CHART HOUSE RESTAURANT FIRE, WEEHAWKEN, NEW JERSEY

CHART HOUSE RESTAURANT FIRE, WEEHAWKEN, NEW JERSEY

BY ANTHONY AVILLO

Some say it offered the most spectacular panorama of the Manhattan skyline. Constructed in 1986, the Chart House building in Weehawken, New Jersey, was 180 feet wide, running from north to south, and 108 feet deep. Occupied by a restaurant and banquet hall and constructed of part wood frame and part heavy timber truss, the height varied from one story at the front to two and three stories in other areas, with atriums, cupolas, and peaks adding to the aesthetic splendor. The wood-frame section on the southwestern end contained a large kitchen and prep area, an employee rest area, and utility and storage areas on the first floor. Access to the second floor was via an open stairway. The second floor contained an office area and employee locker area. The restaurant, bar, and banquet areas occupied the remainder of the building, which was constructed of open heavy timber truss. The truss members, some as large as 12-inch 2 12-inch, made for a very substantial building, as well as the potential for a very heavy fire load. The roof, with its many peaks–some as steep as 15 in 12–was constructed of 1-inch 2 6-inch tongue-in-groove boards covered with a layer of sheet copper. A drop ceiling was located in the kitchen area. The building was protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system supplied by a 12-inch dead-end main. The fire department connection was located at the front of the building.

The restaurant was located at the end of a 1,000-foot pier on the Hudson River. The ambience of the New Jersey waterfront with its unobstructed view of New York City made the restaurant a premier site for weddings, business luncheons, and all types of social gatherings. Surrounded on three sides by the Hudson River, two driveways led from Harbor Boulevard eastward to the front entrance, where they met to form a loop where incoming traffic could enter into the south driveway and exit the pier via the north driveway. Patrons parked doubly in the center lane and singly on each perimeter side of the pier.

Around the perimeter of the restaurant was wood decking, a lower deck that circled the entire perimeter of the building, part old and part new. An upper deck ran from the front of the building and wrapped around the south side, terminating at a fire door accessing the restaurant. This upper deck served as a breezeway and access into the kitchen. Opposite the kitchen doorway was a wood storage shed. In this area, the breezeway ran between the kitchen doorway and the storage shed. The shed stored various types of restaurant equipment such as sterno cans, chairs, and other combustibles. This breezeway acted as a major fire spread component in this fire.

The entrance to the restaurant was located at the front, set back from the front driveway about 30 feet and separated by landscaping and openings in the pier so patrons could see the river beneath them as they entered the restaurant. Fire exits were located on all sides of the restaurant, with egress either onto the pier at the north end or the decking at the east and south ends.

A preaction sprinkler system protected the underside of the pier. It was supplied by the same 12-inch dead-end main as the building`s automatic wet system. This substructure sprinkler system was originally a deluge system with a separate fire department connection. After a previous fire under the pier, however, it was determined that the water supply was not able to support a deluge system for such a large area and supply the restaurant at the same time, so a preaction system was installed under the pier in its place. This system operated through the use of “pilot” sprinklers, which held no water but were set to fuse at a lower temperature than the main substructure sprinkler heads, which were located relatively close to the pilot sprinklers. When a pilot sprinkler fused, a signal was sent to a deluge valve, which, when tripped, supplied water into the main substructure sprinkler system–in essence, converting the system into a wet system. The main substructure sprinkler system would in turn operate as the heads were activated by the heat of the fire. This system would play a large part in the protection of lives in the initial stages of this fire.

Two hydrants were located on the pier and were fed from the same 12-inch dead-end main that fed the sprinkler system. The closest one to the building was located in the center aisle of the pier approximately 50 feet from the front of the building; the other was about halfway down the pier between the building and Harbor Boulevard. This 12-inch dead-end main was fed from a 24-inch circulating feed water main on Harbor Boulevard. There were two hydrants on Harbor Boulevard in close proximity to the pier, one just north of the pier entrance and one about 250 feet to the south. Due to the location of the hydrant on the east end of the pier in proximity to the fire building, the initial attack was made from the same water supply (hydrant) that was feeding the main building and substructure sprinkler system. The choice was either to attempt to get water on the fire quickly to protect the evacuation and primary search or to deal with the inevitable delay of relaying water for the initial attack from the hydrants on Harbor Boulevard more than 1,000 feet away.

