NFPA 58 considerations
This refers to Bill Manning’s “Rockets on the Rooftops” (Editor’s Opinion, March 2000).
As a member of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards Council, I would normally be considered an NFPA “apologist.” However, I think my recorded vote on this topic makes me the ideal person to comment from an informed point of view. It is a matter of public record that I voted against the Standards Council’s decision with regard to LPG storage tanks on rooftops.
To suggest that the NFPA process yielded to some pressure to make a code more marketable internationally is at best irresponsible. This was a very difficult ruling for the Council-and to misrepresent it plays to the lack of understanding your readers may have about how the process works.
Most of the work in the NFPA process is done at the technical committee level. It is designed so that everyone has an opportunity to vote, but no single member category may have more than one-third of the voting membership. A two-thirds majority is required to establish “consensus”; this process requirement is intended to prevent any single group from dominating the discussion. Still, the potential exists for some issues to become blocked at the committee level. Consequently, the process also requires a vote by the membership present at the regular meetings.
In the 1970s, the floor votes at NFPA (which don’t have the same rigorous procedural constraints as the committees’) had been controversial because the opportunity existed to “stack the deck” with voters to sway the outcome. At that time, a number of improvements occurred to the process, among them the formation of the Standards Council to act as the final reviewer of the proposed codes and standards. It provides another opportunity for the organization to ensure that the proper steps have been taken in the process, true consensus has been achieved, and people are not manipulating the process for their own benefit.
In reality, when the technical committees and the floor votes match, the Standards Council rarely intervenes. It is the best indication that consensus has been achieved; the Council acts only as the “official” issuer of the document. Anyone involved in the process may file an appeal; occasionally, the Council has acted out of necessity even when the technical committees and floor votes have matched. Such circumstances are extremely rare and usually indicate some process or technical flaw previously overlooked. But the public good, including that of our fellow firefighters, is always the first consideration.
When the technical committees and floor votes do NOT match, it is usually a “red flag” that gains the Council’s attention. An appeal is almost certain in such circumstances, and the Council must become the final arbitrator to decide how a particular issue will be decided.
Such was the case with the latest version of NFPA 58 [Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code]. Manning was correct in several of his presumptions: that Henry Renfrew argued against the position ultimately adopted by the technical committee and that it is more difficult for an authority having jurisdiction (I am one) to fight the decision of a 60,000-member organization when it has established a standard. His anecdotal examples support the fact that “Murphy” could in fact strike at any time. However, the arguments about this issue will, and should, occur over its technical merits. I have already heard concerns from several fire service friends about the technical basis for this portion of the standard; they question the data on which it was formed. I have urged them to make their arguments through the process. That’s the reason it exists.
But “chalking” it all up to a mercenary decision from the NFPA is inaccurate, misleading, and patently unfair. I was there. It is true that more members from other countries are getting involved in the NFPA process. They have their own ideas about safe practices and standards. However, I’m sure that fire professionals in Mexico would not agree with the assessment that the NFPA is “dumbing down” the standards to the “lowest common denominator.” And the usual argument that the NFPA is dominated by business interests has not been demonstrated to me. In fact, I have observed just the opposite on many occasions. NFPA 58 was a case of different points of view from a variety of professionals about how much stock should be given to “Murphy.” Individuals may disagree-as I did-but the disagreement should be on technical grounds, and the position should be backed up with data and scientific analyses. Anecdotal arguments are a very good beginning.
I obviously did not agree with this decision, but I still have faith in the process, as long as people are willing to participate and back their points of view with some science, research, and logic. I obviously don’t agree that the NFPA and its process should be denigrated for the wrong reason. That is my message to the fire service representatives who were not present for this issue. I urge them to get involved and to make their voices heard by arguing the facts. Public safety and the safety of our firefighters may be at stake. We cannot rely on fear and rhetoric to buffalo others into agreeing with our positions. It won’t work.
It hasn’t worked with my city council when I attempted code changes locally. It won’t work in the NFPA or any other code organization’s (I know of) development process. If that were the case, the fire service would have been successful in getting everything protected by fire sprinklers long ago.
