ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2006, LOS ANGELES COUNTY Fire Department (LACoFD) dispatchers received a 911 call reporting that a man had fallen into a deep bore hole at the construction site for a debris basin at the foot of the San Gabriel Mountains in the city of Duarte. The caller was a site supervisor, who reported that the victim was initially seen moving but was so far down that he was not readily visible.
THE WOODBLUFF INCIDENT
A standard confined space rescue response was dispatched. Engines 44 and 244, Paramedic Squad 32, Quint 29, Patrol 44, and Battalion 16 (Chief Dave Thies) arrived first on-scene. Haz Mat Task Force 43 (HMTF43), USAR Task Force 103 (USARTF103),1 Mobile Air Task Force 115, Technical Operations Battalion 45 (Chief Tom Ewald), and USAR Coordinator Captain Ed Edmonds arrived shortly thereafter.
Utility drivers 10 and 16 overheard the radio traffic indicating a possible “working” shaft rescue and offered to respond with the USAR shoring trailers in their respective battalions. (The answer was yes.) En route, USARTF103 also requested the response of USAR Task Force 134 (USARTF134), whose members were training in the San Fernando Valley. After a working rescue was confirmed, the Monrovia and Arcadia Fire Department USAR units were requested for contingencies.
Frantic workers met first-due Engines 44 and 244; they reported that a man, badly injured by an auger, was in the shaft in a gulley where a debris basin was being formed. The engine companies proceeded along a dirt road winding down into the basin, where they spotted the drilling rig and a six-foot-diameter hole it had been boring. The captains instructed their engineers to stop short of the site and ordered that all apparatus be shut down to avoid unnecessary vibrations. Because of the topography, which blocked the sight of the shaft until the rigs were committed to the dirt road, the apparatus were halted on the single-lane approach-which was unavoidable under the circumstances. Personnel walked from their apparatus to the fall site.
Station 44 members isolated the site and denied entry to bystanders. They began using on-site plywood to put initial edge protection in place and then placed a 14-foot wooden roof ladder over the hole, estimated to be 40 to 50 feet deep, to prevent personnel from falling into it and to allow an initial vantage point. With ground pads in place, a firefighter (with harness and tag line) used a “big beam” light to look down the hole. He saw no obvious victim movement.
As Battalion 16 arrived and gathered additional information from the site supervisor, the following sequence of events was recounted: The inspector had arrived on the work site just as drilling crews were about to break for lunch. He remained behind as they departed. After returning from lunch, the crew fired up the machinery and lowered the auger back into the hole to continue drilling. Moments later, the operator was shocked to see a human foot, part of a shoe, and a hat ejected with soil from the hole. He immediately stopped the machine as his colleagues gathered around the hole.
Workers noted a man, who initially appeared to be moving slightly, in the bottom of the shaft. They immediately dialed 911 to report the accident. When they looked down again (as the first fire department units were rolling up to the scene), the workers did not notice any further movement.
Engine 244 Captain Tom Jones2 radioed his size-up report: He confirmed that it was a working “deep-shaft rescue,” identified the staging location, and named the operation the “Woodbluff Incident” (the name of the access street).
INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
HMTF43’s station was closer to the incident than USARTF103. Therefore, while en route, USAR 103’s captain radioed HMTF43’s captain on the tactical channel and asked him to begin initial atmospheric monitoring, to look for a high point and anchor points that might be used to expedite inserting a rescuer in the shaft, and to start the confined-space rescue entry permit (CSREP) and associated documentation.
Meanwhile, Station 44’s captains had assembled the other first responder units into support positions: a Medical Group (with one paramedic squad and two ambulances), logistical support (to help move equipment and material across the site), a hauling team (to assist with rope raising and lowering operations), and a personnel pool.
