Propane Incident

Propane Incident

FIRE REPORT

This 50-hour, multiagency emergency began when a 2,500-gallon propane delivery truck lost its rear axel assembly and overturned on one of Long Island's major expressways.

All photos by Harry Loud.

AT 0930 HOURS on May 24, 1988, firefighters of the Seaford (NY) Fire Department were at headquarters, returning equipment to service from a previous alarm, when they monitored a report of an overturned propane truck on fire on the SeafordOvster Bay Expressway at the Sunrise Highway eastbound exit—in the confines of the Seaford Fire District. This hazardous-materials incident was to require the largest commitment of emergency service personnel for the longest amount of time in Nassau County history. It would involve thirty-two volunteer fire departments, over 800 firefighters, and numerous support agencies. The emergency would last for over fifty hours in this densely populated suburban community.

The Wantagh Fire Department, which dispatches for the Seaford Fire Department, signed on the air with the first report of the fire. Captain Ray Pennington, anticipating a transmission of alarm for his department, ordered that a pumper be pulled out on the ramp and that available personnel don proper protective equipment. When the Seaford pagers and audible alarms did not sound for several minutes, the captain made radio contact with Seaford Second Assistant Chief Bob Podesta, advising him of the incident and its location.

Chief Podesta responded to the scene and advised the Wantagh dispatcher to notify Seaford to respond. Approximately seven minutes had elapsed since the initial alarm, a delay at least partially due to a mobile phone-user providing an inaccurate location. Additional calls received within one minute of the first call corrected the location.

Upon his arrival, the assistant chief observed an overturned 2,500-gallon propane truck on fire, with flame impingement on the vessel’s vapor space. The vehicle, owned by the Conservative Gas Company, came to rest on its left side after failure of its rear suspension. A company driver and trainee were removed from the vehicle without serious injury.

Arriving units from the Wantagh Fire Department, under command of Assistant Chief Joseph Pignataro, attempted to cool the vapor space with application of water from a deck gun and an elevated water stream. These tactics were not effective due to the location of the propane truck, however, and handlines were ordered stretched to apply water to the tank.

While water from handlines of both the Seaford and Wantagh Fire Departments were in operation, tower ladders from the Massapequa Fire Department (called in on mutual aid) and the Wantagh Fire Department applied water from elevated master streams. This tactic was modified by locking the stream in place and removing the firefighters from the danger area.

Seaford’s first assistant chief, arriving at the incident location five minutes later, conferred with the chief officers on the scene and ordered that portable, unmanned deck guns be set up to cool the vapor space and that the handlines be withdrawn.

“It was apparent that we could have been involved with this incident for as long as ten days.”

Water supply for the large-caliber streams was not easy to provide. The fire hydrants were a considerable distance away from the propane tank location. The use of five-inch large diameter hose in a relay operation made this operation more efficient and helped to supply approximately 2.000 gpm of water flow necessary to cool the vessel.

Fearing for the safety of personnel, it was determined that the deck guns, pumpers, and tower ladders would be left unmanned. The command post would be located at a point one-half mile from the burning propane tank. An incident command system that was placed into effect by Chief Pignataro was adhered to and further tactics were discussed, which included increasing evacuation to a one-half mile radius of the blast area.

Evacuation of citizens from local schools, homes, and businesses was accomplished with the assistance of the Nassau County Police Department and mutual-aid fire departments. Residents who were at home during the initial stages of the incident were advised of the potential danger and asked to leave the area. Many families refused to vacate their homes, believing that the emergency would be over shortly. No residents were forced to vacate.

Arriving at the scene 45 minutes later from my work place 18 miles away, I was apprised of the situation. Command of the incident took some time to obtain: Radio communications in each of the initial responding communities were on different frequencies, but eventually a smooth transition of authority was achieved.

A meeting of chief officers was held at the command post to discuss immediate plans to control the incident. Four zones were established that would provide protection to the surrounding area in event of a BI.EVH of the product. Mutual-aid companies covered the zones under the control of responding chief officers. Ambulances and additional pumpers were assigned to a remote staging area in the event of an emergency at the incident scene. A five-inch water supply manifold was established on the expressway between the staging area and the propane truck. Iliis water supply would be available in the event of failure of the portable deck guns. Additional mutual-aid companies were called in to cover vacant firehouses.

Inspection of the burning tank by the Nassau County Fire Marshal’s Office haz-mat unit indicated leaks at both the Roto-gauge, a device used to measure product level, and a vapor transfer valve. Since the tank was on its side, liquid product discharged from both holes.

Numerous attempts were made by the haz-mat unit of the Fire Marshal’s Office and representatives from Conservative Gas to control the leaks or rapidly burn off the product. These attempts included closing the Roto-gauge discharge port and the vapor transfer valve. Attempts were also made to control product flow at a main supply valve. None of the attempts were successful; these valves had deteriorated and had become damaged as a result of the incident, and could no longer function. The burn-off procedure also proved to be unsuccessful because the assemblies could not be attached properly. Many of these procedures were attempted by a propane gas consultant recommended by CHEMTREC.

Given this information, it was apparent that we could be involved with this incident for as long as ten days. The decision was finally made to allow the product to burn itself out.

