BY STEVEN E. STANDRIDGE
In my nearly 13 years in the fire service, I cannot recall the number of times an incident commander (IC) directed my crew to “recon” an area, the fire floor, or an entire structure. Undoubtedly, we’ve all heard the expression and may have even used it for our own purposes. Oddly enough, for as often as I’ve heard the phrase used, I’ve found very little written on the subject, much less come across a formal and explicit definition for it.1 The only fire-related description that seems to exist is within the realm of wildland firefighting. Yet, this frequently used expression has real-world implications on the fireground; therefore, it is in our best interest to thoroughly understand and use the term properly.
This apparent disconnect compelled me to research the topic. I discovered that “recon,” in the context of the fire service, has a specific meaning and requires a corresponding set of tactics to accomplish the task. It’s with this knowledge that I venture into unfamiliar and controversial territory: I propose a new definition for inclusion in our collective fire service dictionary: Fireground Reconnaissance (fireground recon). I’ll also discuss the specific elements of an effective recon that will better ensure safe and efficient operations. The first thing we must do, though, is establish a universally agreed on definition, which, given our profession’s sometimes prickly nature, may be easier said than done.
As ICs, what exactly do we mean when we instruct our crews to “recon” an area? It’s my contention that we’ve long used the term in a loose and often inaccurate manner. The term, in fact, has a precise definition that requires specific tactical considerations. Unfortunately, we have not collectively devoted the requisite time and energy to come up with a satisfactory definition. The military, by contrast, formally recognizes the term and defines recon as “a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”2 In the wildland vernacular, recon is characterized as a way “to examine a fire area to obtain information about current and probable fire behavior and other related fire suppression information.”3 I submit that these descriptions do not, for the purpose of general firefighting, clearly convey the meaning and intent of fireground recon. Given this, it is then necessary to advance a definition that can withstand the scrutiny of our profession. I believe the following rises to that level:
- Fireground Recon: the process of determining the location and extent of the fire prior to committing resources to a large commercial building, residential structure, or wildland fire.
The key point when evaluating this definition is that there is a distinct difference between reconnaissance and size-up. As firefighters and officers, we’ve been indoctrinated with the size-up process and have it etched into our thought process.
SIZE-UP VS. FIREGROUND RECON
We know that size-up is “the ongoing process of evaluating a situation to determine what has happened, what is happening, what is likely to happen, and what resources will be needed to resolve the situation.”4 One of the most recognizable size-up tools is the COAL WAS WEALTH acronym. This comprehensive assessment tool is designed to give an officer as much information about the incident as possible to make sound strategic and tactical decisions. Some argue that it begins at the time we get the alarm; others suggest it starts before the day even begins with assessments about weather, preplans, personnel, training, and so on. Regardless of the precise moment size-up begins, it is still the fundamental means we use to gather all the pertinent information necessary for doing our jobs safely and efficiently.
Fireground recon, on the other hand, is but one of the tools an IC has at his disposal to help determine the what, where, and how. In military lingo, recon is the “fact-finding” mission, whereas size-up is the evaluative procedure by which the “known” facts dictate your strategy and tactics. Clearly, size-up and recon are not the same.
For example, a truck crew might be assigned to recon the roof. When the team gets to the top, it reports seeing “heavy smoke coming from the vents on the northwest corner of the building.” This is specific and unfiltered information, which is gathered through the process of reconning an area. After the report is transmitted to the IC, he evaluates the information and tries to determine the fire’s location, attempts to predict where it will go, and allocates the appropriate resources to mitigate the situation. This can be accomplished only when all the reconnaissance information is received from the various sources on the fireground. In the military, this process is often referred to as a continuous intelligence operation. For us in the fire service, it is the ongoing process of size-up. The dilemma for most ICs is figuring out how to go about answering those critical questions. The recon team simply acts as an information-gathering resource for the IC. More precisely, recon crews endeavor to help the IC answer all the critical questions, which will assist the officer in determining the proper strategy and tactics for the incident. Ironically, we engage in recon operations every day in both large and small departments.
Think back to your last early-morning fire alarm call. If your department is anything like mine, you get at least one engine and a ladder truck assigned to investigate the alarm. On arrival, you take command; size up the exterior of the building; and, barring any obvious signs of fire, head to the fire alarm panel to gather more information that can help pinpoint where to send your crews. If the fire alarm panel indicates a smoke detector has activated on the third floor, we head up with tools in hand and personnel in tow. Once on the “fire” floor, we begin looking for clues that help us determine where the “phantom” problem may be. In accordance with our training, we feel the door prior to making entry, scan the area with our thermal imaging camera (TIC), check the ceiling space for fire above, and gain entry into offices to check for any signs of fire. As is typically the case, we find no immediate problem and continue this process until we find that lone smoke detector, which, because of neglect, finally activates, causing us to grumble about another false alarm wrenching us from our comfortable beds. Lo and behold, and without even realizing it, we’ve just conducted our recon operation. Some might quibble and suggest, “No, what you’ve done is actually a ‘size-up,’ ” to which I respond, “I beg to differ.”
