Wolf Trap Reprise
FEATURES
FIRE REPORT
Photo by Clark O Martin
Photo courtesy of the National Park Service
Wolf Trap burned for the fourth time early last November 3.
This time, the flames did $20,000 damage to electrical wiring and furnishings in Filene Center II, the main theater building of Wolf Trap Farm Park in Fairfax County, Va., 12 miles west of Washington. Last time, the fire destroyed the entire building.
The difference was fire protection—a sophisticated system that cost more than $1.7 million.
Wolf Trap Farm Park, the only national park dedicated to the performing arts, is owned by the U.S. Department of the Interior. After major fires swept through Filene Center in March of 1971, March of 1980, and April of 1982, the price of fire protection for the previously unprotected, open-air structure began to seem reasonable. The most recent fire proved that it was money well spent.
The first-due companies from a Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department station in nearby Tysons Corner visited often during the reconstruction of Filene Center and developed a 15-page prefire plan. The firefighters watched as the fire protection system went in: a graphic enunciator board in the guard room, which is staffed 24 hours a day; a 1,500-gpm, 185-psi fire pump; a 51-zone fire alarm panel in the fire pump room, monitored at the U.S. Park Police headquarters in Washington; 21 separate and distinct automatic sprinkler systems, in an unusual combination of deluge and preaction types; emergency exhaust fans; a huge fire curtain for the stage; compartmentalizing fire doors; and a comprehensive heat, smoke, and pull-box alarm system.
The latest in a series of major fires at Wolf Trap was the least— thanks to lessons learned regarding fire protection.
Photos by Gordon M Sachs
Lessons Reinforced
A good fire protection system can prevent fire damage worth many times its cost.
Frequent visits enable firstdue companies to compile technical information, such as floor plans and sprinkler system plans, that will guide them and others at the time of an incident.
Occasional on-site drills ensure that the operational plan will be followed smoothly when put into action for real.
Photo courtesy of the National Park Service
How well did the fire protection system and the prefire plan work November 3?
A year and a half before this latest fire, the set-up was described here [see “As a Phoenix Rising from Ashes, Wolf Trap Reopens,” Fire Engineering, May 1985]:
“Were an alarm to go off at Wolf Trap today, it would automatically be transmitted to the U.S. Park Police headquarters in Washington. That alarm would immediately be relayed to the Fairfax County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Simultaneously, the officer on duty in the guard room in Filene Center II would dial 911 to verify EOC’s receipt of the alarm and to specify which alarm zones had been activated. This information would be obtained from the enunciator board in the guard room.
“The first-alarm assignment of three engines, two trucks, one heavy rescue squad, one emergency medical services unit, and a battalion chief would verify the alarm zones on the guard room enunciator board, then proceed to the main fire-alarm panel in the fire pump room on the lower level. While an officer attempted to reset the system, other crews would go to the area in question to investigate.
“The water supply engine would be supplementing the automatic sprinkler/standpipe systems, the exhaust fans above the stage would be operating, and a fire curtain and huge fire doors would have compartmentalized the entire structure.”
When the real thing struck, the response was nearly to the letter.
The fire started shortly after 7 o’clock that Monday morning, in an air-handling unit built into the ceiling of the main chorus dressing room on the lower level. For several minutes, the fire spread undetected in the plenum space above the ceiling. When the smoke built up enough pressure, at about 7:20 a.m., it broke through the ceiling tiles and activated the detection system.
A U.S. Park Police guard was on duty in the guard room, and two National Park Service engineers were working in the mechanical room. No one else was in the building at the time, although offices in Filene Center II are occupied year-round.
When the alarm sounded, the guard attempted to call the U.S. Park Police headquarters but found the phones were dead. She left her post to investigate the alarm and to see if the engineers had activated the alarm, shut off the phones, or both. She went down the west stairwell to the lower level and was met by the engineers and by billowing, black smoke.
All three retreated up the stairway and to the outside, where the guard called headquarters by radio. The Fairfax County EOC received a phone call at 7:40 from someone reporting a fire at Wolf Trap. This was followed by a call from the U.S. Park Police headquarters.
A full box-alarm assignment was dispatched. First-arriving units reported there was heavy smoke in the building, and the Filene Center II operational plan for fire response was instituted, along with the incident command system. The smoke was thick, but by checking the graphic enunciator board, firefighters were quickly able to determine the general area of the fire. Because of the heavy smoke throughout, the responders didn’t try to reset the system.
The fire remained above the ceiling, so no sprinkler heads were activated, but fire officers knew where the fire pump control and deluge valves were in order to fill the system with water if manual control were to become necessary. (It did not.) One pumper augmented the fire protection water supply by pumping water into the combination standpipe/sprinkler connection from the 12-inch main.
Fire doors had shut, compartmentalizing the floor area, and the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system had shut down.
Filene Center II—West Elevation
Photo by Peter Krogh
Filene Center II—House Orchestra Seating/Stage Level (One Level Above the Fire)
Photo by Gordon M. Sachs
Interior units were able to find the fire after working their way through a maze of movable partitions and dressing tables stored in the dressing rooms. The fire, once located, was quickly extinguished, but the smoke was more difficult to remove. Special alarms facilitated this by bringing extra personnel and a specialized air/light unit that carries a large generator, lighting equipment, fans, a self-contained breathing-air compressor, and an air storage system.
The situation was secured by about 8:45 a.m. The smoothness of the operation was partially due to the technical information contained in the first-due station’s prefire plan, frequent walkthroughs to become familiar with the building, and on-site drills in carrying out the operational plan.
“The station personnel know the building fairly well, but as incident commander I would have been lost without this preplan,” says Assistant Chief Richard Steinberg.
Wolf Trap officials tried to dismiss the fire as minor; apparently they were worried that media reports about another major fire would hurt the park’s image as one of the nation’s great showplaces.
A fire that does $20,000 damage isn’t minor, but contrary to park officials’ fears, the contrast with the destruction done by the three earlier fires provides an excellent opportunity to reinforce the astuteness of spending $1.7 million for fire protection.
Suppose for a moment that there had been no fire protection systems in Filene Center II. When would the fire have been detected? How would it have been compartmentalized? Would the HVAC system have spread the smoke and fire? And, given the potential magnitude of such a fire, could the water supply have handled the required flows?
In other words, this fire could easily have extended to the point at which it might have destroyed an unprotected structure. But instead, thanks to the fire protection systems in Filene Center II, the show can go on.