USARTF103 arrived and conducted a face-to-face briefing with the incident commander (IC) and HMTF43 and established the basic incident action plan (IAP), which included the following:
- the establishing of an exclusion zone and a support zone,
- continual documentation of the incident conditions and actions on the CSREP,
- determining the patient’s viability as soon as feasible,
- determining the atmosphere in the shaft and identifying any ground or aerial hazards,
- establishing a lowering and raising system for rescue or recovery,
- putting rapid intervention capabilities in place,
- conducting the rescue or recovery,
- securing the scene for postaccident investigation by workplace safety authorities [Thies had already requested that the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal OSHA) respond and that the district attorney’s office and the Los Angeles County coroner’s office be notified in case the victim was determined to be deceased], and
- supporting coroner operations if a body recovery became necessary.
Because of the positioning of the other apparatus (now shut down to avoid vibrations), all rescue equipment and shoring had to be hand-carried several hundred feet from the USAR and hazmat rigs across a field and down the approach ramp to the rescue scene, a personnel-intensive operation. The utility drivers later found a secondary approach from the opposite side of the construction site, which reduced the distance for carrying plywood. The ambulance also made access to the site from this secondary approach.
As HMTF43 began atmospheric monitoring protocols and documentation, USARTF103 personnel deployed their search camera reel system down into the shaft to visualize the patient. The reel system was used in a number of other situations where it was impractical to visualize victims, including a victim in a 900-foot vertical shaft in an abandoned mine in 1996 and a submerged mine rescue in 2000.
As expected at this site where the accident involved what appeared to be a lengthy fall and associated deceleration trauma (and possible trauma from the auger) in a fresh shaft open to the atmosphere, the first atmospheric readings indicated 21 percent oxygen, no explosives, and no other contaminants. The time was 1422 hours. Personnel from Task Forces 43 and 134 conducted atmospheric monitoring throughout the incident.
Technical Operations Battalion 45 Chief Tom Ewald arrived and assumed the position of Rescue Group supervisor. The USAR103 captain became Entry Team manager; USAR Engine 103’s Captain Tim Bauer was rigging officer. Firefighter Sean Findlay (USAR 134) was assigned as the attendant, who would be in direct communication with the rescuer at the edge of the shaft.
Training Captain Brian LeFave (formerly of USAR103 and now coordinator of LACoFD’s Del Valle Regional Training Center) was assigned as the incident safety officer. USAR Coordinator Captain John Boyle was initially assigned to beef up edge protection around the hole in preparation for a raising and lowering system that was being assembled using dual ropes and a high-point directional anchor. It had been determined that the drilling rig was not in the right position to be a high anchor and that the drill may not be a stable ground anchor for tie-backs or other uses. An LACoFD USAR Canine Search Team member, who arrived with his search dog, was assigned to help Haz Mat 43 with confined space entry documentation.
Many of the personnel at this scene had responded to previous deep-shaft and confined-space rescues; they had the experience to make decisions based on the conditions at the site and to double check each other. The IC, the Rescue Group leader, and the Entry Team manager were able to delegate authority and allow personnel to conduct the various tasks for which they were trained.
By now, Utilities 10 and 16 had arrived, each pulling a USAR shoring trailer and trying to access the site. Plywood and other material from the trailers were to be used for ground pads.
SEARCH CAMERA REEL IN THE HOLE
The search camera reel was lowered between the rungs of the roof ladder that had been positioned over the shaft opening. Suspended on a cable in a six-foot-diameter shaft, the camera head swung back and forth. After repositioning it twice, the Rescue Group officers could see the victim on the screen. They detected no body movement, and there was no rise and fall of the chest. The officers, some of them certified paramedics, agreed unanimously that they could not determine if the man were alive or deceased simply from the screen image. In addition, County of Los Angeles criteria for pronouncing nonviability included conditions such as evisceration of the brain or lungs, incineration, decapitation, crushing, or other nonsurvivable situations. The operation proceeded in rescue mode until it was confirmed that the victim was nonviable.