Members of the Standards Council are volunteers dedicated to safety; profits are the last of their concerns. Many NFPA standards do not come close to breaking even; they exist to improve public safety. Reasonable people can, and do, disagree about the nature of “Murphy” and whether adequate safeguards have been put in place to prepare for “his” eventuality. Elevating the technical merit of our arguments is the surest way to improve public and firefighter safety. It is extremely important that more fire service people get involved in the process. That is the best way to get our view heard where it counts.
Jim Crawford
Fire Marshal
Portland (OR) Bureau of Fire,
Rescue and Emergency Services
Is it time to change firefighting policies?
Bill Manning’s “Finding Our Own Before It’s Too Late” (Editor’s Opinion, February 2000) was right on target. After 25 years of firefighting, I can’t understand why we wait seemingly helplessly for others to assist us in preventing firefighter deaths and injuries. The fireground is where we control the action. Maybe we should look to controlling our actions on the fireground to improve our safety. Three things come to mind.
First, we know the danger of lightweight construction, yet firefighters continue to die at these structures. We wait for local laws to be passed to force building owners to put signs on the structures, warning us of their construction. Why not take a proactive approach? Preplan the structures in your district, and don’t send firefighters in when fire has or may have involved dangerous construction features. Apply current technologies (computers) to make specific construction and occupancy data readily available to the incident commander.
Sure, this takes some of the glory out of firefighting-bravely charging and attacking a deeply entrenched fire in a building filled with dangers is a real rush and great for our egos when we are successful. The reality-as we have all too often seen-is a direct rush to another firefighter funeral. Maybe we need to control our attitude and egos to limit needless firefighter deaths. Make no mistake: I’m not saying we should not take risks when what we are saving is worth more than what we are risking. What I am suggesting is that we reconsider our policies of always (when fire conditions permit) conducting an interior search and always attempting an interior attack on all fire buildings. These can be tough decisions. Why is risking firefighters’ lives for interior attacks on dangerous buildings not a tough decision? We make this “decision” quickly, easily, and often willingly!
Second, maybe we need to look at changing our firefighting policies. If we know that the building contains hazards because of lightweight construction or because the building is run-down, vacant, or otherwise an unacceptable risk to firefighters inside, why can’t we make it fire department policy not to go inside?
Consider this scenario: Your fire department advises the owner of a building that it has fallen into a bad state of disrepair, has construction dangerous to firefighters, or presents extreme hazards for firefighters and that, as a result, the fire department will respond and conduct defensive operations only. The letter might read as follows: “Therefore, because current technology used by the fire department does not allow us to operate inside your building with a reasonable degree of safety, we will conduct defensive operations when we respond to your facility. If there is significant fire in your building, it most likely will result in a total loss. Happily, this vastly increases the chances of not killing firefighters at your fire. Unhappily, your losses will most likely be complete.”
You might say, “We can’t say this!” But, we can say, “It is sad to announce we have experienced another line of duty death. Firefighter Jim Smith was killed last night.”
So, what is the next step in this scenario? In court, the attorney representing the building owner pleads his case: “Your Honor, just because my client made a conscious decision to let his property fall into disrepair and just because he still is taking in thousands of dollars in rent each month from businesses in this building, there is no reason firefighters should not risk their lives to save Mr. Fat Cat’s building.”
When the laughter in the courtroom dies down, discussion turns to what a great way this is for building owners to get rid of undesirable properties, especially in our cities. Owners torch them, and the fire department lets them burn to the ground. Is that really bad? This scenario may be a bit unrealistic, but think about how and when we should risk our lives. Maybe we should decide in advance that we simply will not risk firefighter lives for specific buildings under any fire conditions.
Finally, two recent fires in my district highlight our dilemma very clearly. We made excellent stops at both these well-involved fires-an automobile tire shop and a fully involved attic in a row house. We risked our lives at both fires, but, in the end, both buildings were torn down because it was cheaper to put up new ones than to rebuild the old. These were good aggressive operations using solid tactics and strategy and presented significant risk to our firefighters. However, the outcome, in dollars and “sense,” is what ruled in the end, when the rush of the fire attack was over.
