Command Presence
FEATURES
FIREGROUND COMMAND
Twenty-five years ago, as a young firefighter, I learned about “command presence” from the good example of one chief and the bad example of another.
Assigned to an engine company, I used to fill in as a battalion chief’s driver when the regular driver took a day off. I would drive the chief to fires and relay his status reports over the department radio. Sometimes I got a chance to see and hear chief officers exchange command at fires. These extremely tense moments, especially during a serious fire, reveal a chief’s command presence—or lack of it.
There were two deputy chiefs who often took over command of fires from the battalion chief I drove. They had completely different methods of assuming command at a fire; only one had command presence.
The one who didn’t would arrive at a fire and say to my battalion chief, “I’m not here, I’m only observing. You continue to run the fire.” At a particularly serious fire at which this deputy chief was “only observing,” I overheard him tell the battalion chief for whom I was driving, “I’m transmitting a second alarm for you.” He actually transmitted the request for a greater alarm in the name of the battalion chief.
At other fires, this chief who lacked command presence would arrive at the scene without announcing his arrival on the department radio—as all chiefs were required to do. He’d walk around the fire building, watch the fire operations for 10 minutes or so, then leave—without even contacting the battalion chief, who was usually busy directing the fire operation.
This deputy chief, I found out later, believed that by not announcing his arrival at the scene and by simply observing, he was permitting the battalion chief to learn the job of fireground command and develop his skills for determining strategy and tactics. The deputy chief also believed he wasn’t responsible for the fire until he formally announced his arrival over the department radio.
Presence
VINCENT DUNN
The other deputy chief who worked with us was just the opposite. He announced his arrival over the department radio immediately. Dressed in full fire gear—helmet, boots, and turnout coat—he would proceed to the command post. The battalion chief recognized him and knew how he operated, what he expected.
If my chief went inside the fire building to supervise operations before the deputy chief arrived, he told me to stay at the command post and inform the incoming chief of the fire conditions. My chief was very specific about this—for example: “If the deputy chief comes while I’m inside, tell him the fire is on the fourth floor, the first line is in operation on the fourth floor, the second line is being stretched to the floor above, and I’m inside supervising the first line.”
When the deputy chief arrived, I would greet him and relay this information. He’d listen to me, then immediately contact my chief and ask for a close-up assessment of the fire operation from inside the fire building.
The deputy chief would then seek out more information about fire conditions in critical areas of the fire, such as the floor above the fire, the concealed roof spaces, light or air shafts between buildings, and the rear of the fire building. Often, he’d send me to check out one of these areas. He didn’t wait for information to come to him; he got reports about the fire and primary and secondary searches by requesting radio reports or by sending firefighters on reconnaissance missions.
All radio reports about the fireextinguishing process and its final “under control” signal were given by order of the chief in command, not the battalion chief. Several times, when I was about to transmit a status report just as this deputy chief arrived on the scene, he directed me to give the radio report in his name. He wouldn’t declare the fire under control based solely on how the fire appeared from the command post, though; rather, he would first request a final assessment of the interior fire from my chief inside the building.
After a fire was placed under control, the deputy chief would go inside the building and inspect the burned-out fire scene, and sometimes I would accompany him. Inside the fire area, firefighters would be overhauling—opening plaster ceiling and wetting down smoldering furniture with hose lines. Heat, smoke, and plaster dust filled the small rooms and water dripped from the ceiling.
In this burned-out, soot-covered, charred apartment, the deputy chief would ask the battalion chief or a truck officer where that person thought the fire had started. Together, they’d examine the patterns of burn marks to locate the point of fire origin in a room, then identify the cause. The deputy chief didn’t like to see the words undetermined or unknown associated with origin or cause in a fire report.
Before he left the fire floor, the deputy chief would also talk to the officer and firefighters of the firstarriving engine and ladder. “Who was the nozzleman?” he’d ask. “Any problem with the hose? How was the nozzle pressure?” The firefighters assigned to the ladder company first due would be questioned about the searches and forcible entry.
Once, as w’e returned to the street, I asked this chief why he bothered to go up to the fire apartments after the fire; they all were the same, 1 believed. “Standing outside in the street during a fire,” he answered, “you sometimes forget how bad it is inside. These visits remind me.”
Several years after I asked that question, I was promoted and left the engine company. But I read a newspaper article that reminded me of one of these two deputy chiefs. In another city, the firefighting strategy and tactics used in a serious fire had been questioned. The article quoted the fire chief as he tried to explain that he had been at the fire but, technically, had not been in command. He claimed he bore no responsibility for the operation’s weaknesses because he had not yet officially assumed command; he had been only observing. The newspaper also quoted the city manager, who contended, in contrast, that the highest-ranking chief present at the fire was in command and fully responsible, whether he had announced his arrival at the scene or not. The city manager noted that there’s no such title as “observer” in the fire service chain of command.
