OUR WORST DAY
EDITOR’S OPINION
Through most of 1975 we were aware of the political/ financial game being played by the mayor of the City of New York and the state legislature. The police and fire service members were put on the chopping block as a bluff for increased revenue sharing funds. It was thought that public sympathy would be more affected by emergency service cuts than by removing some positions held by pseudo-titled employees filling patronage jobs that choked the city’s coffers.
It didn’t work. The bluff was called and those on duty in fire stations throughout the city were forced to gather badges of firefighters laid off as pawns in the political arena. In my case, 16 brothers handed in their shields of commitment in the world’s busiest fire area. It was my worst day on earth and certainly the worst for those firefighters and families directly affected.
Firefighters operate for the good of the moment. Risk analysis and risks taken don’t always exist as a cause-and-effect system on the fireground. Chances and risk are taken for the good of mankind-whether real, assumed, or imagined; whether it be for life, property, or environment.
In the paid sector, risks are softened by the belief that no matter what, the firefighter’s family will always be taken care of. He feels that the city knows his commitment and it will never fail him.
The rug-pulling ceremony—the layoff—caused severe mental trauma for all. Permanent protection for firefighter and family was no longer a reciprocal commitment from management. Money was needed, and those emergency workers not injured and still alive were up for grabs. It was scary as hell.
Such is now the case in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Twenty percent of the firefighters were laid off. It cut a major city’s fire protection from a mere 267 to an unbelievable 214.
But to relate these stories is reactive. How can we be proactive? It’s easy for city manager types to eliminate expenses when the expense shows no income through productivity, which is his only “bottom line” tor being rehired or reelected.
For us it’s still a matter of being able to market what we do in terms of positive dollars returned and not negative fire-loss costs. The public and its political leader(s) must be able to weigh cost-cutting against loss in profitable municipal income. We must redesign how we report what we do and do it in positive cash-flow dollars.
Second, we can no longer rely on public sympathy and pride in its fire service. Apathy prevails and innovative ideas must identify the value of the fire service to taxpayers.
Third, unions must be forward-thinking, reasonable, and cooperative. The public and its city manager will no longer be willing to pay for “traditional” readiness for its emergency service. We must become proactive in dealing with and being part of the public and its service needs. Inspection, education, investigation, public relations, and training ventures must be as innovative, marketable, and profitable as they are visible. The firefighter and the service he provides to his community must be perceived as valuable and unreplaceable without depending solely on how much water we squirt on fires. Only then will public sympathy and understanding force the political and financial decision makers to be responsible and, not hysterical, sensational, and traumatic.
