Conflagration in PASSAIC
Labor Day 1985. The last holiday of the summer. Two JJ young boys spent the day exploring an aging factory complex in Passaic, NJ. Large vats of napthalene stored against one of the factory walls was the target of their mischief. They tossed lighted matches into the containers. The result was the largest fire in the city’s history.
The conflagration consumed 17 houses and the factories of nearly 60 businesses, which accounted for one quarter of Passaic’s industrial base.One hundred families Were displaced and 2,200 people lost their jobs. Monetary losses were estimated at $400 million. One fire fighter lost his life
The area of fire origin was within a large group of sprinklered mill structures located on the banks of the Passaic River. Originally, the complex was built and owned by a large textile firm; later, it was sold and broken down into space for several smaller tenant businesses. These companies stored and produced a variety of products, including garments, chemicals, and electronic components. A chemical company stored 48 vats of napthalene in an alleyway next to its building on Eighth Street (see map). The vats were stacked four abreast, piled to the second floor level, and contained an estimated 48,000 pounds of napthalene.
Photo by Glenn P. Corbett
THE FIRE’S INITIAL STAGES
At 2:30 P.M., the Passaic fire alarm office received a phone call from a woman, who was on the opposite shore of the Passaic River, reporting a fire at the industrial complex.
Fire alarm operators immediately transmitted the alarm sending two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief. While responding to the alarm, companies noted a column of smoke coming from inside the complex of buildings. A report of a working fire was relayed to the fire alarm office.
The first arriving engine (Engine 2) proceeded down Eleventh Street to the rear of the complex, forced entry through a fence, and positioned its truck in the alleyway where the fire was located. They found the vats of napthalene heavily involved in fire. Molten napthalene was running out of the containers, spreading fire as it flowed along the wall of the building. Fire had also spread to a nearby storage shed, as well as to power lines overhead, and threatened the mill buildings on both sides.
The engine company stretched a supply line to a yard hydrant opposite the burning vats. However, the supply of water from the hydrant flowed for only about one minute. A second yard hydrant was located a few hundred feet away, just outside the alleyway entrance. The engine backed up to this hydrant and layed new supply lines back to the burning vats.
The second-arriving engine company (Engine 3) positioned its apparatus at the dead end of Tenth Street and entered the five-story mill at the rear of 130 Eighth Street for interior examination for fire extension to this exposure. They had difficulty forcing entry into the building, and once inside found numerous locked doors for each of the different businesses located there.
Moving through the building, Engine 3 encountered heat and heavy smoke issuing into the public hall from behind the locked doors of occupancies on all floors. They had attempted to stretch handlines into the building for interior exposure protection from the fire in the alleyway. Company members also noted that there was no water flow from the sprinklers in the building.
With assistance from Ladder 2 in the alleyway, Engine 2 now charged the supply line from the second yard hydrant. Preparations were made to operate the engine’s deck gun and 2 1/2-inch handlines. The water supply from this hydrant was also useless. There was barely any pressure in the line, which collapsed under the weight of a firefighter’s boot.
Conditions were quickly deteriorating. Fire had now extended into both factory buildings on Eighth Street, and communicated to a catwalk between them. The heat was growing to unbearable limits and with an inadequate water supply to protect their position, Engine 2 pulled out.
The urgency of the moment did not allow the members to disconnect the supply lines, and as the engine backed out, the deck gun was torn off the apparatus. The fire was now beyond immediate control.
Photos by Glenn P Corbett
Photos by Ron Jeffers
GENERAL ALARM
Five minutes after the initial alarm was sounded, a request for a general alarm was made. This brought the rest of the Passaic Fire Department, two engines, a truck company, and the on-duty deputy chief.
Firefighting efforts were concentrated in an attempt to keep the fire contained within the two involved mills. Companies evacuated civilians from their homes in the path of the rapidly advancing fire. Master streams and handlines were used to protect the twoand three-story wood frame homes north of the fire. Elevated streams were set up at the rear of the mill complex near the river to try to keep the fire from extending to the rest of the factory complex.