Remember, in this newly created definition, recon is but one of the many mechanisms we use to size up the call. Recon, like any other source of information, helps us answer the critical size-up questions: Where is the fire? How big has it gotten? Where is it going? What do we need to do to get it under control? You might still be wondering what the distinction is and why it is so important. It’s simple really.
Let’s go back to our 2 a.m. mid-rise fire alarm call. This time, when we get to the fire floor and open the door, instead of finding a clear hallway, we discover the entire corridor is charged with heavy black smoke. Now what? Most of us would acknowledge that we have to get to the seat of the fire with our hoseline and start doing what comes naturallyputting the wet stuff on the red stuff. But, what if we don’t know where the seat of the fire is? What should we do then? Do we simply connect our 2½-inch high-rise pack to the nearest standpipe connection and pray we get to the seat of the fire? I would hope not. Instead, it might be far more advisable and efficient to take the extra time and send a crew over to the next stairwell to evaluate the conditions from that location. I’ve witnessed a number of occasions when crews in both training scenarios and on actual calls advanced their attack lines only to come up short of their objective. This adds to the confusion, chaos, and stress of an already tense and highly charged situation. Had the crews taken the time to recon the other stairwells, they might have found a closer access point to the fire than the one originally chosen. Those few minutes needed for recon are vital, but it takes discipline to conduct such an operation.
We all have on our crews those horses we’re forced to rein in from time to time to get them to slow down for their good and the good of the crew. We love them, because they’re the Clydesdales of our department. They can climb eight flights of stairs, advance 150 feet of charged 2½-inch hose, and still have enough energy to overhaul the fire room. That’s when discipline comes into play. I can assure you that if you choose the wrong access point from which to connect and advance your hose, it won’t matter how many thoroughbreds you have on your crew. You won’t come any closer to getting the fire out. That’s why an understanding of when and where to use a fireground recon operation can be beneficial, if not essential, to the overall mitigation of the incident. It will aid you in making the right decisions when assigning resources to the correct location so that you can get the fire under control and extinguished.
In 2003, I had the extraordinary opportunity to do two consecutive 24-hour ride-alongs with the Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department as part of FDIC’s H.O.T. packages. About midway through my second shift, I had the good fortune to be assigned to the engine that was third-in on what I can describe only as a third-alarm fire (L.A. City uses the task force concept, so its alarms don’t equate to a traditional first- or second-alarm assignment most departments use). As our unit positioned, the officer and his two firefighters jumped off the rig and sprinted into the structure with only their personal protective equipment and SCBAs and with axes and rope bags in hand. At the time, I was stunned at how aggressively this crew entered the structure without hoselines or even water cans to protect them, but I shortly realized why they had gone into the structure so quickly. Within a couple of minutes, at least half a dozen firefighters from different crews were dropping rope bags down to their awaiting engineers to hoist up one of their crosslays. The firefighters then raised the hoselines to the fire floor, ensuring they had enough to reach the seat of the fire, and signaled to the engineer to make the connection. At this point, the engineer uncoupled the crosslay, connected at the panel, and began pumping the appropriate gallons per minute (gpm) needed for an adequate fire attack. It was a truly impressive sight to witness. I have great admiration for the L.A. City firefighters, who demonstrated an efficient and highly coordinated operation. It was also during this ride-along that I began to formulate the concept of fireground recon and the tactics needed to facilitate a safe and efficient operation.
THREE-SIDED RECON APPROACH
No hard-and-fast rules exist, since fireground recon is a newly defined concept. However, the following set of general guidelines might be useful in determining the need for a recon operation as part of what I call the “three-sided recon approach.”
1 The interior of the structure. The primary task of our recon team is to determine the location and extent of the fire prior to committing resources. This team is lightly “armed” and most likely will be operating without a hoseline. With that said, it should at a minimum have some forcible entry tools, a TIC, and a water can or two at its disposal. Remember, your recon team needs to be highly mobile to facilitate a quick assessment of the building and the conditions to best determine where to position crews, equipment, and hoselines. The IC should, however, take into consideration at least three factors before committing the recon team inside:
- Is the roof intact, or is it nearing collapse?
- Are the conditions inside the structure such that the “light” recon team can safely proceedi.e., hazmat materials are known to be inside; egress routes cannot be clearly identified?
- Can an offensive strategy still be employed?
