Fight or Flight
FEATURES
FIRE REPORTS
That’s just one of the decisions that helped avert a propane explosion in Colorado Springs last fall.
Battalion Captain jerry Binder earned a year’s pay in the seconds during which he decided between accepting as inevitable the explosion of a propane bulk storage tank and making an aggressive offensive attack. Later in the incident, officers of the Colorado Springs, CO, Fire Department had to make a second high-risk decision about manually shutting off valves on the huge tanks. The department learned lessons from these crucial moments of the October 1, 1986, incident, and from the backdrop of coordination that lasted throughout the 23-hour effort.
As Captain Binder’s Truck Co. 8 turned north on Auburn Drive, at the west edge of the Red Tag Propane Plant, many of the nearly a thousand l(X)-pound-capacity cylinders along the north side of the lot, each filled with 23 gallons of propane in anticipation of winter, were venting, and gas burned hotly above the vents. Almost immediately, the cylinders began bursting open violently in the process called a BLEVE—a boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion.
The 200-by-217-foot lot contained two horizontal, cylindrical tanks with 15,000and 18,000-gallon capacities—each 14 percent full. To the west was a row of three 2,600-gallon tanks, which were two-thirds full. Nearby were cylinders which could hold 250, 500, and 1,000 gallons. Five 2,600-gallon delivery trucks were parked in the southwest corner, standing by the metal-sheathed building at the southwest corner that was Red Tag’s office.
The 6:30 P M. dispatch that had sent Engine Co. 7, Hazardous Materials Co. 9, and Rescue Co. 7 had reported a broken propane gas line and an injured person. The latter was the driver of an 18-wheeled transport tanker that was emptying its 9,800-gallon cargo into the large storage tanks when the discharge hose ruptured. The end of the hose had struck the driver and sprayed him with liquid propane, caiising cyrogenic burns on his face, chest, and right arm.
Finding that he couldn’t shut off the delivery pump or close the valves, the driver had run to a private house at the northeast corner of the complex and warned the occupants to flee. As five family members and the driver ran up an embankment behind the house, the propane ignited and knocked them to the ground.
Truck Co. 8 and Engine Co. 8 were on the scene after Truck Co. 7’s lieutenant requested a full firstalarm response. On the way, Captain Binder had radioed that he was assuming command.
One of the exploding cylinders struck and severed a power pole at the northwest corner of the complex; the power line landed on the north fence, electrically charging it. Another rocketing cylinder struck several cars that were parked on Bijou Street, which runs along the south of the complex.
The westernmost of the three 2,600-gallon tanks, located near the well-involved filling shed, was venting furiously. Flames reached higher than 75 feet. There was the eerie, high-pitched scream of escaping propane.
Binder had the option of backing away and letting the propane burn. But to his mind, there was no way to be sure nearby residences and businesses could be evacuated in time to make that choice safe. So he chose the aggressive attack, the option of surrounding the complex with master streams and cooling the tanks.
The job then became to put the master streams where they’d combine the most effective suppression and the best possible protection for firefighters. Binder ordered Engine Co. 8 to take the hydrant on the east side of Auburn, just south of the Red Tag complex. The office building at the southwest corner of the propane plant would provide a shield—a fragile one—for the engine company and Truck Co. 8.
(Photos by Jerilee Bennett)
To gain distance, the engine’s crew connected two lines to the hydrant and backed up about 40 feet, then laid two lines to Truck Co. 8. These were siamesed into a 3-inch line feeding the ladder pipe, equipped with a 500-gpm nozzle set on straight stream. The truck company then directed this first master stream on the transport tanker and the 18,000-gallon storage tank.
The fire was heavy in this area because of the ruptured transfer lines and the now fully involved tractor of the tanker truck. Truck Co. 8 needed some protection from radiated heat, and Engine Co. 8’s deck gun provided it.
The second master stream—a deluge set the engine company placed in operation in front of the truck company—targeted the 2,600-gallon tanks.
Engine Co. 7 provided the third master stream at the direction of Battalion Chief Ray Spears, who had by now arrived and joined Binder at the command post. This third stream was a deluge set put on the roof of the auto body shop, at the end of the complex opposite where Engine Co. 8 and Truck Co. 8 were spotted.
More companies were needed and a second alarm was transmitted. An engine and a tower ladder responded and were assigned control of the north sector of the complex. The truck provided a 95-foot elevated platform and the engine supplied this fourth master stream.
The same engine, set up behind a concrete block building for some measure of protection, also laid line to an additional deluge and delivered roughly 500 gpm for a fifth master stream. The crew directed this initially at the propane tank behind the house and then at the 100-pound cylinders. This pumper took its supply from the hydrant by suction connection, which proved efficient: The 1,000-gpm pumper was supplying 1,500 gpm.
