HOW MUCH RISK IS TOO MUCH?

HOW MUCH RISK IS TOO MUCH?

BY BILL GUSTIN

One of the most valuable lessons an inexperienced firefighter can learn is that experienced, seasoned firefighters do not attack every fire or search every building with the same intensity or level of risk. This lesson seems to have been forgotten or perhaps was never learned by some of the current generation of firefighters who have not and will never experience the extensive fire activity of their predecessors. The rate of firefighter deaths and injuries is inexcusable in light of an overall decline in the number of fires and the fact that firefighters today have never been more protected through advances in turnout clothing, breathing apparatus, and personnel accountability. Firefighters endanger themselves unnecessarily when they employ overly aggressive tactics in situations in which they are not warranted. This article examines situations, conditions, and factors that incident commanders, company officers, and firefighters must consider to ensure that firefighting personnel do not operate at an excessive level of risk.

Experienced firefighters naturally will take risks at a fire at which there are indications of trapped, savable occupants that they otherwise would not take. When civilian lives are not threatened, firefighters must consider their own safety first and not unduly risk their lives to save property. Clearly, civilians can be trapped by fire in any building at any time. Their locations and conditions can only be positively determined by firefighters who enter the building and search for them. Search operations and fire attack, however, must be conducted in accordance with an ongoing risk-benefit analysis that carefully weighs the chances of a firefighter`s losing his life against the realistic chances of finding and rescuing live occupants.

SELECTING APPROPRIATE STRATEGY

Following are factors that must be continuously considered so that the appropriate strategies for search and rescue and fire attack can be selected:

Fire conditions. They are of particular concern when personnel must conduct a primary search before achieving control of the fire. The primary question to be asked is, What are the chances of occupants` surviving a fire of this size and intensity? Don`t endanger personnel unnecessarily by sending them into a heavily involved structure to search for dead bodies.

Fire duration. When does a rescue operation become a body recovery? The chances of an occupant`s surviving in a building filled with smoke and toxic gases diminish rapidly with the passage of time, whereas the risk to firefighters increases the longer a fire attacks the integrity of a structure. Keep a close watch on how long personnel are inside a fire building, and don`t hesitate to abort a search when the danger to firefighters exceeds the probability of rescuing any live occupants.

Building construction. Does the structure itself add fuel to the fire? How long will lightweight structural components withstand a fire that is weakening or consuming them? Does the building have a combustible interior finish that is prone to early flashover? Can the fire burn undetected in concealed spaces and rapidly take possession of the building? The answers to these questions are always important but are critical to the safety of personnel operating without the protection of a hoseline.

Building size and configuration. At one extreme, large, wide-open floor areas can allow a fire to spread unimpeded to unmanageable proportions. Personnel operating deep inside a large building run the risk of overextending themselves beyond their air supply. At the other extreme, floor areas divided by several partitions, storage racks, or shelves create a maze that increases the chance that firefighters will become lost and unable to find their way out.

Resources. Is a sufficient number of firefighters available to extend the search and control the fire? Are personnel available to stand by, uncommitted, ready to rapidly intervene if a firefighter becomes trapped or is missing?

DETERMINING RISK ACCORDING TO

OCCUPANCY

Occupancy arguably is the most important detail of a building`s prefire plan. Knowing the type of occupancy gives firefighters at least some indication of what a building is used for and possibly when it is in use. Occupancy also indicates the type and amount of contents likely to be found inside a building. Knowing the type of occupancy beforehand gives a fire officer advance notice of the hazards and difficulties his personnel will encounter and what his priorities will be. Occupancy is an essential consideration when formulating strategy and ensuring sufficient resources for its implementation.

Similarly, ascertaining the type of occupancy is one of the first steps in conducting a size-up of a fire building. As much as it is practically impossible to determine the occupancy of every building before a fire, signs on the exterior of commercial buildings can indicate their use–for example, “Johnson Tire Company” or “Speedy Paint and Body Shop.” Signs, however, are not always reliable indicators–for example, “ABC Distributing Co.” and “Reliable Products, Inc.” do little to indicate the type of business. Regardless of how and when it is learned, the occupancy of a building is an essential consideration in determining the safety of its occupants and possibly where and when they are at risk. Occupancy is a critical factor when matching the risk to benefit: making sure that firefighters do not unnecessarily endanger themselves in a building replete with hazards when there is little or no risk to occupants.