Clearly, you may use other go/no-go criteria before committing crews inside. Regardless what they are, keep them at the forefront of your risk assessment, because your recon team is highly vulnerable to rapidly changing conditions that can put the team in peril.
2 Outside the structure. In all actuality, we do this all the time. If your department is anything like mine, this function typically falls to the truck or RIT as it conducts its 360° walk-around. As the RIT is doing this, the recon team should be popping doors and looking in windows and under eaves and vents for signs of smoke and walls for indications of imminent collapse. I know all of this sounds obvious, but I’ve witnessed more than a few occasions where an officer or a recon team conducted a 360° survey and didn’t really “look” at the building. I call this speed walking through the size-up. Consequently, he didn’t take the time to closely examine the structure to gather all the information that might be critical for determining what was actually going on. If you’re assigned to recon the exterior, you have a responsibility to critically evaluate and report back any findings or actions to the IC. And, like an interior recon operation, there are several instances when it may not be suitable to conduct a complete outside recon operation, such as the following:
- When a wall or the roof has collapsed or collapse is imminent.
- When conditions from the fire make it untenable to do an adequate outside reconi.e., radiant heat is so great it limits the crew’s ability to get close to the structure.
- When significant barriers exist that restrict a comprehensive exterior recon from being conducted.
3 The roof. Ideally, as most truckies will tell you, it should be done with “feet on the ground.” However, if the roof has collapsed or is about to collapse or has already vented, this operation can be conducted from an aerial, a ground ladder, or an adjacent structure. Regardless of what your specific department’s standard operating procedures outline for roof operations, there are some key things you should be looking for:
- Is the roof fully intact?
- Has it vented?
- Will the roof collapse, or has any part of it collapsed?
- Are there any signs of firei.e., smoke coming from vents?
Obviously, these guidelines may preclude conducting an immediate recon operation, but as the incident progresses and resources become available or conditions change sufficiently, the IC may elect or be forced to initiate a recon operation.
Although a truly effective recon operation should employ a three-sided approach whenever possible, it does not mean you can’t or shouldn’t use one or more of the approaches when the circumstances dictate. For example, if you’ve arrived on the scene of a fully involved commercial structure fire and declare a defensive strategy, you may still need to conduct a recon operation on the exterior to ensure the fire isn’t impinging on any exposures. Or, an IC may roll up and determine the resources on-scene are too limited to conduct a recon operation when immediate life safety needs are requiredi.e., immediate rescue, mass evacuation of occupants. Or, the structure, such as a residential house or stand-alone commercial building the size of a typical fast food restaurant, is small enough and the location of the fire is obvious that a recon operation is not warranted. Generally speaking, the larger the structure, the more likely a thorough recon operation needs to be conducted to ensure resources are deployed to the proper location in as timely a manner as possible.
Some examples of structures or incidents that necessitate one or more recon operations are large and complex commercial structures (such as churches, strip malls, high rises, and warehouses) and wildland fires. It’s also worth noting that, although the current definition of fireground recon is limited to fires, these operations may not necessarily be restricted to these incidents. For example, as IC you may elect to send a recon team out to gather information on a large multiple casualty or hazmat incident. The possibilities for recon operations are endless.
This article was predicated on the assumption that I’m not introducing a new concept but formalizing a well-known albeit little-discussed idea that should be roundly debated, field tested, and built on. It is designed to be the first stage in what I hope will be the beginning of an ongoing dialogue and evolution of a concept, in much the same way as size-up has taken on a life of its own in discussions about strategy and tactics. Let the debate begin.
Endnotes
1. It should be noted that there have been articles and short sections of books devoted to the subject but only in a superficial manner. For example, John Norman talks about reconnaissance as it relates to building collapses in his Fire Officer’s Handbook of Tactics (Fire Engineering, 2005), while Joseph Bachtler and Tom Brennan take a similar approach in The Fire Chief’s Handbook, Fifth Edition (Fire Engineering, 1995). I’m certain others have discussed this subject, but all the written material I could find talked about it only in a cursory manner. This bolsters my main contention that no definition exists despite the term’s widespread use.
2. Reconnaissance. FM 3-0 Operations. U.S. States Army, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-21-21/chap3.htm. 2001; June, 10-11.
3. Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology, Publication 205. National Wildfire Coordinating Group. http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/glossary/PMS205.pdf/. Oct 2006; 141.
4. Size-up and Incident Plans: Fire Department Company Officer, 3rd ed. International Fire Service Training Association. 1999; 271.
STEVEN E. STANDRIDGE is a captain with South Metro Fire Rescue in the Denver (CO) metro area. He’s been a line and a training officer and is working as an administrative captain helping to develop the department’s Emergency Management Plan. He has a bachelor’s degree in business administration and a master’s degree in management and in public policy.