THE DEPARTMENT

Weehawken is located in Northeastern New Jersey in densely populated Hudson County. The east end of the township borders on the Hudson River. The township is located directly across the river from the borough of Manhattan in New York City and is the location of the New Jersey side of the Lincoln Tunnel.

The Weehawken Fire Department operates from three stations quartering a Class A 1,250-gpm pumper (Engine 203), a 1,250-gpm Telesqurt (Engine 202), a 1,250-gpm 100-foot rear-mount quint (Quint 221), and a 100-foot rear-mount aerial (Truck 222). The command vehicle is designated as Unit 251. The unique effectiveness of this complement of apparatus is that out of the four pieces, three have pumping capability and three have aerial/master stream capability. This enhances our tactical flexibility.

The Weehawken Fire Department is dispatched from North Hudson Regional Communications Center, known locally as Fire Control, which handles the communications for the fire departments of North Bergen, Union City, West New York, and Guttenberg. All are contiguous and operate under a mutual-aid agreement to provide assistance at alarms and coverage of the municipalities during emergencies. North Hudson also provides mutual aid to the fire departments of Hoboken and Jersey City on a routine basis.

Following the initial dispatch of first-alarm companies, the dispatch for mutual aid in this system is as follows: On a second alarm, the closest two engines and one truck company are dispatched to the scene. These apparatus can respond from any one of the contiguous North Hudson departments. The third alarm brings an additional two engines, one truck, and a FAST team. This has recently been amended to dispatch the FAST team on all second alarms. Relocations are drawn from the remaining North Hudson companies, Jersey City, and Hoboken. Subsequent alarms bring an additional two engines and one truck. Chief officers from the contiguous fire departments also respond with their apparatus to assist the incident commander to maintain span of control.

PREPLAN AND STANDARD OPERATING

PROCEDURE

Due to the large, open, and maze-like layouts in some areas that continually change to accommodate the many activities at the restaurant, coupled with building construction, prevailing winds on the river, access problems, and water supply deficiencies, the Weehawken Fire Department had extensively preplanned this building, including the development of a specific standard operating procedure for apparatus positioning. The apparatus positioning SOP addresses the need for a relay of water from Harbor Boulevard to satisfy the potential huge water supply required for the building, which was, as one investigator put it, “a lumberyard with nails.” First-alarm companies were positioned in anticipation of an incident that could deteriorate to a point where an offensive attack would be impractical and dangerous to the operating crews. The relay included the coordinated operation of directing mutual-aid engine companies over the radio to complete the dual water relay in the north and south driveways of the pier. Once complete, the water supply needs of this operation were met. A later drafting operation would supplement this supply, but the preplanned relay was effective enough to place three master streams in operation in a relatively short period of time after the offensive attack crews were withdrawn.

The SOP required the positioning of the three Weehawken apparatus with aerial/master stream capability at the front of the building. All Weehawken apparatus with pumping capability are equipped for a reverse lay, fire-to-hydrant water supply operation. Quint 221, as the first-arriving company, was to enter the south driveway, drive to the front of the building, and position in the north driveway, facing Harbor Boulevard. This allowed the most advantageous use of the rear-mounted aerial as a master stream. Quint 221 was to position at the hydrant closest to the building, connect to a water supply, and feed the initial attack lines as well as the fire department connection on side 1 of the fire building. This allowed for a continuous water supply to be secured and the 100-foot aerial to be positioned to protect the north side of the building. Truck 222 was to enter the pier next, drive down the south driveway, and position in front of the building. This not only made immediately available the ladder and tools but also positioned the 100-foot aerial for master stream protection at the center of the building. Engine 202, the Telesqurt, was to enter the south driveway and drive or back down the pier and position at the south end of the driveway. Its assignment was to assist on the initial attack line, but its positioning also allowed the master stream to be utilized on the south end of the building. Engine 203 had the assignment of backing down the north driveway, dropping a manifold in front of the building, and beginning a four-inch relay to the hydrant on Harbor Boulevard north of the pier. The hydrant at the center of the pier was to be bypassed so water for the initial attack would not be affected.

