By Eric G. Bachman and Philip A. Colvin
Fourth of July 2001 festivities were interrupted by a call for a person trapped in a cave in Mount Joy Township in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. At 1451 hours, the Lancaster Countywide Communications Center received a call that a man was trapped in a cave after a partial collapse. When volunteers from the Fire Department Mount Joy (FDMJ) arrived three minutes later, they found a 24-year-old male lying on his back headfirst in a 10-foot-deep horizontal hole and covered from the chest down by tons of rock. The incident quickly turned into a multicounty and state response that required specialized resources and lasted nearly 29 hours. After 24 hours of rescue efforts, the victim succumbed to his injuries after a major collapse.
Although the rescue efforts were unsuccessful, this incident was an extraordinary example of cooperation and professionalism. It reinforced the need to maintain a structured incident command system and to maintain detailed resource lists. It also emphasizes the need to expand preincident intelligence practices beyond fixed facilities and transportation corridors to include environmental hazards.
THE INCIDENT
A group of out-of-county spelunkers were evaluating a rocky hillside for a known cave in an area called “The Cove.” The cave entrance was barricaded a few years ago to prevent people from exploring the dangerous network of tunnels. The spelunkers disregarded posted “No Trespassing” signs and continued their search for the entrance. During their exploration, they found air movement from a porous area (called a blowhole), which indicated a potential void to the cave. For nearly three hours, the spelunkers created their own hole in the side of the hill. Removing rocks, they manufactured a pathway approximately 10 feet deep. They continued their efforts, angling nearly 90 degrees to the left. At approximately 1300 hours, a partial collapse occurred, pinning a spelunker inside. His friends tried to dig him out.
Realizing they needed assistance, the spelunkers summoned a representative of the National Cave Rescue Commission (NCRC). They delayed calling responders because they feared the local emergency services would not have the expertise to deal with the situation and would make it worse. After working with the NCRC representative for nearly two hours trying unsuccessfully to extract the trapped man, they dialed 9-1-1. Even after emergency services arrived, the NCRC representative told the first-arriving chief officer that all they needed were plywood and shoring.
THE SCENE
FDMJ arrived on the scene with a rescue pumper, a rescue truck, and a ladder truck at 1454 hours. Chief Bill Hall immediately requested the Millersville Fire Company collapse unit (Collapse 65) and Susquehanna Fire Company Rescue 84-1. Crews worked to clear the area of trees and natural cover and shore up the unstable man-made opening. Hall special-called numerous rescues for additional staffing. By 1550 hours, he understood that the incident would be lengthy and labor-intensive and requested additional personnel and equipment. At one point, there were 12 engine companies, four truck companies, eight rescue companies, six service units, and eight emergency medical units on the scene as well as numerous supporting units.
Because the incident was located in a remote area, personnel had to carry all equipment through a wooded area and across a steam. The collapse team diligently worked to shore up the opening and gain access to the victim. At 1645 hours, Harrisburg Bureau of Fire Rescue 1 (HBF1) was dispatched (35 miles northwest). This unit is part of Pennsylvania Task Force One (PA TF-1) Urban Search and Rescue Team. As HBF1 responded, it was recommended that another trench/collapse team be dispatched for safety and personnel. The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department Advanced Technical Rescue Team (BCATR), also a part of PA TF-1, was dispatched at 1708 hours. Life Lion, a medical helicopter from Hershey Medical Center, flew to Shrewsbury, York County, Pennsylvania, to pick up BCATR Team Leader Robert D. Murray Jr.
At 1832 hours, a fourth technical rescue team, Carlisle Fire Department Squad 40, from Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, was requested. Life Lion arrived with Murray and paramedic Mike Kurtz. Kurtz, a medical specialist for PA TF-1, was advised of the victim’s status. HBF1 Team Leader Tim Sevison, Millersville Team Leader Keith Eshelman, and Murray met to discuss the situation and establish their action plan. Scene priorities included shoring the opening and tunnel, preparing and maintaining an equipment staging area, and monitoring weather conditions for forecasted storms. Victim priorities included establishing an intravenous line and treating for crush trauma. Crews continued to meticulously remove the fallen rock, carefully shoring as needed.
The victim’s family and friends were on the scene, and a family services function under the incident command system was established under the direction of FDMJ Chaplain Roxanne Wogelmuth. By 1915 hours, a rescue sector tent was established and a staff assigned near the hot zone. A planning meeting was held, and crew rotation cycles were established. At 2005 hours, the victim’s right thigh and left foot were exposed. An attempt to start an IV was unsuccessful.
 (1) Hazards at the incident scene included limited lighting and rocky terrain. (Photo by Brian Mills.) |
At 2017 hours, another collapse occurred. Personnel were uninjured. Oxygen resources were being depleted, as oxygen was being pumped into the opening for rescuers and victim. At sundown, the air became colder, so heat was also pumped into the hole to keep the victim warm.