USAR 103’s Firefighter/Specialist Chris Swartz was assigned as the primary rescuer; Firefighter Felipe Marcial (USAR103) was the backup rescue (rapid intervention crew), and Firefighter Gonzalez (USARTF103) would be the second backup if additional rescuers had to be lowered into the hole. They geared up in their harnesses and other personal protective equipment (PPE) as the high-point directional anchor was assembled and the rope systems were readied. A report of an updated atmospheric monitoring was announced: “All Clear, 21 percent oxygen, no lower explosive limits (LELs) or contaminants.”
USARTF 134 was now on the scene: Captain Derrick Champman (USAR134) was assigned as the USAR safety officer and Captain Norm Branch (USAR Engine 134) as the rigging officer. USARTF134’s crew was helping finalize the rope systems after they had been moved to take advantage of a more “bombproof” anchor (a stationary trailer on the site). The USAR units from the Monrovia and Arcadia Fire Departments provided personnel where needed.
The high-point directional anchor was raised and secured on the plywood ground covers (a challenge because of the need to avoid pounding pickets into the ground around the edge of the hole). The drill boom was determined to be unsecured and, therefore, was an unreliable anchor for tie-backs. A second dual-rope lowering and raising system was established using Engine 44 as the anchor, in case it was needed for a backup rescuer/rapid intervention operation.
There was a very heavy news media presence at the scene, owing partly to the fact that the 4:00 p.m. news hour was fast approaching. Several news helicopters were hovering high over the scene for a bird’s-eye view of the operations, and news camera crews had positioned themselves in multiple vantage points around the incident, including in the backyards of private hillside residences. The entire rescue was going to be aired live from the ground and the air. Naturally, there was some concern about maintaining the victim’s dignity if the operation turned out to be a recovery.
Provisions for patient privacy were readied in case of a recovery, and the LACoFD’s public information officers and staff were working with IC Thies to address the live media inquiries. They did this with appropriate discretion, because at this point there was no confirmation that next of kin had been notified, and we didn’t want them to find out by watching the news.
ENTRY OPERATIONS
As measures for entry were finalized, the Rescue Group officers briefed Swartz and the backup rescuers about the entry plan. The initial priority would be for Swartz to be lowered to the victim with medical assessment and treatment gear, to determine the man’s status. If he was determined to be alive, the patient would be packaged in a confined space c-spine/lifting harness and raised out of the shaft (on a prusik attached to the rope dangling just below Swartz). This would allow Swartz to clear the hole first, followed by the victim. This method has proven effective in a number of other deep-shaft rescues; the patient is extracted without blocking the hole or impeding the rescuer’s exit.
If, on the other hand, it was determined that the patient was deceased, Swartz would photograph the scene for the coroner’s office (and for any investigation to be conducted by Cal-OSHA, the Sheriff Department, and possibly the district attorney’s office); the victim’s body would not be raised out of the shaft until the coroner arrived and said the body could be moved.
Timing a body removal is a common dilemma in extrication operations in remote areas and situations like this where the coroner may not arrive until hours after a victim has been determined to be deceased. The jurisdictional rescue agencies are sometimes bound to leave a victim in place until the coroner and the law enforcement agency determine there is enough scene documentation to allow an accurate determination of the cause of death and a thorough investigation of responsibility, if necessary. This is especially true when a workplace death occurs.
At some past incidents, fire/rescue resources had to remain on the scene (or return to the scene later) until after investigators had completed evidence gathering. In other cases, we were able to communicate by cell phone or other means with the responding coroner personnel and were given permission to extract the body after taking scene photographs.
Swartz was secured to the rope system, communications and other systems were double-checked, backup rescuers were ready, rope-hauling teams were in place, and a final atmospheric check indicated “All clear.” Swartz was directed onto the roof ladder (still over the hole) to center himself and adjust slack in the system. Swartz then weighted the system, gingerly took his weight off the ladder, and was suspended over the shaft. After a safety check, the ladder was removed. As the attendant gave instructions, the rope teams slowly lowered Swartz into the hole.
