By James R. Phelan and Charles G. King
With New Introduction by Charles G. King
When I co-authored this article several years ago, an act as cowardly as crashing two commercial airplanes into the Twin Towers would have been inconceivable. The unthinkable, however, has happened, and it is necessary for us in the fire service to brace ourselves for more of it. Although we can’t predict every act of insanity that fanatics will inflict on us, we can do our best to prepare for them. After the first bombing of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Bombing, we became unhappily aware of the damage that could be done by car bombs. Now we have to face suicide bombers. We in the fire service are on the front line in protecting civilians from the destructive potential of bombs. Which brings us to why we are revisiting this article, which originally appeared in Fire Engineering. The procedures described here stand the test of time and, with regard to responding to terrorist bomb threats and incidents, should be learned, practiced, and utilized.-Charles G. King
Experts warn that terrorism may increase now that the war against Iraq has ended. It is time, therefore, for firefighters to bone up on techniques that can help them recognize and deal with bomb threats and terrorist attacks.
Depending on the size and the range of responsibilities mandated to your fire company, you could be called on to perform a variety of functions ranging from searching a premises for explosives to extinguishing fires ignited by incendiary devices.
Some tried-and-true methods for dealing with such threats are presented below. The device commonly called a “bomb” is referred to as an “improvised explosive, incendiary and/or chemical device” (IICD) because this terminology encompasses all forms of terrorist threats – from plastic explosives to a Molotov cocktail to an incendiary mix of sodium peroxide and granulated sugar. Implied in the term “improvised” is the possibility or probability that the device was constructed from materials readily available to anyone.
In many cities firefighters receive some training in explosives, incendiaries, and chemicals and the ways they are used to construct improvised devices. However, unless firefighters specifically are charged by law with the ultimate responsibility of dealing with all aspects of these devices, they usually perform only limited functions and receive minimal training.
Response Techniques
The following techniques offer some guidance for responding to a scene where a bomb or chemical poses a fire threat.
- Never attempt to move, disarm, or otherwise tamper with an explosive or incendiary device unless you have been trained to handle these dangerous items. And, spend as little time as possible in the vicinity of the device. Firefighters are not bomb technicians, and they are not expected to act as bomb technicians. Any action taken to neutralize or remove and IICD by anyone other than a trained professional can have disastrous consequences.
Any imprudent action unexpectedly could detonate, ignite, or activate a device and expose occupants, employees, and onlookers to unnecessary danger. If the police or bomb squad is on scene when you arrive, take your lead from the specialists present.
Nevertheless, you can perform many important functions at the scene even if you are not a bomb technician and, therefore, cannot remove or otherwise handle the potentially explosive device. Police and bomb personnel on the scene, for example, welcome any additional knowledge of explosives – their effects, nomenclature, and measures for diminishing their potential to cause damage. This information contributes to a well-coordinated public safety response. - Evacuate the area immediately; maximize the distance between the site of the suspected device and civilians. When possible, the evacuation route should be a safe distance from glass windows and doors and other materials that shatter easily. Evacuation routes should not be dependent on mechanical and/or electrical mechanisms such as elevators and escalators. The alternate means of egress should be wide enough and free of obstructions to reduce the likelihood of panic. Pay special attention to evacuating disabled individuals.
Civilian areas should be at least 300 to 500 feet away to prevent injuries due to the explosion and its effects, including harmful toxic vapors. The distance should be increased according to the type of improvised device, the quantity of explosives or hazardous materials involved, and/or the quantity of glass or other shatterable material in the building, around its exterior, or on the site. Atmospheric conditions such as the speed and direction of the wind and the cloud-ceiling level also should be factored in when determining evacuation distances. - Vent by opening doors, windows and other structural areas such as roof vents, skylights, and hatch covers. The less confinement, the less damage or destruction will be done should the explosive device detonate. Venting does not eliminate the damage and destruction caused by the device’s going off, but it lessens the effects of blast pressure and shock.
- Be aware that more than one bomb or incendiary device may be present and that safety hazards for emergency responders exist.
Primary and Secondary Explosive Effects
Planning for civilian protection entails knowing the signs of an impending explosion and the primary and secondary explosive effects of a chemical explosion or bomb detonation.
