NO “ROUTINE” JOBS
BY FRANCIS L. BRANNIGAN, SFPE
Note: Beginning with this column, the term “UPDATE” will be used when presenting fire stories or information that adds to subjects covered in Building Construction for the Fire Service, Third Edition (BCFS3).
LOS ANGELES “SAFETY MEMBER”
Most fire departments are very concerned about equipment that supports firefighters–such as aerial ladders, ropes, and aerial platforms–because their failure can cost lives. Specifications are tightly written, and acceptance and in-service tests are carefully monitored. There is one working platform firefighters use, however, that is not designed for firefighters use, is not monitored by anyone, and has cost many firefighters their lives: It is the ROOF.
Training exercises assume the stability of the roof. A few warnings, often too little and too late, are passed down in the fire service. The sole information offered in one prefire plan lists architectural types–flat, butterfly, lantern, gable, hip, gambrel, shed, mansard, dome. Such information, while useful, is by no means complete. We must know the structure as well as the appearance of the roof. We simply cannot accept attitudes such as that reflected in the incredible quote of a chief officer at a fire in which three firefighters died in a roof collapse. He said that he had learned nothing and “would use the same tactics again.”
The Los Angeles City Fire Department has recognized the specific hazards of roof operations and has issued the following safety standard that should be adopted universally.
One member from the roof-cutting team must have the sole responsibility of “safety member” and not be involved in the cutting operation. No roof-cutting operation shall be performed without the presence of a dedicated “safety member.”
The order states in part, “It must be understood and accepted that roof-cutting operations lacking appropriate oversight are inherently unsafe and often ineffective. Ideally, the safety member will be the officer in charge of the personnel cutting the roof or a member with the necessary training and experience.”
A number of responsibilities–such as identifying escape routes, recognizing potential collapse, and weighing risk vs. gain–are assigned.
One of the serious risks in firefighting is failure of command to realize that once the structure is attacked by the fire, you no longer have the training school fire, and the situation is deteriorating minute by minute.
In one sad case, a very distant mutual-aid ladder company was called to ventilate a roof. When it arrived 45 minutes later, two firefighters were sent to the roof, which promptly collapsed.
Never forget that ventilation accelerates the fire. If the fire isn`t suppressed immediately, the ventilation crew and firefighters below the roof may be in mortal danger.
One of my problems in training company officers was to get them to direct the work, not do it. I used a picture of New York`s Rescue 3 and a truck company cutting a roof. One of my mentors, Rescue 3 Captain Teddy Beliakoff, was seen pointing at what was to be done with only his hand light in his other hand. I realize today that the staffing levels do not always permit this luxury, but firefighter safety is most important and somebody should be assigned that duty.
GAS LEAKS ARE VERY DANGEROUS
In an earlier column, I commented on the fact that many firefighters and gas company employees seem to take a nonchalant approach to gas leaks. We had a personal, near disaster in New York City in 1950. My wife Maurine happened to go out the front door of our brand new house and saw a gas company employee turning on the gas. She screamed, “There is no meter on the pipe.” (There was also no regulator.) In seconds, high-pressure gas would have filled the basement, where the oil burner was running. He threw his key into the truck and took off. My call to top management turned on the gas properly the next day and brought the borough superintendent out, not to commend Maurine for preventing a disaster but to bawl her out for “going over his head to headquarters.”1
In my opinion, a reported inside gas leak is one of the most dangerous responses you can make. In Loudoun County, Virginia, gas from a hole in a plastic supply pipe leaked into the basement of a new house with disastrous results. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the disaster and will report in due course, so this item is a mixture of fact and speculation. The hole in the pipe appears to have been caused by an electrical short in a power cable that was too close to the gas pipe. In the middle of the night, the gas-air mixture in the basement was ignited violently by the pilot light on the gas water heater. A wall of the house was blown out, causing a collapse that killed the mother. The father was found outside the building severely burned. Two children were blown out of the building and landed 75 feet away, miraculously only slightly injured.