When it was noted that the belay line was rubbing over the lip and dislodging soil, a pike pole was positioned to function as an “edge roller” to keep the line from contacting the edge. The descent proceeded smoothly. As Swartz disappeared into the ground, the attendant communicated with him and observed his descent. At one point, the channel switch on Swartz’s tactical handheld radio apparently was jiggled by the rope or other equipment, moving it onto another channel. After one or two repeated transmissions, the problem was recognized and fixed.
On reaching the bottom of the shaft, Swartz examined the victim and determined that he was deceased; Swartz reported his findings to the attendant. Swartz was requested to proceed with the photographs and then to prepare to be removed. Atmospheric conditions were checked; all was clear.
Back on the surface, the lowering system was being converted to a raising system in preparation for removing Swartz and the victim from the shaft. In a couple of minutes, the rigging officer reported “Ready for raising.”
As Swartz worked in the shaft, the attendant repeatedly asked how he was doing. Swartz indicated that he was making progress. Unlike a trench rescue, he, fortunately, wasn’t performing strenuous work such as digging, although there is always an element of added exertion when working in a confined area because of the tight spaces and the need to be cognizant of the situation and the potential for changing conditions. Swartz sounded fresh and strong.
Speaking from experience (I was inserted for nearly an hour in a 78-foot-deep, 30-inch-diameter shaft during a 1994 rescue), operating in a deep shaft like this can be somewhat disconcerting even for experienced rescuers, because you’re basically all alone down there even if your colleagues are just 50 feet away. Looking upward at the small circle of sky, crowded by the high point, the ropes, and the attendant peering down the shaft can sometimes result in an otherworldly impression of the scene that takes some getting used to. So Entry Team supervisors were evaluating Swartz’s tone and voice, as well as timing his entry. Swartz remained strong and in control. Periodic updates were requested. Swartz was now close to completing the job.
At about this time, the Rescue Group supervisor reported that the coroner had arrived. We were given permission to remove the victim’s body after taking photographs. This decision allowed the operation to be completed with just one evolution-it limited exposure by preventing us from having to remove the first rescuer from the shaft and lower another rescuer into the shaft for body recovery.
RECOVERY
Swartz was informed of the coroner’s permission to remove the body. He was instructed to gather any victim belongings and was told that an enveloping rescue litter rated for vertical raising was about to be lowered on a separate line for victim packaging and removal.
 (2) Firefighters removing rigging from the confined space ventilation tubing after the operation was completed. A Cal/OSHA inspector is in the background. |
This type of litter was selected primarily because of the need to shield the victim from the media cameras (including those positioned beneath the helicopters that continued their high hover over the scene) and because it’s rated for vertical raising operations.
Once the victim was packaged, Swartz attached the litter to the rope system and indicated he was ready to be raised. He was suspended on the main line; the victim was positioned just below him, for control and to prevent blocking the exit. The ambulance litter team was positioned to receive the body on the gurney for expeditious movement into the shelter of the ambulance (out of sight of the news media).
Once the systems and rigging were double checked, Swartz and the victim were slowly raised from the shaft. As Swartz neared the top, the ladder was once again placed over part of the hole so he could stand on it as personnel “taglined” to anchor points maneuvered the victim out of the hole and onto the waiting gurney.
Swartz was disconnected from the system, assisted out of his harness, and escorted to a waiting paramedic squad for rehab and a physical checkup. Meanwhile, the ambulance was closed up for the coroner. Efforts turned to ensuring that all evidence had been gathered. The search dog checked the spoil pile for the victim’s missing foot, which was located and secured.
The systems were broken down, and the shaft opening was secured while the Sheriff Department provided site security. Once personnel and equipment were rehabbed and back in service, the Rescue Group supervisor gathered the personnel in a place out of the range of the news media and conducted a “hot wash” after-action meeting to review the incident and lessons learned.