Contrary to what they may believe, civilians are at the greatest risk of dying in a fire when they are at home, especially when they are sleeping. Civilians statistically are much safer when they are at work, shopping, or being educated in a nonresidential building designed according to a building code`s exit and alarm requirements as well as the fire code`s housekeeping requirements. In fact, nearly 80 percent of civilian fire fatalities occur in residential occupancies. It stands to reason, therefore, that firefighters will take greater risks to aggressively search a house or apartment building than they would a hardware store at 3 a.m. This is not to imply that a civilian life hazard could not exist in such an occupancy. Employees may be stocking shelves, a cleaning crew may be working, or a security guard may be locked in the building. Regardless of the time of day, the risk to civilians in nonresidential occupancies generally is minimal, compared with the risk to firefighters when they fight a fire inside a commercial building.

COMMON HAZARDS IN COMMERCIAL

OCCUPANCIES

The following hazards, commonly found in mercantile, storage, and industrial occupancies, generally make firefighting in these structures more dangerous than in residences.

Contents. Consideration of contents involves three aspects: type of contents, quantity, and the manner in which they are stored. Commercial properties tend to store and use greater quantities of combustible, flammable, and toxic materials than residences. Combustible stock in stores, factories, and warehouses can increase the fire load in these buildings beyond the suppression capabilities of handlines and hasten the structure`s collapse. Flammable liquids and gases commonly found in businesses such as auto body shops can, with no perceptible warning, suddenly increase the size and intensity of a fire, trapping and burning firefighters who have advanced more than a few feet beyond their means of egress.

Storage racks. Some reach several feet high and are prone to collapse from exposure to fire or the weight of stock soaked with water from sprinklers or hose streams. Even if storage racks or shelves remain intact, wet cardboard cartons can fall apart, dumping their contents on firefighters operating below. A company advancing a hoseline between tall storage racks can find themselves trapped in what becomes a dead-end aisle when their means of escape is blocked by collapsing racks or falling stock. Materials stored in bales, bundles, or rolls tend to absorb water and can collapse, crushing firefighters. Fibrous materials saturated with water become extremely heavy and can overload a floor and precipitate a collapse. In addition, wet bales can expand and collapse a building by pushing walls or columns out of alignment.

Building construction, size, and layout. Although residential buildings can be very large, they typically are compartmented into individual rooms that act to confine a fire to a size that usually can be controlled by one or two handlines. Commercial occupancies, on the other hand, usually require large, open floor areas uninterrupted by walls or partitions. This inherent lack of compartmentalization can allow a fire to spread beyond the suppression capabilities of handlines. Large roof spans unsupported by walls and columns necessitate the use of truss construction, which is subject to early collapse. Firefighters who must penetrate deep inside a large commercial occupancy operate in constant danger of running out of air before they can safely make their way out of the building. They must advance cautiously to avoid falling off loading docks or storage lofts, which may have no guard railing to facilitate the movement of palletized stock. Similarly, grease pits are a common mantrap found in many automotive repair businesses.

Lack of exterior openings. Many commercial properties use windowless construction; rolldown gates; and strong doors fortified with several locks and drop bars, particularly in high-crime areas. These features delay discovery of a fire, breed backdraft conditions, and leave firefighters with very few escape options if they cannot exit from the point where they gained entry.

Incendiary fires. Arson is a leading cause of fires in businesses and tends to increase with a downturn in the economy. Also, fires in commercial occupancies frequently are set by disgruntled employees to cover up a burglary.

Companies in my battalion have dealt with a rash of fires in neighborhood grocery markets that apparently were set by someone intent on putting the markets out of business. The perpetrator(s), hiding behind parapets, cut a hole in the roof, enter, and set multiple fires in the building. In one instance, the arsonist evidently used a garden sprayer to soak grocery shelves with gasoline. Miraculously, they did not ignite. Intentional fires are particularly dangerous for firefighters because they may be unaware that more than one fire is burning in the building. Rear storage areas, offices, and bathrooms are common targets. Incendiary fires fueled by accelerants can grow to an advanced stage before fire companies arrive. But a much greater hazard involves unignited puddles and containers of flammable liquid that can flash after firefighters have entered the building and can cause the size and intensity of the fire to suddenly increase.

As much as SCBA provides vital respiratory protection, it does indeed deprive a firefighter of his sense of smell. I responded to two arson fires at which officers, prior to masking up, smelled a strong odor of gasoline and quickly withdrew personnel from the store. We have established that fires in nonresidential occupancies generally pose a much greater risk for firefighters than they do for civilians.