Jerry Knapp
Operations Officer
Rockland County Fire Training Center
Pomona, New York
Firefighters must take care of themselves
In an ideal world, it would be great if every piece of fire equipment had thermal imaging capabilities. I do not feel it is the federal government’s responsibility to be charged with providing them. I think it has its hands full dealing with the homeless, hungry, and uninsured of our society. And, we see how that war is going. Firefighters are dying because we continue to make the same mistakes. Entering buildings we should not be in, lack of training, poor communication, poor preplanning, not turning on PASS devices-the list goes on. Anytime a firefighter dies, it is a tragedy. It hits home because it makes all of us think of our own mortality. But about 50 percent of firefighter deaths since 1977 have been due to heart attacks. I ask you, Why don’t we have programs and equipment in all fire stations to help combat this? At times, we can be our own worst enemy. We need to start or continue to take care of ourselves and make sure the people sending us into burning buildings are doing the same. I am watching my brothers and sisters because I don’t expect Big Brother to do so. Let us use the resources we have to the fullest before we start saying firefighters are dying because we do not have thermal imaging units on every vehicle.
Rashid Taylor
Firefighter
Madison Township Fire Department
Groveport, Ohio
Thermal imaging cameras worth their cost
Reference is made to “Choosing a Thermal Imaging Unit,” by Steven P. Woodworth (Fire Engineering, January 2000). I could not agree with him more that “the question is not whether fire departments should purchase thermal imaging units, but what criteria should be used to make the right purchase.” As the person responsible for field testing and raising donations for a thermal imaging unit, I would like to add a few other factors to consider before purchasing a thermal imaging camera (TIC).
- Where do you send the unit if maintenance work is needed? The TIC we purchased has a 24-hour turnaround time. If the work cannot be accomplished within 24 hours, a temporary replacement will be provided.
- Is the antenna internal or external? In some models, the antenna is stored internally. An external antenna can inadvertently break off the unit.
- How easy is it to change the battery? We wanted a unit that would enable us to change the battery easily with a gloved hand.
Individual departments may have other questions.
In training with a TIC, the “superman” syndrome may arise, in which firefighters believe they can walk around instead of crawl because they can see. To remedy this problem, departments must stress in training that firefighters must crawl, stay close to a wall, and use a lifeline because if the TIC should break for some reason, the firefighter will easily become disoriented.
Thermal imaging is like the hydraulic spreader in the ’70s and automatic external defibrillators in the ’80s. Some will say, “Those are toys for big city fire departments; we can’t justify that technology.” Take it from me and my fellow firefighters-it is well worth every penny. (Our department consists of two fire stations and 44 career firefighters; we protect a district with a population of 19,000 within 22 square miles.)
We received our first TIC at the end of May 1999. Within one week, we used it on our first structure fire. It worked beyond our expectations. On the last day of Fire Prevention Week, we used our TIC to rescue and save a two-year-old boy from his parents’ burning house. The boy is recovering at home from second- and third-degree burns over 60 percent of his body.
Dale Saucier
Firefighter/EMT
Franklin, Indiana
Fog streams vs. solid streams
I recommend that your readers hold on to the February and March 2000 issues containing “Little Drops of Water: 50 Years Later,” Parts 1 and 2, by Andrew A. Fredericks. These articles will make the history books. They are the most significant papers to be published in any publication for a very long time. In addressing the controversy over “fog streams” and “solid streams,” Fredericks has eliminated the debate. He should be commended for his extensive research and his commitment and dedication to improving this great profession.
Ted Corporandy
Battalion Chief
San Francisco (CA) Fire Department
I have read with much interest Andrew A. Fredericks’ articles concerning fire extinguishment in the early ’80s. After spending much of my childhood around the fire service, I had my chance to get my hands on a nozzle and experiment. I have seen the overapplication of water in the indirect mode “baking” the hose team. I learned the lesson the hard way. Over the years, I have found that a narrow fog worked in an aggressive manner into the ceiling area to break up the drops works best. Follow it up by applying water directly onto the material in question. The use of the narrow trimmed stream allows you to interrupt the combustion process from a fairly safe distance and cool the fire area prior to entry. I like having a combination nozzle; I use the wide fog for ventilation purposes.
