By Dane Carley and Craig Nelson
Part 1 of 4
Have you ever watched something unfold over a long time that gave you the feeling you could predict the outcome? Perhaps your gut gave you some of the reasons why it happened, but it was not a directly measurable event? Many things that involve human behavior seem to fall into this category. The following example, because it involves human behavior, is one of those evolutions that seems to have happened to the fire service over the last 20 years or so.
In 1990, crews from the Orange County (CA) Fire Department responded to a reported brush fire in a park between the 91 Freeway and the Santa Ana River in the very southeast corner of Yorba Linda. The first-due station was Fire Station #32, which was about 10 miles away. The crew hopped into the back of E332; an old California Department of Forestry Model 5 Type III-style engine, and headed toward the reported fire. The old engine couldn’t match the speed of the cars on the 91 freeway but the department was doing what it did best–providing a service to the community with firefighters ready to kick some butt.
The exact details of the weather that day are gone, but it was not particularly conducive to rapid fire growth. The exact details of the initial assignment are also gone because this was many years ago and memories are imperfect, but the initial assignment, all running lights and sirens, for that fire was approximately:
- Two Type III engine strike teams
- Two Type I engine strike teams
- Two dozers and their swamper crews (a semi with a dozer loaded on a low boy maneuvering through traffic with lights and sirens is an awesome sight!)
- A safety officer
- A division chief
- A helicopter
The crews arrived to find…a small smoldering slash pile that crews extinguished by spreading the pile out. They did not even need water. Ten engines; five battalion chiefs; a division chief; two dozers and two swamper crews; and, a helicopter were en route to a small smoldering slash pile.
RELATED: Operational Resilience
Dane was part of the E332 crew and was new to the fire service then. Not long after, he asked a battalion chief whom he considered a mentor, Mike McCoy, why the department dispatched so many resources to such a small fire. His answer taught Dane an important lesson.
He said, “Did you or I know it was only a smoldering slash pile when we were dispatched?”
“No, we didn’t know until E332 arrived on scene and described it,” Dane replied.
“We never know for sure what we are responding to. We leave the station preparing for the worst while hoping for the best.”
McCoy went on to say we should assume an activated fire alarm is a working fire but hope it is only a faulty detector. We assume that the traffic accident will require extrication but hope the occupants are out and walking. We assume that the chest pain call will be a full arrest by the time we arrive, but hope it is heartburn. This is because we can always reduce our readiness and return unneeded apparatus, but we cannot as easily catch up to an incident’s needs once we fall behind–mentally or with resources. Hence, we respond mentally and with adequate resources for the worst-case scenario because then everything else will be easier. That is, in large part, because the public expects us to be prepared to deal with the worst-case scenario even if it is “only” a smoldering slash pile.
This is the lesson our fire service predecessors learned and this is the frame of mind that caused some people to consider the fire service a higher reliability organization. This type of preparation for the worst-case scenario was a form of higher reliability organizing that showed a preoccupation with failure and a commitment to resilience as described by Weick and Sutcliffe . Why is a story from 1990 relevant to today’s fire service operations?
A story like this is relevant because today’s fire service culture seems to be changing; it provides an illustrative starting point for this long-term observation. While many of the changes are positive, one is contrary to remaining a higher reliability organization – the current frame of mind that a fire department can operate in all aspects the same way as a profit-driven business that becomes increasingly attractive to shareholders and investors as it becomes more efficient. A fire department’s “shareholders and investors” are the community members to which we respond when they dial 911. Those community members hold public safety agencies to different expectations than a private, for-profit company. It is true that a fire department can learn a lot from private business operations, but there are limits to the concept’s application.
It is also true that the fire service needs to use its limited and valuable resources in those areas with the most to gain. In most cities, only about 0.1 percent of the population has the training and equipment to respond to emergencies like fires; hazardous materials and technical rescue incidents; emergency medical calls; and, many more. Therefore, fire departments should attempt to become more efficient by using data to identify areas where there is room for improvement and use that small percentage of the population most effectively to achieve an outcome. For example, data showing an increasing trend of cooking fires among college-age students near a college campus indicates that stronger public education aimed at college-aged students who live off campus should be conducted in conjunction with the college. This example uses data to improve an outcome.
Public education, in this case, makes the fire department more efficient by spending limited resources on a fire prevention effort that can be scheduled at the department’s convenience. This outreach will reduce the number of apparatus responses. This, in turn, means a higher apparatus availability rate for other emergencies; fewer hours on vehicles, which lowers maintenance and fuel costs; a decreased exposure to accidents and injuries while responding; and most importantly, fewer opportunities for injuries to citizens and firefighters and property loss. In this instance, the fire department has used business practices to identify a need using data then focused its outputs (personnel for public education) on an effective method to reduce the department’s need for inputs (tax revenue to support emergency responses) while improving the outcome for those who live in the community. The fire department has operated effectively because it reduced demand, decreased costs, and improved outcomes.
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Craig Nelson works for the Fargo (ND) Fire Department and works part-time at Minnesota State Community and Technical College – Moorhead as a fire instructor. He also works seasonally for the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources as a wildland firefighter in Northwest Minnesota. Previously, he was an airline pilot. He has a bachelor’s degree in business administration and a master’s degree in executive fire service leadership.
Dane Carley entered the fire service in 1989 in southern California and is currently a captain for the Fargo (ND) Fire Department. Since then, he has worked in structural, wildland-urban interface, and wildland firefighting in capacities ranging from fire explorer to career captain. He has both a bachelor’s degree in fire and safety engineering technology, and a master’s degree in public safety executive leadership. Dane also serves as both an operations section chief and a planning section chief for North Dakota’s Type III Incident Management Assistance Team, which provides support to local jurisdictions overwhelmed by the magnitude of an incident.
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