JOURNAL BUILDING FIRE TUSCOLA, ILLINOIS

JOURNAL BUILDING FIRE TUSCOLA, ILLINOIS

BY STEVE L. HETTINGER

At 7:45 p.m. on a subfreezing February 14, 1997, the Douglas County Communications Center received a call from a young man using a pay telephone in the downtown area, reporting a fire in the old Journal Building at 110 West North Central. We knew where this building was–we had been dreading this fire for a long time.

The 50- by 100-foot building, of ordinary construction, was more than 100 years old. It had been used for a variety of purposes over the years. Originally housing a newspaper, the building was most recently used as a residential occupancy and as a place of assembly. The front half of the first floor contained an apartment unit and fitness rooms used by the apartment occupants. The back half was used for storage of personal and business goods. The first floor was split in half lengthwise by a partition wall, at each end of which was a stairwell to the second floor. During the fire it was found that the rear stairwell was impassable due to a proliferation of materials stored there, as well as its dubious structural integrity. In fact, in recent times, building upkeep had been neglected, and its deterioration may have had an impact on this fire incident.

One-half of the second floor had been used by a Loyal Order of Moose fraternal club, which was inactive at the time of the fire, and the other half as a “haunted house” for Halloween. Although the haunted house was not being used at the time of the fire, props still filled that area. The second-floor window assemblies had been removed and the openings tightly sealed with a sandwich of plywood sheets over two-by-fours. An abandoned, exterior, five-foot-square wood-frame dumbwaiter shaft was attached to the rear of the building and ran from the first floor to the roof; it had previously served the Moose club kitchen.

The fire building had no fire protection systems, with the exception of a smoke detector in the apartment unit.

Unknown to firefighters was the fact that the building interior had been modified dramatically: The original 15-foot ceiling was dropped to seven feet over the apartment/fitness area, creating a hidden eight-foot, wood-frame void space covered by fiber ceiling tile. This modification would play an important role in the outcome of the fire.

The Journal Building fire exposed occupancies on its west and east sides. Exposure 2 was the 112-story “Community Building,” which was of ordinary construction–concrete block walls with laminated wood arches supporting a peaked roof. A three-foot alley separated the fire building from this exposure.

Exposure 4 was a one-story Knights of Columbus hall. This building also was of ordinary construction, with a flat built-up roof supported by lengthwise bearing walls. It was attached directly to the fire building, separated by a fire wall constructed of brick two wythes thick, with a two-foot-high parapet.

THE FIRE

Within four minutes after receipt of the telephone alarm, two pumpers and the department`s rescue unit were brought to the scene. On-scene staffing at this time consisted of four engineers, four firefighters, three officers, and Assistant Chief George Wineland. Engine 92 positioned itself in front of the fire building and stretched a 112-inch handline to the front door. Engine 91 laid a five-inch supply line for Engine 92, taking a hydrant at the corner of Parke Street and W. North Central Avenue, then proceeded to the rear of the building and connected to a hydrant there.

Firefighters observed fire at the rear of the building on the west side of the first floor. This was communicated to me as I arrived on the scene at 7:55 p.m., along with five additional firefighters. I assumed command and set up a command post at the front of the fire building. Immediately I requested mutual aid from the nearby community of Arcola, asking for additional engine companies and manpower. In addition, I sent one of the apparatus engineers on scene back to the station for the department`s 85-foot aerial, Ladder 96. It was positioned at the 1-2 (southwest) corner of the fire building.

I designated Wineland operations officer at the rear of the fire building. Engine 91 stretched a 212-inch handline to the rear entrance of the building. Heavy smoke poured from the building as firefighters forced entry and began an interior attack.

Heavy fire was above and in front of the nozzle team, and the smoke conditions were severe. Electric utility panels on the rear wall were arcing (electric power to the building was disconnected a short time later). Meanwhile, horizontal ventilation (front door opened and first-floor front windows broken out) was performed.

The attack team, with a 212-inch line, made headway. The 112-inch handline stretched to the front of the building was not operated to avoid the situation of opposing streams. Additional firefighters were assigned to conduct a primary search of the first floor, which proved negative.

Even with the knockdown of all visible fire, heavy smoke continued to issue from the structure; inside was very heavily charged with smoke. A positive-pressure fan was operated into the rear door to force smoke out the front of the structure.

By 8:10 p.m., mutual-aid units from Arcola began to arrive. They provided much-needed personnel, detailed to primary search on the second floor and to relieve crews in the rear sector. The second-floor search crew reported heat coming from the floor and heavy smoke. Protective handlines were stretched up the front stairs; this was an absolute necessity, given the fact that the strongly secured windows and impassable rear stairs gave firefighters only one means of egress.

Electrical power lines in front of the building precluded safe access to the second floor and roof via ground or aerial ladders. However, even if we had been able to ladder the front, our ability to ventilate the boarded-up windows in a timely manner would have been questionable, if not impossible. And at this time, we did not have sufficient fireground personnel to ventilate the roof.

