FIRE ON THE HIGHWAY

Photos by Don McKinley.

The fire service’s attitude toward response has changed dramatically over the past decade, as this California interagency haz-mat operation illustrates.

FIRE ON THE HIGHWAY

FIRE REPORT

On March 20, 1990 an MC 307 tanker-truck fire shut down U.S. Highway 101 in California. More than 150 personnel from 18 agencies responded to the 18-hour incident, but more noteworthy than sheer numbers was the attitude of the response: This incident clearly illustrated the changing attitude in the fire service from rushing in and “putting wet stuff on the red stuff” to one of cautious, well-thought-out action that produces positive results and saves lives.

THE ACCIDENT

At approximately 6:10 a m. a truck driver fell asleep at the wheel while en route from San Pedro to Newark, California. The truck jackknifed and rolled onto its side, blocking all northbound traffic. This occurred two miles north of King City, a rural Monterey County area primarily devoted to agricultural production

A Pacific Gas & Electric transmission supervisor, Don McKinley, arrived on the scene seconds behind the accident and by radio requested that the Moss Landing Switching Center report the accident to the Monterey County Sheriffs Office and reroute power around the incident, away from the 12,000and 60,000-kv power lines that were immediately threatened. McKinley then provided first aid for the driver, who had managed to kick his way out of the truck through the windshield.

FIRST RESPONSE

At 6:23 the California Department of Forestry (CDF) Emergency Command Center in King City received notification via E-911 of a vehicle accident with injuries, possibly involving hazardous materials. (The call was delayed for several minutes because PG&E notified the Sheriffs Office before placing the call to E-911.) CDF immediately dispatched two engines from the South Monterey County Volunteer Fire Department. The firefighters arrived on the scene at 6:33 a.m., conducted initial size-up, and established contact with the driver, who was being attended to by paramedics.

The tanker was laying on its right side, partially involved in fire, with the DOT placards visible but unreadable. Smoke was rising vertically for several hundred feet before shifting to a southerly direction.

The driver informed personnel that he was hauling approximately 5,000 gallons of tetrahydrofuran (THF). Personnel placed a request through King City command center to contact Chemtrec and acquire any available information on this product. From information immediately available in the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook, first-responding units backed off to a position one-half mile south of the incident and prepared to isolate the incident with traffic control and evacuation if necessary.

INCIDENT COMMAND

The incident command post was established under the direction of CDF Battalion Chief Kim Pennington. Suppression, support, and public information sectors were established and headed by CDF officers. Chief Pennington requested three additional engines.

A second truck driver, who had stopped to aid the first, succumbed to the effects of fumes from the burning product. While personnel administered to the victim, the incident commander placed a request with the command center for two ambulances, one for the second victim and one to remain at the scene as needed. The new order also included a request for the county haz-mat response team from the Salinas Fire Department to respond.

During the next five minutes, CDF placed calls to confirm the incident and request response of the Sheriffs Office and California Highway Patrol (CHP). Requests also were made for response of the emergency medical service and the Office of Emergency Services and Environmental Health. Upon arrival of the CHP, the unified command was established between the CDF and CHP (under California law the CHP has scene management responsibility for hazardous-materials incidents on California’s highways). Both the northbound and southbound lanes of U.S. Highway 101 were closed to traffic. Evacuation of all civilians within a one-half-mile radius of the incident was initiated. A 12-mile detour was set up and traffic was routed around the incident by CHP, Sheriffs Office, King City, and Greenfield officers. An additional request was placed for a “9191” (NOTAM —notice to airmen) to clear the airspace over the incident for a ‘/2-mile radius to 5,000 feet after an agriculture spray helicopter flew through the smoke plume while “sightseeing.”

INITIAL CHEMICAL DATA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Chemtrec information arrived in the CDF command center by fax machine and copies were delivered to the incident command post. This information included two MSDSs, shipping papers, and the location of area sales offices for the product. From this, THF was determined to be highly flammable, moderately toxic, and reactive only under special circumstances (NFPA 704 rating 2-3-1) (see charts). Also, the bill of lading indicated that 5,424 gallons had initially been loaded onto the tanker in San Pedro.

Joint command public information teams were placed at both the north and south perimeters of the incident to deal with the increasing media interest, and the CHP public affairs officer began contacting local radio stations to issue public advisories. The Salinas Fire Department hazardousmaterials response team arrived on the scene. Its team leader met with unified command to provide technical assistance.