 (5) Personnel get into position for the insertion. The attendant is to the right. |
Personnel on the scene agreed that the operation was successful considering the complications and recognizing the tragedy of a life lost on the job site. The priorities had been accurately laid out from the beginning, including rapid assessment of the patient’s disposition and getting a rescuer in the hole as soon as feasible to conduct a physical assessment consistent with Los Angeles County EMS criteria for determining patient viability. Also, personnel reacted according to the changing conditions, which included arrival of the coroner while the rescuer was in the shaft (and after he had determined the victim was deceased), prompting a shift in strategy from evidence gathering to removal of the victim and reducing exposure to rescuers.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
This incident once again reinforced the lesson that deep-shaft rescues require a combination of confined space, high angle, trench/excavation, technical search and rescue, and “rubble pile medicine” strategy and tactics. Other lessons learned and reinforced include the following:
- The ability to mix the appropriate methods needed for a successful deep-shaft rescue in a manner that results in a positive outcome is highly reliant on training, experience, common sense, and intuition. For responders who have not had experience in this type of incident, case studies and training simulations are valuable tools for adding more slides to the proverbial “slide show” in their head (part of a concept called “Recognition-Primed Decision Making” that explains how effective commanders make good time-critical decisions without having all the information they might need).
- As in other highly technical rescue situations, a pragmatic approach is necessary for dealing with deep-shaft rescues. Conversely, an overly dogmatic approach that preaches only one way to operate may be comforting for some but binds the hands of responders. They must accurately size up the situation, determine the worst hazards, and figure out a way to deal with them while inserting rescuers when necessary-or, in some cases, they may decide that it’s a “no-go” situation because of low victim viability and immitigable dangers-while simultaneously dealing with the natural expectations of the victim’s coworkers and relatives that everything possible is being done as quickly as possible to save the victim and prevent additional casualties.
- If there are indications that a rescue involves one or more victims trapped in an unprotected dirt shaft or there is some other potential engulfment hazard, strongly consider requesting at least one (and preferably multiple) hydro-vac (vactor) trucks to respond should soil have to be removed from the bottom of the shaft. The rescue vacuum, which attaches to the hydro-vac tubing and has hard nozzles of differing lengths and sizes, is excellent for effectively removing soil using the hydro-vacs. It can also be used to remove water and mud where there is water or the potential for ruptured water mains.
- Strongly consider the use of supplied air breathing apparatus (SABA) for rescuers and victims in deep-shaft rescue situations. There has been some debate about whether this is an absolute necessity in situations where atmospheric monitoring indicates good air with no contaminants. Even if it’s not strictly required by law or regulation when the atmosphere is testing clean, it’s a good idea to consider. It provides another source of air in case conditions change. If the SABA incorporates hardline communication, especially the hands-free type, it can also improve communication with the rescuer.
- The high-point directional anchor is often a challenge in deep-shaft rescues. Over the years in many deep-shaft rescues, we have successfully employed on-site heavy equipment like cranes suspended over the shaft, heavy-rated fire department aerial ladders extended over the shaft, ladder gins, rescue frames, and tripods. Key factors include proximity of heavy equipment to the shaft, whether operating the machinery will cause vibrations, whether aerial ladders can safely approach and deploy, the availability of special tools, and the nature of the edge and soil. LAFD and LACoFD sometimes use their heavy-lift rescue units to establish high point anchors (among many other uses). The units are specially designed adaptations of heavy-duty wreckers that provide fire departments with unique rescue capabilities including extendable rotating booms with capacities up to 60 tons or more. These apparatus provide another high point option for anchoring the change of direction for the lowering and raising systems.3
- Regarding first responder/IC information, the first-in engine company captains and Battalion 16 had interviewed the work site supervisor and gathered reliable information indicating there were severe traumatic injuries and that the victim had stopped moving. This information provided important clues about the essence of the emergency, as well as the need to engage in an extraordinary “hasty” rescue to save a life, even if it meant an “above and beyond” risk to life, or to approach it more methodically and carefully because of the likelihood that the victim was deceased (which was eventually confirmed by a member after the rescue entry).This is somewhat different from the approach we might have taken if the victim had been clearly alive and in danger of drowning or becoming engulfed. It is also somewhat of a gray area in terms of quantifying it in writing, because you can never replicate on paper the conditions and emotions encountered on the scene.
