By Rita L. Reith
In the early morning hours of Thursday, March 12, 2009, firefighters from the Indianapolis (IN) Fire Department (IFD) were in for a firefight that lasted longer than anything they had seen in downtown Indianapolis in the past 20 years. The first call came in to dispatch at 0322 hours as a report of smoke in the area. Per protocol, one engine was dispatched to investigate. As that engine was responding, more calls poured in to dispatch, with callers frantically advising that there was a huge fire somewhere downtown. First-alarm companies were dispatched. Only one caller got the location accurate, identifying it as Michigan Street and Senate Avenue. This location sits about three blocks west of Monument Circle, the center point of downtown Indianapolis.
The crew from Station 13, located three blocks south of the fire, was first on-scene within four minutes of the first call. The smoke was so thick that the only thing crew members knew for sure was that they had heavy fire in the air. Unable to see what or how many buildings were involved, they established command and went to work.
 (1) Steel framing and a pile of burning lumber were all that remained of what was thought to be the area of origin. (Photos by Rodger Birchfield.) |
Two minutes later, Battalion Chief David Grider and Aide Lieutenant Michael V. White were on the scene. Instructing his aide to drive around and immediately do as much of a 360º survey as possible, Grider tried to assess the size of the massive fire. As they drove around the block, he quickly realized that with the density of the smoke and the large volume of fire, a quick assessment was almost impossible. Within four minutes, he called for a second alarm. Within a few more minutes, Acting Shift Commander Jim McNair called for a third alarm.
The conditions that night in Indianapolis were clear but chilly. The unusual weather pattern that had traveled through the Midwest over the previous several weeks left freezing temperatures in the 20s. The wind was blowing to the northwest at about 16 mph. The fire was located along the downtown canal and reflected an almost eerily beautiful picture. The area involved was compact with businesses, apartments, and condominiums. The potential for destruction was so great that Grider knew exposure control was the first priority.
 (2) Firefighters battled to save the Historic Landmarks Foundation of Indiana building as flames caught the roof and third floor of the building. |
As fire crews positioned their apparatus, they needed to quickly overcome several access obstacles. The area of involvement actually sat at a V-like intersection with Michigan Street to the south, Senate Avenue to the East, and Indiana Avenue running diagonally north to west. A 60-foot-wide canal bordered the entire west side of the incident. Making matters worse, a fully occupied condominium complex and a historic landmark office building were within 30 to 50 feet of the fire building on the north and south sides. Knowing the fire building was under construction, Grider made evacuation of exposure buildings an equal first priority.
Crews stationed in downtown Indy are well versed on the difficulties the canal presents. Built in 1836, the canal has a storied history. Refurbished in the 1980s and 1990s, the eight-mile stretch of the canal that runs through Indianapolis brings an element of grace and charm to the downtown area. Developers whose property was the scene of the fire were excited to bring their dream to the canal area. Residents were looking forward to the retail shops, coffee house, four-story parking garage, and six-story apartment building (218 units)all contained within the “Cosmopolitan on the Canal” complex. Involving 340,000 square feet of property, land along the canal is pricey; this particular spot was worth about $10 million. Jerry Collins, one of the owners, stated that they had invested an additional $28 million in the actual construction.
 (3) Six of nine aerial ladders used on the fire simultaneously threw water into the main building of the complex. Thousands of feet of three- and five-inch hose lined the street. |
Properties along both sides of the downtown canal included hotels, residences, businesses, and attractions. Crews knew that approaching from the unburned side, inside the building, to the canal side was about the only option in an offensive attack. Aerial ladder placement on the canal side was crucial because the stream could reach only so far and crews were already a minimum distance of 60 feet away before they could even place the ladder. Going up and over another structure to hit the one they wanted was a viable option as well but certainly not optimal. For these downtown crews, preplanning was necessary and constant. As more structures are added to the canal area, the preplans change; communication is key.
In this instance, there was not an unburned side from which to approach. The complex, which sits in an “L “shape, is hundreds of feet back from the roads that border it. Adjacent to the property is the Historic Landmarks Foundation of Indiana building, which, when visualized, makes the complex go from an “L” shape to a “U” shape. On the far north corner is the parking garage. This total area covers about a half block. Crews could not get their aerial ladders anywhere close to the heavily involved west side and were forced to position in a parking lot near the Michigan Street Bridge and Indiana Avenue. Engine and ladder crews trying to place hoselines had to drag them from the apparatus, across the courtyard, down the embankment, and around the already burning structures.
 (4) Because of collapse zone considerations, aerial placement made work difficult for firefighters trying to reach trapped fire behind the parapet. |
Grider had dispatch verbalize over the radio for all companies to concentrate on the exposures. Firebrands were flying everywhere. Some were reported to have hit the Indiana Statehouse several blocks away, and many hit trees and bushes, causing them to catch fire. Engine 23, with handlines in place, concentrated on protecting the occupied condominiums while simultaneously battling the huge amount of fire coming at them from the two apartment buildings and a cafe under construction. Ladder 27, in the parking lot, concentrated on the Historic Landmarks Foundation of Indiana building. The fire had now jumped across to that building and was getting a good start. Able to locate a hydrant, they hooked up and shot water over an apartment building and across the 60-foot span of the canal to hit the building. The heat was so intense that it radiated to a building in the parking lot where they were located and cracked all of the windows facing the fire.
Residents in the fire area were evacuated. Many stood in disbelief as they watched what began as a yearlong project burn out of control. The complex of buildings was in various stages of construction. None of the fire buildings had sublevels, basements, or garages. Built on a post-tension slab, they were made of precast concrete and wood-frame construction.