Currently in my company, we now know where to set our nozzle to give us the desired stream for fire attack and when to switch to a wider stream for venting the gases. This process seems to work well, and we preset the tip at the start of each tour before the “bells” come in.
I feel also that it is important to develop in new firefighters the ability to read the fire and to use nozzle and stream selections to best advantage. This combined with live training will surely give the hose team the know-how to apply the wet to the red safely and in the proper form. Congratulations to Fredericks on a well-written and researched piece.
Todd A. Reese
Wilmington, Delaware
I very much enjoyed reading Andrew A. Fredericks’ articles. His opinions are thought provoking; however, I respectfully disagree with just about all he has to say. I will hit only the high points.
Fredericks has set out to prove the superiority of a straight stream for interior firefighting. In doing so, he has taken most of his “proof” out of context and degraded its value in the process. He has also totally ignored basic scientific fact. After all, the absorption of heat by water is an endothermic chemical reaction, not just a simple change in temperature.
In the fire service, we use water in one of two ways: to cool the fire down below its ignition temperature or to generate steam to smother the fire. Regardless of which of these two you are trying to do, water will always be used to its best advantage if it is allowed to vaporize. Water that starts out at 68°F will only absorb 144 Btus when heated to 212°F. This is because of the specific heat properties of water. In the process of going from liquid at 212°F to steam at 212°F, a pound of water will absorb another 970.3 Btus. This is the latent heat of vaporization of water. This means that water allowed to fully vaporize will absorb a total of 1,114.3 Btus per pound. By vaporizing, water will absorb more than 7.7 times as much heat than if the water were only allowed to get to its boiling point-or, to put it another way, if we don’t allow water to vaporize, we reduce its efficiency as an extinguishing agent by an astonishing 87 percent.
Fredericks is overly concerned with the danger of steam to the interior attack crew. If properly done, the steam generated from an interior attack with a fog nozzle is a nonissue. Since the fog pattern has a unique property, a straight stream pattern lacks the ability to draw fresh air in behind it, the area near the floor around the attack crew remains sufficiently cool to prevent the bulk of the steam from descending on the attack crew. How’s that for using the thermal balance in a constructive way?
Since a fog nozzle operating at 100 psi tip pressure and flowing 100 gpm can move as much air as a small window exhaust fan, most of the steam generated will usually be blown out the window of the fire room. This is the reason ventilation needs to be coordinated with the interior attack. Another point to consider about the ability of the fog nozzle to move air is that if trapped persons are not in the immediate area of the fire, the fresh air the nozzle pulls in can increase their chance of survival. Victims in the immediate vicinity of the fire are probably dead anyway if the area has flashed over. Remember, flashover occurs at around 400°F and, as Fredericks points out, unprotected people cannot survive beyond 300°F if the air is dry. We also need to remember that since water vapor is a by-product of combustion, the requirement for dry air is not met anyway.
A point to consider about the information Fredericks uses to support his point is that it is 50 years old. Some of the early concerns have just not proven themselves to be as serious as first thought. The issue of steam burning the attack crew is just such an issue. In the intervening 50 years, interior fire attack with fog has proven to be worth its weight in gold. A combination attack extinguishes the fire with a fraction of the water a direct attack uses. If done correctly, the overhaul crew will not have to clean up water that has pooled on the floor below. This also means companies get back in service faster. In my 28 active years as a firefighter, I personally have participated in at least a few hundred interior attacks-all with fog nozzles and not one steam burn. In fact, I cannot recall any steam burns received by anyone I was ever with. Just one more empirical study that proves interior firefighting with a fog nozzle is as safe as any other form of interior firefighting, and more efficient.
Another point about the use of combination variable fog straight stream (CVFSS), even when doing a direct attack, the fog nozzle can often be more efficient than a straight stream. Instead of having to make several sweeps of the fire, 7/8-inch or 15/16-inch at a time, the fog pattern can be adjusted to cover the entire burning area and extinguish the fire with one pass-again, reducing water damage and getting the most out of the water. And, I haven’t yet explained how the fog nozzle can be put on wide fog to protect the line crew when things do go bad.
