alarm was pulled but was quickly silenced by security personnel on the ground floor. Next, a smoke detector was activated on the 12th floor; security personnel reset it. Two minutes later, three additional smoke detectors were activated on the 12th floor; security personnel reset them again. Two minutes subsequent to that, four smoke detectors were activated on the 12th floor; they, again, were reset by security personnel. Six minutes after the first smoke detector was activated on the 12th floor, multiple smoke detector alarms were received from the 12th all the way to the 30th floors. A maintenance employee took a service elevator to the 12th floor to investigate the source of the alarms. This employee became the only fatality of this fire when the elevator door opened up onto the inferno in the lobby of the 12th floor.
Twelve minutes after the sprinkler company employees pulled the first manual alarm, the Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department received 9-1-1 calls from outside the bank building reporting fire on the upper floors. The first report of fire from inside the building was received four minutes after that, as the first fire companies were arriving. Within the first five minutes of the operation, 200 personnel, 36 engine companies, 12 truck companies, and two fire department helicopters were assigned to the fire. In accordance with department policy, elevators were not used; firefighters had to climb 12 stories to the fire area. The initial attack began approximately 45 minutes after the first activation of the original manual pull alarm. Firefighters simultaneously attacked floors 12 through 15 and set up a defensive position on the 16th floor to limit the fire’s extension. This massive attack, in which more than 20 hoselines and 2,400 gallons of water per minute were used, succeeded in containing the fire to those five floors.
Some of the lessons learned from the Interstate Bank fire include the following:
- Automatic sprinklers probably would have controlled the fire at its point of origin in minutes with minor damage. Local ordinances need to be amended to require retroactive sprinkler installation in all high-rise buildings.
- The fire took advantage of large open areas and combustible materials to quickly reach major proportions. The large open space plan many companies prefer today allows for the rapid, unchecked horizontal and vertical spread of fire in large commercial office buildings. Smaller, divided office spaces would have held the fire in check longer and would have allowed for more rapid fire control.
- Building personnel failed to take appropriate action when the fire alarm was activated. The delay in notifying the fire department allowed the fire to grow and extend into other areas of the structure. Automatic alarms should transmit to central station monitoring companies that would ensure immediate notification of the fire department on alarm activation.2
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
On June 30, 1989, the Atlanta (GA) Bureau of Fire Services responded to 1720 Peachtree Street for an automatic alarm. The building was composed of two, 10-story fire resistive office towers interconnected on several floors. The North and the South towers were completed in 1962 and 1969, respectively. The building was built using typical 1960s construction methods and building codes. It was not required to be equipped with automatic sprinklers. The building’s fire protection features included manual fire alarm stations at each exit and a class three standpipe system. Only two floors had smoke-detection equipment, which was installed during renovations at the individual tenant’s request. There was no smoke-detection equipment on the fire floor.
En route to the reported automatic alarm, Atlanta firefighters received several phone calls reporting a fire on the sixth floor of the South Tower. Electricians were attempting to change a fuse on a live conductor when several explosions occurred. The workers had neglected to turn off the electricity before starting repairs. The insertion of the fuse into the live conductor caused an enormous electrical arc. This event produced a self-sustaining fire in the electrical closet, generating intense heat and smoke conditions. Workers on the sixth floor investigating the explosions encountered heavy smoke and fire conditions on opening their office doors. Workers on upper floors who had been alerted to the fire found the front stairway impassible less than a minute after the explosions. The rear stairs were also rapidly filling with smoke, but all building occupants above the sixth floor safely self-evacuated. Sixth-floor occupants were trapped in their offices by the extreme fire conditions in the hallway. On arrival, the fire department encountered heavy fire conditions on the sixth floor with possible extension to other floors. Firefighters removed 19 victims by aerial ladders or interior rescues. In all, five civilians, including the electrician who started the fire, were found dead on the sixth floor.
The open electrical closet doors leading out into the public hall space caused rapid fire spread. The plenum between the suspended ceiling tiles and the underside of the floor above, which was undivided and spanned the entire floor, provided a route for rapid fire extension. No fire stopping or other fire protection methods were designed into this area. This open area led to the rapid, unchecked spread of the fire, trapping workers in their sixth-floor offices.
