“Webster Parish 911 to Webster Fire District 7: Respond to a possible structure fire at the Family Store in Dixie Inn. Employees are reporting a fire in the rear storeroom. Your automatic mutual-aid engine is being dispatched as well.”
For Webster Parish Fire District 7 in Dixie Inn, Louisiana, where I am a captain and the training officer, these few simple words could start a chain of events that not only would tax our small volunteer department’s resources and training but also would likely involve the response of several surrounding mutual-aid departments and fire districts. It would also create a situation where the company officers would have to make a series of critical decisions in a very short time in positions possibly ranging from the initial incident commander (IC) to the supervising officer of the fire attack or ventilation crews.
Webster Fire District 7 is not alone in facing the challenges posed by small- and medium-sized box stores; just about every community in the country has at least one such occupancy in its response area. In addition to serving in Webster Parish Fire District, I also work full-time for a neighboring Bossier Parish fire district as a captain/fire prevention officer. We also have multiple small box stores that pose the same challenges.
RELATED FIREFIGHTER TRAINING
“Big Box” Store Fire: Lessons Learned
Firefighting in Big Box Stores
Large-Area Search: Lessons Found in a “Big Box”
This article focuses on the company officer’s (CO) role in the response to these types of incidents. Whether functioning as the initial IC, the operations officer, a division or sector officer, or simply the leader and supervisor of a company, the CO’s responsibility for managing these incidents successfully is significant.
Retail Stores
For the purposes of this article, retail store sizes are defined as follows: small box stores are less than 9,000 to 10,000 square feet and medium-box stores are from 10,001 to 22,000 square feet. These occupancies may include national chain general merchandise stores such as Dollarmania, Dollar General, and Family Dollar and locally owned or national chain hardware, clothing, furniture, second-hand, rent-to-own, tire, and auto parts stores. A common thread among all of these occupancies is that they likely have a significant fire load containing a high percentage of hydrocarbon-based fuels, which, as we know from street experience and current fire research, burn at a much hotter temperature and faster pace than natural fuels.
Although much of the information discussed in this article can be applied to “big box” store fire operations, we should consider these bigger stores as very different occupancies because of their greater size, fire load, and tactical complexity.
This article is derived from a class I have presented for more than 25 years in Vermont and Louisiana. It is based on my 40 years of responding to fires in these structures with volunteer and combination fire departments in rural and light- and medium-density suburban settings. Much of the time, we operated with limited personnel, especially on the initial alarm. In many cases, especially in the suburban volunteer departments in which I served in upstate New York and Vermont, the departments involved were part of an aggressive and a well-coordinated mutual-aid system, which typically brought multiple departments to alarms, smoke investigations, and reported fires on the initial alarm and included predetermined “working fire” assignments. However, because of distance, the first-in companies often operated alone for several minutes until the automatic mutual-aid assignment arrived.
The lessons I learned from responding to these incidents as a firefighter, a driver, can be summed up in these “10 Commandments.” Although not all-encompassing, they give the company officer arriving on scene and assuming the role of IC a starting point for setting the tone for the next five minutes or five hours. They may also assist when developing or revising policies, procedures, or current operational and training guidelines for making it a little easier to handle these types of fires.
One important note: This information is based on my experiences. Your situations may dictate local solutions based on local conditions.
The 10 Commandments
1. Thou Shalt Know Thy Building Construction (the Enemy).
All aspects of commercial building construction are not covered, not only because of space limitations but also because they have been covered by many great writers and instructors in books, articles, videos, and training programs. However, a brief overview is presented to set the stage for the operational and tactical discussions that follow related to operating as the initial CO and evaluating building construction and performance under fire conditions. Moreover, it will assist COs to fulfill their responsibility to train their members in building construction.
Most small- and medium-sized box stores are of unprotected Type II construction, with heavy steel purlins or lightweight trusses of partial or full span. The roof likely will contain the building heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) unit, which adds a significant dead load and likely hastens structural collapse. It is critical to note this information in your department’s prefire plans, as it will guide the IC’s decision regarding the expected roof performance under fire conditions. Depending on the local fire code, the buildings may be monitored by an alarm system, which will provide early warning, especially when the building is unoccupied. Typically, the structure, except the storeroom area, will have an undivided floor plan, which will allow smoke, heat, and fire to move more rapidly throughout the structure prior to your arrival.
(1) Some small- and medium-sized box stores may be found in strip malls. It is critical that members assigned to controlling utilities understand how to locate and manage banked utilities such as electricity and gas. (Photos by author unless otherwise noted.)