One other point I would like to make is that the contention that fires are worse today than in the past is trite. I first heard it in 1965 when I began firefighting as a volunteer. They used all the same reasons then as now to explain why fires are worse. I recently had a fire protection engineer make the same statement to me, so I contacted the National Fire Data Center to find out the truth. It turns out that fires today are no worse than they have been since at least 1988. The same percentage of fires was extinguished by tank water and hydrant water from 1988 to 1997. If fires are worse today, there should be an increase in both categories over the 10 years of the data. I would have liked to have carried the data back further to see if or when an increase in severity occurred, but reliable data are not available past 1988. I strongly suspect that any increase in severity because of plastics and the like occurred before the 1970s. In short, it is time the fire service stopped using that worn-out excuse to explain away its inability to positively deal with this nation’s increasing fire fatality and injury rates.
Firefighting is a dangerous undertaking. Even under ideal circumstances, just one mistake can injure or even kill a firefighter. CVFSS nozzles are a tremendous asset in our efforts to do the job safely and efficiently. Choosing when to use fog or straight stream requires a thorough understanding of applicable principles of chemistry and physics supported by actual firefighting experience. After all, we must at all times be smarter than the fire and be capable of using all our resources to their fullest to accomplish our goal; our greatest resource will always be our intelligence.
William F. Crapo
Captain (Retired)
District of Columbia Fire Department
Andrew A. Fredericks responds: I appreciate Crapo’s comments and he is certainly entitled to his opinions, but I must respectfully disagree with the entire content of his letter. I do not believe that I ignore basic scientific fact anywhere in my articles. I believe it is just the opposite. Although he provides an explanation of the mechanism by which water absorbs heat-an explanation that should be understood by anyone who has completed a course in introductory fire science-he is evidently confusing efficient steam creation with efficient fire extinguishment. They are not one and the same. Although water fog will convert to steam more readily than a straight or solid stream, much of this steam creation will occur at what might be termed the “nozzle team/fire interface.” A straight or solid stream is advantageous in that the steam necessary for fire control is generated largely at the “fuel/flame interface,” which is more efficient because it eliminates the production of volatile fuel vapors at their source and is much less debilitating to the nozzle team.
As far as the dangers of steam burns are concerned, my personal experience indicates that excessive unwanted steam production is an issue, and I believe there are many readers who have their own horror stories involving the inappropriate use of water fog during interior fire attack. I remember a particular fire on the second floor of a private dwelling in my hometown. I was a fresh-faced volunteer firefighter and was assigned to the backup line. The first line was bogged down, and the fog stream being used was doing nothing more than causing pain and discomfort to everyone on the stair landing. A senior member of my fire company-and one of the best, most instinctive nozzlemen I’ve ever met-arrived on the stairs and pushed his way to the top. He simply turned the stream adjustment from fog to straight stream, and in a few seconds the fire was blackened and the line was advanced into the fire room to finish the job. Crapo himself admits that a “narrow trimmed stream allows you to interrupt the combustion process from a fairly safe distance and cool the fire area prior to entry.” A “narrow, trimmed stream” sounds like a straight stream (or something very close) to me.
Crapo also mentions air movement and, though a fog stream will both “push” air ahead of the stream and bring air in from behind (not to mention the air entrained in the stream), there is no documentation to suggest that this air is in any way beneficial to victims in the fire area. To suggest that anyone in near proximity to the fire is “probably dead anyway” is a copout and flies in the face of what we stand for as a fire service.
With regard to the statement that flash-over occurs at around 400°F, I hope this is a typo, because most members of both the fire service community and the fire protection engineering profession believe flashover begins when ceiling temperatures are in the 750°F to 1,100°F range-generally closer to 1,000°F. [Carbon monoxide (CO) doesn’t ignite until it reaches a temperature of 1,128°F.]