Subsequent to a detonation, the solid material is converted to a rapidly expanding gas in approximately 110,000th of a second. These gases create up to 700 tons of pressure per square inch as they are pushed away from the detonation point and travel at a speed greater than 13,000 mph. The expanding gases, which move in a spherical direction, create a pressure wave that shatters or destroys any object or material in its path. The power generated by the gases decreases as distance from the detonation point increases.
The effects of a chemical explosion include blast, pressure, and fragmentation (primary and secondary). Other secondary effects include noise, light and heat – the thermal incendiary explosive effect. This thermal effect is evidenced as a bright, white, somewhat spherical flash that occurs the instant a chemical explodes or a bomb detonates.
The thermal incendiary chemical explosive effects that follow the initial explosion can cause significant damage. In the case of high explosives such as dynamite, TNT, and C-4, temperatures can approach 7,200° F but usually only for a short time. Low explosives such as black and smokeless powder produce less intense thermal incendiary effects, but they are of longer duration. Incidents during which low explosives are ignited or confined and explode tend to set the surrounding ground cover on fire quickly, whereas TNT or C-4 detonated on the same surrounding ground cover usually leaves only a black scorch mark. The thermal incendiary effect can ignite surrounding flammable and combustible materials. Flammable vapors, such as those produced by gasoline, are extremely vulnerable.
Toxicity, which is a secondary effect, is always present when these devices are involved. When responding to an incident where there is a threatened use of an IICD, therefore, prepare for the possibility of adverse toxic effects.
You should wear SCBA routinely to this type of incident. When ventilation is not adequate, health risks are significant. Some toxins commonly encountered during these incidents, particularly in the enclosed area, include the thick purple vapor consisting of iodine crystals and aluminum powder produced by a chemical device and which is initiated by applying water.
Inspection of Premises
In addition to life safety duties, you may have to survey the building to ensure that all electrical circuits are intact, all extraneous electrical power has been shut down, and all material gas and fuel oil lines are in proper operating order and have not been damaged or ruptured. You also may have to make sure that the gas or oil flow to the target facility has been shut off; fires caused by bombing devices usually have been traced to these fuels.
Fires that begin after the explosive device has been detonated and are attributed to the thermal incendiary effect normally occur when a significant quantity of combustible or flammable material is present in the area of detonation.
Firefighters and the Crime Scene
Crimes may be part of the scenario of a terrorist-threatened site. You may be responding to a scene at which a fire has been set or an assault, homicide, burglary, or suicide has occurred. Your activities under these circumstances normally would be subordinated to those of the law-enforcement personnel in charge.
You could, however, be the first on the scene if there is a fire that must be suppressed – and you may not be aware that it is a crime scene. When an explosion occurs in a building or motor vehicle, there are usually enough smoke and flames for the fire department to be called in first. In such cases, by the time the fire is extinguished and police have determined that a bomb may have caused the explosion, you already may be in the process of overhauling.
When responding under such conditions, you should, of course, remove all victims from the danger area and administer appropriate medical attention, in accordance with fire department procedure. Then, ensure that the fire is contained and extinguished, using the most expedient means available, as long as it is appropriate.
In addition, you should have in mind the possibility that the fire could have been caused by an IICD and, consequently, you should be especially careful not to wash away any valuable evidence with the hoses. You can preserve evidence by changing from a solid stream to a fog stream, thereby substantially reducing the water pressure. Also, when overhauling, do not sweep any debris out to the street where it inadvertently may be washed into drainage areas or sewers. Move building or vehicle debris as little as possible.
Items that constitute evidence will be present unless they have been vaporized or thrown clear of the scene by the force of the explosion. Many people mistakenly believe that the fire destroys the evidence, but this definitely is not the case. The fire may char and burn evidence, but it does not destroy it. Bomb components, for example, are still identifiable after a fire.
Other items that could provide evidence include fragments of the bomb container, an arming or timing mechanism (a clock or watch) or any type of integrated circuit components or mercury, microtoggle switches, detonators (blasting caps), and wires or pieces of unconsumed explosives or power supply (battery components). An investigator should be able to find these bomb components at the scene unless they were destroyed during the firefighting and overhaul operations.