SCENARIOS

Now, let`s examine two fire scenarios–one residential and one nonresidential–and see how they call for radically different strategies, tactics, and levels of firefighter risk.

Residential Occupancies

Fires in occupied residences require immediate, aggressive action.

You are a lieutenant in a small, combination career/volunteer fire department. At 0430 hours, your engine company–consisting of an engineer, a firefighter, and you–respond to a report of a house fire in a new subdivision on the outskirts of town. Although the volunteers have been alerted, your company is first-due and will have to operate alone for several minutes before help arrives. Water supply, you realize, could be a problem. Hydrants in that development are few and far between.

The odor of smoke is unmistakable as the pumper turns the corner and enters the block on which the fire has been reported. You approach the scene slowly so you can scan the street for hydrants and confirm that the address is correct and not the address of the person who reported the fire who lives behind or down the street from the fire`s location.

On arrival, you find a large, modern, ranch-style home with smoke rolling out from under the eaves where the roof line overhangs the outside walls. You instruct the engineer to drive past the front of the house and spot the apparatus at the corner of the fire building. This allows you to view three sides of the structure and adjacent exposures from the cab. A quick glance upward ensures no overhead electric service wires that could eventually burn off the house and fall on your apparatus or personnel.

As your company stretches a 134-inch preconnect hoseline, you continue your size-up, noting that a station wagon and minivan are parked in the driveway, a tricycle is on the sidewalk, and there is no sign of occupants. You briskly walk around the structure, checking windows for any signs of fire or occupants. At the rear of the house, you pass a swing set and find a window in the southwest corner that is stained with sooty condensation and is hot to the touch; but there is still no sign of a family, who will surely perish if you do not take action immediately. Although you are dangerously understaffed, it will take more than a government regulation or national standard to keep you and your company from entering this structure and trying to save its occupants.

So, you go to work: With the engineer feeding you hose from the front door, you and your nozzleman advance the line down the hallway toward the fire. Once the nozzle is in range of the fire, which is burning in a rear bedroom, you separate from your partner and immediately begin to search. The aggressive strategy and tactics employed by the firefighters in this scenario put them at great personal risk. The risk is justified, however, because there was a strong indication that civilians were at an even greater risk and could possibly be saved by immediate efforts to confine the fire and initiate search and rescue. The actions taken by that first-arriving engine company were appropriate, given the type of structure, its occupancy, fire conditions, and threat to civilian life.

Following are actions, appropriate in this scenario, that could be entirely inappropriate and excessively dangerous under different circumstances:

Initiating fire attack with the apparatus booster tank without a continuous water supply.

Stretching a preconnected, 134-inch hose. Although this size preconnect can be deployed quickly and maneuvered with a minimum of personnel and its flow capacity makes it excellent for suppressing fires involving one or two rooms in residential structures, it can be inadequate in length and suppression capability for fires in larger, nonresidential occupancies.

In their haste, the company did not take the time to adequately ventilate, force entry to provide alternate means of egress/escape routes, and check for fire in the attic (that could have been burning over their heads).

The officer`s leaving the nozzleman and searching by himself. The floor plan of a typical private dwelling (divided into relatively small bedrooms) and the urgent need for rescue in this scenario make the practice of firefighters` staying in physical contact when they search unnecessary and a waste of precious time and personnel. They, of course, should remain within voice contact of each other and stay aware of each other`s position relative to the hallway and hoseline, which leads to safety (outside the building).

The company operated inside a fire building without sufficient personnel to

–protect them with a backup line,

–force additional means of egress,

–vent simultaneously with fire attack,

–control a fire in the attic, and

–come to their rescue if they should become trapped by fire or collapse.

The meaning of terms such as minimum staffing, riding short, and understaffed in reference to the number of personnel in a fire company are relative and vary widely with fire departments across the country. For example, a four-person engine company may be considered inadequate in some departments, whereas in others that are used to riding two to three firefighters per unit, it would be considered more than adequate. Generally speaking, rural and suburban departments by necessity have adapted their strategies, tactics, and apparatus to operate with a bare minimum of personnel. Rural and suburban firefighters usually are astounded by the resources of big city fire departments. Small departments protecting suburban or bedroom communities, comprised predominantly of single-family homes, generally are quite effective in combating fires in these structures when they can initiate a quick attack with preconnected lines supplied by the apparatus booster tank. Their success in fighting house fires, however, can condition suburban firefighters to use the same tactics inappropriately and dangerously at fires in larger, commercial structures.