These efforts had no effect on the fire and the first of the mutual aid requests to outside communities was ordered. The fire continued growing unchecked in all directions.
An insufficient water supply on the fireground compounded the problems. Eleven of the municipal hydrants in the area had been shut off at the street control valve because of vandalism and misuse during the summer. Each Passaic fire company had been issued a hydrant key to open these valves, and as companies from outside the city arrived, some of Passaic’s manpower was needed to open the hydrants to supply water to these units.
Most of the fireground and surrounding areas were serviced by eightand twelve-inch water mains. As more and more companies arrived and connected to additional hydrants for water supply, pressure in the area began to drop. The hydraulic limits of the supply system for the fireground area were being exceeded. It is interesting to note that other sections of the city did not experience a drop in water pressure, which supports this conclusion.
As the fire plume began to grow, so did the fire brand problem. The plume extended over the river, dropping large embers on structures in towns on the other side. Brand patrols were formed to inspect and wet down the roofs of buildings exposed to these airborne ignition sources.
Thousands of people flocked to see the growing conflagration. Officials found it difficult keeping the holiday crowd away from the incident. At one point, traffic was grid locked for a one-mile radius around the fire scene.
Photo by Tom Ernst
Photo by Glenn P. Corbett
Photo by Tom Ernst
With the fire having extended to many of the homes on Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Streets, a concerted effort was made to keep it from jumping across South Street. Water supply was still a major problem on the fireground, and pumpers began a drafting operation from the Passaic River at the end of South Street. The distance from river access coupled with a tide problem (25-foot lift) required that one company use five lengths of hard suction hose to successfully draft water.
Flames had almost fully consumed the two mills originally involved and were rapidly spreading south through the rest of the complex. The fire was moving so quickly that aerial apparatus had to be frequently repositioned to keep ahead of the fire.
FIRE JUMPS STREET
As the fire moved through the factory complex down Eighth Street, the radiant heat began to increase on the exposed group of buildings across the street at 109-119 Eighth Street. Two hours later, at 4:30 P.M., small wisps of smoke began to appear on the exposed facade of the buildings.
Handlines were ordered stretched inside the exposed structures to prevent the fire from gaining a hold beyond the exterior window frames. Connecting to the buildings’ standpipe system, firefighters positioned offensive handlines. They again encountered water pressure problems. Flames began to appear inside the window frames and communicated to the contents stored within the buildings. With conditions worsening, and with no possibility of charging the protective lines, firefighters were removed from the structure. The buildings were heavily involved and collapsing within an hour.
Apparatus was again repositioned to defensively surround these newly involved structures. Exterior streams coupled with larger open areas confined the fire to these sectors.
Firefighting efforts in the residential area on the northern perimeter of the fire were also finally meeting with some success. Masonary walls of some of the homes, particularly along South Street, slowed the fire’s progression.
Exterior lines were at last able to advance toward the conflagration and begin knockdown of the flame front.
The movement of fire along Eighth Street in the main complex was also slowing and was eventually stopped at the complex’s southern boundary, a five-story, concrete masonary building at 100 Eighth Street. A large lot next to the building also aided firefighters in containment on this side of the fire.
As a mutual aid company was checking for roof brands, one of its members suffered a heart attack. The 65-year-old volunteer firefighter was rushed to the hospital, but the attack proved to be fatal.
Photo by Steven Spak
UNDER CONTROL
By 11 P.M., the fire was essentially contained and declared under control. Many of the 47 mutual aid fire units that had responded began to return to their communities. It is estimated that over 300 firefighters fought the blaze.
The thermal column began to lose strength, allowing smoke to settle at ground level. The toxicity of the atmosphere began to cause concern, since a wide variety of hazardous materials had been stored in many of the buildings.
Passaic firefighters remained on the scene for several weeks, extinguishing flare-ups and pockets of fire buried deep within the debris. Large demolition equipment was brought in to tear down the many free-standing walls that had not collapsed during the conflagration.
