“Amen” to Bobby Halton’s “The King Has No Clothes … or Firefighters” (Editor’s Opinion, July 2008). At the technical college level, we teach basic skills (ladder raises, advancing handlines, forcible entry) to a team of three under the supervision of an instructor, who is also functioning as the company officer. In real life, the same team of three will be expected to perform the same task without the presence of the fourth team member, the officer, because that is the way our elected officials have staffed our real-life fire departments and companies.
Even if one of the three team members is a company officer, the officer will be so occupied performing tasks that he can pay little attention to firefighter safety and survival. Although this hasn’t been stated as a factor [in line-of-duty deaths] in any of the National Institute for Occupational Safety Health reports that I have read, some of them imply it.
It doesn’t take a big-city fire department to feel the effects of downsizing. My fire department presently has three stations covering about 40 square miles, including two residential areas around two lakes, divided by a city, a river, and a railroadand with no hydrants. The town board is considering building one new station to replace two aging and inadequate facilities and does not seem to regard personnel (all volunteer) response time, apparatus response time, changes in our ISO rating (presently mostly a 7), and response distance as significant factors. The next step would be eliminating one of three engines and not replacing our 22-year-old water tender.
Most citizens are willing to pay for a high level of fire protection services and seem to expect that it is available. Somehow, this message doesn’t get through to the elected officials, who don’t understand that to provide any level of fire protection, we have to be staffed to perform tasks simultaneously, not sequentially. This means 24 people performing six or seven tasks at the same time, plus the incident commandernot the same three or four people performing one task after another.
Gregory Havel
Deputy Chief (Ret.)
Burlington (WI) Fire Department
In reference to July’s Editor’s Opinion, it is nice to see that some departments might consider hiring chiefs based on some level of fireground competence. One thing that no one in the fire service has pointed out is that although the Charleston report finds that the fireground operations were flawed (big time!), Charleston is an ISO Class 1. What kind of a measure is this? You can run a fireground like that in today’s fire service and the instrument used to rate fire departments finds that department to be the best in the field! This situation has to point to the ISO’s being irrelevant to the modern fire service.
Phil Hodgdon
Chief
Consolidated Fire District #2
Prairie Village, Kansas
Approaches to air management
I have been a career firefighter for 16 years, a lifelong student of the fire service, and an instructor. I have not been to a fire where there was not something we could have done better. It is not the mistake you makeit is how you recover from it and the fact that you recognize it, share it, and learn from it. We as a service cannot address safety issues incrementally; we must take an all-inclusive proactive approach.
An air management policy that supports NFPA 1404, Standard for Fire Service Respiratory Protection Training, 2006 edition, recommendations combined with practical training to change the firefighters’ reference on their air consumption with different variables will aid us in reducing smoke-inhalation injuries and deaths. We must train in large acquired structures! However, I’m concerned about the message suggested about filter mask use in “Out-of-Air Emergency: Using Technology to Survive,” by Frank Ricci and Matt Marcarelli (May 2008).
While technology produces many pieces of safety equipment to protect firefighters, inadequate training, failure to adhere to training and procedures, and improper use of equipment will always put the firefighter at risk. Using technology to solve a cultural or behavioral problem may not save the firefighter.
Too many fire departments fail to train their firefighters in proper SCBA air management and to constantly monitor their air supply pressure and to plan on exiting the building before the low-air warning activates.
I routinely pose the following question to audiences as I speak around the country: “What does your SCBA training tell you as to when to leave a building?” Consistently, nearly 100 percent of the time, the answer is, “When my low-air warning activates.” This indicates a serious cultural and training failure. While the firefighter may have enough air to safely exit a small residential property, it will not allow enough air to safely exit a large, deeply penetrated building, as was learned in Phoenix at the Southwest Supermarket fire that killed firefighter Bret Tarver. I know. I was there that day.
The above article cited that 79 firefighters died of smoke inhalation between 1995 and 2004. An anecdotal review of those cases strongly suggests a large number of the deaths were related to a lack of situational awarenesslack of awareness of air supply and fire conditions. Only a small number were trapped by collapse. Some were caught in a flashover. The majority appear to have run out of air before they could exit. This is supported by the authors’ statement, “Analysis of past LODDs shows the need for conservative air management training ….” I couldn’t agree more.