Structural engineers as part of PA TF-1 as well as a representative of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Deep Mine Safety were on the scene. They provided assistance and advice to the rescuers regarding the rock formation conditions.
 (2) A rescuer makes his way into the limited-access hole. (Photo by Brian Mills.) |
Medics continued to attempt to start an IV, but numerous subsequent collapses thwarted their efforts. By 2120 hours, conditions were poor, and victim oxygen therapy and IV continued to be priorities.
After a situation status meeting, squad working times were limited to no longer than 45 minutes. Safety was a priority, as the rock formation continued to shift.
Rescuers maintained voice communication with the victim through a listening device. A microphone had been placed on the victim’s chest, and he was able to describe his injuries and interior conditions. Periodically, the victim’s fiance was allowed to communicate with him. This was a morale booster for the trapped spelunker, and his family appreciated this courtesy as well.
Crews continued their work and were able to establish an IV at 2210 hours. This gave rescuers new hope.
Because of the instability of the scene, a written rapid intervention plan was developed. At 2304 hours, there was significant movement in the hole. Additional air-monitoring equipment was requested for interior atmosphere conditions. The conditions had destabilized, and 18-inch ID schedule 80 PVC pipe was made ready to shield rescuers. By 0255 hours on July 5, a medium-pressure air bag was placed in a void space in the hole to aid in stabilization.
Throughout the night, crews rotated and continued to remove rock from the hole. Subsequent collapses occurred and continued to delay the progress of the rescue effort. The victim’s vital signs were satisfactory through the night as oxygen was continuously pumped into the hole. IVs continued to be exchanged, and Kurtz constantly monitored the victim’s blood oxygen levels.
By 0900 hours on July 5, the 12-hour plan was reviewed. Because most of the command staff and rescuers had been on the scene from the onset, relief officers from other county rescue companies were dispatched. Throughout the late morning and early afternoon, crews were optimistic about their chances of freeing the victim. A significant amount of stone had been removed, and the medical plan was updated. A special treatment area had been prepared for immediate assessment by a doctor on-scene.
At approximately 1200 hours, the rock formation was racking from right to left, and the hole opening was being significantly compromised. Crews put two four-foot sections of the 18-inch ID pipe in the hole. Because the access was not large enough, pipe was cut into pieces to cover the victim’s exposed lower extremities. Minor collapses occurred throughout the next hour.
At 1359 hours, there was a major collapse. The rescuer in the shielded area was unhurt, but the victim was unresponsive. Medics went in the hole and worked the victim as best they could. At 1415 hours, the incident commander called off the rescue operation.
At 1428 hours, there was a briefing in the rehab area for all of the rescuers. The family members, who had been on the scene since late afternoon on July 4, were informed of the tragic turn of events and brought up to the hole opening for some private time.
At 1455 hours, recovery and rapid intervention plans were developed and recovery operations commenced. At 1710 hours, the victim was removed. At 1735 hours, the technical rescue site operations were terminated.
LESSONS LEARNED
Safety. Safety must be the number one priority. Constantly monitor incidents for changes that may affect personnel safety or incident priorities. Incident officers must constantly weigh risk/benefit factors. Because of the instability of the rock formation and the numerous collapses, operations were almost called off because of the risk to the emergency responders.
Establishing work zones similar to those at a haz-mat incident is important. Hot, warm, and cold zone identification is important for incident management and personnel safety. Although more than 300 emergency responders were involved in this incident, only a handful were in the hot zone conducting rescue operations. The other personnel were busy with equipment replenishment and staging.
Because safety was a priority at this incident, no responders were injured. A rapid intervention team was established and rotated throughout the incident. A rapid intervention area with staged equipment was positioned nearby for rapid deployment.
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Incident command structure. It is vital that a structured incident command system (ICS) be established and maintained. Nearly each function of the ICS was necessary for this incident including logistics, finance, and planning.
Logistics branch. Logistics were necessary to determine response and nonresponse supporting materials. Response logistics included identifying who has the capabilities and expertise to respond to such an incident-not just a single team but multiple teams to maintain operations and for safety of working crews. Nonresponse logistical considerations included tents for cover and staging of personnel and equipment for inclement or extreme weather, personal comfort stations, and other ancillary items such as trash cans. Consumables including oxygen and rehab supplies were necessary, and calls were made for oxygen and drinking water. Batteries for radios and hand lights were also needed. Where can you get supplies not only in a timely fashion but after hours and on holidays?
Resource management. How do you get the supporting equipment there? Do you send someone for it? Do you have it delivered? It is important to have someone in charge of equipment inventory to anticipate shortages and develop contingency plans in advance. Food, fuel, and other supporting supplies were necessary throughout the incident. Do you have agreements with other organizations such as fuel companies to ensure the timely delivery of such materials? Predetermine payment for nonresponse services/materials. You do not want to have to haggle over “who is going to pay for it” during an emergency and possibly delay obtaining the resource.