(2) Renovations such as bricking over windows in commercial structures can create significant issues for firefighters. Operations such as civilian and firefighter rescue, ventilation, and fire attack can be significantly hampered and delay critical operations. These renovations must be identified and documented during the prefire planning process.
As you can probably tell by now, most of these construction factors will work against the fire department, making it critical that the initial arriving CO have a working understanding of how each building type will likely perform under fire conditions, including how those characteristics will contribute to fire spread and the possibility of structural failure.
When required by a building code, some small- and medium-sized box stores may be Type I structures protected by a sprinkler system, which will obviously give the fire department a considerable tactical advantage and may even extinguish the bulk of the fire prior to our arrival. Even if protected by a sprinkler system, the building construction should be clearly identified on the preplan, especially if full-span lightweight trusses are used, in case the sprinkler system fails to operate or extinguish the fire. ICs should be familiar with the external signs that will be exhibited if the sprinkler is successfully or unsuccessfully suppressing the fire. The company officer should also ensure that the drivers/pump operators know how to establish a water supply, how to connect the hose to the fire department connection (FDC), and what pump pressures and operations are needed to support the system.
On occasion, the structures may be older renovated Type III buildings, sometimes as part of a “taxpayer” with additional storage, office, residential, or vacant space above; if so, this should be noted in the preplan. The structure could also be a Type V wood-frame structure. Pay particular attention to the void spaces created by previous renovations or additions; note them clearly in the prefire plans. Obviously, these fires will exhibit the characteristics of these building types once they extend beyond the content phase, and they must be handled with the appropriate structural tactics.
If these “small boxes” are part of a larger box within a strip mall, the preplan must detail the interconnected void spaces that may allow the fire to spread to the neighboring exposures. If fire has escaped the small box prior to arrival or during the fire attack process, immediately implement strip mall firefighting tactics and operations, including an increased water supply, increased personnel, an expanded command staff, and aerial devices. If these buildings exist in the CO’s first-due district, the officer must be familiar with the tactics to contain the fire to the “box of origin” until additional companies and a chief officer arrive.
In just about all cases, the buildings will feature narrow aisles, which will make moving firefighters and handlines through the structure personnel intensive and time consuming. In addition, the arrangement may create significant disorientation issues for firefighters who become separated from their crew or lines and make it difficult for the rapid intervention team (RIT) to locate them since the team will not have a clear view of the floor space. These structures also have a very limited number of entrances, making firefighter egress and rapid intervention operations even more difficult. The CO must prepare members for this complex situation through realistic training evolutions.
The size of these buildings, as well as the limited number of egress points, may necessitate handline stretches beyond the “standard” 200-foot preconnected lines. This is especially true if the fire is in the interior rear of the store and access is not available through the freight entrances. Departments covering these buildings may want to consider the need for a longer attack line, preconnected or as a dead-load. It is the CO’s responsibility to determine which buildings in their assigned areas will necessitate these building-specific hose loads.
It is critical that all department members, especially COs, understand the building stock, including every small- and medium-sized box store, within their community, especially those within their first-due districts. The construction type and specific characteristics of each building should be clearly identified on the department’s preplans and understood by every officer and member who may be responsible for command at these incidents.
In addition, as stated earlier, all members must have a working understanding of how each building type will likely perform under fire conditions, including how it will contribute to fire spread and the possibility of structural failure. This entails knowing the concealed and void spaces in these buildings and, more importantly, the command staff’s understanding how heat and fire in these spaces will impact fire behavior and spread, building performance including structural failure, fire attack operations, and member safety.
2. Know Thy Fire Behavior.
Much like building construction, at a minimum, every officer who may establish or assume command must have a working knowledge of fire behavior involving modern fuels, especially when they are present in large quantities in an open floor plan, which is typical of most, if not all, small- and medium-sized box stores. Ideally, every member of the department should receive this training and be able to demonstrate the ability to discuss this information and its relation to initial fire attack operations, but it should be a “must have” for the command staff, including COs.
Like residential structural fires, a transformation in fire behavior associated with retail establishment fire load has occurred over the past 20 years. The hydrocarbon-based loads found in most retail occupancies have spurred increased British thermal unit production, increased heat-release rates, and fueled explosive fire growth that create hotter and more intense fires that easily overwhelm the traditional medium-sized handlines many fire departments still use. This problem will be compounded in buildings that may be overstocked in anticipation of seasonal or holiday sales spikes, and those periods should be identified as a part of the preplanning process.
Not understanding this change in fire behavior is likely to result in significantly underflowed attack lines; inadequate response; and, in the worst case, firefighter injury or death. How to deliver the increased fire flow will be covered from the perspective of the CO later.
(3) Fire extinguishers are not typically used at commercial incidents, but they can be extremely helpful in extinguishing small fires found during the investigation phase or to knock down larger fires while a handline is being placed in service. Although the training is quite basic, members should receive periodic refresher training on the use and limitations of both water and ABC dry chemical fire extinguishers. [Photo courtesy of Bossier Parish (LA) Fire District 1.]
3. Know Thy Mental Hard Drive.
A commercial building fire response for many departments, especially departments in smaller communities, is an infrequent event. This is true even in a busy volunteer, combination, or small career department running hundreds of fires and thousands of fire-related calls a year; a working commercial building fire accounts for a very small percentage of those responses. As an example, my combination department, which may run 10 to 15 structure fires per year, will typically respond to only one or two commercial building fires during that period. In the case of one of my volunteer departments, it has been several years between responses to a commercial building fire within the district although we have responded to several in neighboring areas.
It is a well-discussed fact that a lack of real-world experience with any type of skill or response can challenge personnel trying to perform safely and effectively during an infrequent emergency response. The same is true with the responsibilities of the CO. The Recognition-Primed Decision Making model states that we develop a mental “hard drive” or “filing cabinet” through repeated successful experiences. These previous experiences provide a playbook that will guide a member’s decision making and task performance in command and operational roles when we arrive on scene. When there are no matches because of a lack of previous experiences, the brain scans the hard drive for the closest match and those are the actions we often take, even if they are not appropriate for the situation. Not only does this affect the firefighter’s ability to perform commercial building tasks, but it also affects the CO’s capability to make effective fireground decisions.
Unfortunately, in slower or smaller departments, when there may be limited or no previous commercial building fire experiences, or matches, it’s not uncommon for the responders to fall back on the closest match in their “hard drive,” which, in almost all cases, is a residential structure fire. This “recall” will drive the officer to use ineffective and dangerous residential tactics instead of the appropriate commercial structure tactics.
The resulting omissions by the CO may include underestimating attack line flows; not securing an adequate water supply or securing it too late in the operation; and underestimating personnel needs or the time required to perform commercial building operations such as forcible entry, ventilation, and search. The CO may also fail to ensure that members under his supervision open up and monitor overhead void spaces for heat and fire since void spaces are not often problems in residential responses.
Though not the best teacher when compared to actual fires, effective and realistic training can fill some of the voids created by a lack of real-world experience. Unfortunately, for many departments, there is a critical lack of retail building fire training for varied reasons: the command staff does not see a need for such training, a lack of resources to conduct hands-on training, a lack of instructor knowledge and experience, or not enough members will attend drills to conduct hands-on evolutions. In many departments, COs are assigned to deliver this training at the company level. Hopefully, the training division will provide a curriculum for delivering this training. In some agencies, the CO has to develop the curriculum.
A significant challenge faced by small- and medium-sized department training and COs when attempting to develop the “hard drive” through the training process is that large burn structures that mimic the commercial fire environment are rarely available. Therefore, members rarely get to experience hands-on training on large-flow/large-fire structural operations, extended hose stretches, and large-area search operations under realistic heat conditions. This also deprives COs of gaining experience supervising their members under realistic large-structure training conditions.
One option would be to acquire large structures in the community prior to demolition for live burn activities; however, the planning and delivery of such burns may prove a daunting task for smaller agencies and could not be accomplished at the company level. If not available for live-burn evolutions, it may be possible to obtain permission to use these structures for simulated large structure fire attack, ventilation, search, and rapid intervention operations prior to demolition. The CO may have a role in identifying and acquiring such buildings in the district and may have a significant, or even lead, role in its planning and execution.
The challenge posed by the lack of instructor experiences can be addressed by bringing in outside instructors with more experience. One drawback to this option is that they may come from departments that typically bring a greater volume of resources to the incident as compared to the host department, which could create some training conflicts.
4. Thou Shalt Not Overrate Thy Capabilities and Thou Shalt Preplan.
Probably the most important aspect of addressing the operational requirements of a small- or medium-sized box store fire is the CO’s realistically and honestly evaluating company and department capabilities and, just as important, company and department limitations and operational challenges. They include not only identifying apparatus needs at these incidents (discussed later) but, more importantly, determining the number of members assigned to your company or volunteers responding to incidents at different times of the day and adjusting mutual-aid requests as needed. This process should also include the CO’s honest and realistic evaluation of members’ exterior and interior firefighting training and operational capabilities. The evaluation process should also extend to the training and fireground capabilities of the mutual-aid departments that may respond. Not being honest about what you and your mutual-aid personnel can do in the high-threat environment posed by small- and medium-sized box stores can result in ineffective firefighting operations and possibly serious injury or death to your personnel. Putting your members in situations for which they are not prepared often does not turn out well.
The CO should use the prefire planning process throughout this evaluation process. Many departments, agencies, and company level leaders view prefire planning as a necessary formality performed simply for rating purposes. If this is an issue in your department or fire district, the CO has a critical role in changing this dangerous culture. Because of this, members may complete this critical function without urgency or diligence. The culture within an organization can have a significant impact on members’ effectiveness during response; a nonchalant prefire inspection wastes the opportunity for the department to determine specific operational needs for structures within their district, which will have significant impact on responding effectively with limited staffing if a fire occurs.
The preplanning process should be an opportunity for the CO to identify operational weaknesses (though we in the fire service hate that word) and needs, which, in turn, will identify the need for additional staffing or companies on the initial alarm. These needs may include additional members or specialized companies such as trucks or squads for forcible entry challenges posed by fortified doors, additional engine companies for extended attack hoselays to the interior rear of the occupancy, or extended supply hoselays to reach hydrants outside the hose load of a single engine.
It may also identify weak or low-pressure hydrants requiring pumper support to boost pressure, concealed spaces that will necessitate additional staffing to open and access, and additional personnel for search needs. The company officer must take the lead in instilling the importance of this process in the members.
Once these needs have been identified through an effective preplanning process, a multiagency or regional mutual-aid response plan should be developed for the target structures. The need for additional companies to address these needs in smaller agencies should include automatic mutual-aid assignments on the initial alarm to ensure sufficient personnel and apparatus to address the identified tactical needs.
The plan can also include automatic enhanced responses for working fires, beefed-up second-alarm assignments, or specialized run or box cards to bring in specialized companies. It may also identify the need for squad or rescue companies for search or RIT assignments, which may not normally be included in a department’s residential response. These response plans must be accompanied by common standard operating procedures (SOPs), incident command structure, and dispatch/communication protocols. For areas without a working system in place, the development of these elements can prove challenging because they will generally require some level of compromise for the departments involved and may challenge the culture prevalent in the department or region. In many places, this role may be filled primarily by members from the Fire Prevention Division, but the CO should have input since he will be first on scene should an incident occur.
The issue of culture can be a major hurdle in some places: The company, or even the department, culture may still view a small- or medium-sized box store fire as “just another building fire,” delaying the dispatching of additional companies or mutual aid until the first-due companies or the command officer encounters significant fire conditions when arriving on scene. This mindset creates dangerous conditions for the initial responders, often placing them in unsafe operating conditions created by minimum staffing until additional resources arrive several minutes (or longer in rural areas) after the arrival of the initial companies.
Where there is an identified chronic shortage of staffing, the department needs to be proactive by developing a plan that ensures the early response of enough members to safely and effectively handle the incident. The staffing issues could be related to limited or reduced paid staffing or an increased workload that limits the number of companies available in career or combination agencies. In volunteer departments, decreased membership or fluctuations in member availability could lead to this situation.
Regardless of the cause, leadership, including COs, needs to understand that the initial resources needed for effective and safe operations at small- and medium-sized box stores are significantly greater than those needed at a residential fire and must be willing to change the response. This may necessitate changing the culture, which may prove to be a very tough nut to crack. Often, this change needs to start at the company level.
5. Thou Shalt Know Thy Incident Command Structure (ICS).
As discussed above, a residential fire and a commercial building fire are very different animals, thus needing far different command structures. Because of the complexity of the incident, including the number of resources likely on scene, the increased amount of fireground communications, and the multiple hazards presented by the incident, the following ICS positions beyond the IC should be established at all working fires:
Incident Commander Aide. The complexity of the incident makes it impossible for the IC to manage the event, especially before the appointment of an Operations chief, without the help of an aide. The aide may assist with performing the 360°; managing radio communications; tracking dispatched and arriving companies; and liaising with other arriving resources such as the police, emergency medical services, and utility companies.
Operations Chief. Even though the IC will retain overall control of the fire and develop the strategic objectives, an Operations chief must be appointed to manage the tactical aspects of the suppression operation. Without this position, it is entirely possible that the IC can quickly become overwhelmed and lose operational control of the incident, which will have a significant impact on firefighter safety. It may also increase the likelihood of freelancing by company officers or individual firefighters since it may be difficult to relay information to the IC and receive prompt orders.
Safety Officer. This position is REQUIRED. An incident of this type requires at least one safety officer and, more than likely, several assistant safety officers.
Interior Sector Officer. Once the decision has been made to conduct an interior fire attack, an Interior Fire Sector officer should be appointed. This person should not have any direct crew-management or hose-handling responsibilities and should be able to function solely as the monitor of fire conditions, interior structural conditions, and the direction and management of company-level supervisors or officers assigned to performing interior operations.
>Water Supply Officer. A dedicated water supply officer must be appointed very early in the incident, especially if a water shuttle or a relay pumping operation is to be used. With everything else going on, the IC or even the Operations chief will be so overwhelmed by the fire itself that water supply necessitates an experienced member dedicated to manage its establishment and operation.
A well-involved fire will likely also require the appointment of sector officers such as Ventilation and Rescue Group officers, Staging officer, Rehabilitation officer, Liaison officer, and public information officer. Filling these positions may take experienced members away from active firefighting duties, but filling these positions will allow the incident to flow smoothly and relieve stress on the other incident command positions. The CO should be ready to fill any one of these positions when requested to do so. In a major incident, this may entail special-calling additional command officers or, better yet, adding them to the first-alarm assignment.
6. Thou Shalt Know Thy Water Supply.
Obviously, knowing the water supply available to your suppression activities is critical in determining what lines arriving personnel can effectively flow. Much like evaluating the capabilities of your department’s apparatus and personnel, your department’s evaluation of your water-flow capabilities must be honest and realistic because it is an important part of your prefire attack plan. At the end of the day, it is the COs who must be familiar with the water supply strengths and weaknesses within their first-due response areas. They should be able to identify the areas of the district that may require the use of extended supply lines, relay pumping operations, or nurse-pumping weak hydrants.
If your primary water source will be from a hydrant system, factors such as rated flows, fluctuations in that flow caused by high-demand periods, the distance from the structure to the hydrant, the size of the supply hose carried, the expected flow capacity and related friction loss, and the need for engines to operate in relay or pump the hydrant must all be considered. Also, calculate the time needed for an extended hoselay since tankers may be needed to supply water while the hoselay is being established.
One important operational consideration includes the development of a policy regarding the laying of supply lines from nearby hydrants by the first-due engine company, even in the cases of little or no smoke showing from the building. Although this could create additional work for the members if no significant fire is located since the hose will have to be reloaded, the possible delay in having the second-due engine arrive and lay the line could create serious water supply issues for the initial attack operations. This may be especially critical if the second-due engine is replacing a closer engine already committed to a run or responding from a distant station or another department. This will be even more critical if two engines are needed for the lay, as the third-due will have to arrive before the lay can be completed. Again, in many departments this will necessitate a change in the “we’ll lay it once we determine that we actually need it” culture.
If you will be using a water shuttle operation, consider the following factors when determining your fire flow: the number of tankers responding, the tanker size and dump or pump-off capabilities responding on the initial alarm, the response time of additional alarm tankers, the distance and travel time to the fill sites as well as any traffic that may increase the travel time, the capacity of the fill sites, and the personnel available to fill and dump tankers.
As discussed in the next section, the minimum sustainable flow should be 500 gallons per minute (gpm) from the time that the nozzles are opened on the fire. This includes a flow from an apparatus-mounted master stream device used to knock down the fire or a ground attack using a large-flow handline such as a two- or 2½-inch backed up by a similar sized handline used as a safety line, a second line on the fire, or an exposure protection line.
7. Thou Shalt Understand the Need for High Fire Flows and a Transitional Fire Attack.
As discussed above, today’s hydrocarbon-based fuels, which compose the majority of the fire load in most small- and medium-sized retail box stores, require much higher flow rates on fire department attack lines than in the past. As such, many departments are finding out, generally as a result of unsuccessful fire attacks, that the 1¾-inch line no longer is effective as the initial or primary attack line at commercial building fires.
As a result of this change in fuels and fire behavior and the resulting need for a change in fire attack techniques, many fire departments across the country are taking a long, hard look at using the transitional fire attack in which operations lead off with an apparatus-mounted master stream, a portable master stream, a single-inlet monitor, or a 2½-inch handline.
For many departments, especially if they choose to use a transitional fire attack, effectively attacking these fires may necessitate some hose load setup and nozzle changes. The most critical changes will likely start with reviewing their 2½-inch hose loads and nozzles. If a department does not carry a preconnected or a dedicated dead load 2½-inch attack line, at least one will need to be loaded because deploying and connecting the transitional attack line from the dead bed are extremely time consuming, especially if a single member has to do the operation. Having a single member rapidly deploy the transitional line and get it into operation is probably the most critical element of the fire evolution in departments operating with limited staffing. The minimum flow for this line should be 250 gpm, although more can be flowed by using a larger smooth bore tip. The apparatus tank-to-pump line should easily provide this flow.
If space allows, a second 2½- inch 100- or 150-foot attack line; again, preconnected or dead-loaded, is recommended for rapid deployment at larger structures. Flowing both of these lines will require a minimum flow of 500 gpm and likely cannot be initiated until an outside water supply from a tanker or hydrant-fed supply line has been secured.
In the case where a department already has a preconnected or dedicated dead load 2½-inch attack line that is 200 feet or longer, shortening the existing load or adding a shorter load that can be deployed by one member in less than one minute may be considered. Often a 200-foot stretch is not needed when used as an exterior attack line, and it will delay getting water on the fire. One significant benefit to this line being placed on the apparatus is that it can also be used for implementing a single-firefighter rapid-deployment transitional line on residential and large-vehicle fire incidents.
If it’s not practical to load a second shorter attack line (lack of space), the driver/operator may be assigned to break the line at the 100-foot mark and connect it to a discharge as the single firefighter deploys the line and positions the nozzle. This function will have to be identified as a training need and be included as part of the driver-operator’s training package.
I have found that the most effective nozzle for the initial line in most, if not all, exterior or large-open area firefighting is a smooth bore because of its higher flow capabilities, reach, and penetration and because it takes only a single member to deploy and operate in a fixed position. In most cases, the majority of the water is applied by a combination nozzle. A combination nozzle certainly has its place in modern firefighting, but the smooth bore nozzle provides the reach and penetration needed for the large, open floor area of a small- or medium-sized box store.
The same can be said about the tip on the apparatus-mounted or portable master stream device or single-inlet monitor; again, a smooth bore tip will deliver maximum reach and penetration. Match the size of the tip through flow testing with the size of the tank-to-pump piping so that an effective stream with sufficient reach can be generated.
The ability to flow Class A foam, if available, through both the transitional and 1¾-inch lines will greatly increase their effectiveness.
As you can tell by now, a small- or medium-sized box store fire incident has the potential to challenge the resources of even well-staffed small career, combination, and volunteer departments. As described previously, these challenges can include personnel, apparatus, command staff, communications, and water supply—especially in areas not served by hydrants or lower-flow water systems.
For smaller agencies with very limited staffing, these issues become even more significant and can easily and quickly overwhelm their response capabilities. In areas without a well-functioning mutual-aid system, often the needs posed by this type of incident can be extremely difficult to overcome.
Adjusting the internal culture.
In light of the challenges that modern small- and medium-box store operations pose, how do we adjust our response and tactics? In some departments, the first change, as previously discussed, may involve an adjustment to the internal culture that views a small- or medium-sized box store fire as “just another structure fire.” Often, this culture will not see a need to change its tactical approach. This change may start at the top of the organizational chart with the chief and the command staff and filter down through the training staff and district chiefs to the COs and firefighters. It can also start at the company level, based on “street experience” or issues encountered with previous small- or medium-sized box stores or through outside training influences such as conferences such as the Fire Department Instructors Conference International, presentations, classes, and online programs, and may filter up the chain of command. Although this evolution can be effective, it can also take considerably longer than the top-down model, especially if there is resistance from the top of the command structure.
After the department has accepted the initial response changes needed to deal with the additional personnel needs in these types of commercial buildings, it must address the operational changes that will more effectively attack these fires. For many departments, especially those operating with limited personnel, the core of this change will be the use of a transitional attack, which, as discussed above, applies large amounts of water from the exterior before mounting an interior fire attack when structural conditions allow.
This will initially involve the development and delivery of training that effectively communicates the reasons behind the tactical shift, as well as operational guidelines associated with the transitional approach. This will involve the development of procedures or guidelines identifying the use of apparatus-mounted or portable single-inlet master stream devices or 2½-inch handlines before moving to operations using 1¾-inch handlines. It is important to stress during training that the master streams or larger lines are not replacing 1¾-inch lines for the bulk of the firefighting and overhaul but that they will be operated until the bulk of the fire is knocked down to a point where the 1¾-inch line can overwhelm the British thermal units being produced by the remaining fire.
In departments that use two-inch handlines, the use of 2½-inch handlines may not be needed as the initial “knockdown line” since they have the capability of flow rates of up to 300 gpm, especially when using smooth bore tips.
