AGGRESSIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT PAYS OFF
BY JAMES J. KERRIGAN
On Saturday, August 26, 1989, at 1141 hours, the Philadelphia Fire Communications Center received a phone-call report of a green acid emitting from a plant on Hope Street. Box 859, located at Mascher Street and Lehigh Avenue, was transmitted, bringing to the site four engines, two ladders, two battalion chiefs, a medic unit, and the Hazardous Materials Task Force.
The plant was Carl Faulkenstein, Inc., an electroplating company that manufactured metal castings for lamps and used nickel sulfate, ammonium hydroxide, copper cyanide, sodium cyanide, and various arsenics in processing. The five-story, “L”-shaped structure was approximately 200 feet by 150 feet, constructed of typical turn-of-the-century heavy timber, and was situated in a densely populated area in North Philadelphia, bounded on the east by Hope Street and the west by Howard Street.
Immediate exposures included an attached two-story row, occupied dwellings immediately to the north and south, and occupied dwellings to the east and west. Episcopal Hospital was two blocks to the southeast at Front Street and Lehigh Avenue, and Saint Christopher`s Children`s Hospital was three blocks to the southwest at Fourth Street.
The first-due engine company reported an unknown substance leaking out of the building on the Hope Street side. The first-due ladder made forcible entry and stood by awaiting the arrival of the haz-mat unit. The unit identified the leaking product as diluted cyanide and overpacked the spill, estimated at 40 gallons. The first-in battalion chief requested the presence of the command fire marshal and a representative of the Department of Licenses and Inspections (L & I), in case a cease-operations order was warranted.
SITE INSPECTION/CEASE-OPERATIONS ORDER
When the command fire marshal arrived, the companies were in the process of taking up their equipment. A team of inspectors representing the Health Department, Water Department, L & I, the Philadelphia Fire Department`s Hazardous Materials Administrative Unit, and the command fire marshal accompanied the building manager through the building for a compliance inspection. While entering the rear of the building, the team noticed a hose attached to a soil pipe that led directly to the sewer line. The connection was used to illegally discharge into the sewer system waste by-products derived from processing.
The inspection revealed numerous violations of the building and fire codes, such as the improper storage of hazardous materials, insufficient ventilation of the processing area, absence of diking, inadequate or no labeling of product or waste, lack of fire doors, and the presence of rubbish throughout the building.
Since these violations would present serious risks were a fire to occur on the property, an immediate cease-operations order was issued; and the building manager was ordered to immediately remediate all violations.
L & I, the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) for fire and building code violations in Philadelphia, rescinded the cease-operations order on Wednesday, August 30, 1989, after significant progress in correcting the violations was noted and the company transmitted a guarantee that its owner would correct all violations in a timely and proper fashion.
HAZARDOUS-MATERIALS INSPECTION AND FINDINGS
The Hazardous Materials Administrative Unit contacted the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (PA DER) and requested an inspection of the plant to determine if the company was violating hazardous waste storage and disposal regulations. The inspection revealed various violations such as the presence of numerous drums of unknown hazardous wastes, waste drums of hazardous substances with no hazardous waste labels, accumulation dates, or U.S. Department of Transportation labels. The company also was cited for failure to present a PA DER/Bureau of Waste Management permit as a treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facility and for violating the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act (Title 25) under the term “storage”–greater than one year.
Based on the findings of PA DER, the Hazardous Materials Administrative Unit and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reinspected the site. They found that approximately 200 drums of toxic waste were being stored within the structure. In response to the city`s request, the EPA immediately disposed of the waste under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA–Superfund). The cost of the cleanup was $463,520.
While waiting for remediation through the Superfund, the Hazardous Materials Administration Unit contacted all parties that might be affected by an incident at the Faulkenstein plant and made them aware of the situation. The Unit also recommended the following: “Given the age of the structure, the presence of extremely toxic wastes, the evidence of chemical contamination on the flooring, and the uncertainty of the sprinkler system, all but incipient fires should be fought from the exterior.” The Hazardous Materials Administrative Unit also suggested that “in the event of a large scale fire, Incident Commanders should consider requesting assistance from the EPA Technical Assistance Team (TAT), whose members possess the capability of monitoring air emissions for toxic content and can advise the Incident Commander on evacuation needs, if any.”
PREFIRE PLAN
The first-due engine company prepared a prefire plan for the location and distributed copies to the fire companies that would respond on the first two alarms. Copies of the preplan were given to the Fire Communications Center, Hazardous Materials Task Force, and Hazardous Materials Administrative Unit with a request for their recommendations.
Based on the most recent inspections and the prior incident at the site, the matter was referred to the Philadelphia Environmental Crimes Task Force (see “Forming an Environmental Task Force,” Fire Engineering, November 1992) for possible criminal violations.
On January 14, 1992, members of the Philadelphia Environmental Crimes Task Force, consisting of special agents of the Pennsylvania Attorney General`s Office, EPA, and Federal Bureau of Investigation served a search warrant at the Faulkenstein facility.
In October 1992, a federal grand jury was convened. As a result of its findings, Faulkenstein was charged with violating the Clean Water Act Pre-treatment Standards by illegally discharging pollutants–including cyanide, arsenic, and selenium waste–through the city`s sewer system. The president of the corporation was charged with hazardous waste storage violations. In addition, the general manager of the plant was indicted on charges of illegally storing and disposing of hazardous waste and supplying deceptive information to regulatory agencies concerning the practice of discharging pollutants into the city`s water system. The general manager and president pleaded guilty to the charges.
On Saturday, January 9, 1994, as the East Coast was recovering from a severe cold spell that made sub-zero temperatures the norm, the temperature rose to a “balmy” 25°F; the winds were out of the northwest at 14 mph, and the humidity was 60 percent. Most conversations in fire stations throughout the city centered around how calm it seemed compared with the past couple of bone-chilling weeks. At 1032 hours, Box 573, Front and Somerset streets, was transmitted from the Fire Communications Center for a fire at the Faulkenstein site.
The first-due engine company reported heavy fire and smoke conditions, and the fire quickly rose to four alarms. Although the incident commander had his hands full the day of the fire, at least he was not confronted with a major hazardous-materials incident. If the hazardous waste had been on-site that day, more extensive resources would have been needed to contain and control the fire. Many more alarms would have had to be sounded, and exposures would have been destroyed. In addition, two hospitals may have had to be evacuated. As a result of the fire and the court proceedings against Faulkenstein, Inc., the company went out of business.
Through aggressive, judicious enforcement and persistence, fires with the potential for catastrophic results can be greatly modified. Fire departments must work in cooperation with agencies at all levels of government and share resources in today`s economy. Field suppression forces and staff personnel must have open communication links before incidents occur and use the information gained to implement plans and actions that will ensure a successful outcome. n
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A view of the Faulkenstein property from Lehigh Avenue looking north on Howard Street, with connecting row houses. (Photos by author.)
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(Top) The hose is tied into the sewer line illegally in the rear of the building. (Bottom) An example of the shoddy hazardous waste storage practices found in the structure.
JAMES J. KERRIGAN is a special agent in the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, Environmental Crime Section. He spent 18 years in the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department, where he served as captain assigned as the operations officer in the Philadelphia Fire Marshal`s Office. He has a master`s degree in public safety administration from St. Joseph`s College and a bachelor`s degree in fire science administration and is a Pennsylvania state-certified haz-mat technician. Kerrigan is an adjunct professor at the Saint Joseph`s University Graduate School of Public Safety Administration and at Delaware County (PA) Community College in the fire science technology program. He is a member of the International Association of Arson Investigators and the Pennsylvania Association of Arson Investigators.