The last-arriving engine company mounted a deluge set atop a stack of bricks at the south side of Red Tag and directed the sixth master stream onto the large tanks.
Fifteen minutes before that, with the communications van and a second rescue unit on the scene, the command post had moved into the the fire department’s Training/ Maintenance Center, which happened to be located immediately across Bijou Street to the south of Red Tag. The fire department’s hazardous materials officer, Lieutenant George Cunning, positioned himself on the top floor of the five-story, concrete training tower. From there, he was able to direct the operations of the largecaliber streams.
Going inside
The effect of those master streams was readily apparent: As the tanks gradually cooled, the pressure in them dropped and the flames at their vents became smaller. This was most obvious on the most westerly 2,600-gallon tank. When Cunning first climbed the tower, he saw what looked like a four-foot clear space above the tank’s vent; above that burned a 10-foot blue flame topped by a 20to 30-foot orange flame. He too heard the noise of venting—he described it as “a high-pitched, shrill sound like a jet engine.” Within 20 seconds of water hitting that tank, the flame dropped to a “lazy, lightblue and orange flame.”
But there was still a danger that the 18,000-gallon tank, situated between the transport and the 15,000-gallon tank, would explode. Time would eventually run out if the fire, so far impinging only on the bottom part of the tank, were allowed to use up so much fuel that the level would drop and the tank would BLEVE. There was no flame impinging on the upper part of the tank, above the level at which the deeply chilled liquid fuel could protect the metal sides by absorbing heat. That meant the situation might be safe enough to send people in to shut off the valves.
Red Tag officials drew diagrams and told the haz-mats crew how and where to shut off the valves to slow the flow of propane. Thus began the second dramatic operation of the incident.
Late that night, Cunning and another firefighter donned proximity suits. Covered with a fog stream plus an additional backup line, they went through a hole cut in the south fence and shut off four liquid propane line valves. After emerging, they conferred again with Red Tag officials, then went back in to shut off lines flowing propane vapor from the tops of the large tanks. After still another conference with the plant officials, the same firefighter and a captain entered the area to shut off two remaining valves that had been missed.
(Photos by Jerilee Bennett)
Support functions
The larger tanks were still venting and propane was burning at the vents. It was too risky to extinguish these flames before daylight would allow a more thorough examination of the tanks; those streams necessary to provide adequate control would remain in operation throughout the night. Come morning, the entry of personnel clad in proximity suits would be repeated, but during the long hours of the night, many other responders were at work.
At the initial response, a hazmats lieutenant had advised command to evacuate civilians to a distance of 3,000 feet from Red Tag in all directions. The police department command post handling the evacuation was also outside that zone of danger, set up in a school about two blocks behind the fire department command center. Twelve police cars and an additional 12 officers, from the tactical enforcement unit, sealed off the large perimeter and evacuated about 10 families to the school.
But operating from separate command posts caused some confusion. As the fire burned into a new day, the police department told families they could return to their homes. Only later, when conferring with the fire department, did the police department find it was still too early for a safe return.
Simultaneously with evacuation and suppression, other efforts were supporting what went on on the fireground.
Two rescue units and several private ambulances set up a triage area about a block west of Red Tag. The chiefs of emergency services from two local hospitals were on hand, and all four local hospitals were alerted to the emergency. Fortunately, the elaborate medical facilities the hospitals set up were not needed.
Early in the operation, the city of Colorado Springs’ safety director had reported to the command post. As liaison officer, he was quickly in touch with the police command post and several other city departments. Coordinating with the electrical division, he made sure the power to the area was shut down. He called for gas division personnel to report there to give technical advice and for the barricade division to block the streets.
The superintendant of the Water Division Regulation and Treatment Department reported to the scene and monitored the water supply by radio contact with the control room operator at the mass treatment plant. Whenever the water supply threatened to drop, the operator opened a large regulator near the scene to increase the indicated static from 165 to 175 psi. The water supply was good, and the water division has estimated that somewhere between four and seven million gallons of water were pumped at the scene.
Another supportive role was played by the fire department’s master mechanic. He made frequent rounds to check the pumpers and aerials, paying special attention to engine temperatures and oil pressures. Early in the fire, the master mechanic carried diesel fuel to the pumpers in five-gallon cans. Later on, a tanker from the support services department supplied 455 gallons of diesel fuel to the apparatus. The five pumpers and two aerials operated flawlessly for hours.
As the hours slipped into morning, the department’s haz-mats and emergency medical services coordinator assembled the hazmats team and two members of the gas division into an advisory group which devised a plan to extinguish the remaining fires. At this point, the only obvious flames visible were at the vent pipes connected to the pressure relief valve on the 18,000-gallon tank.
