BY ERIC G. BACHMAN
The events of September 11, 2001, and the threat of terrorism have changed our lives forever. They have caused nearly every industry to review and improve its safety and security practices. The fire service industry is no different. The terrorism threat has changed our approach to certain incidents and caused us to develop new and enhance existing training programs and operating guidelines.
It has also caused our government leaders to initiate legislation addressing homeland security measures. This legislation has created funding sources and programs for the emergency services to improve their preparedness for future terrorist events. The federal Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program has encouraged departments to apply for monies to improve personal protective equipment and other services. Other legislation and funding allocations have been enacted to improve the safety and security of specific industries.
In 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appropriated nearly $90 million for drinking water suppliers to evaluate their facilities’ security. Initially, this program was targeted at large water suppliers that serve more than 100,000 customers. According to the EPA, nearly 430 large drinking water systems in the country serve more than 50 percent of the U.S. population. Water suppliers can apply for grants to aid in evaluating and strengthening the security of their treatment and storage facilities. This program was initially established to aid the greatest number of facilities at risk. Programs are being developed, however, to aid the other 168,000 public drinking water and 16,000 wastewater treatment facilities in the United States.
Since June 2002, grants have been allocated to more than 350 of the 430 public drinking water facilities. A water-treatment facility in my county was awarded a grant. A portion of the grant was used to have a consultant review and evaluate security features and to recommend improvements. As an observer at this evaluation, I found it to be a very valuable learning experience. Our facility not only takes and treats river water for domestic consumption, but it also serves as the local wastewater facility that treats effluent and renders it potable. The experience was a good review of the water and wastewater treatment processes. It also enabled me to learn more about security measures that, if initiated, might influence fire department operations at these facilities.
As is true of any other facility, it is important to gather preincident intelligence on water/wastewater-treatment facilities, regardless of their size. These facilities require careful consideration for preincident intelligence and preparedness, as they possess many hazards that need to be identified and considered. Understanding the basic process concepts and associated hazards is essential to preparing for an emergency. We cannot be masters of all industrial processes in our protection districts. We must, however, be aware of what we protect and how these facilities will affect us.
It is essential to maintain a good and sustained working relationship with the operators of water- and wastewater-treatment facilities. If you have not been notified of or invited to participate in a facility security assessment, contact your local authority and determine if it received a grant. The lack of a grant, however, should not be an excuse for you not to prepare for incidents at these facilities and recommend improvements for response operations.
Detailed descriptions of water- and wastewater-treatment processes are beyond the scope of this article, which covers the common hazards associated with these facilities from the perspectives of pre-emergency preparedness and emergency response.
 Water-treatment facilities vary in size. (1) A de-watering/composting area of a wastewater treatment plant. (Photos by author.) |
null
 (2) A small chlorination station designed to fit in with the area. |
null
 (3) Note the National Fire Protection Association 704, Identification of the Hazards of Materials—1996, notice posted on the side door. |
null
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT
Treatment processes are constantly changing and, depending on the age of the facility in your area, some of the items outlined here may not apply or may not be included. Water- and wastewater-treatment processes are very similar. The primary difference between them is that water treatment outfall is distributed for customer use, and wastewater outfall is usually returned into a water source.
 (4) Primary clarifier basins, also known as settling or sedimentation basins. |
null
 (5) A screen and grit collector building that receives large waste. At right is an air scrubber for odor control. |
null
 (6) Clarifier basins settle out additional particles. |
null
General Process
The general purpose of water and wastewater treatment is to remove visible and invisible solids and microorganisms and treat the water to make it safe for use by the public or reintroduction into a water source. Processing of the waste material for disposal is done last.
The first step in water treatment is to pump untreated water/wastewater to the site. From pumping stations, the effluent is sent to the facility through a series of settling tanks (photo 4). The bottom of this tank is scraped, and the materials are sent to screen and grit collectors for removal of large objects (photo 5). The water then passes through primary clarifiers (photo 6) that settle out additional particles, also referred to as sedimentation. The clarifiers may be open or enclosed to treat odors.