Commercial Occupancies

Fires in commercial structures call for a cautious approach.

Your three-person engine company is now responding to a report of smoke in your town`s business district. You arrive at 0430 hours and find a slight haze of smoke, visible in the street lights. You stop the pumper at the corner and, as your crew checks a hydrant for water, you walk ahead to investigate. The smoke appears to be coming from an old, one-story building housing a coffee shop, a hardware store, a sporting goods store, an antique shop, law offices, and a Chinese restaurant. You shine your handlight into each show window and find smoke pushing from around ceiling light fixtures in the hardware and sporting goods stores. You immediately recognize the severity of the situation and call for mutual aid from neighboring towns.

This building, typical of many in older downtown sections, has undergone extensive renovations over the years. More than one ceiling now may be concealing a fire that has originated in or extended to a common cockloft. Your company, anxious to take action, transmits that the hydrant has water and asks if you want it to lay in a supply line and spot the engine at the front of the building. Realizing the potential, however, you order them to back down to the fire; drop off their portable manifold, skidload, or 212-inch hose and ground monitor; and then reverse lay back to the hydrant. Connecting the engine directly to the hydrant will maximize its water supply and leave the fire building accessible for later-arriving aerial apparatus. Lines are charged, and you and your firefighter are ready to make entry–but you don`t.

You`ve calculated the risks of a quick attack on this fire and decided that a commercial building is no place for two firefighters to operate alone. You`ll wait a few minutes for the volunteer companies to arrive. Forcing the front door at this point may be just what a smoldering fire needs to roar into life and spread beyond your control. Fires in commercial districts that are deserted at night tend to burn undiscovered for long periods of time. As a practical matter, therefore, what difference will it make if we delay fire attack a few more minutes until sufficient resources are on the scene? The risk to civilians at this fire is practically nonexistent. Once firefighters enter the structure, however, they will operate under great risk.

Before committing firefighters inside a commercial building with indications of a serious fire, they should be supported outside by sufficient companies to do the following:

Secure an adequate, continuous, and redundant supply of water.

Open up the building. Roof ventilation is not always necessary or possible, but doors should be forced, particularly at the rear; security gates opened; and, if necessary, show windows broken to provide an emergency means of egress for firefighters who could be cut off from where they entered by fire or collapse.

Staff backup lines. These lines are needed to protect interior crews from a sudden intensification of the fire.

Pull ceiling and check for fire in the attic at the front door. Don`t allow a company to penetrate deep inside a building and then discover that fire is raging above their heads.

Set up heavy streams, and stand by for a sudden shift in strategy. Fires that involve flammables or get into concealed spaces may necessitate a withdrawal of interior forces and a shift to a defensive, exterior attack. Don`t wait for the need for heavy stream devices to become obvious and then scramble to get them into operation.

Get a report from the roof. A company that recons the roof can provide the incident commander with a much better picture of a building`s size and layout than that that can be observed from the street. For example, what may appear to be one building may actually be two or three small buildings sharing a common modern-looking facade. A high parapet in the front of the building may hide the characteristic arch of bowstring truss construction. Similarly, a view from the roof can detect the presence of heavy air-conditioning units; high, unstable parapets; or sags in the roof. Fire location and extent sometimes can be ascertained from the roof–fire issuing from a window not visible from the street, hot spots, or fire burning through the roof, for example. Hot ventilators or plumbing stacks also can indicate the location of fire for interior crews. A small inspection hole cut in the corner of the roof will indicate its construction and perhaps a fire in the attic. This information can prompt the incident commander to withdraw companies from the interior; interior crews may be reporting relatively cool and clear conditions from their vantage point.

Set up a medical sector for the immediate treatment of injured firefighters.

Implement a personal accountability system. While this should be done at any structure fire, the incident commander should designate officers exclusively for accounting for personnel and monitoring firefighters` time inside the building.

Assign rapid intervention companies to stand by for immediate deployment if firefighters become trapped or are missing inside the building.