Mutual aid was considered in the preplan. The first mutual-aid engine company to arrive would be directed via radio to back down the north driveway, meet Engine 203, and complete the relay to Harbor Boulevard. Likewise, the same was to occur in the south driveway, with a mutual-aid engine forming a relay to feed Engine 202`s Telesqurt in case the need for master streams arose. At this fire, the successful completion of these relays was due to a coordinated and disciplined effort on the part of the neighboring North Hudson departments, which operated solely on the orders of Command and had no prior knowledge of this preplan. A staging area for apparatus was to be set up in one of the several large parking lots on Harbor Boulevard across from the pier, with responding companies not involved in the relays walking to the command post for assignment.

The challenge for Command was to avoid uncommitted apparatus congestion on the pier so the relay could be properly formed. That this relay was set up within the first 15 minutes of the operation was further testimony to the skill of responding departments.

It had been decided during the preplanning phase that the master stream operation would be effective only in covering the front side of the building. The building was 108 feet deep and set back from the driveways, making stream penetration at the rear impossible. This required notification and response of a fire boat, the closest being within the Marine Division of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY).

THE FIRE

Sunday, May 24, 1998, Memorial Day weekend, was a warm, sunny day with temperatures in the mid-70s and low humidity. The wind was calm, except on the river, which is usually the case. On this day, the wind was blowing approximately 15 to 20 mph out of the southeast. The wind would be a major factor at this fire.

On the Hudson, Fleet Week activities were taking place. Fleet Week occurs each year during the week leading up to and including Memorial Day weekend. The U.S. Navy arrives at the New York Harbor, bringing with it heavy marine traffic, military ships, and the presence of the Coast Guard and the New York City Police Harbor Patrol.

At the time of fire dispatch, 1523 hours, the Chart House had one wedding reception in progress in the north end; one wedding reception not yet in progress, with many guests in the cocktail area at the center and south end of the restaurant, waiting for the reception to start; and a graduation party on the second floor. At the time of the fire, approximately 500 to 600 guests and employees were in the restaurant. The parking lot was filled to capacity. Many people were also in the Weehawken waterfront area, including on the pier–which was open to the public–enjoying the beautiful holiday weekend weather.

I was located on the waterfront, less than a quarter mile from the Chart House pier, Pier DT, when the response tones for a full assignment came over the portable radio. All Weehawken companies were dispatched to 1500 Harbor Boulevard for a reported fire in the rear. From where I was on the waterfront, the south side (side 4) of 1500 Harbor Boulevard was in plain view. I gave a preliminary report, with the stipulation that I would furnish a further report on-scene. Since 1500 Harbor Boulevard is a three-story fire-resistive low-rise office building, I gave a “Nothing showing” preliminary report. The Chart House is actually 1700 Harbor Boulevard and located on the pier on the opposite side of 1500 Harbor Boulevard from where I was located.

At 1524 hours, I arrived at the scene and established Harbor Boulevard Command. It was evident that the fire was not at 1500 but at 1700 Harbor Boulevard. Heavy brown and black smoke was showing at the south side of the building. The wind was driving it across the front of the structure. It was unclear at this time whether the fire was an interior or an exterior fire. Since the restaurant was fully occupied, a tremendous amount of foot traffic was on the pier, self-evacuating from the building. Because of this hazard, I urged incoming companies via radio to use extreme caution while responding onto the pier.

Unknown to me at the time, the Coast Guard and the New York Police Department Harbor Patrol were already on the scene fighting this fire from the exterior utilizing vessel-mounted deluge guns. This action, although well-intentioned, may have aided in spreading fire into the building, hampering the efforts and attack capability of the initial attack team. Since there was no communication between Weehawken land units and the vessels, the outside streams continued unabated while Weehawken companies entered the building to engage in an aggressive interior attack to locate the fire and, more important, protect the evacuation and primary search operations. Also unknown to me at the time, the NYPD Harbor Patrol had requested a fire boat from the FDNY Marine Division. Marine 6, the John McLean, responded and was standing by in the river. FDNY Marine 6 conducted no operations at this time, since there was no communication setup with me and no confirmation to operate from New York City Fire Dispatch or Harbor Boulevard Command.

We set up the command post adjacent to the south driveway about 50 feet from the front of the fire building. Within one minute of my arrival, I struck a second alarm and directed the incoming companies to stage on Harbor Boulevard and await my orders.

Quint 221 positioned in the north driveway as per SOP and connected to the hydrant on the 12-inch main at the front of the building. A connection was also made to the fire department connection on side 1 to feed the sprinkler system. Other Weehawken companies properly positioned as per SOP. Truck 222 conducted a primary search of the fire area, giving an all clear report once it was firmly established that all patrons and employees had been evacuated and all accessible areas had been searched. The crews of the first two arriving engine companies stretched the initial attack line into the fire building.

