LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Share the grief, but learn the lessons
As a volunteer firefighter for 17 years, I share the grief felt by the Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department over the loss of Firefighter Alan Mickelson in a church fire this year.
As I read “Coping with a Brother’s Death” (Fire Engineering, September 1990), the article that detailed the events leading up to the tragic loss, the authors stated that Firefighter Mickelson died “despite textbook tactics we used to combat the fire.” This statement brought questions to my mind. In the hope that looking at all the aspects of this accident will prevent another from occurring, I pose the following:
After documenting a futile attack, the authors state, “Suddenly within minutes the ceiling and roof slowly began to collapse with crews still inside, some 45 minutes after first arrival.” I must question the procedure that allowed crews to continue to fight a free-burning interior fire 45 minutes after arrival, when no progress had been made on extinguishment.
One of the most basic axioms of firefighting taught to me was the 15minute rule: Fifteen minutes after arrival on a free-burning fire, if no progress is made, back all crews out.
As my reading continued, the article stated that the attack was then changed to another wing of the church, where two firefighters fell through the roof while attempting to ventilate. It was in this fall that Mickelson died. With no information to rely on other than what was offered in the article, I also must question placement of personnel on the roof of a building that had already obviously vented and had suffered extreme structural damage in the form of a collapse.
Toward the end of the article the authors state, “Convinced their fireground decisions were correct, officers have not drastically changed their procedures for roof operations.”
People make mistakes. It is the very sad truth that in the fire service when people in command make mistakes, firefighters can get injured or killed. We must provide a safety margin for our firefighters in case mistakes are made. I believe in aggressive interior firefighting, especially if people arctrapped, but we must know when to get out and when not to go in.
I have a very hard time with “textbook tactics” used to save a structure—any structure —that leaves a firefighter seriously injured or dead. There is no structure—a house, a church, or any building that I know of—that has been worth the life of any firefighter.
I read continually about the dangers of the lightweight wood truss used in construction today. Granted, the lightweight truss will not withstand the attack of fire as well as larger structural wood members; however, it must be remembered that larger members introduce a higher dead load to support. How many wood structures (other than heavy timber) can withstand a free-burning fire for 45 minutes or more without suffering structural damage? Fireground commanders must be aware of the limitations of the materials used in the construction in their jurisdiction.
My thoughts and prayers go out to those w ho commanded this scene, for I am sure that they have been through some very difficult times. I hope that fireground commanders who read this will invest more time in learning about the limitations of construction materials under attack by fire and realize that there are incidents that are best fought defensively or not at all. Every fireground commander should look each firefighter and firefighter’s family in the eyes and then decide if he or she is w illing to put a firefighter in a no-win situation.
Was the attempted venting of the church roof worth the life of Alan Mickelson? I say no way, and the Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department should rethink its tactics.
Hank Austin
Chief
Shavano Park (TX) Volunteer Fire
Department
I am so outraged by the article “Coping with a Brother’s Death” and the “textbook tactics” used to fight the fire that killed a firefighter that my hands are shaking as I write this. I’m reminded of a recent American Heat tape in which a chief of department pulled his firefighters out of a fire just minutes before a building collapsed and then stated he sure was glad that he had seen the American Heat video on the Hackensack fire. Where have you people been? I would be ashamed to admit that in 1990 1 had to find out from a videotape that wood trusses are dangerous when exposed to fire! Nearly every month there is an article in one fire service publication or another about the hazards of truss construction during a fire. Haven’t you ever heard of Francis Brannigan?
The dangers of wood-frame trusses have been known for many years; it’s so discouraging to see such a lack of knowledge exposed. There’s a lot of information available and there is no excuse for a lack of knowledge on this subject. One of my favorite sayings came from one of the fire officers in a class we were taking together: “The depth of my ignorance knows no bounds.” It expressed the feelings of several of my most respected instructors as well. In the fire service you can never think you don’t need to learn anything new.
Lt. Don Sepanski
Detroit Metro Airport FD
Detroit, Michigan
NFPA 1500 not a law
First, I must commend Fire Engineering on its fine magazine, especially the October 1990 issue. There were many thought-provoking articles of interest.