Some of the lessons learned from the Peachtree fire include the following:
- High-rise buildings need automatic sprinklers. Because of the large, open-space floor plans common in modern offices, building codes, architects, and occupants should de-mand fire protection from automatic sprinklers.
- Automatic fire detection systems should be in place to alert the occupants as well as the local fire service. Delayed alarm to building occupants could trap them above the fire; a delayed alarm to the fire department would allow the fire to increase in size. Both conditions will lead to potential disasters.
- Fire resistant construction should separate hazardous areas from the exit corridors. The electrical room’s leading right into the hallway that led to the exits allowed the fire to block the occupants’ route of escape.3
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
On the night of February 23, 1991, three Philadelphia firefighters lost their lives fighting a high-rise fire at the Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza. Twenty-four additional firefighters were injured. The fire extended from the 22nd up to the 30th floor.
Construction on this 38-story building began in 1968 and was completed for occupancy in 1973. The building was built with a central core design typical of that time period. Stairways, elevators, HVAC shafts, bathroom utility chases, and telephone and electrical risers were located in this central core. The stairways had standpipe risers equipped with pressure-reducing valves. Adjacent to the stairways were unprotected utility shafts penetrated by pipes and ducts. Floor penetrations were not closed or sealed to maintain the integrity of the fire resistance ratings. Telephone and electrical rooms had unprotected penetrations through the floor assemblies, which allowed wires to travel from floor to floor.
The building’s fire protection systems had been upgraded around 1988. Manual pull fire alarms were replaced by automatic central station monitored alarms. The originally installed dry standpipe system was replaced with a wet system that was fed by two electric fire pumps. The basement pump served floors 1 through 12; the pump on the 12th floor served floors 13 through 38. Because of the number of floors each fire pump served, the water pressure produced by the pump on the lower floors exceeded the pressure limit set by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe, Private Hydrants, and Hose Systems. Pressure-restricting and pressure-reducing valves were installed to limit the pressures at the lower outlets.
According to building plans submitted with the renovations, pressure-reducing devices were not indicated. At the time of construction, automatic sprinklers were required only on service floors located below the street level. At the request of selected tenants, sprinklers were installed on floors 30, 31, 34, and 35 during renovation of those floors. The building owners had plans to install automatic sprinklers only at tenants’ request during renovation.
On the night of February 23, a smoke detector on the 22nd floor was activated. The alarm company called the building security desk in the lobby to report the fire alarm. The company did not notify the fire department at that time. The building engineer overrode the building’s elevator system, which had automatically recalled all elevators to the lobby when the fire alarm activated, and took an elevator to the 22nd floor to investigate the alarm. As with the First Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles, the elevator opened onto the inferno on the 22nd floor. The engineer was able to call for assistance on his radio. The security guard in the lobby was able to recall the endangered elevator with the engineer in it. Again, as in Los Angeles, the first report of the fire the Philadel-phia Fire Department received came from outside the building four minutes after activation of the first automatic alarm.
The Philadelphia Fire Department initiated its high-rise emergency procedures and began the ascent to the 22nd floor. Shortly after members reached the 11th floor, the building completely lost electrical power. Fire had burned through the electrical cables and plunged the entire building into darkness. Redundant power backups and emergency generators failed to operate as planned. Since there was no power, firefighters had to carry out their entire operations using battery-powered flashlights. Also, with the elevators now rendered useless, they had to hand carry all their equipment up to a staging area on the 20th floor. The initial attack on the fire was hindered by the lack of electrical power and an adequate water supply. Firefighters were unable to get suitable water pressure from the improperly set pressure-reducing valves found on the standpipe outlets. It was not until several hours into the operation that a trained technician who knew how to adjust them arrived at the fire scene.
Firefighters were hampered by heavy smoke and heat conditions in the stairways. A captain and two of his firefighters were assigned to open a door or hatch at the roof level to relieve the smoke and heat buildup. This team started up the center stairs from the 22nd floor. Before long, they radioed that they had left the stairway on the 30th floor and were disoriented in heavy smoke conditions. Rescue teams were sent from below, and a helicopter landed a team on the roof. They searched for the missing crew with negative results. During the search and rescue operation, an eight-member search team became disoriented and ran out of breathing air while searching the 38th floor and trying to find an exit to the roof. The team that had landed on the roof rescued them by helicopter. Approximately three hours after their initial call for help, the three missing firefighters were found on the 28th floor, where they had succumbed.
