BY GLEN RUDNER
 As the semitrailer entered the curve, the driver lost control. (Photos by author.) |
A truck carrying 40,000 pounds of multiple grades of black powder proved to be a test for the Fairfax County (VA) Fire and Rescue Hazardous Materials Team, the Fairfax County Police, and several state agencies that responded at 0400 hours on June 2, 1999. A semitrailer, carrying an intermodal container, entered the ramp from Interstate 95 north to Interstate 495/95 north, the outer loop of the Washington Beltway, at about 0345 hours. The powder, picked up at the Norfolk International Marine Terminal, was en route to several manufacturers in the Northeast. The product was shipped from a manufacturer in Brazil through a broker in Arlington, Texas, who had sold the products to several end users. As the semitrailer entered the turn, the driver claimed there was a noise and the front-end lurched to the left, causing the vehicle to roll over on its left side as it entered the top of the curve. The vehicle then skidded, on its side, off the road and hit the berm/embankment and came to a stop. The Virginia State Police, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Emergency Communications Center (EEC), and Virginia Department of Transportation received calls reporting the incident.
NOTIFICATIONS AND REQUESTS FOR AID
On arrival of the first units, the ramp was immediately shut down, and an assessment was begun. Fairfax County Fire and Rescue removed the driver and her codriver from the vehicle and ascertained information about the load. They then activated a full hazardous-materials response to the scene. Command was established. Based on the nature of the product and the recommendation contained in reference materials, the Beltway was shut down, and evacuations were begun.
The Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Hazardous Materials Team reported the incident to the Virginia Department of Emergency Services Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and requested that the regional hazardous-materials officer offer assistance over the telephone. On notification, I called the hazardous-materials unit and was requested to respond to the incident.
Identifying the product involved and determining its hazards became the primary concerns. The manufacturer of the product could not be reached because of location, and the shipping papers had not been recovered from the vehicle at that time. We began contacting all available resources for information on how to safely handle the product. Fairfax County Fire and Rescue had already contacted Fairfax County Police Explosives Ordnance Division (EOD), who was on the scene discussing the product. I then contacted Virginia State Police EOD; two of its bomb technicians assisted me.
ON-SCENE
On arrival at the scene, I met with the operations section chief and the haz-mat sector officer. We reviewed what had happened, the actions that were in progress, and the short- and long-term strategic goals for mitigating the incident. Among the short-term objectives were specifically identifying the product and its hazards, site safety, and vehicle stabilization. The long-term goals included reopening the highway; removing the product; and remediation of the site, if needed.
 Site safety procedures included bonding and grounding operations and the placement of backup handlines. |
Fairfax County Fire and Rescue personnel were ultimately able to obtain the shipping papers, including the bills of lading, which revealed the name and location of the importer, as well as additional product information. The papers also included several material safety data sheets (MSDSs), but several pages were unclear. The information obtained by the hazardous-materials team clearly stated that the powder presented a major explosion hazard and that initial evacuation should be at least 2,500 feet in all directions. Daylight arrived, and rush hour was in full swing. Incident command decided that parts of the Beltway could be opened. This decision was based on the following considerations: the container was positioned off the roadway; the surrounding terrain provided protection; and the vehicle had been stabilized.
During the initial stages of this incident, the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue incident commander quickly recognized that this would be an extended operation requiring the efforts of additional agencies. To mitigate the incident, the command staff had to assemble four private companies, more than 100 fire and rescue personnel, equipment, more than 150 state and local police, and scores of Virginia Department of Transportation personnel. These assets were on the scene within 10 hours.
 Coordination among agencies was crucial to mitigation and cleanup. |
During the next several hours, many resources were called. The Virginia State Police, Fairfax County Police, and Virginia Department of Transportation began to move the traffic load from the mainline Beltway and I-95 to alternate routes. The Virginia Department of Emergency Services assisted Fairfax County Emergency Services in evacuating homes near the incident.
Several agencies were contacted for technical assistance, including the Virginia State Police, Ft. Belvoir EOD, Andrews Air Force Base EOD, and Quantico Marine Base EOD. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms self-dispatched to the scene to offer technical assistance and personnel. We also contacted the Institute of Makers of Explosives in Washington, D.C., a trade association, which put us in contact with a Louisiana manufacturer that made a comparable product. This company provided significant technical assistance to help us in developing our strategic goals and tactical objectives.
 Transloaded boxes of Class 1.1D black powder. |
After 10 hours, the product-removal process was begun. Specific tasks included accessing the interior of the container, conducting an in-depth damage assessment, and initiating product off-loading. Personnel from all agencies-wearing cotton clothing to reduce the chance of static electricity-completed the off-loading under the supervision of the EOD personnel. The incident was terminated at 2200 hours, approximately 17 hours after it started.
Because this incident disrupted traffic on two of the busiest highways in the commonwealth, the public and the media questioned many of the decisions made. Because of the time it took to assemble the needed resources to handle the incident and manage the traffic and to develop and implement the operation plan while ensuring public and employee safety, major portions of both interstates had to be shut down for more than 14 hours.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Lessons learned from this incident include the following:
- We wondered why a product manufactured in Brazil was being off-loaded in Norfolk for shipment to the Northeast instead of being directly shipped to other portage. The answer is that there are laws that regulate where explosives can be off-loaded from marine vessels, and Norfolk is the farthest point north on the East Coast that they may travel by marine transport.
- The technical issues that needed to be overcome were the many conflicts and inconsistencies encountered in obtaining clear product information. Even though there was an MSDS, other technical information contradicted the information, causing confusion. Also, according to the technical information, the product was sensitive to static electricity. This was addressed early in the incident in accordance with NFPA 472, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents-1997. The entry team attached grounding cables to the tractor, the trailer, and the cargo container separately and then attached each to grounding rods driven into the ground. Additional grounding was completed when entry operations began. A total of six cables and six rods was used.
- As with any operation of this size and magnitude, there were problems to overcome. The issues in this regard were whether the emergency responders had the training and resources to handle the incident and what could be done to change the impact this incident had on traffic.
- The use of unified command is necessary when multiple agencies and jurisdictions are involved.
- Planning is a key issue. If we spend the time to develop a plan, we need to spend the time updating and practicing the plan. We also need to make sure that we involve all personnel who will implement the plan.
- Coordinated information should be released to the public in a timely fashion to lessen the impact to motorists. This information should be released through a Joint Information Center (JIC).
- Logistics for long-term incidents must be coordinated and available. The ability to obtain the necessary equipment is enhanced by having prearranged contacts.
- Preplanning can enhance the need for technical support (i.e., explosive experts, specialized cleanup contractors, and so on). By compiling and updating a standard resource manual, many issues can be resolved early by locating the necessary equipment and specialized personnel.
GLEN RUDNER is the hazardous materials response officer for the Virginia Department of Emergency Services, assigned to the Northern Virginia area. He is responsible for coordinating state assets during hazardous-materials incidents. He has instructed in numerous hazardous-materials programs and has assisted in the development of the Virginia Department of Emergency Services Hazardous Materials Technician program and codeveloped the Virginia Department of Emergency Services Advanced Hazardous Materials Control program.