Proactive Decision-Making
Many factors enter into the decision on whether to summon additional assistance to the scene or control the fire with the firefighters at the scene. There may be no more resources left to respond; there may be overtime payments involved when more firefighters are called; there may be mutual aid agreements that discourage the use of additional fire companies. In general, however, proactive decision-making—calling anticipated assistance before a fire spreads and before additional lives are threatened—is effective fireground management.
Reactive decision-making— waiting for fire to spread or for lives to be threatened (playing catchup)—is ineffective fireground management.
The elements of presence
When I was promoted to battalion chief in 1973,1 wondered about command presence. What does it consist of? How do you develop it? As I thought back on the chiefs I’d served under over the years, I realized the good examples — the chiefs at all levels w’ho had command presence—all had similar methods of operating. The common denominators I found among these chiefs were the following eight fireground actions:
1. Assume command of the fire.
Announce your arrival over the department radio right away. Realize you’re in command and responsible for the fire operation’s strategy and tactics from that moment on. If you don’t like what you see, change it; if fire-extinguishing operations appear to be progressing smoothly, continue with the plan of action.
2. Establish a command post.
If a command post site has been established, go there; if not, designate a site as soon as possible. Incoming companies are going to report to the command post for assignments and orders. If there’s no command post site designated, no officer in command, and no firefighter to relay orders, the incoming fire companies will automatically start firefighting tactics. There will be no coordination of tactics supporting a strategy.
3. Get a size-up report.
As soon as possible, contact the officer who was in command before your arrival and get a size-up of the interior fire conditions. There are three basic fire facts you must request: the floor or area where the fire is located; what hose lines are discharging water onto the fire, if any; and how likely it is the hose line will extinguish the fire. You’ll need plenty of other size-up information, too, but these three basic facts are needed first to determine the number of firefighters and pieces of apparatus it will take to control the blaze.
4. Transmit preliminary and periodic status reports of the fire.
A preliminary report of the fire discovered upon arrival lets responding firefighters know what to expect. It’s the justification for requesting more firefighters and equipment at the scene or for returning firefighters to their firehouses.
These periodic status reports on the effectiveness of fire-extinguishment strategy and tactics become a form of analysis, management control, and progress measurement.
5. Determine the results of primary and secondary searches of the fire building.
The most important portion of any firefighting operation is the safe removal of fire victims. Primary and secondary searches are designed to accomplish this. A chief officer must order such searches or—if they are part of a standard operating plan—determine the results of such searches as soon as possible.
It’s important that both the chief and the search companies understand what the terms primary search and secondary search mean when communicating at fires.
The primary search is carried out by one of the first-arriving fire companies as the hose line is advanced on the fire and immediately after the flames are knocked down. Firefighters can now safely and quickly search all rooms and closets in the fire occupancy. This is a rapid search made in conditions of high heat and poor visibility during ventilation operations, and most fire victims are discovered during primary searches.
A secondary search is more thorough. There’s no time limit placed on it; the fire may be placed under control before the secondary search is completed. During a secondary search, every square foot of the fire area is again searched for fire victims, and the floors above, below, and adjacent to the fire area are also searched. By this time, smoke ventilation and portable lights have improved visibility. The results of the secondary search should be transmitted and recorded at the communication center before the chief in command leaves the fire scene, or the chief should identify the officer who will complete the secondary search.
6. Declare the fire to be under control.
One of the most important fireground decisions is determining when a fire is no longer a threat to the community. You can’t know this when you’re standing outside a fire building at the command post; every sector command established at a fire should be consulted before you make this decision. The conditions on the fire floor, the floor directly above, and all exposures where sector officers have been assigned must be determined. Consulting with the sector commands doesn’t indicate a reluctance to make this decision; it indicates a desire to get accurate information upon which to base the decision.
7. Conduct an investigation of the fire scene.
The determination of a fire’s point of origin and cause are responsibilities of the chief in charge. This information is necessary for accurate fire reports and thorough post-fire investigations. An examination of char depths on walls and ceilings can quickly reveal the room of fire origin. (The closer you get to the point of origin, the deeper the charring and the smaller the “alligatoring,” or circles of char.)
Burn patterns and blistering on the walls and the degree of fire damage to the furniture in that room can show the exact point of fire origin. Ninety-nine percent of the time, the cause of the blaze is apparent after the origin is determined. A fire in the kitchen is often caused by cooking. A fire in a stuffed chair or a bed is often caused by smoking. A conversation with the occupant can confirm these investigation findings.
8. Conduct a critique of the fire.
After every serious fire, hold a critique. This can be a short conversation at the command post with the chiefs, company officers, or firefighters before they leave the scene or it can be a formal conference. The most effective critiques are after successful fire operations, not unsuccessful ones: Firefighters hear others explain to a chief or company officer how they successfully advanced a hose line into a fire room and extinguished the flames, or how, during a successful primary search, a small, unconscious child was discovered hiding under a bed, removed, and revived with first aid.
Command presence isn’t achieved by behaving or speaking a certain way during fires. Command presence is achieved by commanding and controlling a firefighting operation. It’s what you do, not how you do it. Carry out these eight steps at routine fires, and they’ll become your guide during the major fire or disaster and produce command presence.