Crapo also describes the importance of ventilation when using a fog attack, but to assume that adequate and timely ventilation can always be provided is simply not the case. As far as the contention that a fog stream will protect you when “things go bad” is concerned, apparently he has bought into perhaps the most ridiculous myth in fire service folklore. All fog will do is burn you or burn someone else. I am also aware of several instances when the high-pressure zone ahead of a fog pattern, in conjunction with inadequate ventilation, caused the fire to wrap around the fog stream and burn the nozzle team. A veteran fire instructor at the Illinois Fire Service Institute coined the term “&%$#@ death knob” when referring to fog nozzles and their impact on firefighters.
As far as my supporting documentation’s being 50 years old-that’s the point. After hearing so many partial truths and outright nonsense about the use of water fog in interior fire attack, I spent the last 10 to 12 years researching this subject in an attempt to place the invention and development of fog fire attack methods into historical context. By reading original manuscripts authored by the inventors of the indirect and combination methods, I hoped to avoid using arguments based on unsubstantiated claims, misinterpreted data, and personal opinion.
Crapo is also preoccupied with water damage. If water damage is a consideration that supersedes prompt fire control and nozzle team safety, tactical priorities are severely skewed. I use the example of an apartment fire on the second floor of a five-story building. Obviously, the issue of water damage in the fire apartment itself is ridiculous-the fire damage will be far greater than any water-induced damage. Perhaps the apartment directly below the fire apartment will suffer some damage as water migrates through light fixtures and the like. But if this fire is not promptly controlled with a hard-hitting stream, consider the alternatives. As the fire burns through the floor of the apartment above (or autoexposes and enters via the outside), we now have two apartments involved in fire. Smoke generation will continue unabated and fill each of the other apartments on the floors above, jeopardizing occupant life safety. If there are five apartments on a floor, that’s 18 apartments between the second floor and the top floor now contaminated with smoke and toxic CO. So in our effort to reduce water damage with a weak, ineffective fog stream, the result is two fire-damaged apartments, 18 smoke-damaged apartments, and maybe a dozen or more people homeless and suffering the effects of smoke inhalation.
In Firefighting Principles & Practices, Second Edition, by the late William Clark, pages 38-41, Clark explains some of the many disadvantages of fog streams, including the fact that during a series of tests, water runoff collected from fires controlled by solid streams was consistently less than runoff collected from fires controlled by fog streams. The fires apparently succumbed to the hard-hitting solid stream more rapidly than the fog streams, using less water overall. In addition, the solid stream attacks were less likely to leave smoldering remains, which require significant follow-up extinguishment and overhaul.
With regard to the issue of the modern fire environment, I am offended that Crapo has trivialized a reality that firefighters in New York City and elsewhere face each day. I, too, had heard statements about fires being worse today than in the past, so I set out to investigate the facts. I consulted with some of the most experienced firefighters and officers in the country, as well as members of the fire protection science and engineering communities, to produce a balanced and objective analysis.
Using data on the percentages of fires extinguished with tank water vs. hydrant water is hardly a scientific approach. Not only are these data subject to error, but in many fire departments, the capacity of booster tanks on engine apparatus has increased by 50 to 100 percent since 1988, making this argument severely flawed. In the mid-1980s, my local fire department had three front-line engines-one with a booster tank capacity of 300 gallons and two with 500-gallon tanks. The fleet now features one engine with a 750-gallon tank and two engines with 1,000-gallon tanks. To say the same percentage of fires is extinguished with booster water vs. hydrant water today as in 1988 does not indicate the amount of water actually used to control these fires and certainly does not provide a true indication of fire severity.
Considering the number of firefighters we’ve lost in the past several years-many horribly burned due to the volatility of the modern fire environment-it is unconscionable to attempt to trivialize their sacrifices. There is something going on. We all should be striving to help solve the problem instead of denying it.
By the way, I e-mailed a member of the District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD) and talked to several friends who are present or former DCFD firefighters. They tell me that straight streams-not fog streams-are taught at the fire academy and are used by the busiest engine companies in the department. You might even find a solid stream nozzle or two.