Because this incident required specialized technical resources, it was necessary to identify several teams. At a minimum, three teams were needed: theoretically one for the rescue, one for rapid intervention, and one to cover the geographical area compromised by the other two being committed. How extensive are your resource lists?
Family services section. This was an important area that we had not identified before. Family and friends of the trapped spelunker congregated near the scene. We designated an area for them and kept them apprised of the incident operations and away from the media. It is also important to meet their personal needs as well. FDMJ maintains a chaplain position in the company, which played an important role at this incident. After the incident was concluded, the family expressed deep gratitude for the support of the chaplain. Does your department have such a position?
Planning meetings/cycles. Planning meetings were necessary to review what had been done, what needed to be done, safety considerations, and changes in the incident priorities. During these periodic meetings, work cycles were established. The operating crews were broken down into six four-person crews who would work a maximum of 50 minutes and then be relieved. We needed to constantly monitor and consider working conditions inside and outside the hole.
Staff relief. Consider relief of command and support staff at long-term incidents. Rotate crews for work and rest as well. In the late morning of July 5, chief officers were special requested from other county fire departments to relieve the original command and support staff, who had been on the scene from the onset. The chaplain position also needed relief.
Manage civilians offering assistance. As the incident progressed and was featured on local and national television, the county communications center was inundated with calls from civilians and businesses offering products and services. Assign a person to field these inquiries, and advise the communication center of the incident’s needs.
Periodic sector briefings. It is important to keep all personnel informed on the planning meetings/cycles and the incident progress to avoid confusion and speculation and promote teamwork. In some cases, some of the sectors were not advised of incident circumstances.
Media staging. The incident quickly gained the attention of numerous local and national media, who flocked to the scene. Because of the remote location, camera crews could not directly view the scene. Scene security is important. Some photographers attempted to blend in with responders by wearing fire department attire to gain access. Once identified, they were escorted to the cold zone. Establish a media staging area, and advertise and conduct timely press briefings.
Postincident press briefing. Shortly after the incident, news media attempted to contact those people who had been directly involved in the operation and had contact with the victim. Mutual-aid organizations were reluctant to give information. One of the mutual-aid companies agreed to a follow-up interview after consulting with the host fire department and setting interview guidelines. The end result was a good public relations endeavor for all of the organizations involved. The interview was professional and protected the integrity of the victim and family.
Postincident critique. An important aspect of an incident, the postincident critique is designed to review what happened and lessons learned, not to cast blame. Although the victim did not survive, no one else was injured despite the extreme conditions present. A postincident critique may also provide new opportunities for cooperation and training. There was much discussion about engaging in future joint training with the agencies involved.
Documentation. This is an important part of any incident, but especially in a large-scale and lengthy incident, it is critical for many reasons. Document the incident command flowchart: When it is time to relieve command and staff personnel, the next staff can review the flowchart to become familiar with the incident. Document which outside agencies are present for an organized accountability. Include state environmental officials, municipal officials, contractors, and even news media.
Documenting the scene is also important-especially for an incident in a remote area with numerous sectors. Draw the incident scene. This may be beneficial to the incident commander, especially one who is isolated from the operations, as well as to other agencies, so they can see sector locations and functions.
Document the equipment utilized and for how long, and which materials were damaged, destroyed, consumed, and procured. This is important not only for general incident reporting references but also for response cost recovery, and maybe even litigation.
Document a timeline of events as well as when incident situations occurred: When did certain agencies arrive? When did planning meetings occur, and what was discussed? These are things that may be questioned during relief staff reviews and postincident critiques. Having a detailed event log will help you answer questions and identify trends.
Environmental hazard identification. Consider gathering preincident intelligence on environmental hazards including caves, waterways, and wooded areas. Do not overlook recreational areas such as parks and areas known for “exploration” by climbers and other explorers. Although you cannot maintain equipment and training for every conceivable scenario, you must have knowledge of the potential problems and prepare resource lists.
Vocational resources. Members of the National Cave Rescue Commission, an organization that trains its members to rescue individuals lost or injured in a cave, were on the scene and offered assistance. Their training and equipment are extensive, but this incident was still beyond their scope of work. A member of the NCRC was at the postincident critique and gave valuable information on the equipment they maintain as a resource for responders. If you have a cave system in your area, contact the NCRC and establish a relationship before an incident happens.
Eric G. Bachman, a 19-year veteran of the fire service, is former chief of the Eden Volunteer Fire/Rescue Department in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He is the hazardous materials administrator for the Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency and public information officer for the Lancaster County Local Emergency Planning Committee. He has an associate’s degree in fire science and professional certification in emergency management through the state of Pennsylvania. He is also a volunteer firefighter with the Manheim (PA) Fire Department.
Philip A. Colvin, a 20-year veteran of the fire service, is deputy chief of the Fire Department Mount Joy in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He is former chief of the Florin Fire Company Inc. and is deputy director of the Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency. He has professional certification in emergency management through the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and is a volunteer firefighter with the Manheim (PA) Fire Department.