 (5) The loss of this collapsed building did not overshadow the remarkably untouched exposure just 30 feet away. |
The potential for collapse was imminent. Within four minutes of the firefight, one apartment building was completely gone, and the other collapsed. The pancake collapse caused many, including firefighters, to believe that they heard explosions. Firefighters said the building made noises they had never heard from a fire building. Sticks and ash were all that remained. Construction workers had been finishing drywall in both fire buildings. The slabs did not suffer any damage. The main apartment building was set to house a few tenants in May. However, the sprinkler system was two weeks away from activation. The parking garage suffered only spalled concrete on one side.
In all, 13 engines, nine aerial ladders, and other support vehicles battled this firea total of 30 units on the scene; 125 firefighters, including command staff, spent the first 11 hours trying to gain control of the fire. Large-scale incident protocol came quickly into play as higher-ups arrived on the scene, including IFD Chief Brian Sanford and Indianapolis Mayor Greg Ballard. McNair took over operations. At a large incident such as this, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Finance are run from a mobile, central command unit called the Metropolitan Emergency Communications Agency (MECA) van.
 (6) Firefighters had no other option but a defensive attack (surround and drown). |
Thousands of feet of three- and five-inch hose lined the streets. All available portable monitor nozzles were used. Nine of IFD’s 18 aerial ladders were throwing water simultaneously. Crews used every 13⁄4- and two-inch handline. Off-duty sworn administrative personnel arrived on-scene to help and were assigned various duties on the fireground. Rehab support came from IFD’s rehab unit and the Salvation Army. Local businesses supplied free hot coffee to the freezing firefighters and the media. Other businesses donated food.
Three hours into the fire, the smoke was still so thick you could barely see your hand in front of your face. The fire, believed to have originated in one apartment building on the canal side (approximately 75 × 150, four stories high) had now communicated around two corners and involved four buildings. Because of the configuration of the complex, a canyon-like effect with the wind helped push this fire faster than crews could work.
 (7) Eight hours into the fire, the southeast corner collapsed from water weight. Note the six master streams in use. |
Firefighters were able to keep the damage to the Historic Landmarks Foundation of Indiana building to a minimum, relatively speaking. This building has two sectionsthe south end (built in 1879 and known as the Kuhn House) and the north end (completed in 1991 and known as the Reed Williamson Center). The worst damage was contained mostly to the newer section. (Despite its name, historic artifacts and documents are not stored in the building.) The heaviest damage was on the third floor and the roof. This was the only building where an interior attack was successful. Firefighters were later able to use the roof of that building to get a better vantage point on other buildings.
Operationally, the fire was defensive from the start. However, crews made several attempts to get an offensive foothold and cut this fire off. They entered the main building to pull ceilings and walls but met fire above them at every turn. At one point, five firefighters were at risk of becoming trapped on the fifth floor when fire got underneath them. Command instructed them to vacate; within minutes of their getting out, the northeast area collapsed. Large void spaces and construction type defeated their attempts. In the more finished section of the main apartment building, the three existing firewalls did their job; conditions looked good there. Eight hours into the fire, the southeast corner collapsed from water weight.
 (8) Fire investigators began the monumental task of determining cause and origin. Four days later, the fire was ruled arson. |
Six of the nine aerial ladders were on the east side of the main apartment building. Crews took the collapse zone into consideration and positioned aerials on the street and in adjacent parking lots. A parapet running along the east side trapped fire and made it difficult for firefighters to reach. According to Grider, “We just couldn’t safely get crews close enough or people inside to make a difference.”
Miraculously, no firefighters or civilians were injured in this fire. Grider, who was familiar with this construction project, was not willing to risk personnel safety for this unoccupied building. He made it clear from the outset that no one was to take any unnecessary risks. Firefighters are constantly reminded in training to consider the risk/benefit ratio. This incident was high risk, low benefit. Losing the structure was certainly not part of the plan, but as the fire grew bigger and more intense, it was evident how this scenario was going to play out.
The combination of the freezing temperatures and water made moving around treacherous for firefighters. As the fight continued, crews were rehabilitated in and out. It is easy to lose focus when you are tired. It is easy to get injured when you are tired. Not so for IFD that day. The normal shift change occurred, and the A shift relieved crews on the scene. Without hesitation, they picked up the fight and seven hours later took up the hoses.
Hot spots proved to be a problem, and crews threw water on the building for another 12 hours. A crane was brought in to help move debris piles to get at the hot spots. Forty hours later, the IFD was able to release the last of its crews from the scene. In all, 73 fire department vehicles with a total of 194 personnel fought this battle. The rest was up to the fire investigators.
Within four days, fire investigators had ruled the fire arson. Within two weeks, they made an arrest. According to the prosecutor, a 23-year-old-homeless man who was mad at his girlfriend set the fire. The girlfriend turned him in after he bragged about his actions. He faces two felony charges of arson.
LESSONS LEARNED
Following are just some of the lessons the IFD learned from this large-scale incident.
1. Early focus on exposures pays great benefits. The goal of saving the surrounding structures/residences far outweighed the disappointment in losing the others.
2. On-site visits during the various phases of construction make firefighting operations safer and more effective. This complex mixed commercial and residential building materials in the same structure. Engineered wood products added to the need for caution.
3. The IFD’s Safety Officer program was vital to the result of having no injuries. Having a safety officer makes firefighters safer on the fireground.
4. Training and preplanning pay off. Communication is key.
5. Establish and maintain a rapid intervention team (RIT). If you need to put the RIT to work, make sure you call for another RIT to be deployed first.
6. Having an accountability system and officer in place is crucial to the success of a large-scale incident.
Thanks to Battalion Chief David Grider for his technical and editorial input regarding the on-scene operations and lessons learned.
RITA L. REITH is a captain and a 14-year veteran with the Indianapolis (IN) Fire Department. She has served as the public information officer since August 2008.