I have on a number of occasions been asked to review accident investigations involving near-miss or fatal incidents involving SCBA use. In each case, the firefighter did not check his air supply pressure level (to confirm a full tank) on donning, did not constantly monitor his pressure while in the building, and was surprised when the low-air warning activated. In reviewing statements from other firefighters at the incidents, several (unbelievably) could not remember the correct pressure for a full tank. They were professional firefighters in major metropolitan fire departments. There is something seriously wrong with our training and culture, and we need to address the cavalier attitude about SCBA use.
The article mentions that SCUBA divers use a “pony bottle”a small bottle attached to the larger tank and harnesses reserved exclusively for emergency use. What the authors did not describe was that all SCUBA training mandates the diver surface with at least 500 pounds of air remaining in the tank. This air is reserved for unexpected underwater emergenciessuch as entrapment and strong currents. It is so well adhered to that professional dive and boat operators will prohibit additional diving if a diver surfaces without 500 pounds, unless he experienced an emergency.
Have firefighters been entangled or trapped in a building? Has their planned exit been blocked by fire or collapse? You bet! With a reserve of 500 pounds of “real” air, the chances of survival are much higher. Perhaps the SCUBA standard ought to be adopted by the fire service.
The 2006 edition of NFPA 1404 attempts to apply the SCUBA concept. The standard states the following: “The firefighter should exit before consumption of reserve air begins” (before the low-air alarm activates). The standard is weak in two areas. One, if you are still using the 1,200-liter “30-minute” bottle, the remaining air may be only 300 pounds once the low-air warning activates. Even the 1,800-liter (45-minute) bottle may provide only 450 pounds at the time of alarm. Two, there is no mandate (disappointingly) that the firefighter “must” exit the building before the alarm sounds. Finally, if a fire department does not adopt the standard and enforce it, the firefighter will remain at great risk.
One of the lessons that evolved out of the Phoenix tragedy was that 75 percent of all training should be spent in teaching firefighters how to stay out of trouble in the first place and to survive. Phoenix has since implemented a very aggressive air-management program.
As to SCBA use, there is no shame in leaving a tactical position early to allow adequate time and air to safely exit the building. On the other hand, it is just plain stupid to intentionally push the safety envelope and suck your last bit of tank air as you stumble out of the building. If you’re doing that, someday “Murphy” will kill you.
So, we’re back to the question. Why are we not aggressively teaching our firefighters to constantly monitor their air pressure and exit before the low-air alarm activates? A filter mask will not interrupt the poor behaviors that get the firefighter in trouble in the first place. It seems to me that we should first focus on preventing out-of-air emergencies through more conservative air-management training.
Gary P. Morris
Assistant Chief (Ret.)
Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department
Frank Ricci and Matt Marcarelli respond: Improved filter technology provides the firefighter in trouble with a last chance to get out alive. The smoke produced in today’s fire is not like the smoke your dad used to breathe. Running out of air has been a reality for far too many firefighters. Failure to manage your air is not the only way to get jammed up on this job. This unit provides a redundancy to our SCBA that is prone to single-point failure. How can anybody be against breathing? This technology has already been credited with saving three firefighters from further injury or possible death in Los Angeles. Although I agree that departments across the country can do more, our article made it clear that air management, proper staffing, a trained rapid intervention team, and a strong departmental commitment to providing the necessary training to prevent the firefighter from getting jammed up in the first place are all part of the answer.
The training program for this technology also focuses on the importance of sound tactical operations for avoiding Maydays. We operate in a hostile and dynamic environment where firefighters must make split-second decisions based on imperfect information. Almost all of our operations are interdependent with decisions made by others (officers, chiefs, and firefighters). This is a dangerous job. We all teach continual size-up and adjusting tactics to fit the situation. We all go in with plan A while coming up with plan B, and that is the point! The fire service has adopted high-risk technology (SCBA) to make our job more efficient and effective [and] that does not have a plan B. Until now we have been without a backup or a parachute. Plan A usually works, but we would be considered ignorant if we didn’t plan for failure in all of our operations.