I intentionally chose two completely different scenarios to illustrate the vast differences between a fire in an occupied residence and in an unoccupied commercial building. We know, however, the differences are not always so black and white. There are, of course, gray areas–such as a commercial establishment with a substantial occupant load or mixed occupancies or a building with a grocery store on the first floor and apartments on the second. Fires in these buildings put civilians and firefighters at risk out of necessity. The risk, however, must be calculated against the chances of saving or losing a life. n

BILL GUSTIN is a captain with the Metro-Dade County (FL) Fire Department and a lead instructor in the department?s officer training program. He has taught cruise ship crews firefighting skills, has instructed in Caribbean countries, and was a member of the International Rescue Task Force for the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. He is an editorial advisory board member of Fire Engineering.

When civilians are not at risk, firefighters should not unduly endanger themselves merely to save property. A heavy fire condition, several explosions, and a roof construction prone to early collapse in this auto repair business necessitated a cautious, defensive attack from exterior positions (with larger handlines and a master stream). In this case, it was known that all civilians had evacuated the building; therefore, interior operations would have been inappropriate and would have put personnel at an excessive level of risk. (Photo by George Izquierdo.)

Knowing the occupancy of a fire building helps a fire officer to assess the hazards to occupants and fire personnel. Signs on the exterior of commercial properties (though not always reliable) can give an indication of a building`s use and, therefore, the hazards associated with that type of occupancy. (Left photo by Joe Starling; right photo by George Izquierdo.)

Aggressive strategy and tactics employed by first-arriving firefighters at this residential fire may put them at great personal risk because they will enter the structure and begin operations with insufficient resources. The risk, however, is justified because there is a strong indication that civilians are at an even greater risk and could possibly be saved by immediate efforts to confine the fire and initiate search and rescue. (Top left photo by Jerry Datsun; all other photos by Bob Pallestrant.)

(Top left) The hazards commonly found in commercial occupancies pose a great risk to firefighters. Aggressive tactics, which may be entirely appropriate for small residential structures, can be excessively dangerous when employed at commercial occupancies, especially when there is little or no risk to civilians. (Photo by Paul Blake.) (Middle left) Firefighters advancing a line between storage racks can be crushed by falling stock or may find themselves trapped in what becomes a dead-end aisle when their means of escape is blocked by the collapse of rack storage. (Photo by John Gardner.) (Top right) Hazardous materials such as flammable liquids and, as in this case, the gas acetylene, are commonly found in an auto repair shop. They can, with no perceptible warning, suddenly increase the size and intensity of a fire, trapping and burning firefighters who have advanced more than a few feet inside the building. (Photo by author.) (Bottom left, right) The interior configuration of commercial occupancies typically is more hazardous to firefighters than residences. The grease pit is a common mantrap found in many automotive repair occupancies. (Photos by author.)

If they burn or become saturated with water from sprinklers and hose streams, materials stored in bales, bundles, or rolls can fall and crush firefighters. Fibrous materials stored in these configurations absorb water, and the added weight can cause a building to collapse. (Photo by Bob Pallestrant.)

(Top) Arson is a leading cause of fires in commercial occupancies. Here, a state fire marshal investigator analyzes one of several open containers of flammable liquid found in this grocery market. Unignited puddles and containers of accelerants can flash after firefighters have entered the building and suddenly increase the fire?s size and intensity. (Middle) An arsonist used a cylinder or LP gas as the accelerant to burn this grocery market. Fortunately for firefighters, the gas exploded, partially collapsing the front wall before their arrival. The force of the blast propelled the concrete block fragment held by the firefighter several feet. (Bottom) Many commercial occupancies use extensive security measures such as heavy doors fortified with gates and drop bars. These features leave firefighters with very few options for escape if they are cut off from the point where they gained entry. (Photos by author.)

Before committing firefighters inside a commercial building with indications of a serious fire, incident commanders should secure an adequate, continuous, and redundant water supply. (Left photo by Paul Blake; right photo by Bob Pallestrant.)

Prior to interior operations, commercial buildings should be opened up not only to achieve ventilation but, equally as important, to provide alternate means of egress for firefighters who could be cut off from where they entered by fire, explosion, or collapse. (Photos by Ray Bell.)

(Left) Firefighters hastily abort their search of the second floor of this church. The size and intensity of fire, the type of building construction, and the possibility of hidden fire in concealed spaces are critical factors that must be continuously considered when personnel are engaged in interior operations, especially when firefighters are searching without the protection of handlines. (Photo by Bob Pallestrant.) (Right) A small inspection hole cut in the roof will indicate its construction and perhaps the presence of fire in the attic. This information may prompt the withdrawal of companies who may be reporting relatively cool and clear conditions inside the building. (Photo by Ray Bell.)