Around 10:30 A M. on October 2, Lieutenant Cunning, a firefighter, and a gas division employee entered the area clad in proximity suits and under the cover of master streams. The team’s first mission was to determine the pressures on the transport tank and the 15,000and 18,000-gallon tanks and to be sure the tanks were intact. If the integrity of any tank had been violated with even a pinhole-sized opening and the tank went to atmospheric pressure, air could enter. The change in the fuel mixture would be likely to set off a BLEVE.
The tanks seemed structurally sound, and the pressures were approximately 80 psi. There was one small fire—fed by a small, copper line—burning under a fallen wall where the filling shed had once stood. Cunning bent the line back on itself several times and the fire, starved of fuel, went out.
The crew emerged, consulted again at the command post, then reentered. This time the team placed ladders on both sides of the still-burning 18,000-gallon tank and took a closer look at the vents. The crew members also shut down several 100-pound cylinders that were leaking at their valves.
As they left the area this time, the three team members were checked by paramedics, per standard operating procedures. One member was found to be experiencing premature ventricular contractions; he was transported to the hospital, observed, and released.
It seemed some foreign material must be holding open the vents on the 18,000-gallon tank; they would have to be turned off manually. On the third entry that day, a new team was able to do so, and the last fire was extinguished.
Total loss in the fire has been estimated at $350,000. The only person injured was the driver who had been delivering the propane. As provided by local ordinance in the case of hazmats response, the department has billed Red Tag for the total cost of its response: $14,400.
The cause of the fire is still under investigation. Six months before the fire, Engine Co. 8 had been to the site for a routine inspection. Red Tag officials assured the firefighters that all equipment was operating properly and any incident would be short-lived. The state oil inspector had confirmed that the plant complied with existing regulations. Yet the excess flow device in the manifold system between the 15,000and 18,000-gallon tanks failed to function to stop the liquid discharge. The questions of why, and why did the hose break, are still unanswered. The remains of the hose and fittings have been sent to a lab for examination.
The fire department has conducted three post-fire critiques and found both success and some lessons to be learned.
The keys to the overall success were rapid response and application of large volumes of water. The incident command system demonstrated the value of close communication among the operations people, the staging area, and the technical advisers. The presence of a liaison officer, who was located in the command post, helped bring that technical advice together.
Personnel risk was minimized by setting up master streams and then withdrawing crews to relatively safe areas. That created some delay when streams had to be repositioned, but it was a better approach than withdrawing to 3,000 feet.
In the future, however, the department will attempt to set up its command post outside that 3,000foot perimeter. In the Red Tag incident, the command post was too vulnerable if a large tank had exploded. A variety of people need to be present—the fire department’s incident commander, plans people, and public information officer; police commanders; representatives of other city agencies; the news media; and even citizens concerned for the safety of relatives living or working near the site. All of these should be safely outside the perimeter in what might be considered the formal command post. An informal command post needs to be closer to the fireground, but only operations officers should be there.
As a result of the Red Tag fire and a later natural gas explosion where evacuation questions again arose, the fire department is preparing a disaster action plan. This plan should help clarify which agency will be in charge in a given incident and the roles that other agencies will play.
Equally important is a program to beef up all firefighters’ education concerning liquified petroleum gas facilities.
Because of an active electronics industry and major transportation routes passing through Colorado Springs, the fire department has a haz-mats force of 39 people—13% of the department’s 321 uniformed firefighters. The inspection that Engine Co. 8 made of Red Tag, however, was a routine one covering fire hazards, cleanliness, exits—the usual things on a fire inspection checklist.
That will change with the new training, which will probably be complete this summer. All firefighters will gain a more sophisticated understanding of LPG facilities. They’ll learn to recognize the various types of valving, pipings, and fittings; the equipment, appliances, and gauges; the connections among the parts of an installation; and the safety procedures appropriate to LPG.
The goal is to have the engine companies, which perform the fire inspections, better understand what they’re seeing. No one can say there will never be another ruptured hose like the one that touched off the Red Tag blaze. But by strengthening the city’s preventive line of defense through inspections, the Colorado Springs Fire Department hopes to eliminate the need for the kind of drawn-out, aggressive line of offense the department had to mount that night last fall.
Lessons Learned
Reinforced:
Department must be able to deliver large volumes of water within minutes
Incident command system can be adapted to local needs
Personnel risk must be minimized by using as few people as possible and shielding them in some way
Reexamined:
Command post should be located outside the zone of danger
Disaster action plan should make clear who’s in charge and who plays supporting roles
Firefighters should be educated in the details of LPG facilities
