MAN DOWN IN TOWER 5
“This is Tower Sandblasting in Area Y! We have a man who’s fallen into water tank #5, and we need someone to come get him out before he dies!”
That call was transmitted to B-Platoon, the shift of firefighters on duty at the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant (LAAP), at 1720 hours on January 17, 1989. What followed was an incident that tested our creativity and our preparedness for effective response to unusual incidents.
IAAP B-Platoon responded to the scene immediately after the call. Captain L.C. Culverhouse arrived in our 250-gpm minipumper, which serves as a command-post/quick-attack vehicle, and Firefighter Tommy L. Burton and I responded in a IIM ambulance.
SIZE-UP
The supervisor of the Tower Sandblasting contracting firm met us at the site and reported that a 30-year-old, 230-pound male employee had fallen 30 feet from scaffolding to the bottom of the water tank and that he was unconscious but breathing, with his air line intact. The victim had been painting the inside of the 40-foot-deep tank that towered ISO feet above the ground. He and the other worker inside the tank were wearing coveralls impervious to toluene and safety helmets with a vapor-barrier seal at the neck. An air line attached to the helmet supplied air from a compressor that st(x>d on the ground below.
A 2inch hatch on the top of the tankwhere a sakiv man is stationed by the contractor during the tank-repainting operation—was the only means of digressing or egressing. Another employee was positioned on the ground to monitor the air supply, call for help in an emergency, and operate the pneumatic cable chair hoist that was constructed by the contractor for the duration of the job and which went up to the tank’s catwalk. Workers inside the tank used a ladder with rope rigging as a platform on which to stand. While one of the workers inside the tank sandblasts or paints, the second stands at the bottom of the tank and holds the platform steady or swings it around to another location with a rope. We knew from the prework conference that precedes every work project on the LAAP site that a toluene-based paint was being used in this tank, adding the hazard of toxicity to the confined work space.
Captain Culverhouse implemented the LAAP Incident Command System and established a command post. Before proceeding, we discussed tactical options for removing the victim from the tank and bringing him to safety. We knew that using a cutting torch or saw to cut the worker out of the steel tank would be inviting disaster, since a spark could ignite the flammable toluene vapors (see sidebar on page 58); therefore, the tank hatch was the only avenue of removal.
Likewise, our options for getting the victim off the tank were limited. Lifting him off the tower via helicopter was not feasible because the only available helicopter was set up for advanced life support transport, not for that type of rescue, and the insurance carrier, moreover, would not cover die liability of such an operation. In addition, removal by helicopter would have increased significantly the danger to the patient, the helicopter crew, and the personnel operating atop the tower. The distance from the ground to the catwalk—120 feet—eliminated a fire department tower ladder as a means of removal. It was obvious that our best option was to lower the victim to die ground via stokes basket, accompanied by personnel.
RESCUE OPERATIONS
Captain Culverhouse contacted LAAP Fire Chief Dale Martin, who was off-duty, and reported the incident. Martin in turn requested assistance from Chief Dallas Greene of the Shreveport Fire Department (SFD), 22 miles west of LAAP. Rescue 1, the SFD high-rise rescue unit, was already engaged in a response, so Greene suggested that Martin call nearby Minden Fire Department for additional rescue personnel until Rescue 1 could be dispatched to LAAP.
Firefighter Burton, equipped with a flashlight, a blood pressure kit, and an intrinsically safe portable radio, was raised to the catwalk in the cable car hoist. I followed with an SCBA and an oxygen kit. We climbed from the catwalk to the tank via a temporary ladder also constructed by the contractor for the tank-cleaning project, then switched to a permanent tower ladder that led to the hatch.
The vapors around the hatch were so strong that we became nauseated. (Although we had an SCBA with us, in our hurry’ we did not use it immediately. Looking back on this operation, we realized that this was an oversight and not in accordance with safe operating procedures.) Burton, shining his flashlight into the hatch, observed the victim lying on the tank floor, with the second worker beside him. Burton donned the SCBA and entered the tank to assess the victim’s condition. I radioed Culverhouse and requested additional SCBAs and rescue-rope equipment, which were brought to the scene immediately by B-Platoon’s utility vehicle. When they arrived, 1 donned an SCBA and joined Burton in the tank. The victim was disoriented and experiencing alternating periods of consciousness and unconsciousness. There were no apparent external injuries. At this time, the victim vomited large amounts of clotted blood for about three to five minutes. Since it was possible that the worker had internal injuries, Culverhouse requested the Life Air-1 helicopter from the Schumpert Medical Center in Shreveport.
Our next step was to package the victim and transport him out of the tank. This took some improvising. We secured a Kendrick’s Extrication Device (KED) to immobilize the victim’s spine. We could not use a cervical collar because of the vapor barrier seal on his safety helmet. We secured the victim’s head with cloth fastener straps and lashed his head with rope as a precaution against cervical spine compromise. Then we set up a blockand-tackle device at the hatch opening and constructed a bos’n chair (a board or plank rigged with ropes, usually used to facilitate the painting of the sides of sea vessels) to help stabilize the patient as we lifted him out of the tank.