After consulting with a structural engineer about the possibility of collapse and the loss of three firefighters, an order was given to evacuate the building. At this point, the fire was controlled on the 22nd through 24th floors but continued to burn on floors 25 and 26 and extend upward. The fire was stopped when it reached the 30th floor. At each point where the fire broke through, it was stopped by an automatic sprinkler. Ten sprinkler heads activated, and the fire was extinguished at each point. The vertical spread of fire was stopped by the action of the automatic sprinkler system. The 30th floor sustained little fire damage; most of its contents were salvageable. For 19 hours, the Philadelphia Fire Department fought this fire until 10 automatic sprinkler heads finally extinguished it.
Some of the lessons learned from the One Meridian Plaza fire include the following:
- Automatic sprinklers should be mandatory in all high-rise buildings. Automatic sprinklers have proven to provide superior fire protection and high reliability. As a result of this fire, Philadelphia adopted an ordinance re-quiring all existing high-rise buildings to be retrofitted with automatic sprinklers by 1997.
- Prefire planning is essential. Departments need to gather information and identify building and fire protection features that will help or hurt firefighting operations.
- Building occupants and alarm-monitoring companies must always treat an automatic alarm as an actual fire. By delaying the alarm, the building engineer almost lost his life. Also, the delay in alerting the fire department allows the fire to extend throughout the building.4
ANALYSIS
The central theme in all the lessons learned from these three high-rise disasters is that automatic sprinklers work. Properly installed and maintained sprinklers prevent loss of life and property. The greatest opposition cited to retrofitting existing structures is cost. The cost of life safety alone is worth the price of these systems, but the millions of dollars in property damage saved would offset the initial cost. The United States Fire Administration’s investigative report on the Meridian Plaza fire best sums up the argument for automatic sprinkler systems: “The ultimate message delivered by this fire is the proof that automatic sprinklers are the most effective and reliable means at our disposal to protect high-rise buildings. When all other systems failed, automatic sprinklers were successful in controlling the fire.” (4,37)
Human error played a large part in all three fires. Fire alarms in Los Angeles and Philadelphia were ignored, reset, or verified by building personnel prior to notifying the fire department, all with tragic results.
Fire safety in high-rise buildings must be a collaborative effort among developers, architects, building owners, code officials, and the local fire department. Building designers and architects are building structures to “meet code,” but many times these building codes and laws are antiquated and do not reflect modern building materials, building use, or current firefighting practices. Modern buildings are also outfitted with flammable furnishings and finishes. Both sides must address the inconsistencies between code assumptions and firefighting tactics.
One key element that must be addressed is that the local government should be involved in ensuring that proper codes are written and enforced in all applicable circumstances. Politicians must be held accountable and not be allowed to hide behind grandfather clauses that exempt existing structures from implementing modern fire safety technology. Just as when a defect is found in a vehicle, not only is the problem corrected in all new models, but also all the existing models are recalled so they can be changed to make the vehicles safe for the public. The fire service must champion the cause to bring all buildings in line with modern fire protection practices.
High-rise fires have continued to cost lives and property damage since they were built beyond the reach of fire department ladders. To protect life and property in high-rise buildings, architects, owners, and the fire service must come together and learn from past mistakes before they are repeated.
Endnotes
1. “141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire,” The New York Times, March 26.1911,1.
2. First Interstate Bank Building Fire Los Angeles, California, 1988, J. Gordon Routley, United States Fire Administration Technical Report Series.
3. Five-Fatality High-rise Office Building Fire Atlanta, Georgia, 1989, Charles Jennings, United States Fire Administration Technical Report Series.
4. High-rise Office Building Fire One Meridian Plaza Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1991, Mark Chubb, Charles Jennings, J. Gordon Routley, United States Fire Admin-istration Technical Report Series.
SCOTT HOLLIDAY has a career spanning 20 years in the fire and emergency services. He is a paramedic captain and the commanding officer of the Fire Department of New York EMS Academy; a deputy chief instructor with the Nassau County Fire Service Academy in Old Bethpage, New York; and the second assistant chief of the Mineola (NY) Volunteer Fire Department. He has a bachelor of science degree in fire and emergency service administration from SUNY Empire State College.