Second-alarm companies were arriving on the scene. Union City Engine 25 was directed to back down the north driveway and complete the relay from Engine 203 to the hydrant north of the pier on Harbor Boulevard.

To accommodate the second relay and to boost staffing at the scene, I called for a third alarm at 1530 hours. Again, incoming companies were instructed to stage on Harbor Boulevard and await orders. A second relay was completed by Union City Engine 23 in the south driveway to the hydrant south of the pier on Harbor Boulevard. Second- and third-alarm companies not involved in the relay were instructed to report to the command post for assignment. This caused a delay in operations, since responding, parking, and then walking the 1,000 feet down the pier to the command post took time. North Bergen 663 responded as the FAST team and was given the tasks of setting up and operating the command board while staged in the ready position at the command post.

Reports from the interior stated that the attack team was encountering difficulty in locating the fire. Due to the heavy smoke conditions, open construction, and maze-like layout, advancement was slow. Truck 222 reported heavy smoke coming through the floors on the first and second floors, as well as a severe heat condition in the kitchen area. No interior automatic fire sprinklers were operating. With the seat of the fire as yet undetermined, no water was applied at this time.

It was apparent, however, that the fire was located in the south side of the building in the kitchen area. There, many concealed spaces and mantraps aided in fire spread and hampered the attack. The wind, blowing out of the southeast into east-side windows broken by searching firefighters, forced companies to advance against the wind in increasing heat and smoke conditions. There were reports later that when companies first entered the building from the front (side 1), the area was clear. As they neared the fire area, they encountered a wall of smoke, floor to ceiling, dropping the visibility to zero. Within a matter of minutes, the smoke had expanded and spread to a point where it had crossed the front entrance area, causing disorientation and difficulty for interior members attempting to exit the building for additional air cylinders. Truck 222 Captain Brian McGorty later stated that after he searched the south side of the building, the smoke condition got so severe within seconds that when he attempted to exit the building he went right past the front door and wound up exiting on the extreme north end of the restaurant. Truck 222 Firefighter Steve Hegarty, likewise, found the smoke condition so severe that he exited out a back window, lacerating his chest on the way out. He was treated at the scene and remained on duty, continuing the firefight. Truck 222 Firefighter Mike Flood found his way out by following a hoseline out the front door.

The copper roof and few windows in the initial fire area prevented the fire from self-ventilating. Had this fire occurred in the restaurant area, where there were many large windows, the fire most likely would have been much easier to control, but in this case our efforts to get ahead of the fire and prevent extension by opening up the walls and ceilings were thwarted by the floor-to-ceiling smoke in the fire area.

The wind acted as a double-edged sword with regard to the ventilation problem. Ventilating the windows opposite the hoseline attack caused the wind to drive the heat and smoke farther into the building, which eventually drove the interior forces out. The other, less desirable, alternative, if it could be called an alternative, would have been not to vent. This would have compromised firefighter safety as well as caused the interior to become quickly untenable. To have vented the windows on the north side would have caused the products of combustion to be pulled across the restaurant. These north-side windows, which were approximately 180 feet from the seat of the fire, remained intact until quite late in the fire to assist in confining the fire to the south end.

The initial strategy was to employ an aggressive interior attack due to the large number of civilians who could have been trapped inside and then reinforce the attack and support operations with additional alarm companies. The time it took for companies to walk to the command post and receive assignments severely handicapped this operation. The first-alarm companies were beginning to exit the building, having run low on air, and there was the possibility that personnel unfamiliar with the building layout would become lost or trapped or run out of air. A primary search of all areas proved negative.

At this point, I made the decision to withdraw all personnel and pursue a defensive mode of attack to confine the fire to the southern end of the restaurant. I directed Fire Control to broadcast the evacuation tones over the radio, ordering all personnel to exit the building and report to the command post for roll call.