FIELD RECONNAISSANCE

Incident command determined that a field reconnaissance was necessary to establish an incident action plan. CDF Captain Cliff Williams, heading up the suppression sector, and Captain Fred Coustette, Salinas haz-mat team leader, used a CDF pickup truck to skirt the incident perimeter via farm roads to view the north/top side of the tanker. They observed fire issuing from the center manway and piping at both ends along the top of the tank. Flaming liquid was flowing out onto the ground and collecting on the highway shoulder, and smoke from the fire was now hanging much closer to the ground.

These observations were radioed to the command post and, after the two reconnaissance officers rejoined the command staff, the decision was made to relocate the command post and all personnel to the north side of the incident. This decision was based on the estimate that the incident would extend well into the afternoon and evening, in which case local winds that traditionally pick up from the north would place the incident command post in a hazardous downwind position. The afternoon weather forecast obtained from the command center confirmed these predictions for that afternoon. At that time the incident commander requested that the command center dispatch a CDF decontamination unit.

At 9:08 a m. a multiagency unified command, including CDF, CHP, CalTrans, and the county’s Office of Emergency Services and Environmental Health, was established and Battalion Chief Pennington briefed all agencies on the dangers associated with the product. The incident agencies concurred with the “let-burn” plan to reduce possible suppression dangers to firefighters and reduce later cleanup operations.

Thirty-two minutes later the incident command post was relocated to the north side. Operational command was transferred to CDF Battalion Chief Don Posten and Battalion Chief Pennington assumed liaison officer functions. The local CDF personnel section was requested to initiate exposure reports on all assigned incident personnel.

PROTECTION, EXTINGUISHMENT, AND CLEANUP FOR THF

During this period, haz-mat team members were compiling available information on THF, utilizing the onboard CAMEO (NOAA) program, reference books, and cellular telephone contacts with Tri-County haz-mat response teams from Watsonville and Hollister. From this information it was determined that none of the Level A personal protective suits carried by the responders were compatible with THF. All the compatibility charts consulted listed only Teflon suits as being appropriate for moderate or longterm exposure.

A call for alcohol foam, a recommended extinguishing agent for THF, was placed to county fire departments and 30 gallons of concentrate were located at the Monterey Fire Department. The alcohol foam was retrieved and delivered to the scene. Furthermore, command requested that the Salinas Fire Department send Engine 312 so its preplumbed foam unit could be used to apply the alcohol foam.

A private cleanup contractor, CKC Inc. from Paso Robles, arrived on the scene at 11:25 a.m. These personnel had been involved in previous incidents with THF and, after consulta-” tions, agreed with the operational , plan in effect.

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

The incident action plan called for the fire to burn out on its own, after which time haz-mat team members would enter the hot zone, open the manway, and determine if any product remained. This operation was to,, be protected by two alcohol foam lines and primary and backup handlines supplied from separate engines. Haz-mat teams were to be suited in fully encapsulating Level A PPE; command did not attempt to procure Teflon suits from outside agencies because the let-burn policy would eliminate most of the product in liquid form and because there was to be no actual contact with any remaining liquid. Furthermore, the downwind approach by responders would significantly lessen contact with the vapors.

CAMEO Printout

CHEMICAL NAME: TETRAHYDROFURAN

TLV-TWA = 200 PPM

IDLH = 20,000 ppm

V. P. = 133 mm (Hg) at 70.0°F

MOL WT. = 72.1

BOILING POINT TEMPERATURE IS: 151°F

COMPUTED V.P. AT 70.0°F is 133 mm (Hg)

SATURATION CONC. at 1 atm. and 70.0°F is 174,947 ppm or 17.5%

WIND SPEED = 15.0 mph FROM THE W

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE IS 70.0°F

NO INVERSION PRESENT / STAB. CLASS = C

GROUND ROUGHNESS IS RURAL OR OPEN-COUNTRY_

MAP Demo Ai LOADED _

USER INPUT SOURCE STRENGTH DIRECTLY

SOURCE STRENGTH IS: 3,000 Gallons_

FOR A ONE-TIME INSTANTANEOUS SOURCE:

DOWNWIND IDLH DIST. & TRAVEL TIME IS: 436 yards & 59 secs.

DOWNWIND TLV-TWA DIST. & TRAVEL TIME IS: 0.939 miles & 4 mins.