- The search camera reel line system was valuable in helping to determine the victim’s status at the bottom of the 45-foot-deep shaft. It showed that the victim was not moving and that there was no chest wall movement or any other signs of respiration. It also showed trauma to at least one leg from the auger. However, this did not give us sufficient confirmation to make a definitive determination about victim viability in accordance with L.A. County’s “determination of death” standards. A physical exam of the patient was required. Consider leaving the search cam reel in place during the entire rescue (suspended from the high point) to allow topside to observe operations, to help light the scene for the rescuer, and potentially to communicate with the victim and provide a backup means of communication for the rescuer. The search cam should not slow down the rescue preparations; the other normal preparations can proceed while the search cam is being used.
- Deep shafts present certain challenges to atmospheric monitoring and ventilation. All levels of the shaft must be monitored periodically and the readings noted. Ventilation can be decreased by a “stack” effect, which can sometimes be overcome by “series” ventilation or “push/pull” ventilation. The rescue vac or the open tubing from a vactor might prove helpful by pulling air from the bottom while introducing fresh air from the top, but we aren’t aware of any formal testing using these devices.
- Position vests make it easier for outside agency personnel and first responders to identify commanders and others with specific tasks.
- The backup rescuer (RIC) will be more effective by having a separate lowering and raising system in place ready to go, preferably using a separate anchor and high point (which is not always practical or possible).
- The 3:1 Z-rig worked fine for the raising operation. We had enough personnel to run a 1:1 system, but the 3:1 worked well.
- The enveloping litter worked well for extracting the deceased victim; it kept the body covered as it came out of the shaft and out of the sight of the heavy news media presence.
- The public information officer and his staff did an excellent job of dealing with the intense media coverage. News helicopter noise became an issue for awhile, complicating communication with the rescuer and topside personnel. News cameras were positioned all around the outside perimeter of this rescue site, on hillsides, on private property with a vantage point, and elsewhere. And, this operation was taking place during the 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. newscasts and would be aired live.
- It was very helpful for the Technical Operations battalion chief to function as Rescue Group supervisor, serving as the buffer between the IC and the personnel supervising and conducting the entry. The LACoFD’s USAR coordinator and other technical operations staff personnel served in other roles such as safety officer, technical specialist, division/group supervisor, and shoring officer.
- We need to be aware of crowding in the operational area and limit the number of people in the exclusion zone to those performing specific functions.
- Strongly consider requesting canine search teams in case they are needed to locate missing victims or human remains.
- Request a communications plan or at least an entry frequency.
- Radio communications between the rescuer and the attendant were interrupted for a time when the rescuer’s handheld radio switch accidentally moved to another channel. Radio communication was reestablished after the rescuer recognized the problem and corrected it. The SABA system would have been helpful for better communications.
- Edge protection was a challenge because of the need to avoid “point-loading” the edges with the legs of the high point directional anchor and because the on-site edge protection consisted of some older plywood sheets that had some imperfections. This was addressed by assigning an “edge protection officer” to oversee reinforcement of the edge protection and using new plywood from the USAR trailer (which took an alternate route, placing it closer to the scene).
- The high-point directional anchor worked for this operation, but a much wider shaft would have required an alternative approach to establish a high point (an aerial or the heavy lift rescue unit’s boom, for example). Plywood wasn’t the best surface; because it was clean and new, sliding became an issue. Another approach could have been to place holes in the plywood to allow the pointed feet to be placed directly into soil. One suggestion was to install pickets, but we didn’t want to be pounding pickets in anywhere near the edge. Back-tying the anchor to the nearby machinery could have been a solution, except that the auger (the closest available solid anchor) turned out to be in an unsecured condition.