I called for a fourth alarm at this time, 1554 hours, and requested an FDNY fire boat. It was at this time that I was informed that the fire boat was already on the scene and awaiting orders to operate. To facilitate a more efficient communication link between Command and FDNY on the fire boat, I placed a captain and a firefighter on the boat; however, the orders to begin operating the large monitor nozzles on the fire boat could be given only by New York City Fire Dispatch. This required that Fire Control call New York City Fire Dispatch, which would then give the order to the fire boat to open the stream. A confirmation that the interior forces all had been withdrawn also had to be relayed to New York City Fire Dispatch. To solve this logistical problem, FDNY dispatched Battalion Chief Stan Dawe, Battalion 9, to the fire scene to liaison with Command on land and direct the operation of the fire boat. These things took time. The land-based master streams were put into operation. These streams had little effect initially, since the fire was being concealed by the copper roof which, due to its steep pitch and limited access, did not allow vertical ventilation to be accomplished by conventional methods. The plan was to use the powerful streams of the fire boat (utilizing the “demolition tip”) to rip the roof off the building, thereby providing the needed ventilation. Finally, I gave the fire boat the order to open the stream. The stream did quick work of venting the roof on the south end but, due to the low tide, could not get into position to tear the roof off the two-story office area, which was concealing most of the fire and presented the brunt of the problem. The stream also worked to knock down the heavy fire the land-based master streams could not reach. The stream was so powerful that at one point in the defensive operation it came through the building untouched and blasted a hole right through the roof-mounted plastic stokes basket on Quint 221.

The master streams operated for approximately 30 minutes, with the land-based master streams covering the front, western half of the building and FDNY Marine 6 covering the rear, eastern half. When most of the visible fire was knocked down, I sent a recon team into the building to evaluate the remaining fire condition. This team was able to walk up to the second floor in clear conditions and evaluate the effectiveness of the master stream operation. It reported there were only small pockets of fire and the mode of operation could once again switch to an offensive one. I ordered through Battalion 9 that the fire boat be shut down. The land-based master streams were kept in operation until the last minute before the inside operation was to begin. No more than 30 seconds had passed when the report from the interior recommended opening the master stream from the boat again. It was apparent that the fire boat was keeping the fire at bay with its tremendous water flow from the huge water cannon nozzle. This action was overcoming the effects of the wind but not penetrating the concealed spaces in the wood-frame portion of the office area. When the boat shut down, the wind whipped the fire into blowtorch proportions in a matter of seconds. This intensification of the fire doomed the interior operation, since it was unsafe and futile to attempt to knock down this wind-driven fire.

To supplement the land water supply (the strategy now was to surround and drown) while attempting to confine the fire to the south end, a drafting operation was set up. West New York Engine 304 drafted from the Hudson on the south side of the pier and supplied additional fireflow to our master stream apparatus. Several large-diameter handlines were also placed on the extreme south end in a flanking position, out of the collapse zone. At the height of this fire, approximately 11,000 gpm were flowing on the structure from three land-based aerial master streams, one deck gun, two large-diameter handlines, and three water-based master streams from the fire boat.

The copper roof was holding the fire in, not letting it vent to the outside. Even with the massive amount of fire inside the structure, the wind and open-area construction would not allow ceiling temperatures on the second floor to reach 2,0007F, the approximate melting temperature of copper. A heavy volume of smoke issued from the building, to the extent at times that Truck 222 was not visible from the command post, only about 40 feet away. If the fire would vent through the roof, problems would diminish.

Battalion 9 was sent around the rear via the north side deck to recon conditions. He reported that the fire was running the underside of the roof from south to north. The sprinklers in this area were hung from the pitched roof about two feet below the peak in the pendant position. They were designed to control a contents fire below and thus were ineffective in protecting the underside of the roof. The fire boat was repositioned from the south end to the north end to blast away the large second-floor windows on the east and north side. This action released the fire from its confines, as the entire upper portion of the structure flashed over at the ceiling almost at once, venting out the atrium windows on the west side (side 1) and the large windows on the east (side 3). The venting fire on side 1 was so intense that it burned the halyards and ladder pipe on Quint 221 and scorched the ladder tip. As a result, the fly-mounted ladder pipe use was discontinued, and the bed ladder pipe was put into operation. As the building was only two stories on the north end, this stream was effective in its range. The fire also finally got hot enough to melt the copper and vent through the roof. These were the first visible flames in quite a while, since the copper roof had been holding the fire in.

Problems from here on began to diminish. Thousands of gallons of water were being poured into the building, and the fire was darkened down quickly. The fire was declared under control at 1847 hours, and mutual-aid companies began to be released from the scene soon after.