The probable course of the gas was along the plastic supply pipe. The backfill earth along the pipe is quite porous. As the gas passes along the pipe, the earth filters out the artificial odorant added to natural gas, so the hazard in this case could have gone undetected by the occupants. If this situation happened in your area and the residents had called 911, would your response have been rather laid back?
I have no recommendations that would provide absolute safety, but the following suggestions are offered:
Treat the situation like a very suspicious package.
Evacuate the building.
Button up full turnout gear.
Bring no ignition source into the area–flashlights, radios, generators, fans, and the like.
Have gas and electricity turned off from outside.
Use a calibrated gas detector with long probe from outside.
Ventilate the building from the outside.
Use a minimum of personnel.
TWO MORE PROPANE FATALITIES
Two Albert City (IA) firefighters died in a BLEVE (boiling-liquid, expanding-vapor explosion) that involved an 18,000-gallon propane tank. Two Carthage (IL) firefighters died in a similar BLEVE disaster in October 1997 while trying to cool a tank.
Many fire schools use a relatively small tank to teach tactics for approaching a propane tank and shutting off the valve. Do such tactics give firefighters a false impression of the hazard? At least one expert, Robert Burke of the University of Maryland (Baltimore), author of Hazardous Materials Chemistry for Emergency Responders (CRC Lewis, 1997), thinks so. I would like to hear your thoughts on this subject.
RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM
Michael Robertson reports in Pennsylvania Fireman (July 1998, p. 234) on the Burlington County, New Jersey, plan for consistency in F.A.S.T. (Firefighter`s Assistance Strike Team) training and operations. The county has 40 fire companies, mostly volunteer and some part career. Any serious fire involves mutual-aid units. It is certainly a real asset for the IC to know that the mutual-aid rapid intervention team (RIT) is trained to a common standard. For further information on this excellent program, visit the Burlington County Fire Chiefs Association at the web site www.befirechiefs. Does your department simply assign a unit to be the RIT without providing any special training? Just consider one problem: How does removing a firefighter encumbered by turnouts and breathing apparatus differ from removing a citizen?
MOVING VANS UPDATE
Our daughter made an interstate move. Her car with a half tank of gas went into the van. The movers had no problem with gas in the tank. They told her of others who had shipped gas grills complete with propane bottles.
If you respond to a closed-up truck with evidence of fire in the cargo, think bomb. Some years ago, in Connecticut, three firefighters died when the fire blew as they opened the back doors of a truck.
A small fire department lost some hose in fighting a truck fire. The trucking company refused to replace it, saying, “We didn`t send for you.” I did some checking and learned that some companies specifically instructed drivers not to call the fire departments–let someone else do it. Their attitude was that any cargo fire would be a total loss anyway, so why take on a potential serious liability? In any event, anybody who ships household goods should certainly insure them properly.
The first question to ask a moving van driver is, “Do you have a car or a gas barbecue grill in there?” If the answer to either is yes, my advice would be to back off as you would for explosives. If an attack on the fire is indicated, I would suggest a piercing nozzle attack through the sides.
DEMONSTRATIONS
Few firefighters have ever seen a fire start, and grow. In fact, few have ever given the first alarm for a serious fire, according to what firefighters in my audiences tell me.
Firefighters wanted to demonstrate the hazard of Christmas trees. They arranged to set one afire in an abandoned house while TV crews photographed it. They found that “the fire spread faster than expected.” Two firefighters and one cameraman were seriously injured; another cameraman was in critical condition. What basis did they have for expecting that it wouldn`t spread rapidly?
Apparently, some victims became entangled in video cables. Video people get fully engrossed in their technology. A clear retreat path should be maintained, and a “bail out” drill held.
All firefighters should be well aware of how home fires can become explosive flashovers in a matter of a few minutes. In a live fire training tape made by the Los Angeles City Fire Department, the chief notes that despite the experience and training of the participants, one officer was seriously injured while making the tape.