In addition to the above precautions, bring to the attention of crime scene investigators any item or material that appears foreign to the scene or out of place, and note the area of greatest damage or destruction – this area might be the seat of the explosion. Protect the area to every extent possible, since it may contain the most evidence. Reroute or direct water flow from a target building to ensure that the evidence is not flooded down the sewer or into drainage areas. Employ salvaging techniques and cover critical areas and items to protect them from excessive water displacement.
Be alert to other types of evidence as well: extraneous tire tracks and footprints; inappropriate amounts of or oddly positioned clothing; blood; and miscellaneous items such as chewing gum wrappers, cigarette lighters, and matchbooks.
Be extremely cautious and constantly alert for anything that appears to be out of the ordinary, such as a secondary device or a bomb left by the terrorist. Often a device is planted specifically to harm fire and police personnel responding to the scene.
Coordinating a Response to Bomb Threats
A coordinated response to bomb threats ensures that life and property will be protected and preserved. There is no universally accepted response to these incidents. Each potential terrorist target (corporation, public utility, medical establishment, financial organization, or educational institution, for example) must develop and implement a plan that suits and meets its needs and circumstances.
Your department can enhance its effectiveness by developing a response plan that incorporates the following: a Command and Control Center; a Threat Response Team, headquartered at the Command and Control Center, to coordinate with public safety agencies, public utilities, and tenants who occupy the property site; and input from all levels of personnel in the occupied building or facility – to prevent wasting time and duplicating efforts.
The Threat Response Team evaluates factors such as the following:
- the physical construction and layout of the work site.
- the type of work performed there.
- the nature of the site materials.
- the number and location of employees.
- the number and quality of access and evacuation routes.
- the level of the site’s vulnerability.
- an evaluation of the site’s security system and staff.
- the stability of the local civilian community.
- the presence of labor unrest in the facility or comparable facilities nearby.
- whether the nature of the work performed at the facility is provocative or controversial and likely to spark a terrorist or criminal attack.
- whether the targeted site has been subjected to previous threats or attacks and whether a viable threat exists at present.
These factors influence decisions such as whether to evacuate and/or to cease or eventually resume normal work operations should an attack be threatened.
The Response Team also evaluates threatening messages received by telephone or switchboard operators at the facility. Communications personnel should be trained to get as much information as quickly as possible concerning the threat and the caller. They should try to obtain specific details such as the following:
- the place and location of the device.
- the type of explosive or incendiary device involved.
- the method of initiation or ignition (mechanical, electronic, booby trap?).
- the type and quality of explosive and incendiary filler (dynamite, black powder, Molotov, chemical ingredients?).
- the caller’s age, sex, voice, accent, and race; clarity of voice.
- the caller’s demeanor.
- apparent signs of mental disorientation, inebriation, speech impairment.
- background noises and street names; they may help to identify the locale where the call is being made.
All threats initially should be treated as though an actual explosive or incendiary device is involved. Specificity sometimes is a key to determining veracity. The more specific the details provided, the more seriously the threat should be taken, the more elaborate should be the response, and the more credibility that should be given to the call. Some terrorist threats that had been very general and nonspecific in nature, however, then were followed by attempted bombings. Until proven otherwise, therefore, react and respond to a terrorist threat as if an IICD is present. Part 2 of this article will appear next week.
Charles G King heads Charles G. King Associates, Inc., a fire and arson investigation firm he founded in 1980. Previously, he served 23 years on the Fire Department of New York, where he was a firefighter, a fire marshal, and a supervising fire marshal. He was a special agent assigned to investigate organized crime and corruption at the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation for more than two years. He was also hired by the City of Philadelphia to investigate the origin and cause of the MOVE conflagration in which 11 people died and more than 60 houses burned. His articles on fire and arson investigation have been published in fire service/arson investigation publications. He wrote the chapter on arson investigation for The Fire Chief’s Handbook, Fifth Edition (Fire Engineering, 1995).
James R. Phelan is a former chief of staff of the FBI Bomb Data Center at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. He has responded to and investigated more than 500 bombings and bomb-related incidents and investigated the explosive aspect of the MOVE incident that occurred in 1985 in the city of Philadelphia in which 11 people died and more than 60 houses burned. He is a private consultant.
Copyright (c) 2002, Charles G. King and James R. Phelan