Chief of Operations Edward Flood arrived on the scene and assumed Command, and I became operations chief. A Salvage Sector was established in the parking lot. On entering the building from the north side, it was clear that all the damage on the first floor was indeed confined to the south end and the upper areas of the second floor where the fire had flashed over under the copper roof. The north end banquet area was damaged only by smoke and water and, as a result, many items were able to be salvaged, among them most of the wedding gifts, computers, cash registers, all the DJ equipment, and various other items.

Marine 6 was relieved by Marine 1, a smaller vessel that was able to enter the more shallow channel on the south end of the building. This enabled the boat`s powerful master stream to accomplish what Marine 6 could not: the demolition of the second-floor office area roof, which even this late in the incident was still intact, concealing hidden fire. Dawe remained on the scene to continue liaison with Command and was relieved along with Marine 1 when the task of hydraulic overhaul from the water side was completed.

The area was lit as night fell. There were still many pockets of fire in the rubble on the south end, and a crane was ordered to assist in the overhaul operation. The crane would not be arriving until the next morning, so a fire watch was set up with Truck 222 and Engine 202 remaining on the scene, being supplied by Reserve Engine 201. Dousing of the hot spots continued overnight. Command was transferred to Captain Kevin Moore, who had been recalled along with about two dozen other Weehawken officers and firefighters to assist in the operation.

At 0500 hours the next morning, the crane arrived and set up to continue the overhaul and final extinguishment of the fire building.

THE INVESTIGATION

The fire origin and cause investigation commenced on the morning of May 25. The investigation team members–with representatives from the Weehawken Fire Department Division of Fire Investigation; the Weehawken Police Department; the building owner; and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-arms–agreed that the fire started in the south end in the deck area. This was corroborated by video, eyewitness accounts, and photographs taken in the early stages of the fire. The heavy fire on arrival indicated the fire was accelerated by something, there was a delayed alarm, or both. It was noted that there were numerous discharged fire extinguishers in the area, an indication that the staff attempted to fight the fire. It was determined that restaurant staff firefighting efforts were made prior to 1515 hours. The 911 call from the Chart House came to Fire Control at 1522 hours. This delayed alarm was a major contributing factor to the amount of fire that confronted the initial arriving units.

From the burn patterns, the extent of the damage, prevailing winds, and early photographs taken from 1500 Harbor Boulevard across the channel, it appeared that the fire originated on or under the pier. It was stopped from spreading underneath the pier by the activation of the substructure sprinkler system. Had this fire been able to spread under the pier, it would have communicated into the restaurant through the many voids created by plumbing and wiring, spreading smoke and fire into many areas of the building almost at once. This could have created a panic situation and resulted in people overboard or becoming trapped and overcome. The resulting life loss could have been staggering. The activation of the substructure sprinklers probably saved more lives than any fire rescue operation could have. The substructure sprinklers, however, had not been extended to accommodate the newer portion of the deck and were not in position to hold the fire in check under the decking. As such, the fire was able to communicate into the building from above rather than below.

The manager of the restaurant reported that he smelled smoke and went to investigate the area on the south side of the building. When the manager opened the access door/hatch that led under the pier, he said he saw a haze of smoke on the water and that the fire then erupted behind him, chasing him off the deck. Possibly, the turbulence created by opening this door whipped the fire out from under the deck, autoexposing the fire onto the upper deck and spreading, as a result of the wind, into the breezeway and into the kitchen. The fire then spread up through the walls and floors and into the drop ceiling in the kitchen. Since these areas were not directly protected by sprinklers, the fire intensified and grew, feeding on the dried-out wood members on the south side.

Near the area of origin was a PVC waste pipe that carried gray water from the kitchen sinks. This was the point of origin in a fire in 1995. In that fire, heat trace tape that was wrapped around the pipe shorted out, causing an electrical fire under the pier. The sprinkler system activated and kept the fire in check, causing minimal damage to the area. During that investigation, it was determined that the breaker that controlled the heat trace tape had been taped so it could not trip. In the May 1998 fire, the PVC pipe where the heat trace tape had been was completely melted away. The electrical panel that fed the heat trace tape also showed a great amount of damage. The electrical engineer, however, determined that the fire damage to the panel was externally inflicted. Further, the management informed the investigators that the heat trace tape on that pipe had been disconnected after the 1995 fire.