Reference is made to “Little Drops of Water … Part 1.” I recently met with Keith Royer in Punta Gorda, Florida, and I telephoned him a week ago to confirm what I am going to tell you now. The combination attack is not “designed primarily for exterior application of water.” Neither is it true that “many fire departments had few, if any, self-contained breathing masks available.” This is certainly not true of the research done at Iowa State University. Keith Royer confirmed to me that the combination attack works equally as well from an inside door or an outside window. He said that they did “an awful lot of interior firefighting.” What you are claiming applies to Layman’s work only. The videos produced at Iowa State University used an exterior attack exclusively for one simple reason. It would have been impossible to produce any videos of an interior attack.
The claim that in Royer and Nelson’s writing there is “no mention of the impact of steam on trapped occupants” is false. I refer you to page 109 of Nelson’s book, Qualitative Fire Behavior, the section entitled “Effect of Expanding Steam.” Overall, however, Fredericks is to be congratulated on producing a fairly accurate analysis of Royer and Nelson’s research. As a matter of professional courtesy, and to eliminate any errors, I don’t see why Fire Engineering shouldn’t present any articles on Keith Royer to him for review before publication.
With respect to Chief Lloyd Layman, there are two major errors:
1. While it is true that an indirect attack requires holding the nozzle in a “fixed position,” Layman did not advocate doing this (see page 48 Attacking and Extinguishing Interior Fires). Layman advocated dispersing the water widely using a high-velocity cone. He advocated a “slight, brisk, and continuous manipulation of the nozzle.” He also added “considerable skill and confidence are required to obtain a high degree of dispersion.” I think that because of the ceiling height of eight feet, Layman’s recommendation was not truly an “indirect attack” but, in reality, a rather crude form of combination attack, using the structures in Parkersburg, West Virginia.
2. With respect to the 1940 edition of Layman’s book Fire Fighting Tactics, Layman, after his research on the use of fog nozzles at the Coast Guard Academy during World War II, simply changed his mind about the role of solid-stream nozzles in fighting Class A structure fires. The 1953 edition of this book, page 45, presents a completely different set of principles and suggestions. In fact, Layman stated: “The solid stream will continue to have a limited degree of usefulness in fire-fighting operations, but it is destined to become the secondary form of application.” This prediction has come true today.
John D. Wiseman
Training Officer
Kitrell Volunteer Fire Department
Readyville, Tennessee
Author, The Iowa State Story
Fire Protection Publications
Oklahoma State University
Andrew A. Fredericks responds: Wiseman and I have not seen eye to eye on several issues in the past, but I am glad he found my article accurate. I agree that I should have sent a draft copy to Keith Royer; that is my mistake. As far as Wiseman’s specific points are concerned, I did not include the late Floyd Nelson’s book Qualitative Fire Behavior in my research for Part 1 because it came many years later. I do have a reference to it in Part 2.
With regard to the “two major errors” contained in my article, Layman does indicate on page 48 of Attacking and Extinguishing Interior Fires that a “slight, brisk, and continuous manipulation of the nozzle” might be required to obtain efficient dispersion of the water fog. It is far less nozzle movement, however, than is necessary with the combination attack, which requires rapid, almost violent, movement of the nozzle.
Regarding the second “error,” I included reference to Layman’s 1940 text because so few members of the fire service know it exists. Additionally, direct attack was still advocated by Layman under certain circumstances, even after water fog came into vogue. Fires in the first phase or early second phase of development may not generate sufficient heat to make an indirect attack efficient. Likewise, a building containing a well-advanced fire venting to the outside through numerous failed windows is no longer a candidate for indirect attack. In these instances, a direct attack is preferred (see page 40 of Attacking and Extinguishing Interior Fires). As far as the direct attack’s becoming the “secondary form of application,” quite the contrary is true. It is the principal form of fire control practiced by the best and busiest fire departments.
I have read the excellent articles by Andrew A. Fredericks. I must say that despite the fact that Elkhart Brass provided the photo, it is not the original Mystery nozzle. The original did not have the teeth around the opening. It was like an overgrown garden hose nozzle. It provided a huge airflow in the center. The Navy rejected it out of hand, since it could not handle the applicators the Navy wanted. One manufacturer submitted a nozzle with three different straight tips and a fog tip that could be removed to put in an applicator. It had all sorts of locking levers. If you want a good hydraulic smoke mover, take the teeth off a Mystery-type nozzle.