INVESTIGATION
An investigation into the origins of the fire was begun immediately. Questioning of neighborhood residents revealed that two young boys, both 12 years old, allegedly entered the industrial complex on Eighth Street, possibly looking for discarded toys amongst the dumpsters. Finding the vats of napthalene, they began to toss matches into them. The fire that began in the volatile substance terrified the boys and they fled the complex.
The two boys were charged as juveniles with arson, criminal mischief, and causing widespread damage and injury.
An investigation into the apparent failure of the sprinkler and yard hydrant systems within the industrial complex was conducted. It revealed that a 100,000-gallon water tank that fed the firefighting systems in the complex had been emptied and placed out of service in 1982. The elevated tank supplied both pressure and volume to water mains that ran throughout the complex. These eight-inch mains, in turn, supplied water for both the sprinkler system risers and yard hydrants.
Photo by Steven Spak
A four-inch pipe from the city’s water system was connected to the eight-inch mains in the complex, apparently used to maintain the proper level within the water tank. This supply line had become so tuberculated over the years that it was only two inches in diameter. With the 100,000-gallon tank out of service, the water coming through this clogged four-inch pipe was the total supply for the entire complex’s firefighting systems. The quickly opening sprinkler heads rapidly overwhelmed such a meager water supply.
A Passaic County grand jury investigation is now being conducted into the facts surrounding the fire. The topics reported to be covered include: failure of the sprinklers and yard hydrants in the factories, careless storage of hazardous materials in the complex, shutting down of the city’s fire hydrants under the supervision of the fire department, as well as the actions of the fire department.
Photo by Steven Spak
CONCLUSIONS
The Passaic conflagration brought out some new points regarding fires and firefighting, while reinforcing others.
- Very often, heavy reliance is placed on auxiliary firefighting appliances such as automatic sprinkler systems. When the system did not function as expected, the fire, after entering the structure, was able to spread relatively unchecked and unplanned for.
- Yard hydrants cannot be relied upon for use by the fire department. They may be useful for industrial fire brigade use, but the municipal fire department should look to the city’s system for its water supply.
- Fire prevention inspections must be a priority within the functions of a fire department. On-site inspections of sprinkler and standpipe systems by fire department units as well as tests by competent contractors must be performed and recorded regularly.
- City water systems have a lim-
- it to the amount of water that they can supply. Water must be used judiciously, and applied where it will have the most effect. Very often in a case of a fire of this magnitude, it is used for defensive operations and containment.
- Secondary water supplies are often necessary as increasing demands are placed upon supplies by expanding numbers of firefighting units.
- Pre-plans and drills are necessary to meet the need of a community in the event of a conflagration
- threat. The cooperation of agencies concerned with water supply should be sought out.
- Life safety considerations in conflagrations are awesome. Evacuating large numbers of people is a difficult and time-consuming task. The Passaic fire occurred on a holiday when most structures were unoccupied. Imagine the magnitude of problems that would have been present had it occurred during “normal” business hours.
- Communication is the key factor in any emergency. Operations and equipment should be standardized. The needs and hazards of neighboring communities should be discussed, assessed, and pre-planned.
- The coordination of mutual aid companies is an important consideration in fireground command.
- Crowd control concerns must be relayed to law enforcement officials. Media control is also necessary, with fire reports given by one or two designated people.
- Pre-plans and drills of target hazards in the community need to be developed, printed, and distributed to not only all units within the fire service, but to all related agencies as well.
Napthalene, C10H8
A flammable white crystalline solid. Uses include: production of mothballs, dyes, resins, explosives, bathroom deodorizers.
Firefighting: CO2, dry chemical, foam. Water streams may cause frothing and foaming.
Properties: Melting point = 176°F
Boiling point = 424°F
Flash point = 174°F
Ignites at 979°F
Flammability = 0.9-5.9
Specific gravity —1.1
Vapor density = 4.4
Not water soluble