The PVC pipe, while not a point of origin, may have aided in accelerating the fire. An employee said that he saw a “tube” burning under the deck. He later identified the “tube” as a piece of PVC pipe. He also stated that a cook came out of the kitchen with a garden hose and when he hit the pipe with water it flared up. The possibility is that the kitchen staff was disposing of grease down the kitchen drains, where it may have accumulated and solidified inside the pipe. Once the pipe melted and burned away, exposing its contents, this grease could have helped accelerate this fire. A piece of this pipe was taken for analysis by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to determine if cooking grease or other oils were present. As this could have indeed accelerated this fire, it was unlikely that the fire started here; there would not be enough oxygen in the pipe to allow ignition of or to sustain a fire.

The investigation was centered on the lower deck, which was burned almost to the waterline. There was heavy damage below the decking on the underside of the wood and on the pilings and horizontal crossbeams that held up the deck. This area of the deck was adjacent to the new deck that had recently been constructed. It was mentioned that when the new deck was being constructed, the extensive saw-fueling and wood-cutting operations were carried out in the area of origin, specifically on the now nearly destroyed lower deck. A lot of residue from these operations was reported to be on the wood. Several pieces of wood were taken as samples to be analyzed.

The deck construction had been completed about two weeks before the fire occurred. It was further learned that the deck had been power-washed a few days prior to the fire. The power washing may have pushed wood-cutting debris and sawdust into the crevices and corners on the deck and into the cracks between the wood decking, as well as beneath the deck. This was consistent with the heavy burning evident below the deck and in the corners from where the samples were taken. This debris and residue would have made the decking easier to ignite.

In addition, a significant amount of debris was deposited on the pilings as a result of the rise and fall of the tide. When the tide went out, this debris–sea grass, cigarette butts, pieces of paper, and wood–dried out and could be easily ignited if conditions were right.

The area of origin was on the windward side and was the southern exposure. This caused the wood in the area to dry out from the years of constant exposure to sun and wind. In addition, heavy deposits of creosote were noted on the pilings under the pier as well as on the pressure-treated wood of the deck and on the south walls. This dried-out, creosote-treated wood can make for a hot, fast fire.

Other than the heat trace tape around the waste pipe that had been disconnected, there were no other structure-related ignition sources in the area. This led to the speculation about carelessly discarded smoking materials. It was learned that the area in the breezeway on the upper decking adjacent to the fire door was used by employees as a smoking area. Guests also wandered out into this area to smoke. This was, incidentally, directly above the area of origin. Moreover, the lower deck was a public area with access to the south side of the building right up to where the new deck was constructed. The new deck was separated from the public deck by a wrought iron fence and was padlocked. Fishermen and civilians looking to get a better view of the Manhattan skyline also used this area. A carelessly discarded cigarette or cigar could very well have been blown by the wind under the pier, where it could have smoldered for hours before igniting.

Many of these possibilities were speculation on the part of the investigation team concerning the possible source of ignition that may have caused the fire to accelerate so quickly. It was obvious that there was a “magic moment” in which all of the conditions were right for this fire to ignite. These conditions, in conjunction with the delayed alarm, may have led to the intense fire conditions on arrival and eventually the complete destruction of the building.

In the opinion of the fire investigators, the probable cause of the fire was most likely improperly discarded smoking materials, which, in conjunction with any or all of the aforementioned fire-accelerating conditions, caused and/or spread this fire. However, with the absence of a definite heat source in the area of origin, the fire must be classified as undetermined.

The physical investigation was concluded on May 28, 1998, at 1528 hours, at which time the incident was officially terminated.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

This fire was a so-called “Murphy`s Law” fire, since the many factors involved in the firefight placed the firefighting forces at an extreme disadvantage. These factors included the following:

The delayed alarm of as much as 10 or 15 minutes and the obvious failed attempts by restaurant workers to extinguish the fire allowed the fire to grow immensely. These problems again point to the need to educate business owners and personnel about proper fire reporting procedures and the limited capabilities of fire extinguishers.

The inability to adequately and safely vent the copper roof complicated interior operations. The severe angle of the roof would have necessitated the use of aerial equipment to vent, but this was impossible due to the limited access to the structure.

The lack of access to the sides and the rear of the building played a major role in this incident. Preplans must include a call for marine equipment very early in the incident, possibly as part of the first-alarm assignment for reported fires in/around piers, wharves, and marine terminals.