There was a box of such stuff at the Fire School at Norfolk, where I was assigned in April 1944 after two years in Panama and where I commanded a Class B school. Lieutenant Jim Allen (lieutenant 6 Truck, later a DC), who was there as a ship fire inspector, “buffed” at my fire school. He had been to the Boston school and was familiar with the topside use of fog on the engine room compartment. He wanted to try it on my smaller structure in Panama. I told him it wouldn’t work. There was no exterior platform on which to stand safely. He insisted. As I predicted, the flames came out the voids between the railroad rails that supported the loose plates (held by vertical pins in holes in the plates). I had told him he could only try this if he stood right at the vertical ladder. He was happy to bail out.
At Norfolk Fire Fighting School, we had a stubborn fire in the engine room. I finally bounced a straight stream off the steel and got it out. Some accused me of heresy. I said, “You saw fog made at a point distant from the nozzle.”
Francis L. Brannigan, SFPE
Port Republic, Maryland
It’s time to reevaluate firefighter survival training
Reference is made to “To Bail or Not To Bail?” (Editor’s Opinion, April 2000). Thanks to Bill Manning for bringing this controversial issue to the forefront. It’s time for the nation’s fire service to address the validity of firefighter survival training, especially after the tragic death of Captain C. Thomas Moore of the Manteca (CA) Fire Department.
Before a decision is made to throw out the ladder bailout evolution, please keep in mind that the tragic incident that occurred in Manteca was a result of freelancing and failure to use necessary safety precautions. It doesn’t necessarily mean there is a problem with the ladder bailout evolution, especially if the evolution is performed correctly.
At the Maryland Fire And Rescue Institute’s (MFRI) Fire Fighter Survival and Rescue course, we use a systems approach training designed to prevent firefighter injuries and deaths by focusing on correcting specific firefighter behavior and performance. The systematic approach requires firefighters and fire officers to look at the total picture or system of fireground safety.
The total system approach studies the activities, evolutions, and thought processes necessary to prevent the firefighter from getting into trouble in the first place; provides the firefighters with various options as to what to do when they find themselves in trouble; and, finally, provides RIT teams with the necessary skills, knowledge, and training to successfully rescue firefighters who are in trouble.
As with all MFRI programs, this 24-hour course consists of student goals, objectives, and structured lesson plans to guide instruction and maintain safety. The instruction is conducted by qualified instructors certified by the Maryland Instructor Certification Review Board. Two instructors conduct each training evolution. The ladder bailout evolution is just one of a number of escape options addressed in the course. The ladder bailout, which is not really a bailout, is a skilled maneuver that prevents the escaping firefighter from going headfirst, straight down the ladder, possibly resulting in injury or death.
This evolution, which is very similar to that presented in “Saving Our Own” at the Illinois Fire Training Institute, consists of the firefighter’s sliding out headfirst, reaching under a ladder rung with one arm and grasping a rung with the same side hand and with the opposite hand, with the arm straight, grasping the opposite side of the same rung and pivoting the body around until the firefighter is standing upright on the ladder. The firefighter wears full protective gear and is secured in a class 3 harness tied off to a belay line managed by one of the instructors.
The MFRI program has instructed more than 100 firefighters in this evolution without any injury or fall with the exception of the occasional sprain or strain. Two metropolitan fire departments in the BaltimoreWashington metropolitan area have taught the evolution to hundreds of career and volunteer firefighters with the same results. The sprains and strains, although minimal, are largely due to the physical condition and weight of the student.
Obviously, it is emphasized throughout the instruction to perform all firefighting activities safely, with a guarded and proactive attitude, and that wall breaches, personal rope escapes, windowsill drops, and ladder bailouts are all last-resort actions. The goal of the program is to never have to use a last-resort action. However, if it should be needed, at least the firefighter would have practiced the evolution. Having experienced the technique and skill necessary for a successful maneuver may make the difference between life and death when a sudden hazardous event occurs.
You can rest assured that the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute has already taken the necessary steps to evolve the ladder bail practice to the next level.
Joseph B. Ross, Jr.
Field Instructor
Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute
