EVEN “SUCCESSFUL”INCIDENTS CAN TEACH VALUABLE LESSONS
BY ROGER McGEHEE
Even an incident that can be termed “successful” can reveal in a postcritique valuable lessons that can be used to improve future operations. The following incident was no exception.
On April 23, 1998, at 2227 hours, units from Fairfax County (VA) Fire and Rescue Department`s second battalion responded to a report of a garden apartment fire at 1914 Hyannis Court, Fire Box 1304. Our dispatchers had received numerous calls reporting fire showing from the second floor. Based on this information, the responding battalion chief initiated a second alarm before any units had arrived on the scene. A third alarm would later be sounded, once the fire had made its way into the attic. When Engine 413 arrived on the scene, heavy fire was showing from the second floor and extending to the third floor by way of the exterior.
The apartment building was a three-story masonry structure about 30 to 40 years old. A common attic spanned the 150-foot 2 50-foot building, which housed 12 units. Engine 413 made a forward lay from a nearby hydrant and positioned at the end of the court, only to discover that what appeared to be the front of the apartment building was actually the rear. The complex was designed in a “U” shape, and the entrance to the units was on side 3 of the building, opposite the street address.
THE OPERATION
While the engine company advanced a 400-foot leader line around to the rear, Rescue Squad 401 was forcing entry to the fire apartment, and Tower 401 was on the floor above searching the units and checking for extension.
Once the attack line was in place, the rescue squad entered the unit and began searching while an attack was made on the fire. By this time, the fire had traveled up the outside of the building, through the soffits, and into the attic, bypassing the third-floor apartment. With the fire extinguished in the apartment of origin, Engine 430 relocated its backup line from the fire floor to the third-floor unit above and started hooking the ceilings.
At this point, all efforts on the fireground shifted to the fire that was rapidly spreading in the attic and threatening to run the roof. Defensive measures had been put in place should this have occurred, but the four engine and two truck companies operating on the third floor were able to open enough ceilings to get at the fire and stop it at the center stairwell.
Additional crews were brought in for salvage work before the entire ceilings in two and a half units were pulled because of the blown-in insulation. Four 134-inch handlines were used to contain the fire, and Tower 401 was in position with a water supply in case a master stream was needed.
Throughout the incident, command components were established to meet the growing needs as the situation escalated.
Deputy Chief Eric D. Walker, the shift deputy, assumed command of the incident after he arrived on the scene, reassigning Battalion Chief 402 to the rear sector and Battalion Chief 404 to the interior sector.
Staging and rehab sectors were assigned early in the incident, as was a rapid intervention team, which was positioned outside the main entrance to the building.
POSTINCIDENT CRITIQUE
A postincident critique was held on Monday, May 11. All units present agreed in general that this fire had the potential for a far worse outcome than was experienced, given the lengthy preburn time and the amount of fire on arrival. Basic aggressive firefighting is what held this fire in check and limited its extension. We were fortunate in that these apartment buildings, constructed in the 1960s, are free of today`s lightweight construction. This gave us the time needed to bring the attic fire under control from the interior. Adequate resources early into the incident gave us the crews needed to attack the seat of the fire quickly and to cope with the extension through the attic. We held the fire to the apartment of origin and less than half of the total attic area through aggressive tactics and proper ongoing size-up. Despite this, however, a postcritique of this incident revealed areas in which we could have been more efficient.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
The initial attack crew had little assistance advancing the hoseline into the building. Units at the front of the building, either waiting for an assignment or on their way to one, should ensure that the entrance door remains chocked open and that the hose is fed inside. The rapid intervention team could assist.
The crews on the third floor were delayed in opening the ceilings because of a lack of tools. It was reiterated that all units should bring tools with them, especially hooks, when entering the structure, including companies assigned to advance the hoselines.
Even though this incident was as-signed an alternate radio channel, trying to get a message through was difficult at best. Using a TAC channel (one that does not go through the repeater) would make it easier to manage the local fireground radio traffic.
An additional crew with a hoseline and hooks should have been positioned well ahead of the attic fire with the ceilings pulled in case the fire overran the initial attack.
Too many people were in the fire building early in the incident. When resources warrant it, an interior sector should be established as early as possible to manage the crews.
ROGER McGEHEE, a 25-year veteran of the fire service, has been with the Fairfax County (VA) Fire and Rescue Department for the past 19 years and currently is a Captain 1. He has an associate`s degree in fire science from Montgomery College.