SARA Title III Chemicals

TETRAHYDROFURAN

CAS Number 109999

NFPA Degrees of Hazard

Health: 2

Flammability: 3

Reactivity: 1

Special:

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Tetrahydrofuran is a clear, colorless liquid with an ethereal odor. It has a flash point of 6°F. It is lighter than water and soluble in water. Its vapors are heavier than air. ((C)AAR, 1986)

1. FIRE HAZARDS:

FLAMMABLE. Flashback along vapor trail may occur. Vapor may explode if ignited in an enclosed area. Irritating vapor is generated when heated. May explode. Vapor is heavier than air and may travel considerable distance to a source of ignition and flash back. (USCG, 1985)

1. FIREFIGHTING:

Do not extinguish fire unless flow can be stopped. Use water in flooding quantities as fog. Solid streams of water may be ineffective. Cool all affected containers with flooding quantities of water. Apply water from as far a distance as possible. Use “alcohol” foam, carbon dioxide, or dry chemical. ((C)AAR, 1986)

1. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING:

Avoid breathing vapors. Keep upwind. Wear boots, protective gloves, and goggles. Do not handle broken packages without protective equipment. Wash away any material that may have contacted the body with copious amounts of water or soap and water. ((C)AAR, 1986)

Butyl: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Chlorobutyl:

Chlor Rub:

CPE: Poor Resistance/Limited Data

CR 39:

EVA PE:

FEP TFE:

Hypalon:

NBR:

Neoprene: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Neo Rub: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Neoprene SBR:

Nitrile: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Nitrile PVC: Poor Resistance/Limited Data

PE: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Polycarb:

PU:

PVA: Poor Resistance/Limited Data

PVC: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Rubber: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Rub Neo NBR:

Rub Neo SBR:

Saranex:

SBR:

Viton: Poor Resistance/Good Data

Viton Neo:

1. HEALTH HAZARDS:

VAPOR: Irritating to eyes, nose, and throat. If inhaled, will cause nausea, headache, or loss of consciousness. LIQUID: Irritating to skin and eyes. Harmful if swallowed. (USCG, 1985)

1. NONFIRE RESPONSE:

Keep sparks, flames, and other sources of ignition away. Keep material out of water sources and sewers. Build dikes to contain flow as necessary. Attempt to stop leak if without hazard. Use water spray to disperse vapors and dilute standing pools of liquid. ((C)AAR, 1986)

1. FIRST AID:

If this chemical comes in contact with the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with large amounts of water, occasionally lifting the lower and upper lids. Get medical attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn when working with this chemical. If this chemical comes in contact with the skin, flush the contaminated skin with water promptly. If this chemical penetrates the clothing, immediately remove the clothing and flush the skin with water promptly. If irritation persists after washing, get medical attention. If a person breathes in large amounts of this chemical, move the exposed person to fresh air at once. If breathing has stopped, perform artificial respiration. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. Get medical attention as soon as possible. If this chemical has been swallowed, get medical attention immediately. (NIOSH, 1987)

1. PROPERTIES:

Flash Point: -4°F o.c. (USCG, 1985)

Lower Exp Limit: 1.8 % (USCG, 1985)

Upper Exp Limit: 11.8 % (USCG, 1985)

Auto Igtn Temp: 610°F (USCG, 1985)

Melting Point: -163.3°F (USCG, 1985)

Vapor Pressure: 132.96 mm Hg @ 70°F (USCG, 1985)

Vapor Density: Not Applicable. (USCG, 1985)

Specific Gravity, Liquid: 0.888 (⅞ 68°F (USCG, 1985)

Boiling Point: 151°F @ 760 mm Hg (USCG, 1985)

Molecular Weight: 72.1 (USCG, 1985)

IDLH: 20,000 ppm (NIOSH, 1987)

TLV-TWA: 200 ppm ((C)ACGIH, 1986)

TLV-STEL: 250 ppm ((C)ACGIH, 1986)

No further isolation was required after an aerial recon conducted by CHP determined that the incident had not spread beyond the immediate area and into the nearby Salinas River. By 3T8 p.m. no further flaming activity was observed from or near the tanker.

At 3:30 p.m. all personnel were briefed on the operational plan and objectives and all assignments were confirmed. Captain Coustette was placed in command of all operations conducted within the hot zone. Fifteen minutes later the haz-mat team and van, decontamination team, and engines and tenders moved into position 500 feet away from the tanker and set up “step-off pads,” the decon area, and foam-line operations.

Captain Coustette and Firefighter Andrada entered the hot zone in fully encapsulating Level A PPE, and we were likewise suited up for potential rescue and backup. A haz-mat safety officer was assigned and recorded all on-air times for personnel entering the zone. The entry’ team approached the tanker and surveyed the surrounding area with a portable combustible gas indicator set to read ppm. No readings were found around the tanker except in the run-off area on the east shoulder of the highway.

