Letters to the Editor
How many team members are needed to make hazardous-materials incident entry safe?
In the September 1987 issue, Thomas R. Wood wrote a Training Notebook article, “Suited for Entry: Haz-Mat Incident Command.” I waited for a storm of letters to the editor. The October issue . . . nothing. In the November issue, one from Jim McFadden, California Department of Forestry.
Mr. McFadden is right. It will take some time to correct the errors in that article. But what strikes me more than the incident command problems are those with the haz-mat entry. To even consider an entry team of three members and support teams of four members is beyond comprehension.
Let’s examine Mr. Wood’s format. Using two entry members and one back-up, what would happen if the entry team members both go down? You have one back-up to remove two members. The decontamination specialist (doubling as a medical specialist) who assisted in the donning operation was out of place; the three contaminated members will have to wait for help in the decon and doffing operation.
The safety observer (also the communications specialist) was talking on the radio, so he missed seeing what happened. The logistics specialist wanted to call for an ambulance, but the safety specialist left with the portable radio when he went to help the decontamination specialist.
Now that we have contaminated the seven specialists, the ambulance, and possibly the hospital’s emergency room, we call the Environmental Protection Agency.
If this letter seems to be sarcastic, so be it. Many people who have only marginal training are trying to deal with hazardous materials, and to allow an article to mislead them is wrong.
I regret that you weren’t flooded with letters. It would seem that dinosaurs are closer to home.
Alan E. Gumbs Master Firefighter City of Virginia Beach (Va.)
Fire Department
Thomas Wood responds:
Mr. Gumbs’s basic dispute is the number of people necessary to carry out an entry mission.
A long time ago, I learned that an acceptable staffing level in one community is “beyond comprehension” in another. Would you believe that there are communities with only a handful of trained haz-mat members? This is the real world for many communities. If the incident is large, a regional disaster plan may be needed to bring in enough trained personnel; on a smaller scale, mutual aid from neighboring towns may foot the bill.
The article clearly stated “seven team members, the minimum required,” emphasis on “team” and “minimum.” If you have more trained people available, use them—I didn’t set a maximum! Use those firefighters not trained in haz-mat response in support roles under the direction of team members.
As I was highlighting only the entry sector on the diagram, I didn’t include the many other sectors, divisions, groups, and levels of command in hazmat response.
Fire prevention should start with the earliest impressions
As I think about the fire problem in America, I can’t help but wonder what the real problem is. Thinking back to my earliest memories, I recall a hot bottle of milk. My parents smoked, so there’s another source—the match and the lighter. And then there was the birthday candle. Are candles toys? Could this be a child’s first experience with fire? Fireworks, sparklers, and toasted marshmallows are next.
I’m not saying this is all totally wrong, but how many parents truly understand what they’re doing? How do you explain to a child that the birthday candle is a tool, even though Mom and Dad are playing with it?
I believe that to gain control of the fire problem in America, we have to start at the beginning. Parents of preschoolers must be taught. Otherwise, the public education officer’s job will be to erase thoughts parents have implanted as good and fun.
Let’s face it, most parents have no idea they’re teaching and setting possible tragic patterns. Do we have any fire prevention instruction for parents attending prenatal care classes? I don’t think we do, but maybe we should. It’s a step in the right direction.
Samuel M. Wilcoxon Fire Prevention/Fire Investigation Officer
Naval Weapons Support Center Crane, Ind.
False security from new hose
I found “Under Pressure” in the December 1987 issue informative. It contained several good pointers, especially the idea of keeping a ready, accessible history on each section of hose.
There is one point Chief Henderson didn’t stress. New hose should be pressure-tested before being put into service. This is one instance where we shouldn’t take the manufacturer’s word on it. We’re lured into a false sense of security because the hose is new and has “Tested to 800 psi,” or whatever, stenciled on it.
After 10 years of service as a volunteer and a paid firefighter, I’ve seen new hose burst twice. In one instance, a 3-inch supply line burst with about 60 psi on line. It tore loose from the female coupling end. The other time, a new section of 1 ½-inch hose burst: Again, it was at the female coupling, but this time with about 150 psi. Fortunately, the firefighters involved weren’t injured in either case.
Both hose burst instances occurred in different years and about two or three months prior to our annual hose testing. In my opinion, this more than justifies the time it would take to test new hose.
Larry Barton Danville Fire Department Damille, Va.