I am compelled to comment on Chief jack Cottet’s article on enclosed apparatus cabs, which I believe deserves a second, hard look.
Chief Cottet continually quotes and refers to NFPA 1500. That standard is a concensus guideline and is not the law as many think. I don’t believe that open jump seats pose a serious hazard, and there simply is no substantiated record of this cab configuration being any more or less hazardous than an enclosed cab or jump seat.
Seat belt requirements and standard operating procedures are a must no matter what the riding position may be. Most injuries attributed to responding and returning were due to the lack of standard operating procedures, lack of enforcement of existing SOPs, or firefighter carelessness—not the cab design.
We must enforce rules that are in place before needlessly spending thousands of dollars to redesign our apparatus cabs.
One last thought about NFPA standards: When was the last time your fire company was cited for noncompliance with NFPA 1201 for improper marking of your fire hydrants? Have you done your preplan work in compliance with NFPA 903? Are your fire reports filled out to NFPA 902 standards? When did you last hear about a fire company being sued for failure to use standard hose threads as established in NFPA 1963? That particular standard has been in place since the early 1900s! Hopefully you didn’t blindly spec out your new pumper to NFPA 1901 and pay for things you really don’t need. I hope you used it as a guideline and modified it to your community’s needs. Are your firefighters certified to 1001, drivers to 1002, and officers to 1021?
I support all NFPA standards, but remember: They are guidelines and not the law.
Wayne DePew
New York State Fire Instructor
Ulster County
Kerhonkson, AT’
Buckling up
Following a recent rain storm, Dallas Fire Department Engine 9 overturned on a wet, slick road while en route to an emergency call. None of the four firefighters on board were injured.
The Dallas Fire Department, like most fire departments in this country, has strict rules about the use of seatbelts and about firefighters being bunkered before leaving the station. These rules are imperative, as so many firefighters are injured or killed responding to or returning from emergency calls.
We in the fire service today are fortunate. We have excellent equipment, apparatus, protective clothing, and training. If we use these correctly and consistently and follow the basic rules of safety, we can help ensure that we all enjoy long, safe fire service careers.
Dodd Miller
Chief
Dallas (IX) Fire Department
Insurance premiums for commercial property
I enjoyed reading Frank Brannigan’s article on Fire Loss Management in the August issue but feel the need to clarify a point made on pg. 82. Mr. Brannigan states, “The underwriter, in determining the premium, takes into account the fact that the fire department might not, for whatever reason, be successful in suppressing the fire.” This is not strictly correct. Premiums are determined by a rate-making process that includes many factors.
Rating commercial property insurance involves several steps. There are seven specific factors that control the premium for direct property damage coverage under a commercial property policy. These are (1) the coverage form used, (2) the causes of loss form that applies, (3) the construction of the building in relation to its susceptibility to fire loss, (4) the occupancy of the building (what sort of business is conducted on the premises), (5) the location of the properv (including the quality of fire protection in the area where the property is located), (6) the amount of insurance being written, and (7) the applicable coinsurance equipment.
For rating purposes, commercial property is classified according to the quality of fire protection available. Fire protection is graded on a scale of one to 10, with one being the best. The assigned number indicates the availability of firefighting personnel and equipment, whether municipal or private. The public protection grading implies various degrees of success in suppressing a fire. In other words, a class 2 source of protection is probably going to be more successful than a class 7 in handling a given fire. This is accounted for in the rate and will result in a lower premium for the class 2 area and a higher premium for class 7.
Based on the these facts, I don’t think it’s fair to say that insurance underwriters assume the fire department will not be able to put out the fire. The assumption is that with a good level of protection, a fire will be handled quickly with minimal loss assuming early detection, alarm, and no other unusual factors. As an employee of the insurance industry and long-term member of the fire service, I felt obligated to raise these points.
Jack L. Cottet
Property Services Specialist
Home Office Loss Control
Utica National Insurance Group
New Hartford, New York