After primary clarification, the water may be treated with polyelectrolyte chemicals to initiate flocculation, which basically binds smaller particles into clumps called “flocs.” Next, a material may be added to help the flocs sink, a process called “coagulation,” primarily accomplished by introducing aluminum sulphate. This process removes organic materials and other nutrients present in the forms of ammonia, nitrogen, and phosphorus. After this treatment, the wastewater and biological solids are sent to the final clarifiers (sedimentation). At this stage, the coagulated flocs (bio-solids) settle to the bottom of the tank, and the clarified water is filtered and decanted for disinfection. The filtered water is then chlorinated (and in some cases fluorinated) to destroy germs and make it safe for consumption.
The settled bio-solids are then processed for composting or disposal. This includes a dewatering process that results in a waste cake or sludge. The above description is generic and may vary with local conditions. Numerous other processes also take place when treating and disinfecting water and wastewater.
As with any other target hazard, there are consistent areas of concern and circumstances unique to the industry. That is the reason it is imperative to maintain good working relationships with facility operators, managers, and owners; they will be a critical resource for you during preincident information gathering and an emergency.
UNIVERSAL AND UNIQUE HAZARDS
Access
Access to any facility/complex is key to managing an incident. Understanding access to a facility may depend on other factors and hazards inherent in the facility. How is the facility secured? If it is secured by a gate, how is it secured—automated or by padlock? When is it secured, after normal business hours or all of the time?
At one of the review sites I observed, the facility was set back several hundred yards from the automatic access gate (photo 7). The access gate cannot be seen from the facility control room; it is located in a remote, mature wooded area. The access gate is equipped with a keypad for which employees have a code that will automatically open the gate (photo 8). Visitors and vendors to the site must announce themselves over the intercom to the control room and await activation from the control room.
After discussing several issues associated with this policy, we learned that the fire department did not have the access code to the gate. In case of an emergency, the gate could hamper fire department access. During the nighttime hours, two employees, at the most, are on-site. If they were to become incapacitated or were not able to activate the access gate, fire department access would be delayed. To solve this problem, the fire department will be given the code to access the gate. Although this situation might not be the norm, fire officials must know how to gain access to their local water- and wastewater-treatment facilities.
 (7) Remote-controlled access gate to a water treatment facility. |
null
 (8) Combination access keypad. |
null
Complex Disposition
A second consideration is facility disposition. You must understand the facility’s terrain and contour. Many facilities are constructed near surface water points and may present topographical hazards. Become familiar with how the complex is laid out and the buildings’ locations. A facility’s disposition may affect its access points and negatively impact an incident.
One complex I visited was next to a river, with a two-lane public road that follows the riverbank situated between the river and the facility. This public road provides the sole access to the facility. The complex is built up on a hillside, so the facility is higher than the public road and is surrounded by a mature tree line. The facility entrance, the only access, is secured by a padlocked gate. When entering the complex, the first building encountered is the chlorine building (photo 9). This facility may have as many as eight ton cylinders (photo 10) on-site at any given time. Knowing this before an incident, a fire officer may take extra precautions for incidents of certain natures. Imagine being dispatched to the area for an unusual odor or an odor of chlorine. The communication center advises you that a passerby reported a strong odor of chlorine in the area. You respond and arrive at the access gate, which is immediately downhill of the chlorine building, and immediately encounter a greenish yellow cloud. Now what? This is not a good scenario to be in, but it is one that is possible.
Preincident preparation for this might include developing response guidelines such as staging and notifying the facility. Perhaps you might suggest to facility officials other safety improvements, such as installing wind socks or ensuring that there is adequate lighting at the entrance.