Maintaining a constant water flow rate of 2,000 gpm at the emergency scene would have been near-impossible without the use of large-diameter hose lays.Unmanned large-caliber streams were set up to keep the tank and, in particular, the flame impingement points cool enough to prevent BIEVE.

Seaford Fire Department’s mobile “Escape House,” a trailer constructed by its members to teach the concepts of EDITH, was brought to the scene to serve as a command post and communications center. Portable cellular telephones, supplied by the Long Island Rail Road Police, were installed in the CP. These phones not only provided land line communications, but also allowed firefighters to call home and advise their families of their safety and the progress of the situation.

Ten portable radios assigned to a special frequency were acquired from Nassau County’s Fire Training Academy to better control fireground communications. These were passed out to the various chief officers, which helped to eliminate radio congestion.

The welfare of firefighters and support personnel was a major consideration, given the projected duration of the incident. The Salvation Army was called to the scene and provided three canteen trucks from as far away as Staten Island, 30 miles from Seaford. Our fire department, with the assistance of the Massapequa and Bellmore Fire Departments, prepared food for distribution at the scene. Portable toilets were also made available by the Nassau County Police Department. A large bus provided by the North Bellmore Fire Department responded to the staging area after evacuating students from a nearby school and was used as a shelter for tired firefighters.

We scheduled replacement of the pumping engines at even’ twelve hours to prevent damage and assure constant flow of water. A plan was put into effect that would call in departments with five-inch large-diameter hoses. Since we had already overtaxed resources from our own six battalions during this incident. I elected to call in departments from neighboring Suffolk County.

A Suffolk County fire coordinator and a Suffolk County fire communications chief were requested to respond to the incident. The Suffolk coordinator called in units as requested, and frequency problems were handled by the communications chief. The use of Suffolk County units on such a large scale proved to be very effective and efficient—and controversial, since it went against traditional procedures.

To assure proper response to the incident. I requested that the command post make mutual aid requests hours in advance. This allowed the districts involved to prepare for the response and to provide coverage for their own districts when necessary.

LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS REINFORCED

  1. Communications…
  2. As crowded fire frequencies have forced many departments to switch to high VHF and UHF radio systems, the need for radio coordination at the scene of a large-scale emergency is necessary. I have recommended to our Nassau County Fire Commission that they purchase a field communications vehicle equipped with portable radios for foreground use.

  3. Large diameter hose…
  4. The LDH supply lines used during this incident were invaluable to supply the flow of water required from remote locations.

  5. The media…
  6. Cooperation with the media not only enhanced the image of the volunteer fire service, it also allowed us communication with concerned citizens in our area.

  7. Need for safety officer…
  8. The use of a trained, designated safety officer would have been a benefit to personnel at the scene.

  9. Haz-mat training…
  10. At the time of the incident, the Seaford Fire Department was enrolled in a propane course conducted by our fire service academy. This training was of great benefit to us in dealing with this emergency.

  11. Need for rest…
  12. I realized the need for rest after being awake for over 36 hours. Several events took place that I did not respond to quickly. As it turned out, these events were not serious. However, it proved that rest periods should have been planned.

  13. Evacuation…

Initially, many residents were evacuated to Seaford Fire Department headquarters. However, the evacuation zone was later extended to include our headquarters, and the civilians had to be evacuated again.

Electrical power and lighting was supplied by Bcllmore and Merrick fire departments and our town parks department.

Protection of vacated homes and businesses was a major consideration for the Nassau County Police Department. The auxiliary police force was activated and provided over 230 auxiliary officers to assist with property protection and traffic control. As vehicle traffic on Sunrise Highway, a major roadway, and rail traffic on the Long Island Rail Road were affected, thousands of residents found it difficult getting to and from work.

Media coverage was tremendous. An area was established near the staging site to allow interviews and provide updates on the progress of the event. Cooperation with the news services played an important role in keeping the public informed.

Inspections of the tank were made periodically as the incident progressed. Teams of firefighters and personnel from Conservative Gas Company and the Fire Marshal’s haz-mat unit checked the progress of the burn in full protective clothing under the protection of handlines and the master streams that were in place. The inspections indicated a slight increase in the burn rate and no obvious deterioration of the propane vessel.

By Wednesday evening, May 25. I was informed that master streams striking the vessel were producing a hollow sound. After inspection of the tank, it was determined that the level of the product had diminished greatly. However, it could not be determined how long the burn would continue since the quantity of product remaining could not be accurately measured. We continued our established tactics, hoping that the product would be exhausted before the Memorial Day weekend.

On Thursday morning, May 26, at approximately 0620 hours, mutual aid crews at the scene observed that the burn had ended. The product had simply burned itself out. At 0630 hours we ordered that the portable deck guns be taken up and relay pumpers begin the task of repacking supply lines

The incident, however, was not completely over—the vehicle had to be safely removed from the area. Removal of the truck was accomplished by the Nassau County Police Department with the cooperation of the Long Island Rail Road’s wreck crew, which provided a heavy-duty crane and flatbed trailer. The vehicle was impounded by the Police Department for inspection, and by 1000 hours, both lanes of the expressway were opened to vehicle traffic. During the entire incident, there was only one reported fireground injury—a sprained ankle—and no fire vehicle accidents had occurred.

Residents of nearby homes were advised to evacuate. Schoolchildren were moved in orderly fashion to fire department headquarters as set forth in the preplan.

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