All deaths are not the result of air management. Many firefighters have exhausted their air supply after getting lost when ordered to evacuate the structure. In 17 of these deaths, air management played no role. Firefighters have faced equipment malfunctions, entrapment after collapse, and simply getting lost during operations. Insufficient staffing, inadequate training, and not being prepared for the Mayday have all been contributing factors. There is no magic bullet. Air management alone will not produce the result we all want. It will take a combination of changes, including a respiratory protection plan that mandates NFPA 1404 recommendations, training, filter technology, and physicals.
We can’t blame our culture for everything! Culture is a symptom, not the problem. Our culture (traditions, background, customs, way of life) can be described as a brotherhood that is compassionate, dedicated, professional, noble, trustworthy, and at times heroic. It is what attracts most of us to the fire service. If we treat only the symptoms, not only will we dishonor ourselves, but also we will never solve the problem. The problem is lack of leadership. We are talking about the departments that are not moving forward from the top down. The way we see it with any safety issue, from offering quality training to something as simple as using seat belts, it comes down to accountability, attitude, and training. A policy, law, and standard operating procedures are all meaningless if not enforced.
Many departments still have leaders that encourage an attitude of pleasing and concealing instead of honest evaluation and correction. It is not the mistake that you make. It is how you recover from it and that you recognize it, share it, and learn from it. We as a service cannot attack safety issues incrementally. We need to have a strong presence on all fronts to reduce our injuries and deaths.
We must keep in mind that most of us with more than 10 years on the job were trained to work in an immediately dangerous to life and health environment until our low-air alarm went off. We as a service have learned from the sacrifice of our fellow firefighters who have died in the line of duty. Now we are teaching air management and now have a backup to use in an out-of-air emergency so we can get out.
We applaud Fire Engineering Editor in Chief Bobby Halton for taking the leading role in getting the word out about air management. The magazine, FDIC, and Fire Engineering Books and Videos have all put the issue to the forefront. I recommend to any department Air Management for the Fire Service by Mike Gagliano, Casey Phillips, Phillip Jose, and Steve Bernocco (Fire Engineering, 2008) and the DVD Firefighter Survival Techniques: Prevention to Intervention (Frank Ricci, Fire Engineering, 2008). These resources demonstrate that the fire service is heading in the right direction.
In the past 10 years, we have seen many improvements. We all must commit to work on training and embrace technology responsibly. Remember, smoke inhalation is not just an acute event; it can produce chronic conditions that may affect your health later down the road. Do not breathe smoke.
USS Indianapolis and Jim O’Donnell
As I am a regular chief who is swamped with everything from A to Z, I usually try to take a little time on Friday to catch up on my magazine reading. I [have gotten up] to the June 2008 issue of Fire Engineering and saw Bobby Halton’s Editor’s Opinion “Thank You” relative to USS Indianapolis and Jim O’Donnell. I thank Fire Engineering for recognizing the ship and crew. My father is a survivor of the ship also. I grew up going to reunions in Indy; now, so many of the survivors are gone. My dad is 82; as I get older, every day I have him with me is a blessing. My parents dedicated their lives to telling the story of what happened at the end of the war. Many people have asked me over the years what it means to be a son of a survivor. I always say how glad I am my dad made it, or I would not be here.
There are many books and movies about the Indianapolis; I still have a hard time watching and hearing what my dad and the others went through. It was my dad’s 9/11, and it has changed his life. I am very proud of what he did for our country. My dad is very proud of me and my sonwe both are firefighters. I am near the end of my career; my son, Michael, is at the beginning of his.
What Bobby Halton said in his column about our traditions and pride is very true. If you could reverse time, my dad would go back to 17 and go back to war; I would go back to 19 and begin my first day in the fire service. So many people do not know the feeling of the brotherhoodthe military or the fire service. Thankfully, I have done both. Actually, looking back, my dad was a volunteer firefighter for a few years and spent many years in the local Civil Defense. It must be in the blood.
I can’t wait to show this magazine to my dad; he loves to read articles about his wartime adventures, as do all his shipmates. He will be tickled to see Jim O’Donnell being recognized.
Michael Kuryla III
Chief
Hillside (IL) Fire Department