The haz-mat team then opened the manway and ppm readings were obtained by placing the probe into the tank opening. The predicted afternoon winds were strong enough to keep the vapors from collecting in low-lying areas and causing possible flash hazards. Upon opening the manway fully, the haz-mat team observed approximately one foot (about 1,000 gallons) of THF still remaining at the bottom of the tank. The tank interior was then foamed to reduce the vapor concentration, provide a protective vapor blanket, and dilute the product to raise its flash point (making it less flammable and hazardous during product transfer operations to the vacuum truck). The operation was completed and the entry team proceeded through a full Level A decon.

A debriefing was held with CDF, CHP, Cal-Trans, CKC, the Health Department, and haz-mat team members * to plan the next course of action: The second entry team was to enter in Level A PPE, open the remaining covers, and repeatedly flush each compartment while CKC personnel vacuumed each out in a coordinated operation.

Second team operations were delayed as CKC vacuum truck and exter’ nal air supply setup operations required more time than anticipated. This 20-minute period was used to extinguish the minor fire in nearby vegetation and to flush the other two tank openings. The entry team then exited the hot zone for a full decontamination.

A second debriefing was conducted, from which it was decided that further operations could be safely conducted using Level B and flash protection clothing (turnouts). The last plan of action called tor the first haz-mat entry team to reenter the hot zone and continue the flushing operations until tank interior ppm and flammable range levels dropped to acceptable levels. Interior tank levels after flushing were down to 60-70 ppm, while levels over the surrounding soil remained over 500 ppm.

INCIDENT COMPLETION

Flushing operations ended at 8:30 p.m. One hundred and fifty pounds of dry ice (C02) were then placed into the tank to inert the atmosphere within it and lower its internal temperature below the flash point prior to moving the tanker. At this point fire service operations ceased and the various fire agencies’ equipment and personnel were demobilized by midnight.

The remaining scene management responsibilities were left with Monterey County Environmental Health. Cal-Trans, and CHP officials. U.S. Highway 101 southbound lanes were reopened at 10:10 p.m. and northbound lanes at 12:45 a.m., but cleanup continued for some time. Cal-Trans reports that 450 tons of contaminated soil were removed from an area of about 10 feet deep, 10 feet wide, and 100 feet long. Although fire sen ce operations ended late that night, ie lessons learned and the working relations developed in the incident would be needed again for a 3,500-gallon spill of crude oil near the same place only three days later.

LESSONS LEARNED

On April 3, 1990, a postincident critique was conducted at the CDF Headquarters in King City with 15 of the 18 agencies that responded to the incident. Several strengths and weaknesses were identified.

1. We had difficulty finding large quantities of readily available alcohol foam, dry chemical, or C02 extinguishing agents for polar materials. Of the three county fire departments normally stocking alcohol foam, only the Monterey Fire Department had any on hand when the incident occurred. No agency with large quantities of dry chemical or CQ2 extinguishing agents was ever identified.
2. Even with three types of Level A PPE, the lack of Level A Teflon suits limited the operational options available to the incident managers and the haz-mat teams during the early phases of the incident.
3. We recognize the importance of immediately establishing and identifying the incident command post for members of other agencies who are not intimately familiar with ICS operations. The need for all agency incident personnel to wear positional vests to
4. rapidly identify the “players” is apparent, as is the requirement that incident command remain centralized in one place and not “mobile.”
5. Aerial reconnaissance proved a great asset in determining the full extent of product spread and possible contamination of the environment.
6. We are more aware of the need to relocate the incident command post at an early point in the incident in anticipation of current or future weather predictions prior to becoming “well-established” with numerous agencies and vehicles.
7. We recognize the need to reevaluate lifting NOTAMs, as both fixedand rotary-wing aircraft flew over the incident shortly after cancelling the NOTAM and while operations were still being conducted in the hot zone.
8. Closely coordinated, timed activities between different agencies operating jointly in the hot zone are imperative. The 20-minute wait by the second entry team in the exclusion zone while the cleanup contractor positioned and set up the vacuum truck and portable external air supplies placed the team in an unnecessary and potentially hazardous position.
9. Pressure to “do something” by the California Highway Patrol or CalTrans was never a factor. Both agencies were highly supportive of fire service operational decisions to allow the product to burn off.
10. There are operational advantages to a fully equipped decontamination unit, preorganized and ready to respond as a separate unit, complete with trained personnel to staff it.
11. There were site security problems along the farm frontage roads where farmers and children on ATVs were able to bypass perimeters and approach the incident.
12. We realize the value of the current hazardous-materials training program within the Tri-County area and the visible benefits derived by the various county agencies’ dedication to it. Many of the participants credited this single factor as the most significant in producing a safe, positive outcome.