For many departments, moving toward a transitional approach can be a cultural challenge; the line personnel may initially view the use of a standoff or “knockdown line” in a very negative light. Some may see it as operating defensively in an “offensive culture.” The members may view not initially deploying the 1¾-inch line as backing down from the fire and, consequently, not performing an aggressive fire attack. This clash with established departmental culture is a barrier that department leadership must overcome early in the training and implementation process.
The change to a transitional approach may take time and may meet with resistance. Making this change will generally necessitate early buy-in from influential officers and members in the department. Departmentwide buy-in will generally take education, training, and persuasion that the department is not abandoning aggressive operations but is responding to a dramatic change in fire behavior characteristics.
Positioning apparatus.
Since many of these structures can be up to 150 to 200 feet deep, placing the apparatus in the front of the structure can create a need for extended attack hose stretches if the fire is deep in the structure. In many cases, especially when operating with three to four members, positioning the apparatus at the side or the rear at the freight entrance, assuming that the door can be rapidly forced open, can significantly reduce the length of the stretch and the time needed to deploy the initial handline into the structure. This will generally necessitate that the officer or senior member sitting in the right seat dismount the engine, enter the structure [preferably with a thermal imaging camera (TIC)], and determine the extent and the location of the fire before positioning the apparatus and pulling the transitional line or smaller handlines.
In most cases, it may be a tactically sound decision for a second member armed with a 2½-gallon water can or Class A foam extinguisher to accompany the officer. This will provide the initial crew with the capability to extinguish or delay the development of a smaller fire while attack lines are deployed.
Department procedures should identify when and how to open and identify the heat condition in overhead concealed spaces; this is critical when discussing the go/no-go decision-making process. This should include the use of a TIC by crews making entry as well as designating the proper tools for accessing the space. It will also require training fire attack crews to bring in pike poles or hooks of sufficient length to open up the ceiling tiles at the front door before entering or as they move through the structure
There is one other issue on the command side: There must be training on when not to engage in interior operations or when to transition to a defensive operation. It is critical that command and company officers understand the significance of high heat conditions with minimal smoke and no visible fire.
8. Thou Shalt Not Neglect Truck Company Functions.
One of the most daunting challenges for smaller departments is the ability to perform basic truck company functions such as forcible entry, utility control, search, and ventilation without a dedicated truck company responding on the initial alarm. The fact that this piece of apparatus is not available does not negate the need for some or all of these tasks to be performed at a working small- or medium-sized box store fire.
One option is to use a squad or rescue for this task; each is often equipped with saws and a wide variety of forcible entry tools. It will be the responsibility of the initially arriving IC to identify the need for these tasks to be performed. It is critical that in smaller departments, the engine company officers recognize that they may be assigned truck company functions even if a truck, squad, or rescue has been assigned. In departments that run off strict departmentwide SOPs and these types of operational changes must occur at the department level, the CO should become involved in that process because COs are generally closest to what is happening “on the street.”
Another option is to equip an engine with saws, additional forcible entry tools, and possibly an extra ground ladder by removing the hard suction and replacing it with a ladder bracket. This conversion was done quite successfully in one of my previous volunteer departments; that apparatus operated as the first-in “truck” on many residential and commercial structure fires. One advantage was that if the apparatus was not needed for truck operations, it still carried its full complement of supply and attack hose and most of its engine company equipment; it could still perform quite well in that role or function as a supply pumper at a hydrant, if needed. Regardless of what option is selected, truck work must be performed at these incidents. In many places, as mentioned earlier, this may necessitate the use of automatic aid on the initial alarm.
One of the most difficult tasks to perform without dedicated personnel is vertical ventilation; it can be personnel intensive and time sensitive. This will be especially difficult if a committed company, such as a truck or a squad, is not dedicated to the operation. Because of this, horizontal ventilation, which, in many cases, can be initiated quickly by a single member, may be the only option. Given this situation, the IC must understand the effects that vertical ventilation will have on fire conditions in the open floor plan of a small- or medium-sized box store. In departments without a truck, the engine CO should ensure that his crew can perform this task if it is assigned.
Another function typically performed by dedicated truck companies is victim search and rescue. The initial IC on arrival must immediately determine the occupancy status of the building and the need for conducting search operations. Although, generally, the employees will be able to account for the staff, it will be far more difficult to determine the status of customers. The reality is that searching a 9,000- to 20,000-square-foot box store will pose a difficult, if not impossible, task for a department responding with limited staffing under even light or moderate smoke conditions. It may be necessary for the command staff to use a targeted limited-area search approach, which concentrates the search effort to the immediate areas of doors and other egress points, generally using TICs and search ropes. Again, it is critical that engine company members are trained to perform effective search operations to the standards dictated by their COs.