THE SECOND QUESTION
The first question we routinely (I hope) ask occupants who have fled the fire building is, of course, “Is anybody else in there?”2
There is now a second question: “Are there loaded firearms in the building?” A Perry, Florida, firefighter died when he was hit by a bullet from a loaded 22-caliber rifle. Fire department management should decide before an incident occurs what the policy will be if the answer is yes. It is unfair to leave the decision up to the incident commander so that management can jump either way after the fire, depending on public sentiment. If the decision is to delay entry, it should be publicized. Normally, I can`t see the logic of delaying entry to avoid a nut holding a gun–but charging into a loaded gun/fire area? The argument “Guns don`t kill people; people do” is not valid in such a case.
LOOK UP!
I have warned many times about the hazards of loads suspended from overhead (see BCFS3, pp. 48, 59, 60, 163, 177). Perhaps the disaster at a commencement at the University of Virginia will encourage us to “cast up our eyes” when in buildings–before the fire, when smoke will hide the killer loads.
A suspended balcony on a historic building at the University of Virginia collapsed during the commencement, killing one person and injuring many others who were under the balcony. The balcony was designed by Thomas Jefferson, who wanted it to “float.” It appears that the wrought iron rods Jefferson installed were still in use. Corrosion in a location hidden from casual view was blamed for the collapse. Be particularly concerned about hidden connections. Don`t fall for “It`s been this way for 150 years without a problem. It must be OK.” The true concept is that it is 150 years closer to failure. Be especially careful in examining historic old dumps being saved as mementos of our past.
Look for “decorative” wooden grids, plant shelves, and other doodads in modern buildings. The main auditorium of the American Institute of Architects has a lumberyard of polished wooden 2 2 10s hanging from the overhead (see photo on page 435 of BCFS3). They may have been coated with an intumescent finish but are probably hanging from anchors imbedded in lead. When last I saw it, the room was unsprinklered.
One or two sprinkler heads are often placed over open stairways. This mistaken use of sprinkler heads in an otherwise unsprinklered building is permitted by some building departments to avoid enclosing “monumental” stairways. It will not stop toxic gases or smoke. It can, however, pour scalding water down on firefighters. Sprinkler water must “hit the fire where it`s at.” (BCFS3, p. 432).
LOOK DOWN …
on the roofs in your district. Take the tower ladder out when traffic is light. Get up and shoot pictures of the roofs of buildings. Perhaps you will spot a hazard that has caused the death of a firefighter. There was a vacant lot between two brick buildings. A brick wall was built across the opening to improve the appearance. A firefighter stepped off a ladder onto what he thought was the roof and died.
Generally, I get to hear of building conditions that cause firefighter fatalities. I would like to hear of near misses. It is much better for the fire service to learn from near misses than fatalities. Unfortunately, some chiefs and the management of big corporations prefer to hush everything up, so back channel communications without identifying items would be welcome.
Endnotes
1. Turf protection can be ridiculous. When my son Vincent complained to a manager in a department store about locking doors while customers were still inside, a fire inspector threatened to arrest him for “impersonating a fire inspector.”
2. When asked if anyone else was in her burning home, a woman in Greenwich Village, New York, responded to my lifelong friend Lt. John Cashman, FDNY (first chief of Levittown, New York, and chief of Barrington, Rhode Island), “Nobody except my husband.”
FRANCIS (FRANK) L. BRANNIGAN, SFPE, recipient of Fire Engineering`s first Lifetime Achievement Award and the IAFC`s 1998 President`s Award, has devoted more than half of his 56-year career to the safety of firefighters in building fires. He is well known for his lectures and videotapes and as the author of Building Construction for the Fire Service, Third Edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association. Brannigan is an editorial advisory board member of Fire Engineering. He may be reached at (301) 855-1982.