BUILDING EVACUATED

The second-floor search crew had found no occupants but reported a maze of walls and obstructions (which turned out to be the Halloween props) and that they were having difficulty penetrating the floor. At this time, I noted that even heavier smoke began to push through the cracks in the front brick and around the wood-sealed windows.

First-floor crews reported a worsening smoke condition but no visible fire. However, when crews searching for fire pulled the ceiling over the apartment space on the first floor, they encountered very heavy fire in the void space. The 212-inch handline was directed into the void; this effort to knock down the fire proved fruitless, and command was notified.

With smoke conditions worsening, fire spreading through hidden voids, insufficient ventilation, and interior crews unable to contend with the volume of fire, I evacuated all firefighters from the building and outside the collapse zone. Additionally, I sent for the department`s 53-foot water tower.

Within minutes, the smoke condition outside got so bad that the front of the building itself was barely visible from the command post. At this time I believe the front window seals blew out and the second floor lit up; Wineland, at the rear, later noted that fire flashed across the second floor and burning material was dropping into the apartment below. All of this took place within 10 minutes of the time when first-floor crews reported they had knocked down all visible fire.

We quickly shifted to a defensive strategy. The ladder truck and water tower were set up at the front corners of the building and operated onto the fire building, which was beginning to burn through the roof. These aerial streams also were to protect the adjacent exposures.

At the rear of the structure, firefighters operated the 212-inch line and a deck gun through openings into the structure.

I requested additional mutual aid from the towns of Atwood and Arthur. They were assigned to exposures 2 and 4 to prevent extension. Two 212-inch handlines were assigned to the roofs and 112-inch handlines inside the two exposures. In our favor were a three-foot gap between the fire building and exposure 2 as well as a fire wall between the fire building and exposure 4, which, fortunately, had no penetrations.

With the large flows of a master stream operation, it became apparent that the town`s water mains in the vicinity of the fire would be pressed to the limit. I requested additional mutual aid to establish a tanker shuttle. Ten communities sent tankers, engines, and personnel for this purpose. Two water-source sites were established–at the town`s water tank (water tower) and at a stream, each about six blocks away from the fire building. A folding tank was set up in a parking lot along Parke Street and supplied an engine company. Additionally, an air supply truck from Arcola was set up to replenish spent SCBA bottles.

COLLAPSE

Less than 15 minutes after the building`s evacuation, the roof collapsed, issuing a ball of fire 100 feet in the air. Another four minutes passed, and the entire front wall collapsed into the street. Then the upper portion of the side walls of the fire building collapsed onto the exposures. This sent another fireball into the air, enveloping a firefighter operating at the tip of the ladder pipe. Fortunately, he was wearing full protective clothing (including SCBA) and was not injured.

The collapsing wall on the east side did not significantly damage the Knights of Columbus building. On the west side, however, the wall collapsing onto the Community Building brought a second-floor office down to street level, but fire did not extend into the exposures.

With concerns over an increasingly strong wind, another aerial pipe was set up to protect exposures on the #4 side. This aerial was never operated, however, as the main body of fire was knocked down quickly by the other streams shortly after the collapse, and brands ultimately did not cause a problem.

I declared the fire under control at 9:45 p.m. Most of the mutual-aid companies were released by 11:30 p.m., but Tuscola fire units remained on scene until 8 a.m. the next morning. Spot fires had to be extinguished for another two days.

The Illinois State Fire Marshal`s Office responded to the scene to conduct an investigation. The investigators were unable to determine the origin and cause of the fire; the fire`s cause has been classified as “undetermined.”

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

Preplanning the interior of this structure would have been invaluable. Such a walk-through would have indicated the presence of the void space above the first-floor apartment as well as the Halloween props and sealed windows on the second floor.

First-alarm staffing (12 firefighters) was less than minimal for this type of fire/structure and had an impact on the way the fire was fought. Delays in accessing the second floor for a search and pulling ceilings to check for extension were limited due to the number of personnel on scene. Vertical ventilation, which could have relieved the heavy smoke condition, and laddering the building were never done. (See editor`s comment.)

The large void space above the first floor let the fire burn out of the reach of firefighters` streams for some time. When it was opened up, it was well beyond the capabilities of the 212-inch handline below. Firefighters must be suspicious of older “renovated” buildings in which voids are often created during the renovation process. A clue in this fire would have been the overall building height compared with the ceiling heights. Observe the location of the windows on the exterior–where should the original ceiling of the first floor be? Probe potential void spaces early in the fire to ensure fire has not extended into these spaces.

The 212-inch handline as the primary attack line did its job–relatively quick knockdown of the fire that was visible. Big fire equals big flows.