9. Thou Shalt Not Leave Thy Members Without Rapid Intervention.
A critical and often overlooked consideration is the designation of a RIT, which, in some places, may be a role that will have to be performed by an engine company. The sad fact is that in many departments, RITs are often not established at commercial building fire incidents for a variety of reasons. Establishing these teams can be a significant challenge for departments operating with limited resources, but it should be a priority when operating at all structural incidents. In many cases, you will have to add companies or departments preassigned to the role of rapid intervention on the first alarm. When establishing the RIT early in the incident is an issue, all members of the first-alarm companies should receive beefed-up training on identifying hostile fire behavior warning signs, self-contained breathing apparatus emergencies, situational awareness, Mayday procedures, and self-rescue techniques because no dedicated resources will be on scene to enter and perform the rescue.
10. Thou Shalt Train, Train, and Train Some More.
This article has presented much of the training required for effective and safe operations at fires in these types of occupancies. Unfortunately, there are departments of all types covering commercial buildings such as small- and medium-sized box stores that do not deliver relevant and effective classroom and hands-on practical training for responding to these buildings.
This issue must be addressed at the highest levels of the department. The chief officers set the pace for the department and are responsible for driving the training program in a direction that ensures effective operations and member safety. However, when the rubber meets the road, it is often the COs who deliver the training and enforce performance standards. They should be familiar with the expectations of the department and deliver training according to department protocols and standards.
Commercial building-targeted training should be conducted at least 12 to 14 times per year in full-time departments and eight to 10 times per year in volunteer departments (assuming one training night per week), depending on the variety of commercial structures within the department’s response area. This may seem excessive when compared to the number of commercial building fires most departments experience, but this frequency is critical in building and maintaining the little-used knowledge and skills associated with these structures. Depending on the flexibility given the COs, they may be able to schedule training even more often in areas with a heavy commercial fire load.
This training should be cognitive and manipulative and should cover all aspects of commercial building construction, fire behavior, size-up, hoseline selection, stretch estimation, forcible entry, fire attack, large-area search, ventilation and suppression, and sprinkler operations. Because of the size of these structures, interior members should also receive continuing self-rescue, firefighter survival, and rapid intervention training.
Relevant command-level training must be delivered to chief officers, COs, and those who may ride as acting officers through lectures, video-based scenarios, or tabletop training sessions on topics such as incident command, incident size-up, and department communication procedures. This training must accurately reflect the real-life fire behavior and building performance of these structures and, just as importantly, must take into account the realistic performance capabilities of the department’s members and apparatus.
As we have discussed, effectively attacking fires in small- and medium-sized box stores with limited personnel takes planning, training, and having the right size attack hose and nozzles on the apparatus in the right places. COs will typically be responsible for making this happen.
It also may necessitate a change in organizational culture, as well as gentle persuasion by the department’s leadership to win the members over or, in some cases, the members acting to win the leadership over to new hose loads, nozzles, and tactics. The CO will have a tremendous impact on ensuring this change in culture is delivered to drivers and backstep firefighters.
Although these fires represent challenges, many of the issues can be overcome through an understanding of the change occurring in the nature and behavior of these fires. This includes a realistic assessment of the additional resources needed, including the use of increased first-alarm and automatic mutual-aid assignments. In addition, the department leadership must be willing to implement the training required to use any new strategies and tactics.
In many places, the structure for this change already exists. To successfully operate at these complex and personnel-intensive incidents, the organization will have to embrace the new nature of these fires and respond with a new respect for today’s fires in small- and medium-sized box stores.
ROBERT CALLAHAN has been in the fire service for almost 40 years. He is the fire prevention officer and a captain with Bossier Parish (LA) Fire District 1 and the training officer and a captain with Webster Parish (LA) Fire District 7. He is the former assistant chief with Webster Parish (LA) Fire District 3. He is an adjunct instructor with the Louisiana State University Fire Training Institute, a contract instructor with the National Fire Academy, and a district representative for the Firefighters Cancer Support Network. He has instructed at conferences throughout Louisiana, including at the Louisiana Arson and Fire Prevention Association Conference, the LSU-FETI Officer Conference, the LSU-FETI Municipal School, the Louisiana Fire Chiefs Association Annual Conference, and the F.O.O.L.S. Brothers of the Boot events.