The volume of fire on arrival as well as the 20-mph wind created a large incident right from the beginning.

The vessel-mounted deluge sets operating on the windward side pushed the fire into the building as well as put interior crews in danger. While well-intentioned, such master stream application by the Coast Guard and the NYPD Harbor Patrol should not have been commenced without the approval of the land-based incident commander. Note that the commencement of water application by FDNY Marine 6 was coordinated even though communication problems existed initially between FDNY and Command.

The open interior area under the pitched roof was out of reach of the sprinkler system. Sprinkler systems, like nozzles, obviously must be able to apply water directly on the fire. A fire coming from underneath the decking on the south side may have exposed the building because no sprinklers were present. Sprinkler systems installed in piers must comply with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, and NFPA 307, Standard for the Construction and Fire Protection of Marine Terminal, Piers, and Wharves. In addition, building designers should be encouraged to provide separate fire mains for sprinkler systems and hydrants as well as provide a plentiful volume of water to supply the hydrants.

“Making things happen” takes time. A delay in the water supply relay occurred, as companies had to stretch large amounts of large-diameter hose. It took time for mutual-aid companies to respond, stage their apparatus, gather their equipment, walk the 1,000-foot pier to the command post, be assigned a task, and then set up to begin their operations. Expect to send companies to rehab earlier. Call for help early and often!

The large life hazard and the subsequent foot/vehicle traffic evacuating the pier and the building as companies entered the area created a “salmon effect” for arriving firefighters. Plan for evacuation and apparatus access problems at pier restaurant incidents.

The maze-like interior made it difficult to negotiate in heavy smoke. Search lines are critical. The potential for trapped/disoriented occupants was very real. In addition, mutual-aid companies were unfamiliar with the interior layout of the building.

Concealed spaces made access to the fire difficult, especially those in the two-story frame office area. Plan for extensive overhauling with fresh crews.

In light of all these extenuating circumstances, the fire forces were able to evacuate more than 500 patrons and staff without any injuries. Firefighter injuries were kept to a minimum (two, and they were minor). Much of the restaurant and DJ equipment and wedding gifts were salvaged. When you think of the potential for loss of life in a fire like this, the loss of the building, when compared with the number of lives protected, was justified.

(1) Incidents that require interstate responses present unique communication problems for Command. For example, the logistical problems of communicating with a fire boat on the Hudson necessitated the use of a land-based command liaison. (Photo by Jeff Richards.)

(2) At the height of the fire, three master streams from the land-based companies hammer the west side of the building. Engine 202 is on the right covering the south end of the building, Truck 222 covers the center, while Quint 221 (ladder pipe visible above tree) covers the north. Notice the lack of smoke at the extreme south end due to the wind. This wind would push the fire into the building, driving the initial attack crews out. In the foreground is the four-foot relay in the south driveway. The parked vehicles created an access problem in the early stages of the fire because patrons were trying to exit the pier as first-alarm companies were arriving. (Photo by Jeff Richards.) (3) FDNY Marine 1, which relieved Marine 6. The time is around 1900 hours; the tide is in. Marine 1, a smaller vessel, was able to enter the channel on the south, where Marine 6 could not go due to low water. Here, the hydraulic overhauling of the south side office area is being accomplished using the “demolition tip” on the nozzle. (Photo by Jeff Richards.) (4) Marine 6, the John McLean, operating on the southeast side of the building. The powerful master streams were utilized to hydraulically rip the roof off the building, exposing concealed spaces. However, due to the shallow water on the south side, the streams were unable to penetrate the wood-frame office area, where the fire was hiding, and represented the major problem for the fire forces. (Photo by Ron Jeffers.) (5) The John McLean operates three master streams on the southeast side of the building. On the left, the fire continued to gain headway on the shallow south side. Due to the wind, even at the height of the fire, the south side remained clear of smoke as the wind pushed the fire through the building and at the land forces. (Photo by Ron Jeffers.) (6) Three Weehawken master streams operate from the land side. Due to the setback and the depth of the building, the streams would only penetrate about halfway into the building.

ANTHONY AVILLO, battalion chief, is a 14-year veteran of the Weehawken (NJ) Fire Department, where he is a platoon commander and in charge of the Training Division and the Arson/Origin and Cause Division. A New Jersey-certified Level II Fire Instructor, Avillo is an instructor at the Bergen County Police and Fire Academy in Mahwah, New Jersey.