Ventilation was problematic at this fire. Even with removal of the front/rear windows and doors on the first floor, heavy smoke continued to persist. The use of the positive-pressure fan was of questionable value–no perceived improvement was noted after the fan had been turned on. It is also possible that the fan forced fresh air into the void space–in some cases the use of PPV during an attack can create more problems than it solves. The lack of vertical ventilation hampered first- and second-floor crews.

The abandoned dumbwaiter also created a hidden vertical void–it may have been the path of fire from the first floor to the second floor. This is another type of void that should be probed–again, preplanning.

I knew the limitations of the water supply and called for the establishment of the tanker shuttle before we needed it. The water supply, therefore, never became an issue during this fire.

Firefighters in and on the exposures could have been injured by the falling walls of the main fire building. Since they were out of the collapse zone, none were injured by falling debris.

Having a firefighter operate a ladder pipe from the tip of the ladder can prove dangerous, especially during the collapse of a structure. It is best to have the firefighter direct the stream using rope halyards at ground level.

Tuscola has no fire or building code. The fire department has only recently begun to use the Life Safety CodeT on existing structures. Had a building code been in place and enforced, using the second floor for a haunted house, boarding up the second-floor windows, as well as several other problems would not have been permitted to exist. Communities without basic fire and building codes create unsafe conditions for civilians and firefighters alike. n

(Above left) Early in the fire, chief officers confer with the son of the building owner, obtaining some information about building layout and contents. Fire crews are at this time conducting an interior attack from the rear. (Photos by Bob Stallsworth unless otherwise noted.) (Above right) Firefighters prepare to access the front stairs and search the second floor. (Bottom right) All interior operations were halted and firefighters evacuated when conditions deteriorated rapidly.

(Top left) Collapse occurred shortly after firefighters were evacuated. In the foreground is the exposed Community Building; the three-foot alley between the two buildings was a favorable circumstance in the fire department`s successful protection of this exposure. (Top right) Firefighters stretched 212-inch handlines to exposure roofs. Handlines also were stretched to the interiors of the adjacent buildings. The fire wall between the fire building and the Knights of Columbus building served its intended purpose–there were no penetrations. (Bottom left) A firefighter rapidly descends the tip of the ladder pipe, which proved to be a dangerous position at this fire. (Photo by Eric Hastings.) (Bottom right) Mutual-aid fire departments implemented a water shuttle operation to augment the strained city water system. Shown is one of three dump tanks used.

(Top) The fire is placed under control 20 minutes after complete collapse and the exposures are saved. (Bottom) Overhaul lasted two days.

EDITOR`S COMMENT

Our conversations with Chief Hettinger reinforced issues on fireground staffing that are of national importance. Although the chief indicated that a turnout of 12 total members on the first alarm was light for his department, for many other departments throughout the country this number would be considered a personnel windfall. Still, Hettinger stressed the fact that, for this fire, the equivalent of two crews was insufficient to address tactical necessities.

The art of effective firefighting demands a multiplicity of basic operational functions performed practically simultaneously in coordination with each other. Remove any one of these functions and the chances for success are diminished exponentially; put another way, remove one and the hazard or fire condition is increased to the nth degree. In hindsight, it is easy to say, for example, that ceilings could have been pulled earlier in the firefight, but with limited personnel, what would have been the tradeoff–horizontal ventilation or primary search? Time is the enemy at structure fires, and windows of opportunity are small. Unfortunately, many, many fire departments in this country are behind the curve on arrival, and five additional members five minutes into the firefight or 20 additional members 20 minutes into the firefight most times cannot compensate.

With all due respect to those who claim “Give me three firefighters who know what they`re doing, and we`ll put out the world!” success and safety rarely can be achieved without the right numbers of well-trained personnel. American fire departments are being staffed to match bare-minimum needs at small, high-frequency fires–the room and contents fire, for example. That creates a major problem for anything larger, such as the “Main Street U.S.A.” fire in Tuscola. Municipal governments throughout America, supporting (or not supporting, as the case may be) both paid and volunteer departments, are playing a dangerous game of percentages, a game that Joe Citizen knows nothing about. In truth, determining the right fireground staffing for structure fires can be made only on an occupancy-type-by-occupancy-type basis–say, 23 members for a taxpayer fire, 13 for a house fire, and so on. Any department would be wise to plan first-alarm resources in this fashion.

It is ironic that the proposed NFPA 1200 deployment standard (which recently hit the skids because of major disagreements within the Technical Committee and was sent back to the Standards Council to determine further action) would have called for a minimum of 12 firefighters at this fire scene–significantly fewer than what was needed to fight this real fire. n

–Bill Manning

STEVE L. HETTINGER is chief and a 19-year veteran of the Tuscola (IL) Fire Department. He has a bachelor`s degree in education and is a certified fire service instructor I in the state of Illinois. Hettinger is president of the Douglas County Mutual Aid Association.