- The attendant and other personnel required to be near the edge were tied off with tag lines. Just as in trench rescues, there is the potential to have so many tag lines that personnel trip over them or become entangled. This has to be evaluated with each scene.
- The rotation times for rescuers in the hole should be evaluated against the operation being conducted, how hard the rescuer is working (e.g., how much physical labor), the rescuer’s demeanor and voice, and the demands of the incident. The rotation times developed by LACoFD (typically 20 to 30 minutes) are a reasonable approach to most confined space and trench/excavation rescue entries, but it’s important to maintain flexibility to accomplish the goal in the best and safest way under the particular conditions. In this case, the plan changed somewhat when the coroner arrived (while the rescuer was in the hole) and indicated that he would be satisfied with the photos being taken of the scene. So the decision was made to have the primary rescuer go ahead and package the victim and attach to his system for extraction instead of replacing him with another rescuer to perform the same function. This was a judgment call based on the evolution of this incident and the rescuer’s status, the tone of his voice, and his repeated reports that he was not physically stressed (he reported that the main source of stress was the repeated calls from topside asking how long it would take him to complete tasks like packaging the victim).
- The belay line should go to the rescuer’s back typically, but the main line may be attached to the front if the rescuer prefers that approach (and especially if he anticipates the need to invert during the rescue). Some rescuers prefer both lines attached at the back. Conditions also dictate the appropriate attachment points.
- Rescuers should review how a victim will be connected to the system for simultaneous raising and manipulating a victim during the raising operation in a tight shaft.
- It would have been helpful to have a floodlight suspended in the shaft above the rescuer.
- Suspending the search camera reel (using a pulley attached to the high point with a separate rope) above the rescuer would allow the attendant and others to visually monitor his status and progress. It would also allow for two-way voice communication and serve as a backup to the tactical channel and SABA communications. We’ve done this at a number of deep-shaft rescues, and it worked well.
- Consider limiting the rescuer’s time in a shaft by having a provision for him to attach a cinch strap or harness (attached to a raising system) to a victim who has been determined to be deceased. This allows the rescuer to be removed immediately; if the coroner or other investigators determine that body recovery should wait until photographic or other evidence is acquired first, the rope and harness (already attached to the victim) can simply be pulled.
Endnotes
1. Each LACoFD HMTF consists of one hazmat company and one hazmat engine combined as a task force. Each USARTF consists of one USAR company and one USAR engine operating as a task force.
2. Ironically, Jones, the captain of Engine 244, had also been the initial incident commander of another major rescue in 1996. A boy fell into a crevasse in a boulder the size of a three-story house and became wedged in the V-shaped crack. He was increasingly being squeezed at the chest as he slipped farther down. LACoFD USAR-1, flown to the scene, worked with LACoFD first responder units. The boy was rescued using ropes; wristlets; and more than a gallon of vegetable oil, which was poured over him as rescuers carefully pulled him from the “V.”
3. The boom-mounted, high-powered cables are not intended as the lowering/raising mechanism for rescuers and victims in a confined space deep shaft. Even the modern devices, with remote controls capable of very precise movement, should typically be considered secondary to rope rescue systems anchored to the boom in these spaces, to maintain the most precise control and to prevent possible injury if mechanical or control problems develop.
LARRY COLLINS is a 27-year member of the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD); a captain; and a USAR specialist and paramedic assigned to USAR Task Force 103, which responds to technical rescues and multialarm fires across Los Angeles County. He is a search team manager for LACoFD’s FEMA/OFDA US&R Task Force for domestic and international response and serves as an US&R specialist on the “Red” FEMA US&R Incident Support Team (with deployments to the Oklahoma City bombing; the 9/11 Pentagon collapse; Hurricanes Frances, Ivan, Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma; and several national security events). He has had numerous articles published in Fire Engineering and is the author of Technical Rescue Operations Volumes I and II (Fire Engineering, 2004, 2005, respectively) and the Rescue chapter of The Fire Chief’s Handbook. He was assigned as Entry Team manager at the Woodbluff Incident.