 (9) Chlorine building at the main entrance. A ton cylinder is at the left bottom corner of the portico. |
null
 (10) Closeup of ton cylinders stored outside the chlorine room. |
null
 (11) Materials stored in this facility’s electrical room include corrosives (left) and oxidizers (right); |
null
 (12) potassium permanganate (on skids); and |
null
 (13) phosphoric acid, a corrosive. |
null
 (14) Nitric acid containers in a laboratory. |
null
Hazardous Materials
Water- and wastewater-treatment facilities use many materials to treat and disinfect water and control odors. You should know which materials are on-site. As part of materials intelligence, know the characteristics of the materials and where and how they are stored.
In the access description given above, gaseous chlorine is stored just inside the facility’s main gate in ton cylinders. You need to know where such materials are ahead of time so you are not surprised when responding to an incident. Do you know some of the physical characteristics of the materials on-site? Chlorine gas is usually a greenish yellow vapor. Do you know that its vapor density is 2.4, which means it is heavier than air and will thus follow the low contours and terrain? What other materials are used? Do you maintain a material safety data sheet (MSDS) reference or know where to obtain an MSDS? You should also know the quantities on-site so you can determine the evacuation distance in case of a release. Remember, though, that the fact that a facility uses 100-pound cylinders does not reduce the risk to your personnel. Chlorine is indiscriminate, and 100 pounds will kill you as effectively as a ton.
A host of other materials may be used, and their storage practices must be noted. Photo 11 illustrates the array of materials stored in an electrical control room. The items include potassium permanganate, an oxidizer. Phosphoric acid, a corrosive, is stored in one-gallon containers. What are their characteristics, and what would happen if they were mixed together? Other materials used in the industry for a variety of purposes include sulfuric acid, alum, lime, fluoride, sodium bisulfite, and sodium hypochlorite. In some facilities, other materials, such as nitric acid, may be used for laboratory tests.
Much attention was given to the issue of accessibility to hazardous materials during the water system vulnerability assessment. In many instances, materials were left in the open for the taking or were not well protected. Water facilities use security measures such as changing the storage location and practices for on-site materials. Fire officials need to be aware of any changes in storage locations and the implementation of new safety/security measures.
null
null
Structures
Preincident intelligence should consider the types and layout of all structures on-site. Some structures, including sedimentation basins and holding areas, may look innocent, but you may be surprised at what is actually on-site, maybe several levels belowgrade (photo 15). Pumping stations may be dozens of feet belowgrade and may have several levels. Access to pumping stations is usually limited; fire officials must be familiar with elevation challenges that may be present. This information will be needed also for preparing for other potential incidents such as confined space rescue, medical emergencies, and other special incidents.
You should have a general understanding of the process mediums. Sludge pits and other treatment areas may present engulfment hazards if someone, including a firefighter, were to fall. Do you know the locations of emergency shutoffs and other controls? Do you know the construction characteristics and depths of holding tanks and sedimentation basins?
Treated water ready for consumption may be introduced directly into the distribution system or stored in tanks for use during peak times. Do you know where these water storage facilities are? Do you know their construction features, layout, and other relevant circumstances? Aboveground storage tanks may present elevation challenges (photos 16, 17). Do you know how and where controls for these structures are positioned and how accessible they are (photo 18)?
For belowground water storage mediums, are you familiar with their layout, access, and controls? While these mediums may seem innocent and the chances for an extraordinary incident low, you can never predict when or what type of emergency may occur. We must be aware of all occupancies we protect regardless of whether they present a high or a low fire risk hazard. We should be aware of potential hazards and be prepared to the best of our ability to respond to all types of emergencies all of the time.