During this time, additional response personnel were arriving on the scene and were deployed or staged by incident command as necessary. B-Platoon’s 750-gpm pumper responded, in accordance with Army and NFPA regulations that mandate a pumper be at the scene when a helicopter is used. Members of the Webster Parish Sheriffs Office and the JAAP Security Police set up a landing zone approximately 500 feet from the tower for the Life Air-1 helicopter and established zones for the press and for crowd control; an LAAP member acted as public information officer and submitted progress reports to the press at regular intervals.
Life Air-1 arrived shortly. Medical and police personnel joined us on the tower. We hoisted the victim up the 40 feet to the hatch and lifted him through to the outside. Ken Candler, chief flight nurse of Life Air-1, assessed the patient’s condition and then placed him on a spine board, applied a cervical collar, administered oxygen, and established an IV of D5W and .45 percent normal saline.
Soon the five members of Minden Lire Department’s Rescue 1 arrived on-scene and were raised up to the tower. Minden’s Chief T.C. Boxom assisted in coordination from the ground. They were followed by Shreveport’s four-member Rescue 1 team, who supplied the stokes basket that would be used for the victim’s descent from the tower, as well as additional ropes and gear. Chief Martin of LAAP arrived and assumed command of the incident. Throughout the entire operation, communication between incident command and tower operations was ongoing and all personnel working in the toxic atmosphere wore personal protection, including SCBA.
Command directed SFD’s Captain David Hope, who was the most experienced in incidents involving high heights, to coordinate the tower operations. Firefighters placed the patient in the basket and secured him. Two belay lines were thrown over the side, and a line was secured to the tower as a safety precaution. Then we lowered the patient to the catwalk while Hope rappeled down astraddle him.
Medical personnel positioned on the catwalk reassessed the patient’s physical condition. Hope situated himself in the pneumatic cable chair and firefighters secured him with a safety chain and rope. We positioned the stokes basket in a vertical position, facing Hope, and tied it to the cable chair with a rope fastened to the cargo hook on the top of the chair. We were forced to position the stokes basket vertically because there was not enough space for us on the catwalk to maintain control of the basket in a horizontal position; this placed particular emphasis on careful packaging and securing of the patient in the basket. We secured the basket and chair together with extra rope and attached a tag safety line to the basket and chair, thereby securing them to the superstructure of the tower. We also applied a brake bar and held the rope by hand to ensure that Hope and the patient would reach the ground safely should the cable chair collapse.
They reached the ground without incident at 2130 hours. After another reassessment of his physical condition, the patient was placed in the ambulance for transport to the Life Air-1 helicopter and then to the Schumpert Medical Center, where he remained in the 1CU for one week. He since has recovered from his injuries: a linear frontal skull fracture, a concussion, and multiple contusions.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
We learned some valuable lessons from the Tower #5 incident and already have taken measures to ensure that we at the LAAF will be ready to answer safely and effectively the challenges of any future incidents. Among the lessons are the following:
- In the “heat of the moment,” it is very easy to overlook important safety precautions that could mean the difference between life and death in the “unusual” response. Statistics are alarming: NIOSH reports that wouldbe rescuers account for more than 60 percent of confined-space fatalities. Training and immediate implementation of SOPs are the most effective ways to reduce overenthusiasm and ensure that every operation begins with safety. Analysis of this incident revealed that safety lines for rescuers,
- immediate donning of SCBA, oxygenand explosive-monitoring equipment, and backup air supply would have increased operational safety,
- The LAAP Incident Command System proved effective despite the fact that we had not had the opportunity to test it in many actual emergencies. Review of our ICS provided insight into our management capabilities of, and mutual-aid arrangements for, this and other incidents that could arise at our plant.
- Disaster drills involving mutualaid departments and all concerned outside agencies should be conducted periodically. Six months after the water-tower rescue, we tested our mutual-aid and contingency plans by staging a mock mass-casualty incident that involved all mutual-aid departments and emergency-related agencies, including the local sheriffs office, private ambulance services, and the marshal of a nearby Air Forcebase.
- Mutual-aid plans should be updated annually and whenever a department’s leadership or equipment changes.
- A common mutual-aid radio frequency is very desirable, but it is difficult to establish. We are still working on it.
- Equipment inventory must be consistent with the types of incidents you’re likely to encounter. (See “The Rescue Company” by Ray Downey, Eire Engineering, September 1988 and October 1988.) Since the tower incident, we have purchased high-rise rescue kits and rappeling equipment. Being well-acquainted with the resources of your mutual-aid departments—including knowing the locations of specialized equipment —increases efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. In our case, we are including in our resource listings the safety plans and equipment available from contractors working on the base, the Army, and nearby fire and EMS departments.
- An accurate, ongoing size-up is of
- vital importance to the success of an operation. After the incident, we held in-house size-up courses for our three fire platoons.
- While we have a prefire plan for ever)’ building on our site, we do not have one for tanks and similar structures. We do, however, know the substances being used or stored in these tanks at all times and have on file schedules of all work being done on the site. Through prework conferences, we learn from the contractors what work will be done and which materials will be used. At that time we
- explain to the contractors how workers can summon help in an emergency.
In the future, it would be beneficial to stress the importance of a backup breathing supply for workers in the event of system failure and the need for additional specific protectiveclothing for rescue use in hazardous environments.
- In rescue incidents such as this, alternatives to hand-held mikes should be considered, since they leave the rescuers’ hands free for tasks more directly related to rescue operations.