 (15) Empty clarifier basin. It is nearly 30 feet deep from the top edge. |
null
 Aboveground water storage tanks. (16) This tank holds 7.5 million gallons. |
null
 (17) The capacity of this tank is almost 200,000 gallons. |
null
 (18) Backup power and control unit for aboveground storage tank. |
null
Special Considerations
 (19) A belowgrade water storage basin with air vents facility personnel use for access to perform maintenance tasks. |
Many hazards within these water-treatment facilities present challenges for firefighters. Notwithstanding the hazardous materials on-site, other existing situations may tax your training and equipment resources. Understanding the potential for such emergencies may lead you to review and improve your response guidelines and seek additional training. There are too many hazards to list here and, as noted, they may vary with the locality. A few of the most commonly encountered hazards include the following:
 20) Control pit for underground water storage. |
- Catwalks (photo 21), ladder assemblies, and other mediums such as conveyors and piping may restrict maneuverability in some areas. Understanding interior access features that may challenge operations is just as important as being familiar with the impediments on the exterior that may challenge access.
Confined spaces are prevalent in a water- and wastewater-treatment facility. They may include holding tanks (photo 22), conveyor pits (photo 23), and pump access points (photo 24). Do you know their locations and dimensions? Do you have the capability to effect a confined space rescue? Do you have the equipment, such as air monitors with the appropriate sensors, to survey confined space atmospheres? What are your procedures and guidelines for such a situation?
 (21) Catwalks pose hazards to and above composting/sludge pits. |
null
 (22) Confined space opening to a composting tank. |
null
 (23) Confined space access to a grit/screen collector conveyor. |
null
 (24) Pump access could be several levels belowgrade. |
null
Alarm Systems
In most cases, facilities that maintain an inventory of gaseous chlorine have a chlorine detection system in the chlorine operations room (photos 25, 26). Know how these detection systems work and the circumstances under which alarms are transmitted. What type of detection system is present? How is an alarm transmitted? To whom? In most of the facilities I toured, detection systems primarily transmit to a control room. Depending on the facility, the system may transmit to an on-call facility employee. I have found that a substantial number of these alarm systems are not tied into a central monitoring station that would effect a prompt dispatch of emergency services.
Also, determine if an audible signal will be sounded at the site. This signal, although not transmitted to a central monitoring station, may draw the attention of a passerby or neighbor who might report alarm bells, prompting your department’s response for investigation. An automatic exhaust system that will simultaneously vent chlorine into the atmosphere may be part of the detection system. Be aware of this in case you are called to investigate alarm bells or an odor.
 (25) Chlorine gas sensor. |
null
 (26) Chlorine gas detector. |
null
 (27) Below-surface intake (about 100 hundred yards out) cannot be seen. |
null
 (28) Surface water intake to initial pumping station. Know the intake type and location in case of river spills. |
null
Water Intakes
Part of your preplans for an emergency at a water-treatment facility should be an understanding of off-site circumstances, such as nearby exposures that may make the facility vulnerable to attack. What industry, processes, or other circumstances are in the vicinity that may have an impact on the operations at the water-treatment facility? Particularly at a water-treatment plant, determine the means by which water is brought into the facility: Is the water intake below the surface of a water source (photo 27) or at the surface (photo 28)? Special precautions may need to be taken to protect water intakes from spills.
If information in this article does not apply to your locale, you should still consider related potential hazards such as nearby exposures. Legislation should not have to be the catalyst for getting the fire service to participate in or gather preincident information on a facility that could be vulnerable to attack. Regardless of the size of the water/wastewater treatment facility, pumping station, or chlorination well station, gathering preincident intelligence is a must. The EPA program outlined in the beginning of this article may help you to improve your department’s preparedness.
ERIC G. BACHMAN, a 21-year veteran of the fire service, is former chief of the Eden Volunteer Fire/Rescue Department in Lancaster County, Pennsyl-vania. He is the hazardous materials administrator for the County of Lancaster Emergency Management Agency and public information officer for the Local Emergency Planning Committee of Lancaster County. He is registered with the National Board on Fire Service Professional Qualifications as a Fire Officer II, Fire Instructor I, Hazardous Materials Technician, and Hazardous Materials Incident Commander. He has an associate’s degree in fire science and certification in emergency management through the state of Pennsylvania. He is a volunteer firefighter with the Manheim (PA) Fire Department.
